Let us now consider the point that Unrestraint in anger1 is less disgraceful than Unrestraint in the desires. Now it appears that anger does to some extent hear reason, but hears it wrong, just as hasty servants hurry out of the room before they have heard the whole of what you are saying, and so mistake your order, and as watch-dogs bark at a mere knock at the door, without waiting to see if it is a friend. Similarly anger, owing to the heat and swiftness of its nature, hears, but does not hear the order given, and rushes off to take vengeance. When reason or imagination suggests that an insult or slight has been received, anger flares up at once, but after reasoning as it were that you ought to make war on anybody who insults you. Desire on the other hand, at a mere hint from [the reason or2] the senses that a thing is pleasant, rushes off to enjoy it. 1149bHence anger follows reason in a manner, but desire does not. Therefore yielding to desire is more disgraceful than yielding to anger, for he that fails to restrain his anger is in a way controlled by reason, but the other3 is controlled not by reason but by desire. Again, when impulses are natural, it is more excusable to follow them, since even with the desires it is more excusable to follow those that are common to all men, and in so far as they are common. But anger and bad temper are more natural than desire for excessive and unnecessary pleasures; witness the man who was had up for beating his father and who said in his defence, “Well, my father used to beat his father, and he used to beat his, and (pointing to his little boy) so will my son here beat me when he grows up; it runs in our family”; and the man who, when his son was throwing him out of the house, used to beg him to stop when he got to the door, “because he only used to drag his father as far as that.”4 Again, the craftier men are, the more Unjust they are. Now the hot-tempered man is not crafty, nor is anger, but open; whereas desire is crafty, as they say of Aphrodite: Weaver of wiles in Cyprus bornThe line seems to have ended Κυπρογένεος πρόπολον (Bergk, cf. Hesych., K. π. προαγ〈ω〉γόν) , for the servant of the wile-weaving Cyprus-born, viz., Peitho, Persuasion. It is ascribed by Wilamowitz to Sappho, and the same epithet is applied to Aphrodite in Sappho, 1.2. and Homer writes of her “broidered girdle” CajoleryOne of the emblematic figures embroidered on the girdle of Aphrodite, Hom. Il. 14.217. that cheats the wisest wits. As therefore unrestraint in desire is more unjust as well as more disgraceful than unrestraint as regards anger, unrestraint in desire is Unrestraint in the strict sense, and is even in a certain sense Vice. Again, a wanton outrage5 gives pleasure to the doer, never pain, whereas an act done in anger always causes him a feeling of pain. If then things are unjust in proportion to the justice of the anger they arouse in the victim, unrestraint arising from desire is more unjust than that arising from anger; for anger contains no element of wanton insolence. It is clear therefore that unrestraint in one’s desires is more disgraceful than unrestraint in anger, and that it is in relation to bodily desires and pleasures that Self-restraint and Unrestraint are really manifested. But we must distinguish among the bodily desires and pleasures themselves. As was said at the beginning,6 some of these are human and natural both in kind and degree, some bestial, and some due to arrested development or disease. Now it is only with the first class that Temperance and Profligacy are concerned; hence we do not use the terms temperate or profligate of the lower animals, except metaphorically, of certain entire species distinguished from the rest by their exceptionally lascivious, mischievous, or omnivorous habits; for animals have neither the faculty of choice nor of calculation: they are aberrations from nature,7 like men who are insane. 1150aBestiality8 is less 〈evil〉 than vice, though more horrible: for 〈in a bestial man as in an animal〉 the highest part 〈i.e. the intellect〉 is not corrupted, as it is in a man 〈who is wicked in a human way〉, but entirely lacking. So that it is like comparing an inanimate with an animate thing, and asking which is the more evil; for the badness of a thing which has no originating principle—and intelligence is such a principle—is always less capable of mischief.9 (It is therefore like comparing Injustice with an unjust man: one is worse in one way and the other in another). For a bad man can do ten thousand times more harm than an animal 〈or a bestial man〉.
