Socrates are not involved in the necessity of dying tomorrow, and therefore present conditions would not lead your judgment astray. Now say, do you not think we were correct in saying that we ought not to esteem all the opinions of men, but some and not others, and not those of all men, but only of some? What do you think? Is not this true?

Crito Crito. It is.

Socrates Socrates. Then we ought to esteem the good opinions and not the bad ones?

Crito Crito. Yes.

Socrates Socrates. And the good ones are those of the wise and the bad ones those of the foolish?

Crito Crito. Of course.

Socrates Socrates. Come then, what used we to say about this?

Socrates If a man is an athlete and makes that his business, does he pay attention to every man’s praise and blame and opinion or to those of one man only who is a physician or a trainer?

Crito Crito. To those of one man only.

Socrates Socrates. Then he ought to fear the blame and welcome the praise of that one man and not of the multitude.

Crito Crito. Obviously.

Socrates Socrates. And he must act and exercise and eat and drink as the one man who is his director and who knows the business thinks best rather than as all the others think.

Crito Crito. That is true.

Socrates Socrates. Well then; if he disobeys the one man and disregards his opinion and his praise, but regards words of the many who have no special knowledge, will he not come to harm?

Crito Crito. Of course he will.

Socrates Socrates. And what is this harm? In what direction and upon what part of the one who disobeys does it act?

Crito Crito. Evidently upon his body; for that is what it ruins.

Socrates Socrates. Right. Then in other matters, not to enumerate them all, in questions of right and wrong and disgraceful and noble and good and bad, which we are now considering, ought we to follow and fear

Socrates the opinion of the many or that of the one, if there is anyone who knows about them, whom we ought to revere and fear more than all the others? And if we do not follow him, we shall injure and cripple that which we used to say is benefited by the right and is ruined by the wrong. Or is there nothing in this?

Crito Crito. I think it is true, Socrates.

Socrates Socrates. Well then, if through yielding to the opinion of the ignorant we ruin that which is benefited by health and injured by disease,

Socrates is life worth living for us when that is ruined? And that is the body, is it not?

Crito Crito. Yes.

Socrates Socrates. Then is life worth living when the body is worthless and ruined?

Crito Crito. Certainly not.

Socrates Socrates. But is it worth living when that is ruined which is injured by the wrong and improved by the right? Or do we think that part of us, whatever it is, which is concerned with right and wrong,

Socrates is less important than the body?

Crito Crito. By no means.

Socrates Socrates. But more important?

Crito Crito. Much more.

Socrates Socrates. Then, most excellent friend, we must not consider at all what the many will say of us, but what he who knows about right and wrong, the one man, and truth herself will say. And so you introduced the discussion wrongly in the first place, when you began by saying we ought to consider the opinion of the multitude about the right and the noble and the good and their opposites.

Socrates But it might, of course, be said that the multitude can put us to death.

Crito Crito. That is clear, too. It would be said, Socrates.

Socrates Socrates. That is true. But, my friend, the argument we have just finished seems to me still much the same as before; and now see whether we still hold to this, or not, that it is not living, but living well which we ought to consider most important.

Crito Crito. We do hold to it.

Socrates Socrates. And that living well and living rightly are the same thing, do we hold to that, or not?

Crito Crito. We do.

Socrates Socrates. Then we agree that the question is whether it is right for me to try to escape from here

Socrates without the permission of the Athenians, or not right. And if it appears to be right, let us try it, and if not, let us give it up. But the considerations you suggest, about spending money, and reputation, and bringing up my children, these are really, Crito, the reflections of those who lightly put men to death, and would bring them to life again, if they could, without any sense, I mean the multitude. But we, since our argument so constrains us, must consider only the question we just broached, whether we shall be doing right in giving money

Socrates and thanks to these men who will help me to escape, and in escaping or aiding the escape ourselves, or shall in truth be doing wrong, if we do all these things. And if it appears that it is wrong for us to do them, it may be that we ought not to consider either whether we must die if we stay here and keep quiet or whether we must endure any thing else whatsoever, but only the question of doing wrong.

Crito Crito. I think what you say is right, Socrates; but think what we should do.

Socrates Socrates. Let us, my good friend, investigate in common, and if you can contradict anything I say, do so, and I will yield to your arguments;

Socrates but if you cannot, my dear friend, stop at once saying the same thing to me over and over, that I ought to go away from here without the consent of the Athenians; for I am anxious to act in this matter with your approval, and not contrary to your wishes. Now see if the beginning of the investigation satisfies you, and try to reply

Socrates to my questions to the best of your belief.

