I think not.

And is it not just the same with the “fairness” of studies also?

Doubtless; and this time, Socrates, your definition is quite fair, when you define what is fair by pleasure and good.

And foul by their opposites, pain and evil?

That needs must follow.

Thus when of two fair things one is fairer, the cause is that it surpasses in either one or both of these effects, either in pleasure, or in benefit, or in both.

Certainly.

And again, when one of two foul things is fouler, 475b this will be due to an excess either of pain or of evil: must not that be so?

Yes.

Come then, what was it we heard just now about doing and suffering wrong? Were you not saying that suffering wrong is more evil, but doing it fouler?

I was.

Well now, if doing wrong is fouler than suffering it, it is either more painful, and fouler by an excess of pain or evil or both; must not this also be the case?

Yes, of course.

Then let us first consider if doing wrong 475c exceeds suffering it in point of pain—if those who do wrong are more pained than those who suffer it.

Not so at all, Socrates.

Then it does not surpass in pain.

No, indeed.

And so, if not in pain, it can no longer be said to exceed in both.

Apparently.

It remains, then, that it exceeds in the other.

Yes.

In evil.

So it seems.

Then it is by an excess of evil that doing wrong is fouler than suffering it.

Yes, obviously.

Now it is surely admitted by the mass of mankind, as it was too by you in our talk a while ago, that doing wrong is fouler than suffering it.

Yes.

And now it has been found to be more evil.

So it seems.

Then would you rather have the evil and foul when it is more than when it is less? Do not shrink from answering, Polus you will get no hurt by it: but submit yourself bravely to the argument, as to a doctor, and reply yes or no to my question.

Why, I should not so choose, Socrates.

And would anybody else in the world?

I think not, by this argument at least.

Then I spoke the truth when I said that neither you nor anyone else in the world would choose to do wrong rather than suffer it, since it really is more evil.

Apparently.

So you see, Polus, that when one proof is contrasted with the other they have no resemblance, but whereas you have the assent of every one else except myself, I am satisfied with your sole and single assent and evidence, 476aand I take but your vote only and disregard the rest. Now let us leave this matter where it stands, and proceed next to examine the second part on which we found ourselves at issue—whether for a wrongdoer to pay the penalty is the greatest of evils, as you supposed, or to escape it is a greater, as I on my side held. Let us look at it this way: do you call paying the just penalty, and being justly punished, for wrongdoing the same thing?

I do.

And can you maintain that all just things are not fair, in so far as they are just? Consider well before you speak.

No, I think they are, Socrates.

Then take another point: if a man does anything, must there be something which is also acted upon by this doer of the thing?

I think so.

And does it suffer what the doer does, and is the effect such as the agent’s action makes it? I mean, for example, when one strikes a blow something must needs be struck?

It must.

And if the striker strikes hard or quick, 476c the thing struck is struck in the same way?

Yes.

Hence the effect in the thing struck is such as the striker makes it?

Certainly.

And so again, if one burns, something must be burnt?

Yes, of course.

And if one burns severely or sorely, the thing burnt is burnt according as the burner burns it?

Certainly.

And again, if one cuts, the same may be said? For something is cut.

Yes.

And if the cut is large or deep or sore, 476d the cut made in the thing cut is such as the cutter cuts it?

Apparently.

Then putting it all in a word, see if you agree that what I was just saying applies to all cases—that the patient receives an effect of the same kind as the agent’s action.

I do agree.

Then this being admitted, is paying the penalty suffering something, or doing it?

Suffering it must be, Socrates.

And at the hands of an agent?

Yes, of course; at the hands of the punisher.

And he who punishes aright punishes justly?

Yes.

Doing what is just, or not?

What is just.

And he who pays the penalty by being punished suffers what is just?

Apparently.

And what is just, I think we have agreed, is fair?

Certainly.

Then of these two, the one does what is fair and the other, he who is punished, suffers it.

Yes.