(iii) But in relation to the pleasures and pains of touch and taste, and the corresponding desires and acts of avoidance, which have already10 been defined as the sphere in which Profligacy and Temperance are displayed, it is possible on the one hand to have such a disposition as to succumb even to those temptations to which most men are superior, or on the other hand to conquer even those to which most men succumb. These two dispositions, when manifested in relation to pleasure, constitute Unrestraint and Restraint respectively; when in relation to pain, Softness and Endurance. The disposition of the great majority of men lies between the two, though they incline rather to the worse extremes. And inasmuch as some pleasures are necessary and others not, and the former are only necessary within certain limits, excessive indulgence in them not being necessary, nor yet deficient indulgence11 either, and inasmuch as the same holds good also of desires and of pains, one who pursues excessive pleasures, or pursues things12 to excess and from choice, for their own sakes and not for the sake of some ulterior consequence, is a profligate; for a man of this character is certain to feel no regret for his excesses afterwards, and this being so, he is incurable,13 since there is no cure for one who does not regret his error. The man deficient in the enjoyment of pleasures is the opposite of the profligate; and the middle character is the temperate man. And similarly, he who avoids bodily pains not because his will is overpowered but of deliberate choice, is also profligate. (Those on the other hand who yield not from choice, are prompted either by the pleasure of indulgence, or by the impulse to avoid the pain of unsatisfied desire. Hence there is a difference between deliberate and non-deliberate indulgence. Everyone would think a man worse if he did something disgraceful when he felt only a slight desire, or none at all, than if he acted from a strong desire, or if he struck another in cold blood than if he did so in anger; for what would he have done had his passions been aroused? Hence the profligate man is worse than the unrestrained.) Of the dispositions described above, the deliberate avoidance of pain is rather a kind14 of Softness; the deliberate pursuit of pleasure is Profligacy in the strict sense. Self-restraint is the opposite of Unrestraint, Endurance of Softness; for Endurance means only successful resistance, whereas Restraint implies mastery, which is a different matter: victory is more glorious than the mere avoidance of defeat. Hence self-restraint is a more valuable quality than Endurance. 1150bOne who is deficient in resistance to pains that most men withstand with success, is soft or luxurious (for Luxury is a kind of Softness) : such a man lets his cloak trail on the ground to escape the fatigue and trouble of lifting it, or feigns sickness, not seeing that to counterfeit misery is to be miserable. The same holds good of Self-restraint and Unrestraint. It is not surprising that a man should be overcome by violent and excessive pleasures or pains: indeed it is excusable if he succumbs after a struggle, like Philoctetes in Theodectes when bitten by the viper, or Kerkyon in the Alope of Karkinos, or as men who try to restrain their laughter explode in one great guffaw, as happened to Xenophantus.15 But we are surprised when a man is overcome by pleasures and pains which most men are able to withstand, except when his failure to resist is due to some innate tendency, or to disease: instances of the former being the hereditary effeminacy16 of the royal family of Scythia, and the inferior endurance of the female sex as compared with the male. People too fond of amusement are thought to be profligate, but really they are soft; for amusement is rest, and therefore a slackening of effort, and addiction to amusement is a form of excessive slackness.17 But there are two forms of Unrestraint, Impetuousness and Weakness. The weak deliberate, but then are prevented by passion from keeping to their resolution; the impetuous are led by passion because they do not stop to deliberate: since some people withstand the attacks of passion, whether pleasant or painful, by feeling or seeing them coming, and rousing themselves, that is, their reasoning faculty, in advance, just as one is proof against tickling if one has just been tickled already.18 It is the quick and the excitable who are most liable to the impetuous form of Unrestraint, because the former are too hasty and the latter too vehement to wait for reason, being prone to follow their imagination.
