1301a 1Almost all the other subjects which we intended to treathave now been discussed. There must follow the consideration of the questions, what are the number and the nature of the causes that give rise to revolutions in constitutions, and what are the causes that destroy each form of constitution, and out of what forms into what forms do they usually change, and again what are the safeguards of constitutions in general and of each form in particular, and what are the means by which the safeguarding of each may best be put into effect.2
And we must first assume the starting-point, that many forms of constitution have come into existence with everybody agreeing as to what is just, that is proportionate equality, but failing to attain it (as has also been said before). Thus democracy arose from men’s thinking that if they are equal in any respect they are equal absolutely (for they suppose that because they are all alike free they are equal absolutely), oligarchy arose from their assuming that if they are unequal as regards some one thing they are unequal wholly (for being unequal in property they assume that they are unequal absolutely); and then the democrats claim as being equal to participate in all things in equal shares, while the oligarchs as being unequal seek to have a larger share, for a larger share is unequal. All these forms of constitution then have some element of justice, but from an absolute point of view they are erroneous; and owing to this cause, when each of the two parties has not got the share in the constitution which accords with the fundamental assumption that they happen to entertain, faction ensues. And of all men those who excel in virtue would most justifiably stir up faction, though they are least given to doing so;
1301b for they alone can with the fullest reason be deemed absolutely unequal. And there are some men who being superior in birth claim unequal rights because of this inequality; for persons who have ancestral virtue and wealth behind them are thought to be noble.
These then roughly speaking are the starting-points and sources of factions, which give rise to party strife (and revolutions due to this take place in two ways: sometimes they are in regard to the constitution, and aim at changing from the one established to another, for instance from democracy to oligarchy, or to democracy from oligarchy, or from these to constitutional government and aristocracy, or from those to these; but sometimes the revolution is not in regard to the established constitution, but its promoters desire the same form of government, for instance oligarchy or monarchy, but wish it to be in their own control. Again it may be a question of degree; for instance, when there is an oligarchy the object may be to change to a more oligarchical government or to a less, or when there is a democracy to a more or to a less democratic government, and similarly in the case of the remaining constitutions, the aim may be either to tighten them up or to relax them. Or again the aim may be to change a certain part of the constitution, for example to establish or abolish a certain magistracy, as according to some accounts Lysanderattempted to abolish the kingship at Sparta and the king Pausanias the ephorate3; and also at Epidamnus the constitution was altered in part, for they set up a council instead of the tribal rulers, and it is still compulsory for the magistrates alone of the class that has political power to come to the popular assembly when an appointment to a magistracy is put to the vote; and the single supreme magistrate was also an oligarchical feature in this constitution). For party strife is everywhere due to inequality, where classes that are unequal do not receive a share of power in proportion (for a lifelong monarchy is an unequal feature when it exists among equals); for generally the motive for factious strife is the desire for equality. But equality is of two kinds, numerical equality and equality according to worth—by numerically equal I mean that which is the same and equal in number or dimension, by equal according to worth that which is equal by proportion4; for instance numerically 3 exceeds 2 and 2 exceeds 1 by an equal amount, but by proportion 4 exceeds 2 and 2 exceeds 1 equally, since 2 and 1 are equal parts of 4 and 2, both being halves. But although men agree that the absolutely just is what is according to worth, they disagree (as was said before5) in that some think that if they are equal in something they are wholly equal, and others claim that if they are unequal in something they deserve an unequal share of all things. Owing to this two principal varieties of constitution come into existence, democracy and oligarchy; for noble birth and virtue are found in few men,
but the qualifications specified6 in more: 1302a nowhere are there a hundred men nobly born and good, but there are rich men7 in many places. But for the constitution to be framed absolutely and entirely according to either kind of equality is bad. And this is proved by experience, for not one of the constitutions formed on such lines is permanent. And the cause of this is that it is impossible for some evil not to occur ultimately from the first and initial error that has been made. Hence the proper course is to employ numerical equality in some things and equality according to worth in others. But nevertheless democracy is safer and more free from civil strife than oligarchy; for in oligarchies two kinds of strife spring up, faction between different members of the oligarchy and also faction between the oligarchs and the people, whereas in democracies only strife between the people and the oligarchical party occurs, but party strife between different sections of the people itself does not occur to any degree worth mentioning. And again the government formed of the middle classes is nearer to the people than to the few, and it is the safest of the kinds of constitution mentioned.
