Next it would seem proper to discuss Magnificence,1 for this also appears to be a virtue concerned with wealth. It does not however, like Liberality, extend to all actions dealing with wealth, but only refers to the spending of wealth; and in this sphere it surpasses Liberality in point of magnitude, for, as its name itself implies, it consists in suitable expenditure on a great scale. But this greatness of scale is relative. An amount of outlay that would be great for a person fitting out a galley for the navy would not be great for one equipping a state pilgrimage. The suitability of the expenditure therefore is relative to the spender himself, and to the occasion or object. At the same time the term magnificent is not applied to one who spends adequate sums on objects of only small or moderate importance, like the man who said “Oft gave I alms to homeless wayfarers”2; it denotes someone who spends suitably on great objects. For though the magnificent man is liberal, the liberal man is not necessarily magnificent. The defect corresponding to the magnificent disposition is called Paltriness, and the excess Vulgarity, Want of Taste or the like. The latter vices do not exceed by spending too great an amount on proper objects, but by making a great display on the wrong occasions and in the wrong way. We will however speak of them later.3 The magnificent man is an artist in expenditure: he can discern what is suitable, and spend great sums with good taste. 1122b(For as we said at the outset,4 a disposition is defined by the activities in which it is displayed, and by the objects to which it is related.) So the magnificent man’s expenditure is suitable as well as great. And consequently the objects he produces must also be great and suitable; for so only will a great expenditure be suitable [to the result5] as well. Hence, as the object produced must be worthy of the expenditure, so also must the expenditure be worthy of or even exceed the object produced. Again, the motive of the munificent man in such expenditure will be the nobility of the action, this motive being characteristic of all the virtues. Moreover he will spend gladly and lavishly, since nice calculation is shabby; and he will think how he can carry out his project most nobly and splendidly, rather than how much it will cost and how it can be done most cheaply. The magnificent man will therefore necessarily be also a liberal man. For the liberal man too will spend the right amount in the right manner; and it is in the amount and manner of his expenditure that the element “great” in the magnificent or “greatly splendid”6 man, that is to say his greatness, is shown, these being the things in which Liberality is displayed. And the magnificent man from an equal outlay will achieve a more magnificent result7; for the same standard of excellence does not apply to an achievement as to a possession: with possessions the thing worth the highest price is the most honored, for instance gold, but the achievement most honored is one that is great and noble (since a great achievement arouses the admiration of the spectator, and the quality of causing admiration belongs to magnificence); and excellence in an achievement involves greatness. Now there are some forms of expenditure definitely entitled honorable, for instance expenditure on the service of the gods— votive offerings, public buildings, sacrifices—and the offices of religion generally; and those public benefactions which are favorite objects of ambition, for instance the duty, as it is esteemed in certain states, of equipping a chorus splendidly or fitting out a ship of war, or even of giving a banquet to the public. But in all these matters, as has been said, the scale of expenditure must be judged with reference to the person spending, that is, to his position and his resources; for expenditure should be proportionate to means, and suitable not only to the occasion but to the giver. Hence a poor man cannot be magnificent, since he has not the means to make a great outlay suitably; the poor man who attempts Magnificence is foolish, for he spends out of proportion to his means, and beyond what he ought, whereas an act displays virtue only when it is done in the right way. But great public benefactions are suitable for those who have adequate resources derived from their own exertions or from their ancestors or connections, and for the high-born and famous and the like, since birth, fame and so on all have an element of greatness and distinction. The magnificent man therefore is especially of this sort, and Magnificence mostly finds an outlet in these public benefactions, as we have said, since these are the greatest forms of expenditure and the ones most honored. But Magnificence is also shown on those private occasions for expenditure which only happen once, 1123afor instance, a wedding or the like, and which arouse the interest of the general public, or of people of position; and also in welcoming foreign guests and in celebrating their departure, and in the complimentary interchange of presents; for the magnificent man does not spend money on himself but on public objects, and his gifts have some resemblance to votive offerings. It is also characteristic of the magnificent man to furnish his house in a manner suitable to his wealth, since a fine house is a sort of distinction; and to prefer spending on permanent objects, because these are the most noble; and to spend an amount that is appropriate to the particular occasion, for the same gifts are not suitable for the gods and for men, and the same expenditure is not appropriate to a sacrifice and a funeral. In fact, inasmuch as the greatness of any form of expenditure varies with its particular kind, and, although the most magnificent expenditure absolutely is great expenditure on a great object, the most magnificent in a particular case is the amount that is great in that case, and since the greatness of the result achieved is not the same as the greatness of the expenditure (for the finest ball or oil-flask does not cost much or involve a very liberal outlay, though it makes a magnificent present in the case of a child), it follows that it is the mark of the magnificent man, in expenditure of whatever kind, to produce a magnificent result (for that is a standard not easily exceeded), and a result proportionate to the cost. Such then is the character of the magnificent man. His counterpart on the side of excess, the vulgar man, exceeds, as has been said, by spending beyond what is right. He spends a great deal and makes a tasteless display on unimportant occasions: for instance, he gives a dinner to his club on the scale of a wedding banquet, and when equipping a chorus at the comedies he brings it on in purple at its first entrance, as is done at Megara.8 Moreover, he does all this not from a noble motive but to show off his wealth, and with the idea that this sort of thing makes people admire him; and he spends little where he ought to spend much and much where he ought to spend little. The paltry man on the other hand will err on the side of deficiency in everything; even when he is spending a great deal, he will spoil the effect for a trifle, and by hesitating at every stage and considering how he can spend least, and even so grudging what he spends and always thinking he is doing things on a greater scale than is necessary. These dispositions then are vices, but they do not bring serious discredit, since they are not injurious to others, nor are they excessively unseemly.