Crito Crito. I will try.

Socrates Socrates. Ought we in no way to do wrong intentionally, or should we do wrong in some ways but not in others? Or, as we often agreed in former times, is it never right or honorable to do wrong? Or have all those former conclusions of ours been overturned in these few days, and have we old men,

Socrates seriously conversing with each other, failed all along to see that we were no better than children? Or is not what we used to say most certainly true, whether the world agree or not? And whether we must endure still more grievous sufferings than these, or lighter ones, is not wrongdoing inevitably an evil and a disgrace to the wrongdoer? Do we believe this or not?

Crito Crito. We do.

Socrates Socrates. Then we ought not to do wrong at all.

Crito Crito. Why, no.

Socrates Socrates. And we ought not even to requite wrong with wrong, as the world thinks, since we must not do wrong at all.

Crito Crito. Apparently not.

Socrates Socrates. Well, Crito, ought one to do evil or not?

Crito Crito. Certainly not, Socrates.

Socrates Socrates. Well, then, is it right to requite evil with evil, as the world says it is, or not right?

Crito Crito. Not right, certainly.

Socrates Socrates. For doing evil to people is the same thing as wronging them.

Crito Crito. That is true.

Socrates Socrates. Then we ought neither to requite wrong with wrong nor to do evil to anyone, no matter what he may have done to us.

Socrates And be careful, Crito, that you do not, in agreeing to this, agree to something you do not believe; for I know that there are few who believe or ever will believe this. Now those who believe this, and those who do not, have no common ground of discussion, but they must necessarily, in view of their opinions, despise one another. Do you therefore consider very carefully whether you agree and share in this opinion, and let us take as the the starting point of our discussion the assumption that it is never right to do wrong or to requite wrong with wrong, or when we suffer evil to defend ourselves by doing evil in return. Or do you disagree and refuse your assent

Socrates to this starting point? For I have long held this belief and I hold it yet, but if you have reached any other conclusion, speak and explain it to me. If you still hold to our former opinion, hear the next point.

Crito Crito. I do hold to it and I agree with you; so go on.

Socrates Socrates. Now the next thing I say, or rather ask, is this: “ought a man to do what he has agreed to do, provided it is right, or may he violate his agreements?”

Crito Crito. He ought to do it.

Socrates Socrates. Then consider whether, if we go away

Socrates from here without the consent of the state, we are doing harm to the very ones to whom we least ought to do harm, or not, and whether we are abiding by what we agreed was right, or not.

Crito Crito. I cannot answer your question, Socrates, for I do not understand.

Socrates Socrates. Consider it in this way. If, as I was on the point of running away (or whatever it should be called), the laws and the commonwealth should come to me and ask, “Tell me, Socrates, what have you in mind to do? Are you not intending by this thing you are trying to do, to destroy us,

Socrates the laws, and the entire state, so far as in you lies? Or do you think that state can exist and not be overturned, in which the decisions reached by the courts have no force but are made invalid and annulled by private persons?” What shall we say, Crito, in reply to this question and others of the same kind? For one might say many things, especially if one were an orator, about the destruction of that law which provides that the decisions reached by the courts shall be valid. Or shall we say to them,

Socrates “The state wronged me and did not judge the case rightly?” Shall we say that, or what?

Crito Crito. That is what we shall say, by Zeus, Socrates.

Socrates Socrates. What then if the laws should say, “Socrates, is this the agreement you made with us, or did you agree to abide by the verdicts pronounced by the state?” Now if I were surprised by what they said, perhaps they would continue, “Don’t be surprised at what we say, Socrates, but answer, since you are in the habit of employing the method of question and answer. Come,

Socrates what fault do you find with us and the state, that you are trying to destroy us? In the first place, did we not bring you forth? Is it not through us that your father married your mother and begat you? Now tell us, have you any fault to find with those of us who are the laws of marriage?” “I find no fault,” I should say. “Or with those that have to do with the nurture of the child after he is born and with his education which you, like others, received? Did those of us who are assigned to these matters not give good directions when we told your father to educate you in music and gymnastics?”

Socrates “You did,” I should say. “Well then, when you were born and nurtured and educated, could you say to begin with that you were not our offspring and our slave, you yourself and your ancestors? And if this is so, do you think right as between you and us rests on a basis of equality, so that whatever we undertake to do to you it is right for you to retaliate?”