And since we are considering what circumstances give rise to party factions and revolutions in constitutions, we must first ascertain their origins and causes generally. They are, speaking roughly, three in number,8 which we must first define in outline separately.For we must ascertain what state of affairs gives rise to party strife, and for what objects it is waged, and thirdly what are the origins of political disorders and internal party struggles.
Now the principal cause, speaking generally, of the citizens being themselves disposed in a certain manner towards revolution is the one about which we happen to have spoken already. Those that desire equality enter on party strife if they think that they have too little although they are the equals of those who have more, while those that desire inequality or superiority do so if they suppose that although they are unequal they have not got more but an equal amount or less (and these desires may be felt justly, and they may also be felt unjustly); for when inferior, people enter on strife in order that they may be equal, and when equal, in order that they may be greater. We have therefore said what are the states of feeling in which men engage in party strife.
The objects about which it is waged are gain and honor, and their opposites, for men carry on party faction in states in order to avoid dishonor and loss, either on their own behalf or on behalf of their friends.
And the causes and origins of the disturbances which occasion the actual states of feeling described and their direction to the objects mentioned, according to one account happen to be seven in number, though according to another they are more. Two of them are the same as those spoken of before although not operating in the same way: the motives of gain and honor also stir men up against each other not in order that they may get them for themselves, as has been said before,
1302bbut because they see other men in some cases justly and in other cases unjustly getting a larger share of them. Other causes are insolence, fear, excessive predominance, contempt, disproportionate growth of power; and also other modes of cause9 are election intrigue, carelessness, pettiness, dissimilarity. Among these motives the power possessed by insolence and gain, and their mode of operation, is almost obvious; for when the men in office show insolence and greed, people rise in revolt against one another and against the constitutions that afford the opportunity for such conduct; and greed sometimes preys on private property and sometimes on common funds. It is clear also what is the power of honor and how it can cause party faction; for men form factions both when they are themselves dishonored and when they see others honored; and the distribution of honors is unjust when persons are either honored or dishonored against their deserts, just when it is according to desert. Excessive predominance causes faction, when some individual or body of men is greater and more powerful than is suitable to the state and the power of the government; for such are the conditions that usually result in the rise of a monarchy or dynasty. Owing to this in some places they have the custom of temporary banishment,10 as at Argos and Athens; yet it would be better to provide from the outset that there may be no persons in the stateso greatly predominant, than first to allow them to come into existence and afterwards to apply a remedy. Fear is the motive of faction with those who have inflicted wrong and are afraid of being punished, and also with those who are in danger of suffering a wrong and wish to act in time before the wrong is inflicted, as the notables at Rhodes banded together11 against the people because of the law-suits that were being brought against them. Contempt is a cause of faction and of actual attacks, upon the government, for instance in oligarchies when those who have no share in the government are more numerous (for they think themselves the stronger party), and in democracies when the rich have begun to feel contempt for the disorder and anarchy that prevails, as for example at Thebes the democracy was destroyed owing to bad government after the battle of Oenophyta,12 and that of the Megarians was destroyed when they had been defeated owing to disorder and anarchy,13 and at Syracuse before the tyranny14 of Gelo, and at Rhodes 15 the common people had fallen into contempt before the rising against them. Revolutions in the constitutions also take place on account of disproportionate growth; for just as the body16 is composed of parts, and needs to grow proportionately in order that its symmetry may remain, and if it does not it is spoiled, when the foot is four cubits long and the rest of the body two spans, and sometimes it might even change into the shape of another animal if it increased disproportionately not only in size but also in quality,17 so also a state is composed of parts,
Almost all the other subjects which we intended to treathave now been discussed. There must follow the consideration of the questions, what are the number and the nature of the causes that give rise to revolutions in constitutions, and what are the causes that destroy each form of constitution, and out of what forms into what forms do they usually change, and again what are the safeguards of constitutions in general and of each form in particular, and what are the means by which the safeguarding of each may best be put into effect.