Hence anger follows reason in a manner, but desire does not. Therefore yielding to desire is more disgraceful than yielding to anger, for he that fails to restrain his anger is in a way controlled by reason, but the other is controlled not by reason but by desire. Again, when impulses are natural, it is more excusable to follow them, since even with the desires it is more excusable to follow those that are common to all men, and in so far as they are common. But anger and bad temper are more natural than desire for excessive and unnecessary pleasures; witness the man who was had up for beating his father and who said in his defence, “Well, my father used to beat his father, and he used to beat his, and (pointing to his little boy) so will my son here beat me when he grows up; it runs in our family”; and the man who, when his son was throwing him out of the house, used to beg him to stop when he got to the door, “because he only used to drag his father as far as that.” Again, the craftier men are, the more Unjust they are. Now the hot-tempered man is not crafty, nor is anger, but open; whereas desire is crafty, as they say of Aphrodite: Weaver of wiles in Cyprus bornThe line seems to have ended Κυπρογένεος πρόπολον (Bergk, cf. Hesych., K. π. προαγ〈ω〉γόν) , for the servant of the wile-weaving Cyprus-born, viz., Peitho, Persuasion. It is ascribed by Wilamowitz to Sappho, and the same epithet is applied to Aphrodite in Sappho, 1.2. and Homer writes of her “broidered girdle” CajoleryOne of the emblematic figures embroidered on the girdle of Aphrodite, Hom. Il. 14.217. that cheats the wisest wits. As therefore unrestraint in desire is more unjust as well as more disgraceful than unrestraint as regards anger, unrestraint in desire is Unrestraint in the strict sense, and is even in a certain sense Vice. Again, a wanton outrage gives pleasure to the doer, never pain, whereas an act done in anger always causes him a feeling of pain. If then things are unjust in proportion to the justice of the anger they arouse in the victim, unrestraint arising from desire is more unjust than that arising from anger; for anger contains no element of wanton insolence. It is clear therefore that unrestraint in one’s desires is more disgraceful than unrestraint in anger, and that it is in relation to bodily desires and pleasures that Self-restraint and Unrestraint are really manifested. But we must distinguish among the bodily desires and pleasures themselves. As was said at the beginning, some of these are human and natural both in kind and degree, some bestial, and some due to arrested development or disease. Now it is only with the first class that Temperance and Profligacy are concerned; hence we do not use the terms temperate or profligate of the lower animals, except metaphorically, of certain entire species distinguished from the rest by their exceptionally lascivious, mischievous, or omnivorous habits; for animals have neither the faculty of choice nor of calculation: they are aberrations from nature, like men who are insane.
