We ought also to ascertain the nature of Deliberative Excellence, and to discover whether it is a species of Knowledge, or of Opinion, or skill in Conjecture, or something different from these in kind. Now it is not Knowledge: for men do not investigate matters about which they know, 1142bwhereas Deliberative Excellence is one form of deliberation, and deliberating implies investigating and calculating. But deliberation is not the same as investigation: it is the investigation of a particular subject.¹ Nor yet is it skill in Conjecture: for this operates without conscious calculation, and rapidly, whereas deliberating takes a long time, and there is a proverb that execution should be swift but deliberation slow. Again, Deliberative Excellence is not the same as Quickness of mind,² which is a form of skill in Conjecture. Nor yet is Deliberative Excellence any form of Opinion. But inasmuch as a bad deliberator makes mistakes and a good deliberator deliberates correctly,³ it is clear that Deliberative Excellence is some form of correctness; though it is not correctness of Knowledge, nor of Opinion. Correctness cannot be predicated of Knowledge,⁴ any more than can error, and correctness of Opinion is truth; and also any matter about which one has an opinion has been settled already; [then again Deliberative Excellence necessarily involves conscious calculation. It remains therefore that Deliberative Excellence is correctness in thinking, for thought has not reached the stage of affirmation;]⁵ for Opinion has passed beyond the stage of investigation and is a form of affirmation, whereas a man deliberating, whether he deliberates well or badly, is investigating and calculating something. But Deliberative Excellence is a form of correctness in deliberation [so that we have first to investigate what deliberation is, and what object it deals with].⁶ However, “correctness” in this connection is ambiguous, and plainly it is not every kind of correctness in deliberation that constitutes Deliberative Excellence. A man of deficient self-restraint or a bad man may as a result of calculation arrive at the object he proposes as the right thing to do, so that he will have deliberated correctly, although he will have gained something extremely evil; whereas to have deliberated well is felt to be a good thing. Therefore it is this kind of correctness in deliberation that is Deliberative Excellence, namely being correct in the sense of arriving at something good.⁷ But it is possible to arrive at a good conclusion, as well as at a bad one, by a false process of reasoning; one may arrive at what is the right thing to do, but not arrive at it on the right grounds, but by means of a wrong middle term. This quality then, which leads one to arrive at the right conclusion, but not on the right grounds, is still not Deliberative Excellence. Again, one man may arrive at the right conclusion by prolonged deliberation, while another may do so quickly. The former case also then does not amount to Deliberative Excellence; this is correctness of deliberation as regards what is advantageous, arriving at the right conclusion on the right grounds at the right time.⁸ Again, a man can be said to have deliberated well⁹ either generally, or in reference to a particular end. Deliberative Excellence in general is therefore that which leads to correct results with reference to the end in general, while correctness of deliberation with a view to some particular end is Deliberative Excellence of some special kind. If therefore to have deliberated well is a characteristic of prudent men, Deliberative Excellence must be correctness of deliberation with regard to what is expedient as a means to the end, a true conception of which¹⁰ constitutes Prudence.

Understanding, or Good Understanding, 1143athe quality in virtue of which we call men “persons of understanding” or “of good understanding,” is not the same thing as Scientific Knowledge in general (nor yet is it the same as Opinion, for in that case everybody would have understanding), nor is it any one of the particular sciences, as medicine is the science of what pertains to health and geometry the science concerned with magnitudes. For Understanding does not deal with the things that exist for ever and are immutable, nor yet with all of the things that come into existence, but with those about which one may be in doubt and may deliberate. Hence it is concerned with the same objects as Prudence. Understanding is not however the same thing as Prudence; for Prudence issues commands, since its end is a statement of what we ought to do or not to do, whereas Understanding merely makes judgements. (For Understanding is the same as Good Understanding; a “man of understanding” means a man of good understanding.)¹¹ Thus Understanding does not mean either the possession or the acquisition of Prudence; but when we employ the faculty of Opinion to judge what another person says about matters that are in the sphere of Prudence, we are said to understand (that is, to judge rightly for right judgement is the same as good understanding), in the same way as learning a thing is termed understanding it when we are employing the faculty of Scientific Knowledge. In fact, the use of the term Understanding to denote the quality that makes men “persons of good understanding” is derived from understanding as shown in learning; in fact we often use “to learn” in the sense of “to understand.”¹²