Greatness of Soul,9 as the word itself implies, seems to be related to great objects; let us first ascertain what sort of objects these are. 1123bIt will make no difference whether we examine the quality itself or the person that displays the quality. Now a person is thought to be great-souled if he claims much and deserves much; he who claims much without deserving it is foolish, but no one of moral excellence is foolish or senseless. The great-souled man is then as we have described. He who deserves little and claims little is modest or temperate, but not great-souled, since to be great-souled involves greatness just as handsomeness involves size: small people may be neat and well-made, but not handsome. He that claims much but does not deserve much is vain; though not everybody who claims more than he deserves is vain.10 He that claims less than he deserves is small-souled, whether his deserts be great or only moderate, or even though he deserves little, if he claims still less. The most small-souled of all would seem to be the man who claims less than he deserves when his deserts are great; for what would he have done had he not deserved so much? Though therefore in regard to the greatness of his claim the great-souled man is an extreme,11 by reason of its rightness he stands at the mean point, for he claims what he deserves; while the vain and the small-souled err by excess and defect respectively. If then the great-souled man claims and is worthy of great things and most of all the greatest things, Greatness of Soul must be concerned with some one object especially. “Worthy” is a term of relation: it denotes having a claim to goods external to oneself. Now the greatest external good we should assume to be the thing which we offer as a tribute to the gods, and which is most coveted by men of high station, and is the prize awarded for the noblest deeds; and such a thing is honor, for honor is clearly the greatest of external goods. Therefore the great-souled man is he who has the right disposition in relation to honors and disgraces. And even without argument it is evident that honor is the object with which the great-souled are concerned, since it is honor above all else which great men claim and deserve. The small-souled man12 falls short both as judged by his own deserts and in comparison with the claim of the great-souled man; the vain man on the other hand exceeds as judged by his own standard, but does not however exceed the great-souled man.13 And inasmuch as the great-souled man deserves most, he must be the best of men; for the better a man is the more he deserves, and he that is best deserves most. Therefore the truly great-souled man must be a good man. Indeed greatness in each of the virtues would seem to go with greatness of soul. For instance, one cannot imagine the great-souled man running at full speed when retreating in battle,14 nor acting dishonestly; since what motive for base conduct has a man to whom nothing is great?15 Considering all the virtues in turn, we shall feel it quite ridiculous to picture the great-souled man as other than a good man. Moreover, if he were bad, he would not be worthy of honor, since honor is the prize of virtue, and the tribute that we pay to the good. 1124aGreatness of Soul seems therefore to be as it were a crowning ornament of the virtues: it enhances their greatness, and it cannot exist without them. Hence it is hard to be truly great souled,16 for greatness of soul is impossible without moral nobility. Honor and dishonor then are the objects with which the great-souled man is especially concerned. Great honors accorded by persons of worth will afford him pleasure in a moderate degree: he will feel he is receiving only what belongs to him, or even less, for no honor can be adequate to the merits of perfect virtue, yet all the same he will deign to accept their honors, because they have no greater tribute to offer him. Honor rendered by common people and on trivial grounds he will utterly despise, for this is not what he merits. He will also despise dishonor, for no dishonor can justly attach to him. The great-souled man then, as has been said, is especially concerned with honor; but he will also observe due measure in respect to wealth, power, and good and bad fortune in general, as they may befall him; he will not rejoice overmuch in prosperity, nor grieve overmuch at adversity. For he does not care much even about honor, which is the greatest of external goods17 (since power and wealth are desirable only for the honor they bring, at least their possessors wish to be honored for their sake); he therefore to whom even honor is a small thing will be indifferent to other things as well. Hence great-souled men are thought to be haughty. But it is thought that the gifts of fortune also conduce to greatness of soul; for the high-born and those who are powerful or wealthy are esteemed worthy of honor, because they are superior to their fellows, and that which is superior in something good is always held in higher honor; so that even these gifts of fortune make men more great-souled, because their possessors are honored by some people. But in reality only the good man ought to be honored, although he that has both virtue and fortune is esteemed still more worthy of honor; whereas those who possess the goods of fortune without virtue are not justified in claiming high worth, and cannot correctly be styled great-souled, since true worth and greatness of soul cannot exist without complete virtue. It is true that even those who merely possess the goods of fortune may be haughty and insolent; because without virtue it is not easy to bear good fortune becomingly, 1124band such men, being unable to carry their prosperity, and thinking themselves superior to the rest of mankind, despise other people, although their own conduct is no better than another’s. The fact is that they try to imitate the great-souled man without being really like him, and only copy him in what they can, reproducing his contempt for others but not his virtuous conduct. For the great-souled man is justified in despising other people—his estimates are correct; but most proud men have no good ground for their pride. The great-souled man does not run into danger for trifling reasons, and is not a lover of danger, because there are few things he values; but he will face danger in a great cause, and when so doing will be ready to sacrifice his life, since he holds that life is not worth having at every price. He is fond of conferring benefits, but ashamed to receive them, because the former is a mark of superiority and the latter of inferiority. He returns a service done to him with interest, since this will put the original benefactor into his debt in turn, and make him the party benefited. The great-souled are thought to have a good memory for any benefit they have conferred, but a bad memory for those which they have received (since the recipient of a benefit is the inferior of his benefactor, whereas they desire to be superior); and to enjoy being reminded of the former but to dislike being reminded of the latter: this is why the poet makes Thetis18 not specify her services to Zeus; nor did the Spartans treating with the Athenians19 recall the occasions when Sparta had aided Athens, but those on which Athens had aided Sparta. It is also characteristic of the great-souled man never to ask help from others, or only with reluctance, but to render aid willingly; and to be haughty towards men of position and fortune, but courteous towards those of moderate station, because it is difficult and distinguished to be superior to the great, but easy to outdo the lowly, and to adopt a high manner with the former is not ill-bred, but it is vulgar to lord it over humble people: it is like putting forth one’s strength against the weak. He will not compete for the common objects of ambition, or go where other people take the first place; and he will be idle and slow to act, except when pursuing some high honor or achievement; and will not engage in many undertakings, but only in such as are important and distinguished. He must be open both in love and in hate, since concealment shows timidity; and care more for the truth than for what people will think; and speak and act openly, since as he despises other men he is outspoken and frank, except when speaking with ironical self-depreciation,20 as he does to common people. He will be incapable of living at the will of another, unless a friend, 1125asince to do so is slavish, and hence flatterers are always servile, and humble people flatterers. He is not prone to admiration, since nothing is great to him. He does not bear a grudge, for it is not a mark of greatness of soul to recall things against people, especially the wrongs they have done you, but rather to overlook them. He is no gossip, for he will not talk either about himself or about another, as he neither wants to receive compliments nor to hear other people run down (nor is he lavish of praise either); and so he is not given to speaking evil himself, even of his enemies, except when he deliberately intends to give offence. In troubles that cannot be avoided or trifling mishaps he will never cry out or ask for help, since to do so would imply that he took them to heart. He likes to own beautiful and useless things, rather than useful things that bring in a return, since the former show his independence more. Other traits generally attributed to the great-souled man are a slow gait, a deep voice, and a deliberate utterance; to speak in shrill tones and walk fast denotes an excitable and nervous temperament, which does not belong to one who cares for few things and thinks nothing great. Such then being the Great-souled man, the corresponding character on the side of deficiency is the Small-souled man, and on that of excess the Vain man. These also21 are not thought to be actually vicious, since they do no harm, but rather mistaken. The small-souled man deprives himself of the good things that he deserves; and his failure to claim good things makes it seem that he has something bad about him [and also that he does not know himself],22 for (people argue), if he deserved any good, he would try to obtain it. Not that such persons are considered foolish, but rather too retiring; yet this estimate of them is thought to make them still worse, for men’s ambitions show what they are worth, and if they hold aloof from noble enterprises and pursuits, and for go the good things of life, presumably they think they are not worthy of them. The vain on the other hand are foolish persons, who are deficient in self-knowledge and expose their defect: they undertake honorable responsibilities of which they are not worthy, and then are found out. They are ostentatious in dress, manner and so on. They want people to know how well off they are, and talk about it,23 imagining that this will make them respected. Smallness of Soul is more opposed than Vanity to Greatness of Soul, being both more prevalent and worse. Greatness of Soul then, as we have said, is concerned with great honors.
