Cephalos Ceph.Now I think this has been very manfully discussed by you; but I should, as I say, be more amazed if anyone could show in the abstract ideas, which are intellectual conceptions, 130a this same multifarious and perplexing entanglement which you described in visible objects.

Pythodorus said that he thought at every word, while Socrates was saying this, Parmenides and Zeno would be angry, but they paid close attention to him and frequently looked at each other and smiled, as if in admiration of Socrates, and when he stopped speaking Parmenides expressed their approval. Socrates, 130b he said, what an admirable talent for argument you have! Tell me, did you invent this distinction yourself, which separates abstract ideas from the things which partake of them? And do you think there is such a thing as abstract likeness apart from the likeness which we possess, and abstract one and many, and the other abstractions of which you heard Zeno speaking just now?

Yes, I do, said Socrates.

And also, said Parmenides, abstract ideas of the just, the beautiful, the good, and all such conceptions?

Yes, he replied. 130c And is there an abstract idea of man, apart from us and all others such as we are, or of fire or water?

I have often, he replied, been very much troubled, Parmenides, to decide whether there are ideas of such things, or not.

And are you undecided about certain other things, which you might think rather ridiculous, such as hair, mud, dirt, or anything else particularly vile and worthless? Would you say that there is an idea of each of these distinct and different from the things 130d with which we have to do, or not?

By no means, said Socrates. No, I think these things are such as they appear to us, and it would be quite absurd to believe that there is an idea of them; and yet I am sometimes disturbed by the thought that perhaps what is true of one thing is true of all. Then when I have taken up this position, I run away for fear of falling into some abyss of nonsense and perishing; so when I come to those things which we were just saying do have ideas, I stay and busy myself with them. 130e Yes, for you are still young, said Parmenides, and philosophy has not yet taken hold upon you, Socrates, as I think it will later. Then you will not despise them; but now you still consider people’s opinions, on account of your youth. Well, tell me do you think that, as you say, there are ideas, and that these other things which partake of them are named from them, 131a as, for instance, those that partake of likeness become like, those that partake of greatness great, those that partake of beauty and justice just and beautiful?

Ceph.

Certainly, said Socrates.

Well then, does each participant object partake of the whole idea, or of a part of it? Or could there be some other third kind of participation?

How could there be? said he.

Do you think the whole idea, being one, is in each of the many participants, or what?

Yes, for what prevents it from being in them, Parmenides? said Socrates. 131b Then while it is one and the same, the whole of it would be in many separate individuals at once, and thus it would itself be separate from itself.

No, he replied, for it might be like day, which is one and the same, is in many places at once, and yet is not separated from itself; so each idea, though one and the same, might be in all its participants at once.

That, said he, is very neat, Socrates you make one to be in many places at once, just as if you should spread a sail over many persons and then should say it was one and all of it was over many. 131c Is not that about what you mean?

Perhaps it is, said Socrates.

Would the whole sail be over each person, or a particular part over each?

A part over each.

Then, said he, the ideas themselves, Socrates, are divisible into parts, and the objects which partake of them would partake of a part, and in each of them there would be not the whole, but only a part of each idea.

So it appears.

Are you, then, Socrates, willing to assert that the one idea is really divided and will still be one?

By no means, he replied.

No, said Parmenides, for if you divide absolute greatness, 131d and each of the many great things is great by a part of greatness smaller than absolute greatness, is not that unreasonable?

Certainly, he said.

Or again, will anything by taking away a particular small part of equality possess something by means of which, when it is less than absolute equality, its possessor will be equal to anything else?

That is impossible.

Or let one of us have a part of the small; the small will be greater than this, since this is a part of it, and therefore the absolute small will be greater; but that to which the part of the small is added will be smaller, 131enot greater, than before.

That, said he, is impossible.

How, then, Socrates, will other things partake of those ideas of yours, if they cannot partake of them either as parts or as wholes?

By Zeus, he replied, I think that is a very hard question to determine.