The quality termed Consideration,¹³ in virtue of which men are said to be considerate, or to show consideration for others (forgiveness), is the faculty of judging correctly what is equitable. This is indicated by our saying that the equitable man is specially considerate for others (forgiving), and that it is equitable to show consideration for others (forgiveness) in certain cases; but consideration for others is that consideration which judges rightly what is equitable, judging rightly meaning judging what is truly equitable. All these qualities, it is reasonable to say, refer to the same thing; indeed we attribute Considerateness, Understanding, Prudence, and Intelligence to the same persons when we say of people that they “are old enough to show consideration and intelligence,”¹⁴ and are prudent and understanding persons. For all these faculties deal with ultimate and particular things; and a man has understanding and is considerate, or considerate for others, when he is a good judge of the matters in regard to which Prudence is displayed¹⁵; because equitable actions are common to all good men¹⁶ in their behavior towards others, while on the other hand all matters of conduct belong to the class of particular and ultimate things (since the prudent man admittedly has to take cognizance of these things), and Understanding and Consideration deal with matters of conduct, which are ultimate. Also Intelligence apprehends the ultimates in both aspects—since ultimates as well as primary definitions¹⁷ 1143bare grasped by Intelligence and not reached by reasoning: in demonstrations, Intelligence apprehends the immutable and primary definitions, in practical inferences,¹⁸ it apprehends the ultimate and contingent fact, and the minor, premise, since these are the first principles from which the end is inferred, as general rules are based on particular cases; hence we must have perception of particulars, and this immediate perception is Intelligence.¹⁹ This is why it is thought that these qualities are a natural gift, and that a man is considerate, understanding and intelligent by nature, though no one is a wise man by nature. That this is so is indicated by our thinking of them as going with certain ages: we say that at such and such an age a man must have got intelligence and considerateness, which implies that they come by nature. [Hence Intelligence is both a beginning and an end, for these things are both the starting-point and the subject matter of demonstration.]²⁰ Consequently the unproved assertions and opinions of experienced and elderly people, or of prudent men,²¹ are as much deserving of attention as those which they support by proof; for experience has given them an eye for things, and so they see correctly. We have now discussed the nature and respective spheres of Prudence and Wisdom, and have shown that each is the virtue of a different part of the soul.

But the further question may be raised, What is the use of these intellectual virtues? Wisdom does not consider the means to human happiness at all, for it does not ask how anything comes into existence. Prudence, it must be granted, does do this; but what do we need it for? seeing that it studies that which is just and noble and good for man, but these are the things that a good man does by nature. Knowing about them does not make us any more capable of doing them, since the virtues are qualities of character; just as is the case with the knowledge of what is healthy and vigorous—using these words to mean not productive of health and vigor but resulting from them: we are not rendered any more capable of healthy and vigorous action by knowing the science of medicine or of physical training. If on the other hand we are to say that Prudence is useful not in helping us to act virtuously but in helping us to become virtuous, then it is of no use to those who are virtuous already. Nor is it of any use either to those who are not, since we may just as well take the advice of others who possess Prudence as possess Prudence ourselves. We may be content to do as we do in regard to our health; we want to be healthy, yet we do not learn medicine. Moreover it would seem strange if Prudence, which is inferior to Wisdom, is nevertheless to have greater authority than Wisdom: yet the faculty that creates a thing²² governs and gives orders to it. Let us now therefore discuss these difficulties, which so far have only been stated. 1144aFirst then let us assert that Wisdom and Prudence, being as they are the virtues of the two parts of the intellect respectively, are necessarily desirable in themselves, even if neither produces any effect. Secondly, they do in fact produce an effect: Wisdom produces Happiness, not in the sense in which medicine produces health, but in the sense in which healthiness is the cause of health. For Wisdom is a part of Virtue as a whole, and therefore by its possession, or rather by its exercise, renders a man happy. Also Prudence as well as Moral Virtue determines the complete performance of man’s proper function: Virtue ensures the rightness of the end we aim at, Prudence ensures the rightness of the means we adopt to gain that end. (The fourth part²³ of the soul on the other hand, the nutritive faculty, has no virtue contributing to the proper function of man, since it has no power to act or not to act.²⁴) But we must go a little deeper into the objection that Prudence does not render men more capable of performing noble and just actions. Let us start with the following consideration. As some people, we maintain, perform just acts and yet are not just men (for instance, those who do what the law enjoins but do it unwillingly, or in ignorance, or for some ulterior object, and not for the sake of the actions themselves, although they are as a matter of fact doing what they ought to do and all that a good man should), on the other hand it appears, there is a state of mind in which a man may do these various acts with the result that he really is a good man: I mean when he does them from choice, and for the sake of the acts themselves. Now rightness in our choice of an end is secured by Virtue²⁵; but to do the actions that must in the nature of things be done in order to attain the end we have chosen, is not a matter for Virtue but for a different faculty. We must dwell on this point to make it more clear. There is a certain faculty called Cleverness, which is the capacity for doing the things aforesaid that conduce to the aim we propose, and so attaining that aim. If the aim is noble, this is a praiseworthy faculty: if base, it is mere knavery; this is how we come to speak of both prudent men and knaves as clever. Now this faculty is not identical with Prudence, but Prudence implies it. But that eye of the soul of which we spoke²⁶ cannot acquire the quality of Prudence without possessing Virtue. This we have said before, and it is manifestly true. For deductive inferences about matters of conduct always have a major premise of the form “Since the End or Supreme Good is so and so” (whatever it may be, since we may take it as anything we like for the sake of the argument); but the Supreme Good only appears good to the good man: vice perverts the mind and causes it to hold false views about the first principles of conduct. Hence it is clear that we cannot be prudent without being good.