1327b (for a state ought to be formidable, and also capable of the defence of not only its own people but also some of its neighbors, by sea as well as by land); but when we come to the question of the number and size of this force, we have to consider the state’s manner of life if it is to live a life of leadership and affairs,¹ it must possess maritime as well as other forces commensurate with its activities. On the other hand it is not necessary for states to include the teeming population that grows up in connection with common sailors, as there is no need for these to be citizens; for the marines are free men and are a part of the infantry, and it is they who have command and control the crew; and if there exists a mass of villagers and tillers of the soil, there is bound to be no lack of sailors too. In fact we see this state of thing existing even now in some places, for instance in the city of Heraclea; the Heracleotes man a large fleet of triremes, although they possess a city of but moderate size as compared with others.

Let such then be our conclusions about the territories and harbors of cities, and the sea, and about naval forces.

About the citizen population, we said before what is its proper limit of numbers. Let us now speakof what ought to be the citizens’ natural character. Now this one might almost discern by looking at the famous cities of Greece and by observing how the whole inhabited world is divided up among the nations.² The nations inhabiting the cold places and those of Europe are full of spirit but somewhat deficient in intelligence and skill, so that they continue comparatively free, but lacking in political organization and capacity to rule their neighbors. The peoples of Asia on the other hand are intelligent and skillful in temperament, but lack spirit, so that they are in continuous subjection and slavery. But the Greek race participates in both characters, just as it occupies the middle position geographically, for it is both spirited and intelligent; hence it continues to be free and to have very good political institutions, and to be capable of ruling all mankind if it attains constitutional unity. The same diversity also exists among the Greek races compared with one another: some have a one-sided nature, others are happily blended in regard to both these capacities.³ It is clear therefore that people that are to be easily guided to virtue by the lawgiver must be both intellectual and spirited in their nature. For as to what is said by certain persons about the character that should belong to their Guardians⁴—they should be affectionate to their friends but fierce towards strangers—it is spirit that causes affectionateness, for spirit is the capacity of the soul whereby we love.

1328a A sign of this is that spirit is more roused against associates and friends than against strangers, when it thinks itself slighted. Therefore Archilochus⁵ for instance, when reproaching his friends, appropriately apostrophizes his spirit: For ’tis thy friends that make thee choke with rage. Moreover it is from this faculty that power to command and love of freedom are in all cases derived; for spirit is a commanding and indomitable element. But it is a mistake to describe the Guardians as cruel towards strangers; it is not right to be cruel towards anybody, and men of great-souled nature are not fierce except towards wrongdoers, and their anger is stillfiercer against their companions if they think that these are wronging them, as has been said before. And this is reasonable, because they think that in addition to the harm done them they are also being defrauded of a benefit by persons whom they believe to owe them one. Hence the sayings For brothers’ wars are cruel, Eur. frag. 965. and They that too deeply loved too deeply hate. Nauck frag. 78

We have now approximately decided what are the proper numbers and the natural qualities of those who exercise the right of citizens, and the proper extent and nature of the territory (for we must notseek to attain the same exactness by means of theoretical discussions as is obtained by means of the facts that come to us through sense-perceptions).

But since, just as with all other natural organisms those things that are indispensable for the existence of the whole are not parts⁶ of the whole organization, it is also clear that not all the things that are necessary for states to possess are to be counted as parts of a state (any more than this is so with any other association that forms something one in kind, for there must be something that is one and common and the same for the partners, whether the shares that they take be equal or unequal: for example this common property may be food or an area of land or something else of the same sort—⁷ but when of two related things one is a means and the other an end, in their case there is nothing in common except for the one to act and the other to receive the action. I mean for instance the relation between any instrument or artificer and the work that they produce: between a house and a builder there is nothing that is produced in common, but the builder’s craft exists for the sake of the house. Hence although states need property, the property is no part of the state. And there are many living things that fall under the head of property.⁸ And the state is one form of partnership of similar people, and its object is the best life that is possible. And since the greatest good is happiness, and this is some perfect activity or employment of virtue, and since it has so come about that it is possible for some men to participate in it, but for others only to a small extent or not at all, it is clear that this is the cause for there arising different kinds and varieties of state and several forms of constitution;

1328b for as each set of people pursues participation in happiness in a different manner and by different means they make for themselves different modes of life and different constitutions. And we must also further consider how many there are of these things referred to that are indispensable for the existence of a state; for among them will be the things which we pronounce to be parts of a state, owing to which their presence is essential. We must therefore consider the list of occupations that a state requires : for from these it will appear what the indispensable classes are. First then a state must have a supply of food; secondly, handicrafts (since life needs many tools); third, arms (since the members of the association must necessarily possess arms both to use among themselves and for purposes of government, in cases of insubordination, and to employ against those who try to molest them from without); also a certain abundance of money, in order that they may have enough both for their internal needs and for requirements of war; fifth, a primary need, the service of religion, termed a priesthood; and sixth in number and most necessary of all, a provision for deciding questions of interests and of rights between the citizens. These then are the occupations that virtually every state requires (for the state is not any chance multitude of people but one self-sufficient for the needs of life, as we say,⁹ and if any of these industries happens to be wanting, it is impossible for that association to be absolutely self-sufficient). It is necessary therefore for the state to be organizedon the lines of these functions; consequently it must possess a number of farmers who will provide the food, and craftsmen, and the military class, and the wealthy, and priests and judges to decide questions of necessity¹⁰ and of interests.

These matters having been settled, it remains to consider whether everybody is to take part in all of these functions (for it is possible for the whole of the people to be at once farmers and craftsmen and the councillors and judges), or whether we are to assume different classes corresponding to each of the functions mentioned, or whether some of them must necessarily be specialized and others combined. But it will not be the same in every form of constitution; for, as we said,¹¹ it is possible either for all the people to take part in all the functions or for not all to take part in all but for certain people to have certain functions. In fact these different distributions of functions are the cause of the difference between constitutions: democracies are states in which all the people participate in all the functions, oligarchies where the contrary is the case. But at present we are studying the best constitution, and this is the constitution under which the state would be most happy, and it has been stated before¹² that happiness cannot be forthcoming without virtue; it is therefore clear from these considerations that in the most nobly constituted state, and the one that possesses men that are absolutely just, not merely just relatively to the principle that is the basis of the constitution, the citizens must not live a mechanic or a mercantile life (for such a life is ignoble and inimical to virtue), nor yet must those who are to be citizens in the best state be tillers of the soil