And so, if fair, good? For that is either pleasant or beneficial.¹

It must be so.

So he who pays the penalty suffers what is good?

It seems so.

Then he is benefited?

Yes.

Is it the benefit I imagine—that he becomes better in soul if he is justly punished?

Quite likely.

Then is he who pays the penalty relieved from badness of soul?

Yes.

And so relieved from the greatest evil? 477b Look at it this way; in a man’s pecuniary resources do you perceive any other badness than poverty?

No, only poverty.

And what in his bodily resources? You would say that badness there is weakness or disease or ugliness or the like?

I would.

And in soul too you believe there is a certain wickedness?

Of course.

And do you not call this injustice, ignorance, cowardice, and so forth?

Certainly I do.

So now in property, body, and soul, these three, you have mentioned three vices—poverty, disease, and injustice?

Yes.

Then which of these vices is the foulest? Is it not injustice—in short, the vice of the soul?

Far the foulest.

And if foulest, then also most evil?

How do you mean, Socrates?

Just this: the foulest is foulest in each case because it produces the greatest pain or harm or both; this follows from our previous admissions.

Quite so.

And foulest of all, we have just agreed, is injustice and, 477d in general, vice of soul?

Yes, we have.

So then either it is most painful, that is, foulest of these vices by an excess of painfulness, or else of harmfulness, or in both ways?

Necessarily.

Then do you think that being unjust, licentious, cowardly, and ignorant is more painful than being poor and sick?

No, I do not, Socrates, from what we have said.

Portentous then must be the extent of harm, and astonishing the evil, by which the soul’s vice exceeds all the others 477e so as to be foulest of all, since it is not by pain, on your view of the matter.

Apparently.

But further, I suppose, whatever has an excess of harm in the greatest measure, must be the greatest evil in the world.

Yes.

So injustice, licentiousness, and in general, vice of soul, are the greatest evils in the world?

Apparently.

Now what is the art that relieves from poverty? Is it not money-making?

Yes.

And what from disease? Is it not medicine?

It must be.

And what from wickedness and injustice? If you are not ready for that offhand, consider it thus: whither and to whom do we take those who are in bodily sickness?

To the doctor, Socrates.

And whither the wrongdoers and libertines?

To the law-court, do you mean?

Yes, and to pay the penalty?

I agree.

Then is it not by employing a kind of justice that those punish who punish aright?

Clearly so.

Then money-making relieves us from poverty, 478b medicine from disease, and justice from licentiousness and injustice.

Apparently.

Which then is the fairest of these things?

Of what things, pray?

Moneymaking, medicine, justice.

Justice, Socrates, is far above the others.

Now again, if it is fairest, it causes either most pleasure or benefit or both.

Yes.

Well then, is it pleasant to be medically treated, and do those who undergo such treatment enjoy it?

I do not think so.

But it is beneficial, is it not?

Yes.

Because one is relieved of a great evil, and hence it is worth while to endure the pain and be well.

Of course.

Is this then the happiest state of body for a man to be in—that of being medically treated—or that of never being ill at all?

Clearly, never being ill.

Yes, for what we regarded as happiness, it seems, was not this relief from evil, but its non-acquisition at any time.

That is so.

Well now, which is the more wretched of two persons who have something evil either in body or in soul, he who is medically treated and is relieved of the evil, or he who is not treated and keeps it?

To my thinking, he who is not treated.

And we found that paying the penalty is a relief from the greatest evil, wickedness?

We did.

Because, I suppose, the justice of the court reforms us and makes us juster, and acts as a medicine for wickedness.

Yes.

Happiest therefore is he who has no vice in his soul, since we found this to be the greatest of evils.

Clearly so.

Next after him, I take it, is he who is relieved of it.

So it seems.

And that was the man who is reproved, reprimanded, and made to pay the penalty.

Yes.

Hence the worst life is led by him who has the vice and is not relieved of it.

Apparently.