Cephalos Ceph. And will the case not be the same in relation to other changes? When it changes from being to destruction 157a or from not being to becoming, does it not pass into an intermediate stage between certain forms of motion and rest, so that it neither is nor is not, neither comes into being nor is destroyed? Yes, so it appears. And on the same principle, when it passes from one to many or from many to one, it is neither one nor many, is neither in a process of separation nor in one of combination. And in passing from like to unlike or from unlike to like, it is neither like nor unlike, neither in a process of assimilation nor in one of dissimilation; 157b and in passing from small to great and to equal and vice versa, it is neither small nor great nor equal, neither in a process of increase, nor of diminution, nor of equality. Apparently not. All this, then, would happen to the one, if the one exists. Yes, certainly.

Must we not consider what is likely to happen to the other things, if the one exists? We must. Shall we tell, then, what must happen to the things other than one, if one exists? Let us do so. Well, since they are other than the one, the other things are not the one for if they were, they would not be other than the one. True. 157c And yet surely the others are not altogether deprived of the one, but they partake of it in a certain way. In what way? Because the others are other than the one by reason of having parts; for if they had no parts, they would be altogether one. True. But parts, we affirm, belong to that which is a whole. Yes, we affirm that they do. But the whole must be one composed of many and of this the parts are parts. For each of the parts must be a part, not of many, but of a whole. How is that? If anything is a part of many, and is itself one of the many, it will be a part of itself, 157d which is impossible, and of each one of the others, if it is a part of all. For if it is not a part of some particular one, it will be a part of the rest, with the exception of that one, and thus it will not be a part of each one, and not being a part of each one, it will not be a part of any one of the many. But that which belongs to none cannot belong, whether as a part or as anything else, to all those things to none of which it belongs. That is clear. Then the part is a part, not of the many nor of all, but of a single form and a single concept 157e which we call a whole, a perfect unity created out of all this it is of which the part is a part. Certainly. If, then, the others have parts, they will partake of the whole and of the one. True. Then the things which are other than one must be a perfect whole which has parts. Yes, they must.

Ceph. And the same reasoning applies to each part for the part must partake of the one. For if each of the parts is a part, 158a the word “each” implies that it is one, separated from the rest, and existing by itself; otherwise it will not be “each.” True. But its participation in the one clearly implies that it is other than the one, for if not, it would not partake of the one, but would actually be one; but really it is impossible for anything except one itself to be one. Yes, it is impossible. And both the whole and the part must necessarily participate in the one; for the one will be a whole of which the parts are parts, and again each individual one which is a part of a whole will be a part of the whole. Yes. 158b And will not the things which participate in the one be other than the one while participating in it? Of course. But the things which are other than the one will be many; for if they were neither one nor more than one, they would not be anything. No.

But since the things which participate in the one as a part and the one as a whole are more than one, must not those participants in the one be infinite in number? How so? Let us look at the question in this way. Is it not true that at the moment when they begin to participate in the one they are not one and do not participate in one? 158c Clearly. Then they are multitudes, in which the one is not, are they not? Yes, they are multitudes. Well, then, if we should subtract from them in thought the smallest possible quantity, must not that which is subtracted, if it has no participation in one, be also a multitude, and not one? It must. And always when we consider the nature of the class, which makes it other than one, whatever we see of it at any time will be unlimited in number, will it not? Certainly. And, further, when each part becomes a part, 158d straightway the parts are limited in relation to each other and to the whole, and the whole in relation to the parts. Undoubtedly. The result, then, to the things which are other than one, that from the one and the union of themselves with it there arises, as it appears, something different within themselves which gives them a limitation in relation to one another; but their own nature, when they are left to themselves, gives them no limits. So it appears. Then the things which are other than one, both as wholes and as parts, are both unlimited and partake of limitation. Certainly. 158e And are they also both like and unlike one another and themselves? How is that? Inasmuch as they are all by their own nature unlimited, they are all in that respect affected in the same way. Certainly. And surely inasmuch as they all partake of limitation, they are all affected in the same way in that respect also. Obviously.

Ceph. And inasmuch as they are so affected as to be both limited and limitless, they are affected by affections which are the opposites of one another. 159a Yes. But opposites are as unlike as possible. To be sure. Then with regard to either one of their two affections they are like themselves and each other, but with regard to both of them together they are utterly opposed and unlike. Yes, that must be true. Therefore the others are both like and unlike themselves and one another. So they are. And they are the same as one another and also other than one another, they are both in motion and at rest, and since we have proved these cases, we can easily show that the things 159b which are other than one experience all the opposite affections. You are right.

Then what if we now drop these matters as evident and again consider whether, if one is, the things other than one are as we have said, and there is no alternative. Certainly. Let us then begin at the beginning and ask, if one is, what must happen to the things which are other than one. By all means. Must not the one be separate from the others, and the others from the one? Why is that? Because there is nothing else besides these, 159c which is other than one and other than the others. For when we have said “one and the others” we have included all things. Yes, all things. Then there is nothing other than these, in which both the one and the others may be. No. Then the one and the others can never be in the same. Apparently not. Then they are separate? Yes. And surely we say that what is truly one has no parts. How can it have parts? Then the one cannot be in the others as a whole, nor can parts of it, if it is separate from the others and has no parts. Of course not. 159d Then the others cannot partake of the one in any way; they can neither partake of any part of it nor of the whole. No, apparently not. The others are, then, not one in any sense, nor have they in themselves any unity. No. But neither are the others many; for if they were many, each of them would be one part of the whole; but actually the things that are other than one are not many nor a whole nor parts, since they do not participate in the one in any way. Right. Neither are the others two or three, nor are two or three in them, if they are entirely deprived of unity. 159e True.

Nor are the others either themselves like and unlike the one, nor are likeness and unlikeness in them; for if they were like and unlike or had likeness and unlikeness in them, the things which are other than the one would have in them two elements opposite to one another. That is clear. But it is impossible for that to partake of two things which does not even partake of one. Impossible.