And we must first assume the starting-point, that many forms of constitution have come into existence with everybody agreeing as to what is just, that is proportionate equality, but failing to attain it (as has also been said before). Thus democracy arose from men’s thinking that if they are equal in any respect they are equal absolutely (for they suppose that because they are all alike free they are equal absolutely), oligarchy arose from their assuming that if they are unequal as regards some one thing they are unequal wholly (for being unequal in property they assume that they are unequal absolutely); and then the democrats claim as being equal to participate in all things in equal shares, while the oligarchs as being unequal seek to have a larger share, for a larger share is unequal. All these forms of constitution then have some element of justice, but from an absolute point of view they are erroneous; and owing to this cause, when each of the two parties has not got the share in the constitution which accords with the fundamental assumption that they happen to entertain, faction ensues. And of all men those who excel in virtue would most justifiably stir up faction, though they are least given to doing so;
αἱρετούς.
for they alone can with the fullest reason be deemed absolutely unequal. And there are some men who being superior in birth claim unequal rights because of this inequality; for persons who have ancestral virtue and wealth behind them are thought to be noble.
These then roughly speaking are the starting-points and sources of factions, which give rise to party strife (and revolutions due to this take place in two ways: sometimes they are in regard to the constitution, and aim at changing from the one established to another, for instance from democracy to oligarchy, or to democracy from oligarchy, or from these to constitutional government and aristocracy, or from those to these; but sometimes the revolution is not in regard to the established constitution, but its promoters desire the same form of government, for instance oligarchy or monarchy, but wish it to be in their own control. Again it may be a question of degree; for instance, when there is an oligarchy the object may be to change to a more oligarchical government or to a less, or when there is a democracy to a more or to a less democratic government, and similarly in the case of the remaining constitutions, the aim may be either to tighten them up or to relax them. Or again the aim may be to change a certain part of the constitution, for example to establish or abolish a certain magistracy, as according to some accounts Lysanderattempted to abolish the kingship at Sparta and the king Pausanias the ephorate; and also at Epidamnus the constitution was altered in part, for they set up a council instead of the tribal rulers, and it is still compulsory for the magistrates alone of the class that has political power to come to the popular assembly when an appointment to a magistracy is put to the vote; and the single supreme magistrate was also an oligarchical feature in this constitution). For party strife is everywhere due to inequality, where classes that are unequal do not receive a share of power in proportion (for a lifelong monarchy is an unequal feature when it exists among equals); for generally the motive for factious strife is the desire for equality. But equality is of two kinds, numerical equality and equality according to worth—by numerically equal I mean that which is the same and equal in number or dimension, by equal according to worth that which is equal by proportion; for instance numerically 3 exceeds 2 and 2 exceeds 1 by an equal amount, but by proportion 4 exceeds 2 and 2 exceeds 1 equally, since 2 and 1 are equal parts of 4 and 2, both being halves. But although men agree that the absolutely just is what is according to worth, they disagree (as was said before) in that some think that if they are equal in something they are wholly equal, and others claim that if they are unequal in something they deserve an unequal share of all things. Owing to this two principal varieties of constitution come into existence, democracy and oligarchy; for noble birth and virtue are found in few men,
but the qualifications specified in more:
μάλιστα γὰρ εὔλογον ἀνίσους ἁπλῶς εἶναι τούτους μόνον. εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἳ κατὰ γένος ὑπερέχοντες οὐκ ἀξιοῦσι τῶν ἴσων αὑτοὺς διὰ τὴν ἀνισότητα ταύτην· εὐγενεῖς γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦσιν οἷς ὑπάρχει προγόνων ἀρετὴ καὶ πλοῦτος.