(For as we said at the outset, a disposition is defined by the activities in which it is displayed, and by the objects to which it is related.) So the magnificent man’s expenditure is suitable as well as great. And consequently the objects he produces must also be great and suitable; for so only will a great expenditure be suitable [to the result] as well. Hence, as the object produced must be worthy of the expenditure, so also must the expenditure be worthy of or even exceed the object produced. Again, the motive of the munificent man in such expenditure will be the nobility of the action, this motive being characteristic of all the virtues. Moreover he will spend gladly and lavishly, since nice calculation is shabby; and he will think how he can carry out his project most nobly and splendidly, rather than how much it will cost and how it can be done most cheaply. The magnificent man will therefore necessarily be also a liberal man. For the liberal man too will spend the right amount in the right manner; and it is in the amount and manner of his expenditure that the element “great” in the magnificent or “greatly splendid” man, that is to say his greatness, is shown, these being the things in which Liberality is displayed. And the magnificent man from an equal outlay will achieve a more magnificent result; for the same standard of excellence does not apply to an achievement as to a possession: with possessions the thing worth the highest price is the most honored, for instance gold, but the achievement most honored is one that is great and noble (since a great achievement arouses the admiration of the spectator, and the quality of causing admiration belongs to magnificence); and excellence in an achievement involves greatness. Now there are some forms of expenditure definitely entitled honorable, for instance expenditure on the service of the gods— votive offerings, public buildings, sacrifices—and the offices of religion generally; and those public benefactions which are favorite objects of ambition, for instance the duty, as it is esteemed in certain states, of equipping a chorus splendidly or fitting out a ship of war, or even of giving a banquet to the public. But in all these matters, as has been said, the scale of expenditure must be judged with reference to the person spending, that is, to his position and his resources; for expenditure should be proportionate to means, and suitable not only to the occasion but to the giver. Hence a poor man cannot be magnificent, since he has not the means to make a great outlay suitably; the poor man who attempts Magnificence is foolish, for he spends out of proportion to his means, and beyond what he ought, whereas an act displays virtue only when it is done in the right way. But great public benefactions are suitable for those who have adequate resources derived from their own exertions or from their ancestors or connections, and for the high-born and famous and the like, since birth, fame and so on all have an element of greatness and distinction. The magnificent man therefore is especially of this sort, and Magnificence mostly finds an outlet in these public benefactions, as we have said, since these are the greatest forms of expenditure and the ones most honored. But Magnificence is also shown on those private occasions for expenditure which only happen once,
ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴπομεν, ἡ ἕξις ταῖς ἐνεργείαις ὁρίζεται, καὶ ὧν ἐστίν. αἱ δὴ τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς δαπάναι μεγάλαι καὶ πρέπουσαι. τοιαῦτα δὴ καὶ τὰ ἔργα· οὕτω γὰρ ἔσται μέγα δαπάνημα καὶ πρέπον τῷ ἔργῳ. ὥστε τὸ μὲν ἔργον τῆς δαπάνης ἄξιον δεῖ εἶναι, τὴν δὲ δαπάνην τοῦ ἔργου, ἢ καὶ ὑπερβάλλειν. δαπανήσει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὁ μεγαλοπρεπὴς τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα· κοινὸν γὰρ τοῦτο ταῖς ἀρεταῖς. καὶ ἔτι ἡδέως καὶ προετικῶς· ἡ γὰρ ἀκριβολογία μικροπρεπές. καὶ πῶς κάλλιστον καὶ πρεπωδέστατον, σκέψαιτʼ ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ πόσου καὶ πῶς ἐλαχίστου. ἀναγκαῖον δὴ καὶ ἐλευθέριον τὸν μεγαλοπρεπῆ εἶναι. καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἐλευθέριος δαπανήσει ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ· ἐν τούτοις δὲ τὸ μέγα τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς, οἷον μέγεθος, περὶ ταῦτα τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος οὔσης, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης δαπάνης τὸ ἔργον ποιήσει μεγαλοπρεπέστερον. οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ κτήματος καὶ ἔργου. κτῆμα μὲν γὰρ τὸ πλείστου ἄξιον τιμιώτατον, οἷον χρυσός, ἔργον δὲ τὸ μέγα καὶ καλόν (τοῦ γὰρ τοιούτου ἡ θεωρία θαυμαστή, τὸ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπὲς θαυμαστόν)· καὶ ἔστιν ἔργου ἀρετή, μεγαλοπρέπεια, ἐν μεγέθει. ἔστι δὲ τῶν δαπανημάτων οἷα λέγομεν τὰ τίμια, οἷον τὰ περὶ θεούς, ἀναθήματα καὶ κατασκευαὶ καὶ θυσίαι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον, καὶ ὅσα πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν εὐφιλοτίμητά ἐστιν, οἷον εἴ που χορηγεῖν οἴονται δεῖν λαμπρῶς ἢ τριηραρχεῖν ἢ καὶ ἑστιᾶν τὴν πόλιν. ἐν ἅπασι δʼ ὥσπερ εἴρηται, καὶ πρὸς τὸν πράττοντα ἀναφέρεται τὸ τίς ὢν καὶ τίνων ὑπαρχόντων· ἄξια γὰρ δεῖ τούτων εἶναι, καὶ μὴ μόνον τῷ ἔργῳ ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ ποιοῦντι πρέπειν. διὸ πένης μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη μεγαλοπρεπής· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀφʼ ὧν πολλὰ δαπανήσει πρεπόντως· ὁ δʼ ἐπιχειρῶν ἠλίθιος· παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν γὰρ καὶ τὸ δέον, κατʼ ἀρετὴν δὲ τὸ ὀρθῶς. πρέπει δὲ οἷς τοιαῦτα προϋπάρχει διʼ αὐτῶν ἢ τῶν προγόνων ἢ ὧν αὐτοῖς μέτεστιν, καὶ τοῖς εὐγενέσι καὶ τοῖς ἐνδόξοις καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα μέγεθος ἔχει καὶ ἀξίωμα. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν τοιοῦτος ὁ μεγαλοπρεπής, καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις δαπανήμασιν ἡ μεγαλοπρέπεια, ὥσπερ εἴρηται· μέγιστα γὰρ καὶ ἐντιμότατα· τῶν δὲ ἰδίων ὅσα εἰσάπαξ γίνεται,