ὥσθʼ ὁ μὲν θυμὸς ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ λόγῳ πως, ἡ δʼ ἐπιθυμία οὔ. αἰσχίων οὖν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ θυμοῦ ἀκρατὴς τοῦ λόγου πως ἡττᾶται, ὃ δὲ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ οὐ τοῦ λόγου. ἔτι ταῖς φυσικαῖς μᾶλλον συγγνώμη ἀκολουθεῖν ὀρέξεσιν, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐπιθυμίαις ταῖς τοιαύταις μᾶλλον ὅσαι κοιναὶ πᾶσι, καὶ ἐφʼ ὅσον κοιναί· ὁ δὲ θυμὸς φυσικώτερον καὶ ἡ χαλεπότης τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν τῶν τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων, ὥσπερ ὁ ἀπολογούμενος ὅτι τὸν πατέρα τύπτοι καὶ γὰρ οὗτος ἔφη τὸν ἑαυτοῦ κἀκεῖνος τὸν ἄνωθεν,καὶ τὸ παιδίον δείξας καὶ οὗτος ἐμέ ἔφη, ὅταν ἀνὴρ γένηται· συγγενὲς γὰρ ἡμῖν· καὶ ὁ ἑλκόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ υἱοῦ παύεσθαι ἐκέλευε πρὸς ταῖς θύραις· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἑλκύσαι τὸν πατέρα μέχρις ἐνταῦθα. ἔτι ἀδικώτεροι οἱ ἐπιβουλότεροι. ὁ μὲν οὖν θυμώδης οὐκ ἐπίβουλος, οὐδʼ ὁ θυμός, ἀλλὰ φανερός· ἡ δʼ ἐπιθυμία, καθάπερ τὴν Ἀφροδίτην φασίν· δολοπλόκου γὰρ κυπρογενοῦς· καὶ τὸν κεστὸν ἱμάντα Ὅμηρος· πάρφασις, ἥ τʼ ἔκλεψε νόον πύκα περ φρονέοντος. ὥστʼ εἴπερ ἀδικωτέρα καὶ αἰσχίων ἡ ἀκρασία αὕτη τῆς περὶ τὸν θυμόν ἐστι, καὶ ἁπλῶς ἀκρασία καὶ κακία πως. ἔτι οὐδεὶς ὑβρίζει λυπούμενος, ὁ δʼ ὀργῇ ποιῶν πᾶς ποιεῖ λυπούμενος, ὁ δʼ ὑβρίζων μεθʼ ἡδονῆς. εἰ οὖν οἷς ὀργίζεσθαι μάλιστα δίκαιον, ταῦτα ἀδικώτερα, καὶ ἡ ἀκρασία ἡ διʼ ἐπιθυμίαν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐν θυμῷ ὕβρις. ὡς μὲν τοίνυν αἰσχίων ἡ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας ἀκρασία τῆς περὶ τὸν θυμόν, καὶ ὅτι ἔστιν ἐγκράτεια καὶ ἡ ἀκρασία περὶ ἐπιθυμίας καὶ ἡδονὰς σωματικάς, δῆλον· αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων τὰς διαφορὰς ληπτέον. ὥσπερ γὰρ εἴρηται κατʼ ἀρχάς, αἳ μὲν ἀνθρώπιναί εἰσι καὶ φυσικαὶ καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῷ μεγέθει, αἳ δὲ θηριώδεις, αἳ δὲ διὰ πηρώσεις καὶ νοσήματα. τούτων δὲ περὶ τὰς πρώτας σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀκολασία μόνον ἐστίν· διὸ καὶ τὰ θηρία οὔτε σώφρονα οὔτʼ ἀκόλαστα λέγομεν ἀλλʼ ἢ κατὰ μεταφορὰν καὶ εἴ τινι ὅλως ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο διαφέρει γένος τῶν ζῴων ὕβρει καὶ σιναμωρίᾳ καὶ τῷ παμφάγον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἔχει προαίρεσιν οὐδὲ λογισμόν, ἀλλʼ ἐξέστηκε τῆς φύσεως, ὥσπερ οἱ μαινόμενοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων.
Bestiality is less 〈evil〉 than vice, though more horrible: for 〈in a bestial man as in an animal〉 the highest part 〈i.e. the intellect〉 is not corrupted, as it is in a man 〈who is wicked in a human way〉, but entirely lacking. So that it is like comparing an inanimate with an animate thing, and asking which is the more evil; for the badness of a thing which has no originating principle—and intelligence is such a principle—is always less capable of mischief. (It is therefore like comparing Injustice with an unjust man: one is worse in one way and the other in another). For a bad man can do ten thousand times more harm than an animal 〈or a bestial man〉.
