Book I, Chapter 5

The result, as we have said, is that in one way this view says the same thing as those who hold the soul to be a body of fine parts, while in another way — inasmuch as, like Democritus, it says that the body is moved by the soul — it has an absurdity peculiar to itself. For if the soul is present in the whole of the perceiving body, there must necessarily be two bodies in the same place, if the soul is a body of any sort; while for those who call it a number, there must be many points in a single point, or else every body must possess a soul, unless some different number comes to be present in it, distinct from the points already existing in the body. And it follows that the animal is moved by the number, in just the way in which we said that Democritus makes it move the animal. For what difference does it make whether we speak of small spheres or of large units, or in general of units in locomotion? For in either case the animal must be moved by the movement of these.

For those, then, who have woven movement and number together into one and the same thing, these consequences follow, and many others like them; for it is impossible that such a thing should be, not merely the definition of the soul, but even an attribute of it. And this is plain if one tries, on the basis of this account, to render the affections and the functions of the soul — reasonings, perceptions, pleasures, pains, and all the rest of the kind. For, as we said before, it is not easy even to guess at them on such principles.

Three ways of defining the soul have been handed down. Some declared it to be that which is most capable of movement, in that it moves itself; others, that it is the body of the finest parts, or the least corporeal of all bodies. What difficulties and contradictions these views involve, we have now more or less gone through. It remains to examine in what sense it is said that the soul is composed of the elements.

For they say this in order that the soul may perceive the things that are and may know each of them; but many impossible consequences necessarily follow for this account. For they lay it down that like is known by like, as though they were positing that the soul is the things themselves. Yet these elements are not the only things there are; there are many others besides, or rather, perhaps, an infinite number of things composed of them. Let it be granted, then, that the soul knows and perceives the elements of which each of these things consists; but by what will it know or perceive the whole, such as what a god is, or a man, or flesh, or bone? And likewise with any other composite thing whatever. For it is not in any chance condition that the elements make up each of these, but in a certain ratio and composition, as Empedocles himself says about bone. It is of no use, then, for the elements to be present in the soul, unless the ratios and the composition are present there also; for each element will know its like, but nothing will know bone or man, unless these too are present in the soul. And there is no need to say that this is impossible; for who would raise the question whether a stone or a man is present in the soul? And so likewise with the good and the not-good; and in the same way with all the rest.

Again, since being is said in many ways — for it signifies now a "this," now a quantity or a quality or some other of the categories that have been distinguished — will the soul be composed of all of these or not? But there do not seem to be elements common to them all. Is it, then, composed only of those elements which are elements of substances? How, then, does it know each of the other kinds as well? Or will they say that there are elements and principles proper to each genus, out of which the soul is composed? Then the soul will be a quantity and a quality and a substance. But it is impossible that what is composed of the elements of quantity should be a substance and not a quantity. These consequences, then, and others like them, follow for those who say that the soul is composed of all the elements.

It is absurd, too, to say on the one hand that like is unaffected by like, and on the other that like perceives like and knows like by like; for they lay it down that perceiving is a way of being affected and of being moved, and likewise with thinking and knowing.

The doctrine that all things are known by the bodily elements and by reference to what is like them — as Empedocles maintains — involves many difficulties and objections, and what has now been said bears witness to this. For all those parts in the bodies of animals which are simply earth, such as bones, sinews, and hair, seem to perceive nothing at all, and therefore not their like either. And yet they ought to.

Again, each of the principles will possess more ignorance than understanding; for each will know one thing, but will fail to know many — indeed, all the rest. And for Empedocles it follows besides that God is the least intelligent of beings; for he alone will not know one of the elements, namely Strife, while mortal beings know them all, since each of them is composed of them all.

And in general, for what reason do not all the things that are possess a soul, since everything either is an element, or is composed of one element, or of several, or of all of them? For each thing must necessarily know one of them, or some, or all.

One might also raise the difficulty what it is that makes them one; for the elements resemble matter, and that which holds them together, whatever it may be, is supreme. But it is impossible that anything should be superior to the soul and rule over it; and still more impossible that anything should be superior to the intellect. For it is reasonable that the intellect should be first in origin and supreme by nature, whereas they say that the elements are the first of the things that are.