for instance, a wedding or the like, and which arouse the interest of the general public, or of people of position; and also in welcoming foreign guests and in celebrating their departure, and in the complimentary interchange of presents; for the magnificent man does not spend money on himself but on public objects, and his gifts have some resemblance to votive offerings. It is also characteristic of the magnificent man to furnish his house in a manner suitable to his wealth, since a fine house is a sort of distinction; and to prefer spending on permanent objects, because these are the most noble; and to spend an amount that is appropriate to the particular occasion, for the same gifts are not suitable for the gods and for men, and the same expenditure is not appropriate to a sacrifice and a funeral. In fact, inasmuch as the greatness of any form of expenditure varies with its particular kind, and, although the most magnificent expenditure absolutely is great expenditure on a great object, the most magnificent in a particular case is the amount that is great in that case, and since the greatness of the result achieved is not the same as the greatness of the expenditure (for the finest ball or oil-flask does not cost much or involve a very liberal outlay, though it makes a magnificent present in the case of a child), it follows that it is the mark of the magnificent man, in expenditure of whatever kind, to produce a magnificent result (for that is a standard not easily exceeded), and a result proportionate to the cost. Such then is the character of the magnificent man. His counterpart on the side of excess, the vulgar man, exceeds, as has been said, by spending beyond what is right. He spends a great deal and makes a tasteless display on unimportant occasions: for instance, he gives a dinner to his club on the scale of a wedding banquet, and when equipping a chorus at the comedies he brings it on in purple at its first entrance, as is done at Megara. Moreover, he does all this not from a noble motive but to show off his wealth, and with the idea that this sort of thing makes people admire him; and he spends little where he ought to spend much and much where he ought to spend little. The paltry man on the other hand will err on the side of deficiency in everything; even when he is spending a great deal, he will spoil the effect for a trifle, and by hesitating at every stage and considering how he can spend least, and even so grudging what he spends and always thinking he is doing things on a greater scale than is necessary. These dispositions then are vices, but they do not bring serious discredit, since they are not injurious to others, nor are they excessively unseemly.
Greatness of Soul, as the word itself implies, seems to be related to great objects; let us first ascertain what sort of objects these are.
οἷον γάμος καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον, καὶ εἰ περί τι ἡ πᾶσα πόλις σπουδάζει ἢ οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι, καὶ περὶ ξένων δὲ ὑποδοχὰς καὶ ἀποστολάς, καὶ δωρεὰς καὶ ἀντιδωρεάς· οὐ γὰρ εἰς ἑαυτὸν δαπανηρὸς ὁ μεγαλοπρεπὴς ἀλλʼ εἰς τὰ κοινά, τὰ δὲ δῶρα τοῖς ἀναθήμασιν ἔχει τι ὅμοιον. μεγαλοπρεποῦς δὲ καὶ οἶκον κατασκευάσασθαι πρεπόντως τῷ πλούτῳ (κόσμος γάρ τις καὶ οὗτος), καὶ περὶ ταῦτα μᾶλλον δαπανᾶν ὅσα πολυχρόνια τῶν ἔργων (κάλλιστα γὰρ ταῦτα), καὶ ἐν ἑκάστοις τὸ πρέπον· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὰ ἁρμόζει θεοῖς καὶ ἀνθρώποις, οὐδʼ ἐν ἱερῷ καὶ τάφῳ. καὶ ἐπεὶ τῶν δαπανημάτων ἕκαστον μέγα ἐν τῷ γένει, καὶ μεγαλοπρεπέστατον ἁπλῶς μὲν τὸ ἐν μεγάλῳ μέγα, ἐνταῦθα δὲ τὸ ἐν τούτοις μέγα, καὶ διαφέρει τὸ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ μέγα τοῦ ἐν τῷ δαπανήματι· σφαῖρα μὲν γὰρ ἡ καλλίστη ἢ λήκυθος μεγαλοπρέπειαν ἔχει παιδικοῦ δώρου, ἡ δὲ τούτου τιμὴ μικρὸν καὶ ἀνελεύθερον· διὰ τοῦτό ἐστι τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς, ἐν ᾧ ἂν ποιῇ γένει, μεγαλοπρεπῶς ποιεῖν (τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτον οὐκ εὐυπέρβλητον) καὶ ἔχον κατʼ ἀξίαν τοῦ δαπανήματος. τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν ὁ μεγαλοπρεπής· ὁ δʼ ὑπερβάλλων καὶ βάναυσος τῷ παρὰ τὸ δέον ἀναλίσκειν ὑπερβάλλει, ὥσπερ εἴρηται. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς μικροῖς τῶν δαπανημάτων πολλὰ ἀναλίσκει καὶ λαμπρύνεται παρὰ μέλος, οἷον ἐρανιστὰς γαμικῶς ἑστιῶν, καὶ κωμῳδοῖς χορηγῶν ἐν τῇ παρόδῳ πορφύραν εἰσφέρων, ὥσπερ οἱ Μεγαροῖ. καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ποιήσει οὐ τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα, ἀλλὰ τὸν πλοῦτον ἐπιδεικνύμενος, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα οἰόμενος θαυμάζεσθαι, καὶ οὗ μὲν δεῖ πολλὰ ἀναλῶσαι, ὀλίγα δαπανῶν, οὗ δʼ ὀλίγα, πολλά. ὁ δὲ μικροπρεπὴς περὶ πάντα ἐλλείψει, καὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἀναλώσας ἐν μικρῷ τὸ καλὸν ἀπολεῖ, καὶ ὅ τι ἂν ποιῇ μέλλων καὶ σκοπῶν πῶς ἂν ἐλάχιστον ἀναλώσαι, καὶ ταῦτʼ ὀδυρόμενος, καὶ πάντʼ οἰόμενος μείζω ποιεῖν ἢ δεῖ. εἰσὶ μὲν οὖν αἱ ἕξεις αὗται κακίαι, οὐ μὴν ὀνείδη γʼ ἐπιφέρουσι διὰ τὸ μήτε βλαβεραὶ τῷ πέλας εἶναι μήτε λίαν ἀσχήμονες.
