1255aIt is manifest therefore that there are cases of people of whom some are freemen and the others slaves by nature, and for these slavery is an institution both expedient and just.

But at the same time it is not difficult to see that those who assert the opposite are also right in a manner. The fact is that the terms “slavery” and “slave” are ambiguous; for there is also such a thing as a slave or a man that is in slavery by law, for the law is a sort of agreement under which the things conquered in war are said to belong to their conquerors. Now this conventional right is arraigned by many jurists just as a statesman is impeached for proposing an unconstitutional measure; they say that it is monstrous if the person powerful enough to use force, and superior in power, is to have the victim of his force as his slave and subject; and even among the learned some hold this view, though others hold the other. But the reason of this dispute and what makes the theories overlap is the fact that in a certain manner virtue when it obtains resources has in fact very great power to use force, and the stronger party always possesses superiority in something that is good,¹ so that it is thought that force cannot be devoid of goodness, but that the dispute is merely about the justice of the matter (for it is due to the one party holding that the justification of authority is good-will, while the other identifies justice with the mere rule of the stronger); because obviously if these theories be separated apart,the other theories have no force or plausibility at all, implying that the superior in goodness has no claim to rule and be master. But some persons, simply clinging, as they think, to principle of justice (for the law is a principle of justice), assert that the enslavement of prisoners of war is just; yet at the same time they deny the assertion, for there is the possibility that wars may be unjust in their origin and one would by no means admit that a man that does not deserve slavery can be really a slave—otherwise we shall have the result that persons reputed of the highest nobility are slaves and the descendants of slaves if they happen to be taken prisoners of war and sold. Therefore they do not mean to assert that Greeks themselves if taken prisoners are slaves, but that barbarians are. Yet when they say this, they are merely seeking for the principles of natural slavery of which we spoke at the outset; for they are compelled to say that there exist certain persons who are essentially slaves everywhere and certain others who are so nowhere. And the same applies also about nobility: our nobles consider themselves noble not only in their own country but everywhere, but they think that barbarian noblemen are only noble in their own country—which implies that there are two kinds of nobility and of freedom, one absolute and the other relative, as Helen says in Theodectes²: But who would dare to call me menial, The scion of a twofold stock divine? Yet in so speaking they make nothing but virtue and vice the distinction between slave and free, the noble and the base-born;

1255bfor they assume that just as from a man springs a man and from brutes a brute, so also from good parents comes a good son but as a matter of fact nature frequently while intending to do this is unable to bring it about.

It is clear therefore that there is some reason for this dispute, and that in some instances it is not the case that one set are slaves and the other freemen by nature; and also that in some instances such a distinction does exist, when slavery for the one and mastership for the other are advantageous and just, and it is proper for the one party to be governed and for the other to govern by the form of government for which they are by nature fitted, and therefore by the exercise of mastership, while to govern badly is to govern disadvantageously for both parties (for the same thing is advantageous for a part and for the whole body or the whole soul, and the slave is a part of the master—he is, as it were, a part of the body, alive but yet separated from it; hence there is a certain community of interest and friendship between slave and master in cases when they have been qualified by nature for those positions, although when they do not hold them in that way but by law and by constraint of force the opposite is the case).

And even from these considerations it is clear that the authority of a master over slaves is not the same as the authority of a magistrate in a republic, nor are all forms of government the same, as some assert. Republican government controls men who are by nature free, the master’s authority men who are by nature slaves; and the government of a household is monarchy (since every house is governed by a single ruler),whereas statesmanship is the government of men free and equal. The term “master” therefore denotes the possession not of a certain branch of knowledge but of a certain character, and similarly also the terms “slave” and “freeman.” Yet there might be a science of mastership and a slave’s science—the latter being the sort of knowledge that used to be imparted by the professor at Syracuse (for there used to be a man there who for a fee gave lessons to servants in their ordinary duties); and indeed there might be more advanced scientific study of such matters, for instance a science of cookery and the other such kinds of domestic service—for different servants have different functions, some more honorable and some more menial, and as the proverb says, Slave before slave and master before master.Probably from a comedy of Aristotle’s contemporary Philemon. The slave’s sciences then are all the various branches of domestic work; the master’s science is the science of employing slaves—for the master’s function consists not in acquiring slaves but in employing them. This science however is one of no particular importance or dignity: the master must know how to direct the tasks which the slave must know how to execute. Therefore all people rich enough to be able to avoid personal trouble have a steward who takes this office, while they themselves engage in politics or philosophy. The science of acquiring slaves is different both from their ownership and their direction—that is, the just acquiring of slaves, which is akin to the art of war or that of the chase. Let this then stand as our definition of slave and master.

1256a But let us follow our normal method and investigate generally the nature of all kinds of property and the art of getting wealth, inasmuch as we saw the slave to be one division of property. In the first place therefore one might raise the question whether the art of getting wealth is the same as that of household management, or a part of it, or subsidiary to it; and if subsidiary, whether it is so in the sense in which the art of making shuttles is subsidiary to the art of weaving or in that in which the art of casting bronze is subsidiary to the making of statues (for the two are not subsidiary in the same way, but shuttle-making supplies tools whereas bronze-founding supplies material—and by material I mean the substance out of which certain work is produced, for example fleeces are material for a weaver and bronze for a statuary).

Now it is clear that wealth-getting is not the same art as household management, for the function of the former is to provide and that of the latter to use—for what will be the art that will use the contents of the house if not the art of household management? but whether wealth-getting is a part of the art of household management, or a different sort of science, is open to debate. For if it is the function of the getter of wealth to study the source from which money and property are to be procured, . . .³ But property and riches comprise many divisions; hence first of all is husbandry a division of the household art, or is it a different kind of science? and so in general of the superintendence and acquisition of articles of food.

But furthermore, there are many sorts of food,owing to which both animals and men have many modes of life; for it is impossible to live without food, so that the differences of food have made the lives of animals different. Among wild animals some are nomadic and others solitary, according to whichever habit is advantageous for their supply of food, because some of them are carnivorous, others graminivorous, and others eat all kinds of food; so that nature has differentiated their modes of life to suit their facilities and their predilection for those articles of food. And as different kinds of animals by nature relish different sorts of food, and not each kind the same, even within the classes of carnivorous and graminivorous animals their modes of life differ from one another. And similarly in the human race also, for there are wide differences of life among mankind. The idlest men are nomads (for to procure food from domesticated animals involves no toil or industry, but as it is necessary for the herds to move from place to place because of the pastures, the people themselves are forced to follow along with them, as though they were farming a live farm). Other men live from hunting, and different people from different kinds of hunting, for instance some from brigandage,⁴ others from fishing—these are those that dwell on the banks of lakes, marshes and rivers or of a sea suitable for fishing,—and others live on wild birds and animals. But the largest class of men live from the land and the fruits of cultivation. This then virtually completes the list of the various modes of life, those at least that have their industry sprung from themselves and do not procure their food by barter and trade—