Well, what do you think of this?

Of what?

Ceph.I fancy your reason for believing that each idea is one is something like this; when there is a number of things which seem to you to be great, you may think, as you look at them all, that there is one and the same idea in them, and hence you think the great is one.

That is true, he said.

But if with your mind’s eye you regard the absolute great and these many great things in the same way, will not another great appear beyond, by which all these must appear to be great?

So it seems.

That is, another idea of greatness will appear, in addition to absolute greatness and the objects which partake of it; 132b and another again in addition to these, by reason of which they are all great; and each of your ideas will no longer be one, but their number will be infinite.

But, Parmenides, said Socrates, each of these ideas may be only a thought, which can exist only in our minds then each might be one, without being exposed to the consequences you have just mentioned.

But, he said, is each thought one, but a thought of nothing?

That is impossible, he replied.

But of something?

Yes. 132c

Of something that is, or that is not?

Of something that is.

A thought of some single element which that thought thinks of as appertaining to all and as being one idea?

Yes.

Then will not this single element, which is thought of as one and as always the same in all, be an idea?

That, again, seems inevitable.

Well then, said Parmenides, does not the necessity which compels you to say that all other things partake of ideas, oblige you also to believe either that everything is made of thoughts, and all things think, or that, being thoughts, they are without thought?

That is quite unreasonable, too, he said, 132d but Parmenides, I think the most likely view is, that these ideas exist in nature as patterns, and the other things resemble them and are imitations of them; their participation in ideas is assimilation to them, that and nothing else.

Then if anything, he said, resembles the idea, can that idea avoid being like the thing which resembles it, in so far as the thing has been made to resemble it; or is there any possibility that the like be unlike its like?

No, there is none.

And must not necessarily the like partake of 132e the same idea as its like?

It must.

That by participation in which like things are made like, will be the absolute idea, will it not?

Certainly.

Ceph. Then it is impossible that anything be like the idea, or the idea like anything; for if they are alike, some further idea, in addition to the first, will always appear, and if that is like anything, still another, 133a and a new idea will always be arising, if the idea is like that which partakes of it.

Very true.

Then it is not by likeness that other things partake of ideas we must seek some other method of participation.

So it seems.

Do you see, then, Socrates, how great the difficulty is, if we maintain that ideas are separate, independent entities?

Yes, certainly.

You may be sure, he said, that you do not yet, if I may say so, 133b grasp the greatness of the difficulty involved in your assumption that each idea is one and is something distinct from concrete things.

How is that? said he.

There are many reasons, he said, but the greatest is this; if anyone should say that the ideas cannot even be known if they are such as we say they must be, no one could prove to him that he was wrong, unless he who argued that they could be known were a man of wide education and ability and were willing to follow the proof through many long and elaborate details; 133c he who maintains that they cannot be known would be unconvinced.

Why is that, Parmenides? said Socrates.

Because, Socrates, I think that you or anyone else who claims that there is an absolute idea of each thing would agree in the first place that none of them exists in us.

No, for if it did, it would no longer be absolute, said Socrates.

You are right, he said. Then those absolute ideas which are relative to one another have their own nature in relation to themselves, and not in relation to the likenesses, 133d or whatever we choose to call them, which are amongst us, and from which we receive certain names as we participate in them. And these concrete things, which have the same names with the ideas, are likewise relative only to themselves, not to the ideas, and, belong to themselves, not to the like-named ideas.

What do you mean? said Socrates.

For instance, said Parmenides, if one of us is master or slave of anyone, he is not the slave of master in the abstract, 133e nor is the master the master of slave in the abstract; each is a man and is master or slave of a man but mastership in the abstract is mastership of slavery in the abstract, and likewise slavery in the abstract is slavery to mastership in the abstract, but our slaves and masters are not relative to them, nor they to us; 134a they, as I say, belong to themselves and are relative to themselves and likewise our slaves and masters are relative to themselves.