ἀρχαὶ μὲν οὖν ὡς εἰπεῖν αὗται καὶ πηγαὶ τῶν στάσεών εἰσιν, ὅθεν στασιάζουσιν· διὸ καὶ αἱ μεταβολαὶ γίνονται διχῶς· ὁτὲ μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν, ὅπως ἐκ τῆς καθεστηκυίας ἄλλην μεταστήσωσιν, οἷον ἐκ δημοκρατίας ὀλιγαρχίαν ἢ δημοκρατίαν ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας, ἢ πολιτείαν καὶ ἀριστοκρατίαν ἐκ τούτων, ἢ ταύτας ἐξ ἐκείνων, ὁτὲ δʼ οὐ πρὸς τὴν καθεστηκυῖαν πολιτείαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν κατάστασιν προαιροῦνται τὴν αὐτήν, διʼ αὑτῶν δʼ εἶναι βούλονται ταύτην, οἷον τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἢ τὴν μοναρχίαν· ἔτι περὶ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, οἷον ἢ ὀλιγαρχίαν οὖσαν εἰς τὸ μᾶλλον ὀλιγαρχεῖσθαι ἢ εἰς τὸ ἧττον, ἢ δημοκρατίαν οὖσαν εἰς τὸ μᾶλλον δημοκρατεῖσθαι ἢ εἰς τὸ ἧττον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν πολιτειῶν, ἢ ἵνα ἐπιταθῶσιν ἢ ἀνεθῶσιν· ἔτι πρὸς τὸ μέρος τι κινῆσαι τῆς πολιτείας, οἷον ἀρχήν τινα καταστῆσαι ἢ ἀνελεῖν, ὥσπερ ἐν Λακεδαίμονί φασι Λύσανδρόν τινες ἐπιχειρῆσαι καταλῦσαι τὴν βασιλείαν καὶ Παυσανίαν τὸν βασιλέα τὴν ἐφορείαν, καὶ ἐν Ἐπιδάμνῳ δὲ μετέβαλεν ἡ πολιτεία κατὰ μόριον (ἀντὶ γὰρ τῶν φυλάρχων βουλὴν ἐποίησαν, εἰς δὲ τὴν ἡλιαίαν ἐπάναγκές ἐστιν ἔτι τῶν ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι βαδίζειν τὰς ἀρχάς, ὅταν ἐπιψηφίζηται ἀρχή τις, ὀλιγαρχικὸν δὲ καὶ ὁ ἄρχων ὁ εἷς ἦν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ ταύτῃ). πανταχοῦ γὰρ διὰ τὸ ἄνισον ἡ στάσις, οὐ μὴ τοῖς ἀνίσοις ὑπάρχει ἀνάλογον (ἀΐδιος γὰρ βασιλεία ἄνισος, ἐὰν ᾖ ἐν ἴσοις)· ὅλως γὰρ τὸ ἴσον ζητοῦντες στασιάζουσιν. ἔστι δὲ διττὸν τὸ ἴσον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀριθμῷ τὸ δὲ κατʼ ἀξίαν ἐστίν. λέγω δὲ ἀριθμῷ μὲν τὸ πλήθει ἢ μεγέθει ταὐτὸ καὶ ἴσον, κατʼ ἀξίαν δὲ τὸ τῷ λόγῳ, οἷον ὑπερέχει κατʼ ἀριθμὸν μὲν ἴσῳ τὰ τρία τοῖν δυοῖν καὶ ταῦτα τοῦ ἑνός, λόγῳ δὲ τὰ τέτταρα τοῖν δυοῖν καὶ ταῦτα τοῦ ἑνός· ἴσον γὰρ μέρος τὰ δύο τῶν τεττάρων καὶ τὸ ἓν τοῖν δυοῖν· ἄμφω γὰρ ἡμίση. ὁμολογοῦντες δὲ τὸ ἁπλῶς εἶναι δίκαιον τὸ κατʼ ἀξίαν, διαφέρονται, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη πρότερον, οἱ μὲν ὅτι, ἐὰν κατὰ τὶ ἴσοι ὦσιν, ὅλως ἴσοι νομίζουσιν εἶναι, οἱ δʼ ὅτι, ἐὰν κατὰ τὶ ἄνισοι, πάντων ἀνίσων ἀξιοῦσιν ἑαυτούς. διὸ καὶ μάλιστα δύο γίνονται πολιτεῖαι, δῆμος καὶ ὀλιγαρχία· εὐγένεια γὰρ καὶ ἀρετὴ
nowhere are there a hundred men nobly born and good, but there are rich men in many places. But for the constitution to be framed absolutely and entirely according to either kind of equality is bad. And this is proved by experience, for not one of the constitutions formed on such lines is permanent. And the cause of this is that it is impossible for some evil not to occur ultimately from the first and initial error that has been made. Hence the proper course is to employ numerical equality in some things and equality according to worth in others. But nevertheless democracy is safer and more free from civil strife than oligarchy; for in oligarchies two kinds of strife spring up, faction between different members of the oligarchy and also faction between the oligarchs and the people, whereas in democracies only strife between the people and the oligarchical party occurs, but party strife between different sections of the people itself does not occur to any degree worth mentioning. And again the government formed of the middle classes is nearer to the people than to the few, and it is the safest of the kinds of constitution mentioned.