(iii) But in relation to the pleasures and pains of touch and taste, and the corresponding desires and acts of avoidance, which have already been defined as the sphere in which Profligacy and Temperance are displayed, it is possible on the one hand to have such a disposition as to succumb even to those temptations to which most men are superior, or on the other hand to conquer even those to which most men succumb. These two dispositions, when manifested in relation to pleasure, constitute Unrestraint and Restraint respectively; when in relation to pain, Softness and Endurance. The disposition of the great majority of men lies between the two, though they incline rather to the worse extremes. And inasmuch as some pleasures are necessary and others not, and the former are only necessary within certain limits, excessive indulgence in them not being necessary, nor yet deficient indulgence either, and inasmuch as the same holds good also of desires and of pains, one who pursues excessive pleasures, or pursues things to excess and from choice, for their own sakes and not for the sake of some ulterior consequence, is a profligate; for a man of this character is certain to feel no regret for his excesses afterwards, and this being so, he is incurable, since there is no cure for one who does not regret his error. The man deficient in the enjoyment of pleasures is the opposite of the profligate; and the middle character is the temperate man. And similarly, he who avoids bodily pains not because his will is overpowered but of deliberate choice, is also profligate. (Those on the other hand who yield not from choice, are prompted either by the pleasure of indulgence, or by the impulse to avoid the pain of unsatisfied desire. Hence there is a difference between deliberate and non-deliberate indulgence. Everyone would think a man worse if he did something disgraceful when he felt only a slight desire, or none at all, than if he acted from a strong desire, or if he struck another in cold blood than if he did so in anger; for what would he have done had his passions been aroused? Hence the profligate man is worse than the unrestrained.) Of the dispositions described above, the deliberate avoidance of pain is rather a kind of Softness; the deliberate pursuit of pleasure is Profligacy in the strict sense. Self-restraint is the opposite of Unrestraint, Endurance of Softness; for Endurance means only successful resistance, whereas Restraint implies mastery, which is a different matter: victory is more glorious than the mere avoidance of defeat. Hence self-restraint is a more valuable quality than Endurance.
ἔλαττον δὲ θηριότης κακίας, φοβερώτερον δέ· οὐ γὰρ διέφθαρται τὸ βέλτιον, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἔχει. ὅμοιον οὖν ὥσπερ ἄψυχον συμβάλλειν πρὸς ἔμψυχον, πότερον κάκιον· ἀσινεστέρα γὰρ ἡ φαυλότης ἀεὶ ἡ τοῦ μὴ ἔχοντος ἀρχήν, ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἀρχή. παραπλήσιον οὖν τὸ συμβάλλειν ἀδικίαν πρὸς ἄνθρωπον ἄδικον. ἔστι γὰρ ὡς ἑκάτερον κάκιον· μυριοπλάσια γὰρ ἂν κακὰ ποιήσειεν ἄνθρωπος κακὸς θηρίου.
