This form of friendship is perfect both in point of duration and of the other attributes¹ of friendship; and in all respects either party receives from the other the same or similar benefits, as it is proper that friends should do. 1157aFriendship based on pleasure has a similarity to friendship based on virtue, for good men are pleasant to one another; and the same is true of friendship based on utility, for good men are useful to each other. In these cases also the friendship is most lasting when each friend derives the same benefit, for instance pleasure, from the other, and not only so, but derives it from the same thing, as in a friendship between two witty people, and not as in one between a lover and his beloved. These do not find their pleasure in the same things: the lover’s pleasure is in gazing at his beloved, the loved one’s pleasure is in receiving the attentions of the lover; and when the loved one’s beauty fades, the friendship sometimes fades too, as the lover no longer finds pleasure in the sight of his beloved, and the loved one no longer receives the attentions of the lover; though on the other hand many do remain friends if as a result of their intimacy they have come to love each other’s characters, both being alike in character. But when a pair of lovers exchange not pleasure for pleasure but pleasure for gain, the friendship is less intense and less lasting. A friendship based on utility dissolves as soon as its profit ceases; for the friends did not love each other, but what they got out of each other. Friendships therefore based on pleasure and on and utility can exist between two bad men, between one bad man and one good, and between a man neither good nor bad and another either good, bad, or neither. But clearly only good men can be friends for what they are in themselves; since bad men do not take pleasure in each other, save as they get some advantage from each other. Also friendship between good men alone is proof against calumny; for a man is slow to believe anybody’s word about a friend whom he has himself tried and tested for many years, and with them there is the mutual confidence, the incapacity ever to do each other wrong, and all the other characteristics that are required in true friendship. Whereas the other forms of friendship are liable to be dissolved by calumny and suspicion. But since people do apply the term “friends” to persons whose regard for each other is based on utility, just as states can be “friends” (since expediency is generally recognized as the motive of international alliances), or on pleasure, as children make friends, perhaps we too must call such relationships friendships; but then we must say that there are several sorts of friendship, that between good men, as good, being friendship in the primary and proper meaning of the term, while the other kinds are friendships in an analogical sense,² since such friends are friends in virtue of a sort of goodness and of likeness³ in them: insomuch as pleasure is good in the eyes of pleasure-lovers. But these two secondary forms of friendship are not very likely to coincide: men do not make friends with each other both for utility and for pleasure at the same time, since accidental qualities are rarely found in combination. 1157bFriendship then being divided into these species, inferior people will make friends for pleasure or for use, if they are alike in that respect,⁴ while good men will be friends for each other’s own sake, since they are alike in being good.⁵ The latter therefore are friends in an absolute sense, the former accidentally, and through their similarity to the latter.

It is with friendship as it is with the virtues; men are called good in two senses, either as having a virtuous disposition or as realizing virtue in action, and similarly friends when in each other’s company derive pleasure from and confer benefits on each other, whereas friends who are asleep or parted are not actively friendly, yet have the disposition to be so. For separation does not destroy friendship absolutely, though it prevents its active exercise. If however the absence be prolonged, it seems to cause the friendly feeling itself to be forgotten: hence the poet’s remark⁶ Full many a man finds friendship end For lack of converse with his friend. The old and the morose do not appear to be much given to friendship, for their capacity to please is small, and nobody can pass his days in the company of one who is distasteful to him, or not pleasing, since it seems to be one of the strongest instincts of nature to shun what is painful and seek what is pleasant. And when persons approve of each other without seeking such other’s society, this seems to be goodwill rather than friendship. Nothing is more characteristic of friends than that they seek each other’s society: poor men desire their friends’ assistance, and even the most prosperous wish for their companionship (indeed they are the last people to adopt the life of a recluse); but it is impossible for men to spend their time together unless they give each other pleasure, or have common tastes. The latter seems to be the bond between the members of a comradeship.⁷ Friendship between good men then is the truest friendship, as has been said several times before. For it is agreed that what is good and pleasant absolutely is lovable and desirable strictly, while what is good and pleasant for a particular person is lovable and desirable relatively to that person; but the friendship of good men for each other rests on both these grounds.⁸ Liking⁹ seems to be an emotion, friendship a fixed disposition, for liking can be felt even for inanimate things, but reciprocal liking¹⁰ involves deliberate choice, and this springs from a fixed disposition. Also, when men wish the good of those they love for their own sakes, their goodwill does not depend on emotion but on a fixed disposition. And in loving their friend they love their own good, for the good man in becoming dear to another becomes that other’s good. Each party therefore both loves his own good and also makes an equivalent return by wishing the other’s good, and by affording him pleasure; for there is a saying, “Amity is equality,” 1158a and this is most fully realized in the friendships of the good.

Morose and elderly people rarely make friends, as they are inclined to be surly, and do not take much pleasure in society; good temper and sociability appear to be the chief constituents or causes of friendship. Hence the young make friends quickly, but the old do not, since they do not make friends with people if they do not enjoy their company; and the same applies to persons of a morose temper. It is true that the old or morose may feel goodwill for each other, since they may wish each other well and help each other in case of need; but they cannot properly be called friends, as they do not seek each other’s society nor enjoy it, and these are thought to be the chief marks of friendship. It is not possible to have many friends in the full meaning of the word friendship, any more than it is to be in love with many people at once (love indeed seems to be an excessive state of emotion, such as is naturally felt towards one person only); and it is not easy for the same person to like a number of people at once, nor indeed perhaps can good men be found in large numbers. Also for perfect friendship you must get to know a man thoroughly, and become intimate with him, which is a very difficult thing to do. But it is possible to like a number of persons for their utility and pleasantness, for useful and pleasant people are plentiful, and the benefits they confer can be enjoyed at once. Of these two inferior kinds of friendship, the one that more closely resembles true friendship is that based on pleasure, in which the same benefit is conferred by both parties, and they enjoy each other’s company, or have common tastes; as is the case with the friendships of young people. For in these there is more generosity of feeling, whereas the friendship of utility is a thing for sordid souls. Also those blessed with great prosperity have no need of useful friends, but do need pleasant ones, since they desire some society; and though they may put up with what is unpleasant for a short time, no one would stand it continually: you could not endure even the Absolute Good itself for ever, if it bored you; and therefore the rich seek for friends who will be pleasant. No doubt they ought to require them to be good as well as pleasant, and also good for them, since then they would possess all the proper qualifications for friendship. But princes and rulers appear to keep their friends in separate compartments: they have some that are useful, and some that are pleasant, but rarely any that are both at once. For they do not seek for friends who are pleasant because they are good, or are useful for noble purposes, but look for witty people when they desire pleasure, and for the other sort seek men who are clever at executing their commissions; and these two qualities are rarely found in the same person. The good man, as we have said, is both useful and pleasant, but the good man does not become the friend of a superior, unless his superior in rank be also his superior in virtue; otherwise the good man as the inferior party cannot make matters proportionally equal.¹¹ But potentates of such superior excellence are scarcely common. 1158bBut to resume: the forms of friendship of which we have spoken are friendships of equality, for both parties render the same benefit and wish the same good to each other, or else exchange¹² two different benefits, for instance pleasure and profit. (These¹³ are less truly friendships, and less permanent, as we have said; and opinions differ as to whether they are really friendships at all, owing to their being both like and unlike the same thing. In view of their likeness to friendship based on virtue they do appear to be friendships, for the one contains pleasure and the other utility, and these are attributes of that form of friendship too; but in that friendship based on virtue is proof against calumny, and permanent, while the others quickly change, besides differing in many other respects, they appear not to be real friendships, owing to their unlikeness to it.)