ἡ δὲ μεγαλοψυχία περὶ μεγάλα μὲν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὀνόματος ἔοικεν εἶναι, περὶ ποῖα δʼ ἐστὶ πρῶτον λάβωμεν·
It will make no difference whether we examine the quality itself or the person that displays the quality. Now a person is thought to be great-souled if he claims much and deserves much; he who claims much without deserving it is foolish, but no one of moral excellence is foolish or senseless. The great-souled man is then as we have described. He who deserves little and claims little is modest or temperate, but not great-souled, since to be great-souled involves greatness just as handsomeness involves size: small people may be neat and well-made, but not handsome. He that claims much but does not deserve much is vain; though not everybody who claims more than he deserves is vain. He that claims less than he deserves is small-souled, whether his deserts be great or only moderate, or even though he deserves little, if he claims still less. The most small-souled of all would seem to be the man who claims less than he deserves when his deserts are great; for what would he have done had he not deserved so much? Though therefore in regard to the greatness of his claim the great-souled man is an extreme, by reason of its rightness he stands at the mean point, for he claims what he deserves; while the vain and the small-souled err by excess and defect respectively. If then the great-souled man claims and is worthy of great things and most of all the greatest things, Greatness of Soul must be concerned with some one object especially. “Worthy” is a term of relation: it denotes having a claim to goods external to oneself. Now the greatest external good we should assume to be the thing which we offer as a tribute to the gods, and which is most coveted by men of high station, and is the prize awarded for the noblest deeds; and such a thing is honor, for honor is clearly the greatest of external goods. Therefore the great-souled man is he who has the right disposition in relation to honors and disgraces. And even without argument it is evident that honor is the object with which the great-souled are concerned, since it is honor above all else which great men claim and deserve. The small-souled man falls short both as judged by his own deserts and in comparison with the claim of the great-souled man; the vain man on the other hand exceeds as judged by his own standard, but does not however exceed the great-souled man. And inasmuch as the great-souled man deserves most, he must be the best of men; for the better a man is the more he deserves, and he that is best deserves most. Therefore the truly great-souled man must be a good man. Indeed greatness in each of the virtues would seem to go with greatness of soul. For instance, one cannot imagine the great-souled man running at full speed when retreating in battle, nor acting dishonestly; since what motive for base conduct has a man to whom nothing is great? Considering all the virtues in turn, we shall feel it quite ridiculous to picture the great-souled man as other than a good man. Moreover, if he were bad, he would not be worthy of honor, since honor is the prize of virtue, and the tribute that we pay to the good.
διαφέρει δʼ οὐδὲν τὴν ἕξιν ἢ τὸν κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν σκοπεῖν. δοκεῖ δὴ μεγαλόψυχος εἶναι ὁ μεγάλων αὑτὸν ἀξιῶν ἄξιος ὤν· ὁ γὰρ μὴ κατʼ ἀξίαν αὐτὸ ποιῶν ἠλίθιος, τῶν δὲ κατʼ ἀρετὴν οὐδεὶς ἠλίθιος οὐδʼ ἀνόητος. μεγαλόψυχος μὲν οὖν ὁ εἰρημένος. ὁ γὰρ μικρῶν ἄξιος καὶ τούτων ἀξιῶν ἑαυτὸν σώφρων, μεγαλόψυχος δʼ οὔ· ἐν μεγέθει γὰρ ἡ μεγαλοψυχία, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ κάλλος ἐν μεγάλῳ σώματι, οἱ μικροὶ δʼ ἀστεῖοι καὶ σύμμετροι, καλοὶ δʼ οὔ. ὁ δὲ μεγάλων ἑαυτὸν ἀξιῶν ἀνάξιος ὢν χαῦνος· ὁ δὲ μειζόνων ἢ ἄξιος οὐ πᾶς χαῦνος. ὁ δʼ ἐλαττόνων ἢ ἄξιος μικρόψυχος, ἐάν τε μεγάλων ἐάν τε μετρίων, ἐάν τε καὶ μικρῶν ἄξιος ὢν ἔτι ἐλαττόνων αὑτὸν ἀξιοῖ. καὶ μάλιστʼ ἂν δόξειεν ὁ μεγάλων ἄξιος· τί γὰρ ἂν ἐποίει, εἰ μὴ τοσούτων ἦν ἄξιος; ἔστι δὴ ὁ μεγαλόψυχος τῷ μὲν μεγέθει ἄκρος, τῷ δὲ ὡς δεῖ μέσος· τοῦ γὰρ κατʼ ἀξίαν αὑτὸν ἀξιοῖ· οἳ δʼ ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν. εἰ δὴ μεγάλων ἑαυτὸν ἀξιοῖ ἄξιος ὤν, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν μεγίστων, περὶ ἓν μάλιστʼ ἂν εἴη. ἡ δʼ ἀξία λέγεται πρὸς τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά· μέγιστον δὲ τοῦτʼ ἂν θείημεν ὃ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπονέμομεν, καὶ οὗ μάλιστʼ ἐφίενται οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι, καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῖς καλλίστοις ἆθλον· τοιοῦτον δʼ ἡ τιμή· μέγιστον γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν· περὶ τιμὰς δὴ καὶ ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγαλόψυχός ἐστιν ὡς δεῖ. καὶ ἄνευ δὲ λόγου φαίνονται οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι περὶ τιμὴν εἶναι· τιμῆς γὰρ μάλιστα ἀξιοῦσιν ἑαυτούς, κατʼ ἀξίαν δέ. ὁ δὲ μικρόψυχος ἐλλείπει καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ μεγαλοψύχου ἀξίωμα. ὁ δὲ χαῦνος πρὸς ἑαυτὸν μὲν ὑπερβάλλει, οὐ μὴν τόν γε μεγαλόψυχον. ὁ δὲ μεγαλόψυχος, εἴπερ τῶν μεγίστων ἄξιος, ἄριστος ἂν εἴη· μείζονος γὰρ ἀεὶ ὁ βελτίων ἄξιος, καὶ μεγίστων ὁ ἄριστος. τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄρα μεγαλόψυχον δεῖ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι. καὶ δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι μεγαλοψύχου τὸ ἐν ἑκάστῃ ἀρετῇ μέγα. οὐδαμῶς τʼ ἂν ἁρμόζοι μεγαλοψύχῳ φεύγειν παρασείσαντι, οὐδʼ ἀδικεῖν· τίνος γὰρ ἕνεκα πράξει αἰσχρὰ ᾧ γʼ οὐδὲν μέγα; καθʼ ἕκαστα δʼ ἐπισκοποῦντι πάμπαν γελοῖος φαίνοιτʼ ἂν ὁ μεγαλόψυχος μὴ ἀγαθὸς ὤν. οὐκ εἴη δʼ ἂν οὐδὲ τιμῆς ἄξιος φαῦλος ὤν· τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ ἆθλον ἡ τιμή, καὶ ἀπονέμεται τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς.