περὶ δὲ τὰς διʼ ἁφῆς καὶ γεύσεως ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας καὶ ἐπιθυμίας καὶ φυγάς, περὶ ἃς ἥ τε ἀκολασία καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη διωρίσθη πρότερον, ἔστι μὲν οὕτως ἔχειν ὥστε ἡττᾶσθαι καὶ ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ κρείττους, ἔστι δὲ κρατεῖν καὶ ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ ἥττους· τούτων δʼ ὁ μὲν περὶ ἡδονὰς ἀκρατὴς ὃ δʼ ἐγκρατής, ὁ δὲ περὶ λύπας μαλακὸς ὃ δὲ καρτερικός. μεταξὺ δʼ ἡ τῶν πλείστων ἕξις, κἂν εἰ ῥέπουσι μᾶλλον πρὸς τὰς χείρους. ἐπεὶ δʼ ἔνιαι τῶν ἡδονῶν ἀναγκαῖαί εἰσιν αἳ δʼ οὔ, καὶ μέχρι τινός, αἱ δʼ ὑπερβολαὶ οὔ, οὐδʼ αἱ ἐλλείψεις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας ἔχει καὶ λύπας, ὁ μὲν τὰς ὑπερβολὰς διώκων τῶν ἡδέων †ἢ καθʼ ὑπερβολὰσ† ἢ διὰ προαίρεσιν, διʼ αὐτὰς καὶ μηδὲν διʼ ἕτερον ἀποβαῖνον, ἀκόλαστος· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τοῦτον μὴ εἶναι μεταμελητικόν, ὥστʼ ἀνίατος· ὁ γὰρ ἀμεταμέλητος ἀνίατος. ὁ δʼ ἐλλείπων ὁ ἀντικείμενος, ὁ δὲ μέσος σώφρων. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ φεύγων τὰς σωματικὰς λύπας μὴ διʼ ἧτταν ἀλλὰ διὰ προαίρεσιν. τῶν δὲ μὴ προαιρουμένων ὃ μὲν ἄγεται διὰ τὴν ἡδονήν, ὃ δὲ διὰ τὸ φεύγειν τὴν λύπην τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας, ὥστε διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων. παντὶ δʼ ἂν δόξειε χείρων εἶναι, εἴ τις μὴ ἐπιθυμῶν ἢ ἠρέμα πράττοι τι αἰσχρόν, ἢ εἰ σφόδρα ἐπιθυμῶν, καὶ εἰ μὴ ὀργιζόμενος τύπτοι ἢ εἰ ὀργιζόμενος· τί γὰρ ἂν ἐποίει ἐν πάθει ὤν; διὸ ὁ ἀκόλαστος χείρων τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς. τῶν δὴ λεχθέντων τὸ μὲν μαλακίας εἶδος μᾶλλον, ὃ δʼ ἀκόλαστος. ἀντίκειται δὲ τῷ μὲν ἀκρατεῖ ὁ ἐγκρατής, τῷ δὲ μαλακῷ ὁ καρτερικός· τὸ μὲν γὰρ καρτερεῖν ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ ἀντέχειν, ἡ δʼ ἐγκράτεια ἐν τῷ κρατεῖν, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἀντέχειν καὶ κρατεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μὴ ἡττᾶσθαι τοῦ νικᾶν· διὸ καὶ αἱρετώτερον ἐγκράτεια καρτερίας ἐστίν.
One who is deficient in resistance to pains that most men withstand with success, is soft or luxurious (for Luxury is a kind of Softness) : such a man lets his cloak trail on the ground to escape the fatigue and trouble of lifting it, or feigns sickness, not seeing that to counterfeit misery is to be miserable. The same holds good of Self-restraint and Unrestraint. It is not surprising that a man should be overcome by violent and excessive pleasures or pains: indeed it is excusable if he succumbs after a struggle, like Philoctetes in Theodectes when bitten by the viper, or Kerkyon in the Alope of Karkinos, or as men who try to restrain their laughter explode in one great guffaw, as happened to Xenophantus. But we are surprised when a man is overcome by pleasures and pains which most men are able to withstand, except when his failure to resist is due to some innate tendency, or to disease: instances of the former being the hereditary effeminacy of the royal family of Scythia, and the inferior endurance of the female sex as compared with the male. People too fond of amusement are thought to be profligate, but really they are soft; for amusement is rest, and therefore a slackening of effort, and addiction to amusement is a form of excessive slackness. But there are two forms of Unrestraint, Impetuousness and Weakness. The weak deliberate, but then are prevented by passion from keeping to their resolution; the impetuous are led by passion because they do not stop to deliberate: since some people withstand the attacks of passion, whether pleasant or painful, by feeling or seeing them coming, and rousing themselves, that is, their reasoning faculty, in advance, just as one is proof against tickling if one has just been tickled already. It is the quick and the excitable who are most liable to the impetuous form of Unrestraint, because the former are too hasty and the latter too vehement to wait for reason, being prone to follow their imagination.