And since we are considering what circumstances give rise to party factions and revolutions in constitutions, we must first ascertain their origins and causes generally. They are, speaking roughly, three in number, which we must first define in outline separately.For we must ascertain what state of affairs gives rise to party strife, and for what objects it is waged, and thirdly what are the origins of political disorders and internal party struggles.
Now the principal cause, speaking generally, of the citizens being themselves disposed in a certain manner towards revolution is the one about which we happen to have spoken already. Those that desire equality enter on party strife if they think that they have too little although they are the equals of those who have more, while those that desire inequality or superiority do so if they suppose that although they are unequal they have not got more but an equal amount or less (and these desires may be felt justly, and they may also be felt unjustly); for when inferior, people enter on strife in order that they may be equal, and when equal, in order that they may be greater. We have therefore said what are the states of feeling in which men engage in party strife.
The objects about which it is waged are gain and honor, and their opposites, for men carry on party faction in states in order to avoid dishonor and loss, either on their own behalf or on behalf of their friends.
And the causes and origins of the disturbances which occasion the actual states of feeling described and their direction to the objects mentioned, according to one account happen to be seven in number, though according to another they are more. Two of them are the same as those spoken of before although not operating in the same way: the motives of gain and honor also stir men up against each other not in order that they may get them for themselves, as has been said before,
ἐν ὀλίγοις,
but because they see other men in some cases justly and in other cases unjustly getting a larger share of them. Other causes are insolence, fear, excessive predominance, contempt, disproportionate growth of power; and also other modes of cause are election intrigue, carelessness, pettiness, dissimilarity. Among these motives the power possessed by insolence and gain, and their mode of operation, is almost obvious; for when the men in office show insolence and greed, people rise in revolt against one another and against the constitutions that afford the opportunity for such conduct; and greed sometimes preys on private property and sometimes on common funds. It is clear also what is the power of honor and how it can cause party faction; for men form factions both when they are themselves dishonored and when they see others honored; and the distribution of honors is unjust when persons are either honored or dishonored against their deserts, just when it is according to desert. Excessive predominance causes faction, when some individual or body of men is greater and more powerful than is suitable to the state and the power of the government; for such are the conditions that usually result in the rise of a monarchy or dynasty. Owing to this in some places they have the custom of temporary banishment, as at Argos and Athens; yet it would be better to provide from the outset that there may be no persons in the stateso greatly predominant, than first to allow them to come into existence and afterwards to apply a remedy. Fear is the motive of faction with those who have inflicted wrong and are afraid of being punished, and also with those who are in danger of suffering a wrong and wish to act in time before the wrong is inflicted, as the notables at Rhodes banded together against the people because of the law-suits that were being brought against them. Contempt is a cause of faction and of actual attacks, upon the government, for instance in