Greatness of Soul seems therefore to be as it were a crowning ornament of the virtues: it enhances their greatness, and it cannot exist without them. Hence it is hard to be truly great souled, for greatness of soul is impossible without moral nobility. Honor and dishonor then are the objects with which the great-souled man is especially concerned. Great honors accorded by persons of worth will afford him pleasure in a moderate degree: he will feel he is receiving only what belongs to him, or even less, for no honor can be adequate to the merits of perfect virtue, yet all the same he will deign to accept their honors, because they have no greater tribute to offer him. Honor rendered by common people and on trivial grounds he will utterly despise, for this is not what he merits. He will also despise dishonor, for no dishonor can justly attach to him. The great-souled man then, as has been said, is especially concerned with honor; but he will also observe due measure in respect to wealth, power, and good and bad fortune in general, as they may befall him; he will not rejoice overmuch in prosperity, nor grieve overmuch at adversity. For he does not care much even about honor, which is the greatest of external goods (since power and wealth are desirable only for the honor they bring, at least their possessors wish to be honored for their sake); he therefore to whom even honor is a small thing will be indifferent to other things as well. Hence great-souled men are thought to be haughty. But it is thought that the gifts of fortune also conduce to greatness of soul; for the high-born and those who are powerful or wealthy are esteemed worthy of honor, because they are superior to their fellows, and that which is superior in something good is always held in higher honor; so that even these gifts of fortune make men more great-souled, because their possessors are honored by some people. But in reality only the good man ought to be honored, although he that has both virtue and fortune is esteemed still more worthy of honor; whereas those who possess the goods of fortune without virtue are not justified in claiming high worth, and cannot correctly be styled great-souled, since true worth and greatness of soul cannot exist without complete virtue. It is true that even those who merely possess the goods of fortune may be haughty and insolent; because without virtue it is not easy to bear good fortune becomingly,
ἔοικε μὲν οὖν ἡ μεγαλοψυχία οἷον κόσμος τις εἶναι τῶν ἀρετῶν· μείζους γὰρ αὐτὰς ποιεῖ, καὶ οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ ἐκείνων. διὰ τοῦτο χαλεπὸν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μεγαλόψυχον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἄνευ καλοκαγαθίας. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν περὶ τιμὰς καὶ ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγαλόψυχός ἐστι· καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν ταῖς μεγάλαις καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν σπουδαίων μετρίως ἡσθήσεται, ὡς τῶν οἰκείων τυγχάνων ἢ καὶ ἐλαττόνων· ἀρετῆς γὰρ παντελοῦς οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀξία τιμή, οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ ἀποδέξεταί γε τῷ μὴ ἔχειν αὐτοὺς μείζω αὐτῷ ἀπονέμειν· τῆς δὲ παρὰ τῶν τυχόντων καὶ ἐπὶ μικροῖς πάμπαν ὀλιγωρήσει· οὐ γὰρ τούτων ἄξιος· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀτιμίας· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται δικαίως περὶ αὐτόν. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐστίν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ὁ μεγαλόψυχος περὶ τιμάς, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ πλοῦτον καὶ δυναστείαν καὶ πᾶσαν εὐτυχίαν καὶ ἀτυχίαν μετρίως ἕξει, ὅπως ἂν γίνηται, καὶ οὔτʼ εὐτυχῶν περιχαρὴς ἔσται οὔτʼ ἀτυχῶν περίλυπος. οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τιμὴν οὕτως ἔχει ὡς μέγιστον ὄν. αἱ γὰρ δυναστεῖαι καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος διὰ τὴν τιμήν ἐστιν αἱρετά· οἱ γοῦν ἔχοντες αὐτὰ τιμᾶσθαι διʼ αὐτῶν βούλονται· ᾧ δὲ καὶ ἡ τιμὴ μικρόν ἐστι, τούτῳ καὶ τἆλλα. διὸ ὑπερόπται δοκοῦσιν εἶναι. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ εὐτυχήματα συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς μεγαλοψυχίαν. οἱ γὰρ εὐγενεῖς ἀξιοῦνται τιμῆς καὶ οἱ δυναστεύοντες ἢ πλουτοῦντες· ἐν ὑπεροχῇ γάρ, τὸ δʼ ἀγαθῷ ὑπερέχον πᾶν ἐντιμότερον. διὸ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα μεγαλοψυχοτέρους ποιεῖ· τιμῶνται γὰρ ὑπὸ τινῶν· κατʼ ἀλήθειαν δʼ ὁ ἀγαθὸς μόνος τιμητός· ᾧ δʼ ἄμφω ὑπάρχει, μᾶλλον ἀξιοῦται τιμῆς. οἱ δʼ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἔχοντες οὔτε δικαίως ἑαυτοὺς μεγάλων ἀξιοῦσιν οὔτε ὀρθῶς μεγαλόψυχοι λέγονται· ἄνευ γὰρ ἀρετῆς παντελοῦς οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα. ὑπερόπται δὲ καὶ ὑβρισταὶ καὶ οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ἀγαθὰ γίνονται. ἄνευ γὰρ ἀρετῆς οὐ ῥᾴδιον φέρειν ἐμμελῶς τὰ εὐτυχήματα·
