These monarchies therefore now and in the past are of the nature of tyrannies because they are autocratic, but of the nature of kingships because they are elective and rule over willing subjects. A fourth class of royal monarchy consists of the hereditary legal kingships over willing subjects in the heroic period. For because the first of the line had been benefactors of the multitude in the arts or in war, or through having drawn them together or provided them with land, these kings used to come to the throne with the consent of the subjects and hand it on to their successors by lineal descent. And they had supreme command in war and control over all sacrifices that were not in the hands of the priestly class, and in addition to these functions they were judges in law-suits; some gave judgement not on oath and some on oath—the oath was taken by holding up the sceptre.¹ These kings then of ancient times used to govern continuously in matters within the city and in the country and across the frontiers; but later on when gradually the kings relinquished some of their powers and had others taken from them by the multitudes, in the cities in general only the sacrifices were left to the kings,² while where anything that deserves the name of royalty survived the kings only had the command in military expeditions across the frontiers.

There are then these kinds of kingship, four in number: one belonging to the heroic times, which was exercised over willing subjects, but in certain limited fields, for the king was general and judge and master of religious ceremonies; second, the barbarian monarchy, which is an hereditary despotism governing in conformity with law; third, the rule of the functionary called an aesymnetes, which is an elective tyranny; and fourth among these is the Spartan kingship, which may be described simply as an hereditary generalship held for life. These kingships then differ from one another in this manner. But a fifth kind of kingship is when a single ruler is sovereign over all matters in the way in which each race and each city is sovereign over its common affairs; this monarchy ranges with the rule of a master over a household, for just as the master’s rule is a sort of monarchy in the home, so absolute monarchy is domestic mastership over a city, or over a race or several races.

There are therefore, we may say, virtually two kinds of kingship that have been examined, this one and the Spartan. For most of the others lie between these, since with them the king is sovereign over fewer things than under absolute monarchy, but over more than under the Spartan kingship. Hence our inquiry is virtually about two questions, one whether it is expedient or inexpedient for states to have a military commander holding office for life, and that either by descent or by class,³

1286a and one whether it is expedient or inexpedient for one man to be sovereign over everything. Now the study of a militarycommand of the kind mentioned has more the aspect of a legal than of a constitutional inquiry (for it is possible for this form of office to exist under all constitutions), so let it be dismissed at the first stage⁴; but the remaining mode of kingship is a kind of constitution, so that it is necessary to consider this one and to run over the difficulties that it involves.

And the starting-point of the inquiry is the question whether it is more advantageous to be ruled by the best men or by the best laws. Those of the opinion that it is advantageous to be governed by a king think that laws enunciate only general principles but do not give directions for dealing with circumstances as they arise; so that in an art of any kind it is foolish to govern procedure by written rules (and indeed in Egypt physicians have the right to alter their prescription after four days, although if one of them alters it before he does so at his own risk); it is clear therefore that government according to written rules, that is laws, is not the best, for the same reason. At the same time, however, rulers ought to be in possession of the general principle before mentioned as well. And a thing that does not contain the emotional element is generally superior to a thing in which it is innate; now the law does not possess this factor, but every human soulnecessarily has it. But perhaps someone might say that in compensation for this a single ruler will decide better about particular cases. Therefore it is clear that on the one hand the ruler must necessarily be a legislator, and that there must or be laws laid down, although these must not be sovereign⁵ where they go astray—admittedly in all other cases they ought to be sovereign; but on the other hand in matters which it is impossible for the law either to decide at all or to decide well, ought the one best man to govern or all the citizens? As it is, the citizens assembled hear lawsuits and deliberate and give judgements, but these judgements are all on particular cases. Now no doubt any one of them individually is inferior compared with the best man, but a state consists of a number of individuals, and just as a banquet towhich many contribute dishes is finer than a single plain dinner, for this reason in many cases a crowd judges better than any single person. Also the multitude is more incorruptible—just as the larger stream of water is purer, so the mass of citizens is less corruptible than the few; and the individual’s judgement is bound to be corrupted when he is overcome by anger or some other such emotion, whereas in the other case it is a difficult thing for all the people to be roused to anger and go wrong together. But the multitude must consist of the freemen, doing nothing apart from the law except about matters as to which the law must of necessity be deficient. And if this is not indeed easy to ensure in the case of many men, yet if there were a majority of good men and good citizens, would an individual make a more incorruptible ruler or rather those who though the majority in number yet are all good?

1286b The majority, is it not obvious? But it will be said that they will split up into factions, whereas with a single ruler this cannot happen. But against this must perhaps be set the fact that they are as virtuous in soul as the single ruler. If then the rule of the majority when these are all good men is to be considered an aristocracy, and that of the one man kingship, aristocracy would be preferable for the states to kingship, whether the royal office be conjoined with military force or without it, if it be possible to get a larger number of men than one who are of similar quality. And it was perhaps only owing to this that kingships existed in earlier times, because it was rare to find men who greatly excelled in virtue, especially as in those days they dwelt in small cities. Moreover they used to appoint their kings on the ground of public service, and to perform this is a task for the good men. But as it began to come about that many men arose who were alike in respect of virtue, they would no longer submit to royalty, but sought for some form of commonwealth, and set up a republican constitution. And as men becoming baser began to make money out of the community, it is reasonable to suppose that some such cause as this occasioned the rise of oligarchies; for they brought wealth into honor. And from oligarchies they first changed to tyrannies, and from tyrannies to democracy; for by constantly bringing the government into fewer hands owing to a base love of gain, they made the multitude stronger,⁶ so that it set upon the oligarchs, and democracies came into existence.But now that the states have come to be even greater than they were, perhaps it is not easy for yet another form of constitution beside democracy to come into existence. And even if one held that royal government is best for states, what is to be the position as regards the king’s children? is the sovereignty to be hereditary? But this will be disastrous if the king’s sons turn out to be like what some have been. It may be said that the king being sovereign will not in that case bequeath the throne to his children. But that is too much to be easy to believe: it would be difficult for a king to disinherit his sons, and an act of virtue above the level of human nature. And there is a difficulty also about the royal power: ought the man who is to reign as king to force to have an armed force about him, by means of which he willhave power to compel those who may be unwilling to obey, or if not, how is it possible for him to administer his office? For even if he were a law-abiding sovereign and never acted according to his own will against the law, nevertheless it would be essential for him to have power behind him whereby to safeguard the laws. Probably therefore it is not difficult to define the regulations for a king of this sort: he must have a force of his own, but the force must be only so large as to be stronger than a single individual or even several individuals banded together, but weaker than the multitude, on the principle on which the men of old times used to assign bodyguards whenever they appointed somebody as what they termed aesymnetes or tyrant⁷ of the state, and also, when Dionysius⁸ asked for his guards, somebody advised him to give the same number of guards to the citizens of Syracuse.