ὁ δʼ ἐλλείπων πρὸς ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ ἀντιτείνουσι καὶ δύνανται, οὗτος μαλακὸς καὶ τρυφῶν· καὶ γὰρ ἡ τρυφὴ μαλακία τίς ἐστιν· ὃς ἕλκει τὸ ἱμάτιον, ἵνα μὴ πονήσῃ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ αἴρειν λύπην, καὶ μιμούμενος τὸν κάμνοντα οὐκ οἴεται ἄθλιος εἶναι, ἀθλίῳ ὅμοιος ὤν. ὁμοίως δʼ ἔχει καὶ περὶ ἐγκράτειαν καὶ ἀκρασίαν. οὐ γὰρ εἴ τις ἰσχυρῶν καὶ ὑπερβαλλουσῶν ἡδονῶν ἡττᾶται ἢ λυπῶν, θαυμαστόν, ἀλλὰ συγγνωμονικὸν εἰ ἀντιτείνων, ὥσπερ ὁ Θεοδέκτου Φιλοκτήτης ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔχεως πεπληγμένος ἢ ὁ Καρκίνου ἐν τῇ Ἀλόπῃ Κερκύων, καὶ ὥσπερ οἱ κατέχειν πειρώμενοι τὸν γέλωτα ἀθρόον ἐκκαγχάζουσιν, οἷον συνέπεσε Ξενοφάντῳ· ἀλλʼ εἴ τις πρὸς ἃς οἱ πολλοὶ δύνανται ἀντέχειν, τούτων ἡττᾶται καὶ μὴ δύναται ἀντιτείνειν, μὴ διὰ φύσιν τοῦ γένους ἢ διὰ νόσον, οἷον ἐν τοῖς Σκυθῶν βασιλεῦσιν ἡ μαλακία διὰ τὸ γένος, καὶ ὡς τὸ θῆλυ πρὸς τὸ ἄρρεν διέστηκεν. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ παιδιώδης ἀκόλαστος εἶναι, ἔστι δὲ μαλακός. ἡ γὰρ παιδιὰ ἄνεσίς ἐστιν, εἴπερ ἀνάπαυσις· τῶν δὲ πρὸς ταύτην ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ παιδιώδης ἐστίν. ἀκρασίας δὲ τὸ μὲν προπέτεια τὸ δʼ ἀσθένεια. οἳ μὲν γὰρ βουλευσάμενοι οὐκ ἐμμένουσιν οἷς ἐβουλεύσαντο διὰ τὸ πάθος, οἳ δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ βουλεύσασθαι ἄγονται ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους· ἔνιοι γάρ, ὥσπερ προγαργαλίσαντες οὐ γαργαλίζονται, οὕτω καὶ προαισθόμενοι καὶ προϊδόντες καὶ προεγείραντες ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν οὐχ ἡττῶνται ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους, οὔτʼ ἂν ἡδὺ ᾖ οὔτʼ ἂν λυπηρόν. μάλιστα δʼ οἱ ὀξεῖς καὶ μελαγχολικοὶ τὴν προπετῆ ἀκρασίαν εἰσὶν ἀκρατεῖς· οἳ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τὴν ταχυτῆτα οἳ δὲ διὰ τὴν σφοδρότητα οὐκ ἀναμένουσι τὸν λόγον, διὰ τὸ ἀκολουθητικοὶ εἶναι τῇ φαντασίᾳ.
ἔστι δʼ ὁ μὲν ἀκόλαστος, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη, οὐ μεταμελητικός· ἐμμένει γὰρ τῇ προαιρέσει· ὁ δʼ ἀκρατὴς μεταμελητικὸς πᾶς. διὸ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἠπορήσαμεν, οὕτω καὶ ἔχει, ἀλλʼ ὃ μὲν ἀνίατος ὃ δʼ ἰατός· ἔοικε γὰρ ἡ μὲν μοχθηρία τῶν νοσημάτων οἷον ὑδέρῳ καὶ φθίσει, ἡ δʼ ἀκρασία τοῖς ἐπιληπτικοῖς· ἣ μὲν γὰρ συνεχὴς ἣ δʼ οὐ συνεχὴς πονηρία. καὶ ὅλως δʼ ἕτερον τὸ γένος ἀκρασίας καὶ κακίας· ἡ μὲν γὰρ κακία λανθάνει, ἡ δʼ ἀκρασία οὐ λανθάνει.
Page 32 of 49 · Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle , tr. H. Rackham · Perseus Digital Library