and such men, being unable to carry their prosperity, and thinking themselves superior to the rest of mankind, despise other people, although their own conduct is no better than another’s. The fact is that they try to imitate the great-souled man without being really like him, and only copy him in what they can, reproducing his contempt for others but not his virtuous conduct. For the great-souled man is justified in despising other people—his estimates are correct; but most proud men have no good ground for their pride. The great-souled man does not run into danger for trifling reasons, and is not a lover of danger, because there are few things he values; but he will face danger in a great cause, and when so doing will be ready to sacrifice his life, since he holds that life is not worth having at every price. He is fond of conferring benefits, but ashamed to receive them, because the former is a mark of superiority and the latter of inferiority. He returns a service done to him with interest, since this will put the original benefactor into his debt in turn, and make him the party benefited. The great-souled are thought to have a good memory for any benefit they have conferred, but a bad memory for those which they have received (since the recipient of a benefit is the inferior of his benefactor, whereas they desire to be superior); and to enjoy being reminded of the former but to dislike being reminded of the latter: this is why the poet makes Thetis not specify her services to Zeus; nor did the Spartans treating with the Athenians recall the occasions when Sparta had aided Athens, but those on which Athens had aided Sparta. It is also characteristic of the great-souled man never to ask help from others, or only with reluctance, but to render aid willingly; and to be haughty towards men of position and fortune, but courteous towards those of moderate station, because it is difficult and distinguished to be superior to the great, but easy to outdo the lowly, and to adopt a high manner with the former is not ill-bred, but it is vulgar to lord it over humble people: it is like putting forth one’s strength against the weak. He will not compete for the common objects of ambition, or go where other people take the first place; and he will be idle and slow to act, except when pursuing some high honor or achievement; and will not engage in many undertakings, but only in such as are important and distinguished. He must be open both in love and in hate, since concealment shows timidity; and care more for the truth than for what people will think; and speak and act openly, since as he despises other men he is outspoken and frank, except when speaking with ironical self-depreciation, as he does to common people. He will be incapable of living at the will of another, unless a friend,
οὐ δυνάμενοι δὲφέρειν καὶ οἰόμενοι τῶν ἄλλων ὑπερέχειν ἐκείνων μὲν καταφρονοῦσιν, αὐτοὶ δʼ ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσι πράττουσιν. μιμοῦνται γὰρ τὸν μεγαλόψυχον οὐχ ὅμοιοι ὄντες, τοῦτο δὲ δρῶσιν ἐν οἷς δύνανται· τὰ μὲν οὖν κατʼ ἀρετὴν οὐ πράττουσι, καταφρονοῦσι δὲ τῶν ἄλλων. ὁ μὲν γὰρ μεγαλόψυχος δικαίως καταφρονεῖ (δοξάζει γὰρ ἀληθῶς), οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τυχόντως. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ μικροκίνδυνος οὐδὲ φιλοκίνδυνος διὰ τὸ ὀλίγα τιμᾶν, μεγαλοκίνδυνος δέ, καὶ ὅταν κινδυνεύῃ, ἀφειδὴς τοῦ βίου ὡς οὐκ ἄξιον ὂν πάντως ζῆν. καὶ οἷος εὖ ποιεῖν, εὐεργετούμενος δʼ αἰσχύνεται· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερέχοντος, τὸ δʼ ὑπερεχομένου. καὶ ἀντευεργετικὸς πλειόνων· οὕτω γάρ οἱ προσοφλήσει ὁ ὑπάρξας καὶ ἔσται εὖ πεπονθώς. δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ μνημονεύειν οὗ ἂν ποιήσωσιν εὖ, ὧν δʼ ἂν πάθωσιν οὔ (ἐλάττων γὰρ ὁ παθὼν εὖ τοῦ ποιήσαντος, βούλεται δʼ ὑπερέχειν), καὶ τὰ μὲν ἡδέως ἀκούειν, τὰ δʼ ἀηδῶς· διὸ καὶ τὴν Θέτιν οὐ λέγειν τὰς εὐεργεσίας τῷ Διί, οὐδʼ οἱ Λάκωνες πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ἀλλʼ ἃ πεπόνθεσαν εὖ. μεγαλοψύχου δὲ καὶ τὸ μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι ἢ μόλις, ὑπηρετεῖν δὲ προθύμως, καὶ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἐν ἀξιώματι καὶ εὐτυχίαις μέγαν εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς μέσους μέτριον· τῶν μὲν γὰρ ὑπερέχειν χαλεπὸν καὶ σεμνόν, τῶν δὲ ῥᾴδιον, καὶ ἐπʼ ἐκείνοις μὲν σεμνύνεσθαι οὐκ ἀγεννές, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ταπεινοῖς φορτικόν, ὥσπερ εἰς τοὺς ἀσθενεῖς ἰσχυρίζεσθαι· καὶ εἰς τὰ ἔντιμα μὴ ἰέναι, ἢ οὗ πρωτεύουσιν ἄλλοι· καὶ ἀργὸν εἶναι καὶ μελλητὴν ἀλλʼ ἢ ὅπου τιμὴ μεγάλη ἢ ἔργον, καὶ ὀλίγων μὲν πρακτικόν, μεγάλων δὲ καὶ ὀνομαστῶν. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ καὶ φανερομισῆ εἶναι καὶ φανερόφιλον (τὸ γὰρ λανθάνειν φοβουμένου, καὶ ἀμελεῖν τῆς ἀληθείας μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς δόξης), καὶ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν φανερῶς (παρρησιαστὴς γὰρ διὰ τὸ καταφρονητικὸς εἶναι, καὶ ἀληθευτικός, πλὴν ὅσα μὴ διʼ εἰρωνείαν πρὸς τοὺς πολλούς), καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον μὴ δύνασθαι ζῆν ἀλλʼ ἢ φίλον·
