1309afor it would then be possible for the notables and also the multitude both to have what they want; for it is the democratic principle for all to have the right to hold office and the aristocratic one for the offices to be filled by the notables, and this will be the case when it is impossible to make money from office; for the poor will not want to hold office because of making nothing out of it, but rather to attend to their own affairs, while the wealthy will be able to hold office because they have no need to add to their resources from the public funds; so that the result will be that the poor will become well-off through spending their time upon their work, and the notables will not be governed by any casual persons. Therefore to prevent peculation of the public property, let the transfer of the funds take place in the presence of all the citizens, and let copies of the lists be deposited for each brotherhood,¹ company² and tribe; and to get men to hold office without profit there must be honors assigned by law to officials of good repute. And in democracies it is necessary to be sparing of the wealthy not only by not causing properties to be divided up, but not incomes either (which under some constitutions takes place unnoticed), and it is better to prevent men from undertaking costly but useless public services like equipping choruses and torch-races³ and all other similar services, even if they wish to; in an oligarchy on the other hand it is necessary to take much care of the poor, and to allot to them the offices of profit, and the penalty if one of the rich commits an outrage against them must be greater than if it is done by one of themselves,⁴ and inheritance must not go by bequest but by family, and the same man must not inherit more than one estate, for so estates would be more on a level, and more of the poor would establish themselves as prosperous. And it is expedient both in a democracy and in an oligarchy to assign to those who have a smaller share in the government—in a democracy to the wealthy and in anoligarchy to the poor—either equality or precedence in all other things excepting the supreme offices of state; but these should be entrusted to those prescribed by the constitution exclusively, or to them for the most part.

There are some three qualities which those who are to hold the supreme magistracies ought to possess, first, loyalty to the established constitution, next, very great capacity to do the duties of the office, and third, virtue and justice—in each constitution the sort of justice suited to the constitution (for if the rules of justice are not the same under all constitutions, it follows that there must be differences in the nature of justice also). It is a difficult question how the choice ought to be made when it happens that all these qualities are not found in the same person;

1309bfor instance, if one man is a good military commander but a bad man and no friend of the constitution, and the other is just and loyal, how should the choice be made? It seems that two things ought to be considered, what is the quality of which all men have a larger share, and what the one of which all have a smaller share? Therefore in the case of military command one must consider experience more than virtue, for men have a smaller share of military experience and a larger share of moral goodness; but in the case of a trusteeship or a stewardship the opposite, for these require more virtue than most men possess, but the knowledge required is common to all men. And somebody might raise the question, why is virtue needed if both capacity and loyalty to the constitution are forthcoming, as even these two qualities will do what is suitable? May not the answer be, because those who possess these two qualities may possibly lack self-control, so that just as they do not serve themselves well although they know how to and although they love themselves, so possibly in some cases they may behave in this way in regard to the community also? And broadly, whatever provisions in the laws we describe as advantageous to constitutions, these are all preservative of the constitutions, and so is the supreme elementary principle that has been often stated, that of taking precautions that the section desirous of the constitution shall be stronger in numbers than the section not desirous off it. And beside all these matters one thing must not be overlooked which at present is overlooked by the, deviation-forms⁵ of constitution—the middle party; for many of the institutions thought to be popular destroy democracies, and many of those thought oligarchical destroy oligarchies. But the adherents of the deviation-form, thinking that this form is the only right thing, drag it to excess, not knowing that just as there can be a nose that although deviating from the most handsome straightness towards being hooked or snub nevertheless is still beautiful and agreeable to look at, yet all the same, if a sculptor carries it still further in the direction of excess, he will first lose the symmetry of the feature and finally will make it not even look like a nose at all, because of its excess and deficiency in the two opposite qualities (and the same is the ease also in regard to the other parts of the body), so this is what happens about constitutions likewise; for it is possible for an oligarchy and a democracy to be satisfactory although they have diverged from the best structure, but if one strains either of them further, first he will make the constitution worse, and finally he will make it not a constitution at all. Therefore the legislator and the statesman must not fail to know what sort of democratic institutions save and what destroy a democracy, and what sort of oligarchical institutions an oligarchy; for neither constitution can exist and endure without the well-to-do and the multitude, but when an even level of property comes about, the constitution resulting must of necessity be another one,

1310a so that when men destroy these classes by laws carried to excess they destroy the constitutions. And a mistake is made both in democracies and in oligarchies—in democracies by the demagogues, where the multitude is supreme over the laws; for they always divide the state into two by fighting with the well-to-do, but they ought on the contrary always to pretend to be speaking on behalf of men that are well-to-do, while in democracies the oligarchical statesmen ought to pretend to be speaking on behalf of the people, and the oligarchics ought to take oath in terms exactly opposite to those which they use now, for at present in some oligarchies they swear, “And I will be hostile to the people and will plan whatever evil I can against them,”⁶ but they ought to hold, and to act the part of holding, the opposite notion, declaring in their oaths, “I will not wrong the people.” But the greatest of all the means spoken of to secure the stability of constitutions is one that at present all people despise: it is a system of education suited to the constitutions. For there is no use in the most valuable laws, ratified by the unanimous judgement of the whole body of citizens, if these are not trained and educated in the constitution, popularly if the laws are popular, oligarchically if they are oligarchical; for there is such a thing as want of self-discipline in a state, as well as in an individual. But to have been educated to suit the constitution does not mean to do the things that give pleasure to the adherents of oligarchy or to the supportersof democracy, but the things that will enable the former to govern oligarchically and the latter to govern themselves democratically. But at present in the oligarchies the sons of the rulers are luxurious, and the sons of the badly-off become trained by exercise and labor, so that they are both more desirous of reform and more able to bring it about; while in the democracies thought to be the most democratic the opposite of what is expedient has come about. And the cause of this is that they define liberty wrongly (for there are two things that are thought to be defining features of democracy, the sovereignty of the majority and liberty); for justice is supposed to be equality, and equality the sovereignty of what ever may have been decided by the multitude, and liberty doing just what one likes. Hence in democracies of this sort everybody lives as he likes, and “unto what end he listeth,” as Euripides⁷ says. But this is bad; for to live in conformity with the constitution ought not to be considered slavery but safety.

This therefore, speaking broadly, is a list of the things that cause the alteration and the destruction of constitutions, and of those that cause their “security and continuance.”

It remains to speak of monarchy, the causes that destroy it and the natural means of its preservation.