Cephalos Ceph. And because the parts are parts of a whole, the one would be limited by the whole; 145a or are not the parts included by the whole? They must be so. But surely that which includes is a limit. Of course. Then the existent one is, apparently, both one and many, a whole and parts, limited and of infinite number. So it appears. Then if limited it has also extremes ? Certainly. Yes, and if it is a whole, will it not have a beginning, a middle, and an end? Or can there be any whole without these three? And if any one of these is wanting, will it still be a whole? It will not. 145b Then the one, it appears, will have a beginning, a middle, and an end. It will. But surely the middle is equally distant from the extremes for otherwise it would not be a middle. No. And the one, apparently, being of such a nature, will partake of some shape, whether straight or round or a mixture of the two. Yes, it will.

This being the case, will not the one be in itself and in other? How is that? Each of the parts doubtless is in the whole and none is outside of the whole. True. And all the parts are included in the whole ? 145c Yes. And surely the one is all its parts, neither more nor less than all. Certainly. But the whole is the one, is it not? Of course. Then if all the parts are in the whole and all the parts are the one and the one is also the whole, and all the parts are included in the whole, the one will be included in the one, and thus the one will be in itself. Evidently. But the whole is not in the parts, neither in all of them nor in any. 145d For if it is in all, it must be in one, for if it were wanting in any one it could no longer be in all; for if this one is one of all, and the whole is not in this one, how can it still be in all? It cannot in any way. Nor can it be in some of the parts; for if the whole were in some parts, the greater would be in the less, which is impossible. Yes, it is impossible. But not being in one or several or all of the parts, it must be in something else or cease to be anywhere at all? It must. And if it were nowhere, it would be nothing, but being a whole, since it is not in itself, it must be in something else, must it not? 145e Certainly. Then the one, inasmuch as it is a whole, is in other and inasmuch as it is all its parts, it is in itself; and thus one must be both in itself and in other. It must. This being its nature, must not the one be both in motion and at rest? How is that?

Ceph. It is at rest, no doubt, if it is in itself; for being in one, 146a and not passing out from this, it is in the same, namely in itself. It is. But that which is always in the same, must always be at rest. Certainly. Well, then, must not, on the contrary, that which is always in other be never in the same, and being never in the same be not at rest, and being not at rest be in motion? True. Then the one, being always in itself and in other, must always be in motion and at rest. That is clear.

And again, it must be the same with itself and other than itself, 146b and likewise the same with all other things and other than they, if what we have said is true. How is that? Everything stands to everything in one of the following relations: it is either the same or other; or if neither the same or other, its relation is that of a part to a whole or of a whole to a part. Obviously. Now is the one a part of itself? By no means. Then it cannot, by being a part in relation to itself, be a whole in relation to itself, as a part of itself. No, that is impossible. Nor can it be other than itself. 146c Certainly not. Then if it is neither other nor a part nor a whole in relation to itself, must it not therefore be the same with itself? It must. Well, must not that which is in another place than itself—the self being in the same place with itself—be other than itself, if it is to be in another place? I think so. Now we saw that this was the case with one, for it was in itself and in other at the same time. Yes, we saw that it was so. Then by this reasoning the one appears to be other than itself. 146d So it appears. Well then, if a thing is other than something, will it not be other than that which is other than it? Certainly. Are not all things which are not one, other than one, and the one other than the not one? Of course. Then the one would be other than the others. Yes, it is other. Consider; are not the absolute same and the absolute other opposites of one another? Of course. Then will the same ever be in the other, or the other in the same? No. Then if the other can never be in the same, there is no existing thing 146e in which the other is during any time; for if it were in anything during any time whatsoever, the other would be in the same, would it not? Yes, it would. But since the other is never in the same, it can never be in any existing thing. True. Then the other cannot be either in the not one or in the one. No, it cannot. Then not by reason of the other will the one be other than the not one or the not one other than the one. No.

Ceph. And surely they cannot by reason of themselves be other than one another, if they do not partake of the other. 147a Of course not. But if they are not other than one another either by reason of themselves or by reason of the other, will it not be quite impossible for them to be other than one another at all? Quite impossible. But neither can the not one partake of the one; for in that case they would not be not one, but would be one. True. Nor can the not one be a number; for in that case, too, since they would possess number, they would not be not one at all. No, they would not. Well, then, are the not one parts of the one? Or would the not one in that case also partake of the one? Yes, they would partake of it. 147b If, then, in every way the one is one and the not one are not one, the one cannot be a part of the not one, nor a whole of which the not one are parts, nor are the not one parts of the one, nor a whole of which the one is a part. No. But we said that things which are neither parts nor wholes of one another, nor other than one another, are the same as one another. Yes, we did. Shall we say, then, that since the relations of the one and the not one are such as we have described, the two are the same as one another? Yes, let us say that. The one, then, is, it appears, other than all other things and than itself, and is also the same as other things and as itself. 147c That appears to be the result of our argument.

Is it, then, also like and unlike itself and others? Perhaps. At any rate, since it was found to be other than others, the others must also be other than it. Of course. Then it is other than the others just as the others are other than it, neither more nor less? Certainly. And if neither more nor less, then in like degree? Yes. In so far as it is so affected as to be other than the others and the others are affected in the same way in relation to the one, to that degree the one will be affected 147d in the same way as the others and the others in the same way as the one. What do you mean? I will explain. You give a particular name to a thing? Yes. Well, you can utter the same name once or more than once? Yes. And do you name that to which the name belongs when you utter it once, but not when you utter it many times? Or must you always mean the same thing when you utter the same name, whether once or repeatedly? The same thing, of course. The word other is the name of something, is it not? Certainly. 147e Then when you utter it, whether once or many times, you apply it to nothing else, and you name nothing else, than that of which it is the name. Assuredly. Now when we say that the others are other than the one, and the one is other than the others, though we use the word other twice, we do not for all that apply it to anything else, but we always apply it to that nature of which it is the name. Certainly.