oligarchies when those who have no share in the government are more numerous (for they think themselves the stronger party), and in democracies when the rich have begun to feel contempt for the disorder and anarchy that prevails, as for example at Thebes the democracy was destroyed owing to bad government after the battle of Oenophyta, and that of the Megarians was destroyed when they had been defeated owing to disorder and anarchy, and at Syracuse before the tyranny of Gelo, and at Rhodes the common people had fallen into contempt before the rising against them. Revolutions in the constitutions also take place on account of disproportionate growth; for just as the body is composed of parts, and needs to grow proportionately in order that its symmetry may remain, and if it does not it is spoiled, when the foot is four cubits long and the rest of the body two spans, and sometimes it might even change into the shape of another animal if it increased disproportionately not only in size but also in quality, so also a state is composed of parts,
ὁρῶντες τοὺς μὲν δικαίως τοὺς δʼ ἀδίκως πλεονεκτοῦντας τούτων· ἔτι διὰ ὕβριν, διὰ φόβον, διὰ ὑπεροχήν, διὰ καταφρόνησιν, διὰ αὔξησιν τὴν παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον· ἔτι δὲ ἄλλον τρόπον διʼ ἐριθείαν, διʼ ὀλιγωρίαν, διὰ μικρότητα, διὰ ἀνομοιότητα. Τούτων δὲ ὕβρις μὲν καὶ κέρδος τίνα ἔχουσι δύναμιν καὶ πῶς αἴτια, σχεδόν ἐστι φανερόν· ὑβριζόντων τε γὰρ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς καὶ πλεονεκτούντων στασιάζουσι καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας τὰς διδούσας τὴν ἐξουσίαν· ἡ δὲ πλεονεξία γίνεται ὁτὲ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων ὁτὲ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν. —δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἡ τιμή, καὶ τί δύναται καὶ πῶς αἰτία στάσεως· καὶ γὰρ αὐτοὶ ἀτιμαζόμενοι καὶ ἄλλους ὁρῶντες τιμωμένους στασιάζουσιν· ταῦτα δὲ ἀδίκως μὲν γίνεται ὅταν παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἢ τιμῶνταί τινες ἢ ἀτιμάζωνται, δικαίως δὲ ὅταν κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν. —διʼ ὑπεροχὴν δέ, ὅταν τις ᾖ τῇ δυνάμει μείζων (ἢ εἷς ἢ πλείους) ἢ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ πολιτεύματος· γίνεσθαι γὰρ εἴωθεν ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων μοναρχία ἢ δυναστεία· διὸ ἐνιαχοῦ εἰώθασιν ὀστρακίζειν, οἷον ἐν Ἄργει καὶ Ἀθήνησιν· καίτοι βέλτιον ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὁρᾶν ὅπως μὴ ἐνέσονται τοσοῦτον ὑπερέχοντες, ἢ ἐάσαντας γενέσθαι ἰᾶσθαι ὕστερον. —διὰ δὲ φόβον στασιάζουσιν οἵ τε ἠδικηκότες, δεδιότες μὴ δῶσι δίκην, καὶ οἱ μέλλοντες ἀδικεῖσθαι, βουλόμενοι φθάσαι πρὶν ἀδικηθῆναι, ὥσπερ ἐν Ῥόδῳ συνέστησαν οἱ γνώριμοι ἐπὶ τὸν δῆμον διὰ τὰς ἐπιφερομένας δίκας. —διὰ καταφρόνησιν δὲ καὶ στασιάζουσι καὶ ἐπιτίθενται, οἷον ἔν τε ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις, ὅταν πλείους ὦσιν οἱ μὴ μετέχοντες τῆς πολιτείας (κρείττους γὰρ οἴονται εἶναι), καὶ ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις οἱ εὔποροι καταφρονήσαντες τῆς ἀταξίας καὶ ἀναρχίας, οἷον καὶ ἐν Θήβαις μετὰ τὴν ἐν Οἰνοφύτοις μάχην κακῶς πολιτευομένων ἡ δημοκρατία διεφθάρη, καὶ ἡ Μεγαρέων διʼ ἀταξίαν καὶ ἀναρχίαν ἡττηθέντων, καὶ ἐν Συρακούσαις πρὸ τῆς Γέλωνος τυραννίδος, καὶ ἐν Ῥόδῳ ὁ δῆμος πρὸ τῆς ἐπαναστάσεως.
γίνονται δὲ καὶ διʼ αὔξησιν τὴν παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον μεταβολαὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν. ὥσπερ γὰρ σῶμα ἐκ μερῶν σύγκειται καὶ δεῖ αὐξάνεσθαι ἀνάλογον ἵνα μένῃ ἡ συμμετρία, εἰ δὲ μή, φθείρεται, ὅταν ὁ μὲν ποὺς τεττάρων πηχῶν ᾖ τὸ δʼ ἄλλο σῶμα δυοῖν σπιθαμαῖν, ἐνίοτε δὲ κἂν εἰς ἄλλου ζῴου μεταβάλοι μορφήν, εἰ μὴ μόνον κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν αὐξάνοιτο παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον, οὕτω καὶ πόλις σύγκειται
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