All of them alike — both those who say that the soul is composed of the elements because it knows and perceives the things that are, and those who say that it is what is most capable of movement — fail to speak about every kind of soul. For not all things that perceive are capable of movement; some animals evidently remain stationary in respect of place. And yet it is thought that this is the only one of the movements with which the soul moves the animal. And it is the same with all those who make the intellect and the perceptive faculty out of the elements; for plants evidently live without sharing in locomotion or in perception, and many animals evidently do not possess thought. And even if one were to concede these points, and were to lay it down that the intellect is a part of the soul, and likewise the perceptive faculty, not even so would they be speaking universally about every soul, nor about the whole of a soul, nor about any single one.

The account in the so-called Orphic poems is open to the same objection; for it says that the soul enters from the whole as living things breathe, borne in by the winds. But this cannot happen in the case of plants, nor in the case of some animals, since not all of them breathe. And this has escaped the notice of those who have held such an opinion.

And if the soul must be made out of the elements, there is no need for it to be made out of all of them; for one member of a pair of contraries is sufficient to discern both itself and its opposite. For by the straight we know both the straight itself and the crooked, since the ruler is the judge of both, whereas the crooked is judge neither of itself nor of the straight.

Some say, too, that the soul is mixed in the whole universe, which is perhaps why Thales also thought that all things are full of gods. But this involves certain difficulties. For what is the reason that the soul, when it is in air or in fire, does not make a living thing, whereas it does so in mixed bodies — and this although it is thought to be better when it is in air or fire? For one might well go on to ask for what reason the soul in the air is better and more immortal than the soul in animals. Either way an absurd and unreasonable result follows: to call fire or air a living thing is among the most unreasonable things to say, while not to call them living things, when soul is present in them, is absurd. They seem to have supposed that soul is present in these because the whole is of the same kind as its parts. Hence they must necessarily say that the soul too is of the same kind as its parts, if it is by some portion of the surrounding element being cut off and enclosed within animals that animals come to be ensouled. But if air, when torn apart, is of the same kind throughout, while the soul is not homogeneous in its parts, then clearly one part of it will be present in the portion enclosed, and another will not. It is necessary, then, either that the soul should be homogeneous, or that it should not be present in any and every part of the universe.

It is evident, then, from what has been said, that knowing does not belong to the soul because the soul is composed of the elements, and that it is neither well nor truly said that the soul is moved.

But since knowing belongs to the soul, and perceiving, and forming opinions, and further desiring and wishing and the appetites in general, and since movement in respect of place also comes about in animals through the soul, and likewise growth, maturity, and decay — does each of these belong to the whole soul, so that with the whole of it we think and perceive and do and undergo each of the rest, or do different ones belong to different parts? And does living, too, reside in some one of these parts, or in more than one, or in all of them, or has it some other cause?

Now some say that the soul is divisible, and that it thinks with one part and desires with another. What is it, then, that holds the soul together, if it is by nature divisible? Certainly not the body; for on the contrary the soul seems rather to hold the body together, since when the soul has departed the body breathes away and rots. If, then, it is something else that makes the soul one, that above all would be soul. And we shall have to inquire again about that too, whether it is one or has many parts. For if it is one, why is not the soul itself one straightaway? And if it is divisible, the argument will again inquire what it is that holds that together, and so it will go on to infinity.

One might also raise a difficulty about the parts of the soul: what power does each of them have in the body? For if the whole soul holds together the whole body, it is fitting that each of the parts should hold together some part of the body. But this seems impossible; for what part the intellect will hold together, or how, it is difficult even to invent.

Plants, too, evidently go on living when divided, and so do some of the insects among animals, as having a soul that is the same in kind, even if not the same in number; at any rate each of the parts has perception and moves in respect of place for a certain time. And if they do not continue to do so, there is nothing strange in that; for they do not have the organs needed to preserve their nature. But none the less all the parts of the soul are present in each of the divided parts, and they are of the same kind as one another and as the whole soul — as one another, in that they are not separable from one another; as the whole soul, in that the whole soul is divisible.

The principle in plants, too, seems to be a kind of soul; for this is the only principle in which animals and plants alike share. And this principle can be separated from the perceptive principle, though nothing has perception without it.