since to do so is slavish, and hence flatterers are always servile, and humble people flatterers. He is not prone to admiration, since nothing is great to him. He does not bear a grudge, for it is not a mark of greatness of soul to recall things against people, especially the wrongs they have done you, but rather to overlook them. He is no gossip, for he will not talk either about himself or about another, as he neither wants to receive compliments nor to hear other people run down (nor is he lavish of praise either); and so he is not given to speaking evil himself, even of his enemies, except when he deliberately intends to give offence. In troubles that cannot be avoided or trifling mishaps he will never cry out or ask for help, since to do so would imply that he took them to heart. He likes to own beautiful and useless things, rather than useful things that bring in a return, since the former show his independence more. Other traits generally attributed to the great-souled man are a slow gait, a deep voice, and a deliberate utterance; to speak in shrill tones and walk fast denotes an excitable and nervous temperament, which does not belong to one who cares for few things and thinks nothing great. Such then being the Great-souled man, the corresponding character on the side of deficiency is the Small-souled man, and on that of excess the Vain man. These also are not thought to be actually vicious, since they do no harm, but rather mistaken. The small-souled man deprives himself of the good things that he deserves; and his failure to claim good things makes it seem that he has something bad about him [and also that he does not know himself], for (people argue), if he deserved any good, he would try to obtain it. Not that such persons are considered foolish, but rather too retiring; yet this estimate of them is thought to make them still worse, for men’s ambitions show what they are worth, and if they hold aloof from noble enterprises and pursuits, and for go the good things of life, presumably they think they are not worthy of them. The vain on the other hand are foolish persons, who are deficient in self-knowledge and expose their defect: they undertake honorable responsibilities of which they are not worthy, and then are found out. They are ostentatious in dress, manner and so on. They want people to know how well off they are, and talk about it, imagining that this will make them respected. Smallness of Soul is more opposed than Vanity to Greatness of Soul, being both more prevalent and worse. Greatness of Soul then, as we have said, is concerned with great honors.
δουλικὸν γάρ· διὸ καὶ πάντες οἱ κόλακες θητικοὶ καὶ οἱ ταπεινοὶ κόλακες. οὐδὲ θαυμαστικός· οὐδὲν γὰρ μέγα αὐτῷ ἐστίν. οὐδὲ μνησίκακος· οὐ γὰρ μεγαλοψύχου τὸ ἀπομνημονεύειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ κακά, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον παρορᾶν. οὐδʼ ἀνθρωπολόγος· οὔτε γὰρ περὶ αὑτοῦ ἐρεῖ οὔτε περὶ ἑτέρου· οὔτε γὰρ ἵνα ἐπαινῆται μέλει αὐτῷ οὔθʼ ὅπως οἱ ἄλλοι ψέγωνται· οὐδʼ αὖ ἐπαινετικός ἐστιν· διόπερ οὐδὲ κακολόγος, οὐδὲ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, εἰ μὴ διʼ ὕβριν. καὶ περὶ ἀναγκαίων ἢ μικρῶν ἥκιστα ὀλοφυρτικὸς καὶ δεητικός· σπουδάζοντος γὰρ οὕτως ἔχειν περὶ ταῦτα. καὶ οἷος κεκτῆσθαι μᾶλλον τὰ καλὰ καὶ ἄκαρπα τῶν καρπίμων καὶ ὠφελίμων· αὐτάρκους γὰρ μᾶλλον. καὶ κίνησις δὲ βραδεῖα τοῦ μεγαλοψύχου δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ φωνὴ βαρεῖα, καὶ λέξις στάσιμος· οὐ γὰρ σπευστικὸς ὁ περὶ ὀλίγα σπουδάζων, οὐδὲ σύντονος ὁ μηδὲν μέγα οἰόμενος· ἡ δʼ ὀξυφωνία καὶ ἡ ταχυτὴς διὰ τούτων. τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν ὁ μεγαλόψυχος· ὁ δʼ ἐλλείπων μικρόψυχος, ὁ δʼ ὑπερβάλλων χαῦνος. οὐ κακοὶ μὲν οὖν δοκοῦσιν εἶναι οὐδʼ οὗτοι (οὐ γὰρ κακοποιοί εἰσιν), ἡμαρτημένοι δέ. ὁ μὲν γὰρ μικρόψυχος ἄξιος ὢν ἀγαθῶν ἑαυτὸν ἀποστερεῖ ὧν ἄξιός ἐστι, καὶ ἔοικε κακὸν ἔχειν τι ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτὸν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ ἀγνοεῖν δʼ ἑαυτόν· ὠρέγετο γὰρ ἂν ὧν ἄξιος ἦν, ἀγαθῶν γε ὄντων. οὐ μὴν ἠλίθιοί γε οἱ τοιοῦτοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὀκνηροί. ἡ τοιαύτη δὲ δόξα δοκεῖ καὶ χείρους ποιεῖν· ἕκαστοι γὰρ ἐφίενται τῶν κατʼ ἀξίαν, ἀφίστανται δὲ καὶ τῶν πράξεων τῶν καλῶν καὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ὡς ἀνάξιοι ὄντες, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν. οἱ δὲ χαῦνοι ἠλίθιοι καὶ ἑαυτοὺς ἀγνοοῦντες, καὶ ταῦτʼ ἐπιφανῶς· οὐ γὰρ ἄξιοι ὄντες τοῖς ἐντίμοις ἐπιχειροῦσιν, εἶτα ἐξελέγχονται· καὶ ἐσθῆτι κοσμοῦνται καὶ σχήματι καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, καὶ βούλονται τὰ εὐτυχήματα καὶ φανερὰ εἶναι αὑτῶν, καὶ λέγουσι περὶ αὐτῶν ὡς διὰ τούτων τιμηθησόμενοι. ἀντιτίθεται δὲ τῇ μεγαλοψυχίᾳ ἡ μικροψυχία μᾶλλον τῆς χαυνότητος· καὶ γὰρ γίνεται μᾶλλον καὶ χεῖρόν ἐστιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν μεγαλοψυχία περὶ τιμήν ἐστι μεγάλην, ὥσπερ εἴρηται.
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