Cephalos for if anything is moved in any way, in so far as it is moved it is no longer in its former condition, but in a different one. True. Then in moving, the one changes in nature. Yes. And yet when it does not move in any way, it will not change its nature in any way. No. Then in so far as the non-existent one moves, it changes, and in so far as it does not move, it does not change. True. Then the non-existent one both changes and does not change. So it appears. And must not that which changes come into a state of being other than its previous one, and perish, so far as its previous state is concerned;

Cephalos whereas that which does not change neither comes into being nor perishes? That is inevitable. Then the non-existent one, when it is changed, comes into being and perishes, and when it is not changed, neither comes into being nor perishes and thus the non-existent one both comes into being and perishes and neither comes into being nor perishes. Quite true.

Let us now go back again to the beginning and see whether the conclusions we reach will be the same as at present, or different. Yes, we should do that. We ask, then, if the one is not,

what will be the consequences in regard to it? Yes. Does the expression “is not” denote anything else than the absence of existence in that of which we say that it is not? No, nothing else. And when we say that a thing is not, do we mean that it is in a way and is not in a way? Or does the expression “is not” mean without any qualifications that the non-existent is not in any way, shape, or manner, and does not participate in being in any way? Without any qualifications whatsoever. Then the non-existent cannot be and cannot in any other way partake of existence.

No. But were coming into being and perishing anything else than receiving and losing existence. No, nothing else. But that which has no participation in it can neither receive it nor lose it. Of course not. Then the one, since it does not exist in any way, cannot possess or lose or share in existence at all. That is reasonable. Then the non-existent one neither perishes nor comes into being, since it participates in no way in existence. No; that is clear. Then it is not changed in nature at all;

for such change involves coming into being and perishing. True. And if it is not changed, it cannot move, either, can it? Certainly not. And we cannot say that that which is nowhere is at rest; for that which is at rest must always be in some place which is the same. Yes, of course, the same place. Thus we shall say again that the non-existent one is neither at rest nor in motion. No, neither.

Cephalos Ceph. Nor can anything which exists pertain to it for the moment it partook of anything which exists it would partake of existence.

Cephalos That is plain. Then neither greatness nor smallness nor equality pertains to it. No. Nor likeness nor difference, either in relation to itself or to other things. Clearly not. And can other things pertain to it, if nothing pertains to it? Impossible. Then the other things are neither like it nor unlike it, nor the same nor different. No. Well, then, will the notions “of that” or “to that” or “some,” or “this” or “of this”

Cephalos or “of another” or “to another” or past or future or present or knowledge or opinion or perception or definition or name or anything else which exists pertain to the non-existent? No. Then the non-existent one has no state or condition whatsoever. It appears to have none whatsoever. Let us then discuss further what happens to the other things, if the one does not exist. Let us do so. Well, they must exist; for if others do not even exist, there could be no talking about the others. True. But if we talk about the others, the others are different. Or do you not regard the words other and different as synonymous?

Cephalos Yes, I do. And we say that the different is different from the different, and the other is other than the other? Yes. Then if the others are to be others, there must be something of which they will be others. Yes, there must be. Now what can that be? For they cannot be others of the one, if it does not exist. No. Then they are others of each other; for they have no alternative, except to be others of nothing. True. They are each, then, others of each other, in groups; for they cannot be so one at a time, if one does not exist.

Cephalos But each mass of them is unlimited in number, and even if you take what seems to be the smallest bit, it suddenly changes, like something in a dream that which seemed to be one is seen to be many, and instead of very small it is seen to be very great in comparison with the minute fractions of it. Very true. Such masses of others would be others of each other, if others exist and one does not exist. Certainly. There will, then, be many masses, each of which appears to be one, but is not one, if one does not exist? Yes.

Cephalos And they will seem to possess, number, if each seems to be one and they are many. Certainly. And some will seem to be even and others odd, but all that will be unreal, if the one does not exist. True.

Ceph. And there will, we assert, seem to be a smallest among them but this proves to be many and great in comparison with each of the many minute fractions.

Cephalos Of course. And each mass will be considered equal to the many minute fractions for it could not appear to pass from greater to smaller, without seeming to enter that which is between them; hence the appearance of equality. That is reasonable. And although it has a limit in relation to another mass, it has neither beginning nor limit nor middle in relation to itself? Why is that? Because whenever the mind conceives of any of these as belonging to the masses, another beginning appears before the beginning,

Cephalos another end remains after the end, and in the middle are other more central middles than the middle, but smaller, because it is impossible to conceive of each one of them, since the one does not exist. Very true. So all being which is conceived by any mind must, it seems to me, be broken up into minute fractions; for it would always be conceived as a mass devoid of one. Certainly. Now anything of that sort, if seen from a distance and dimly, must appear to be one,

Cephalos but if seen from close at hand and with keen vision, each apparent one must prove to be unlimited in number, if it is really devoid of one, and one does not exist. Am I right? That is perfectly conclusive. Therefore the other things must each and all appear to be unlimited and limited and one and many, if the things other than one exist and one does not. Yes, they must. And will they not also appear to be like and unlike? Why? Just as things in a picture, when viewed from a distance, appear to be all in one and the same condition and alike.

Cephalos Certainly. But when you come close to them they appear to be many and different, and, because of their difference in appearance, different in kind and unlike each other. Yes. And so the groups of the other things must appear to be like and unlike themselves and each other. Certainly. And also the same and different, and in contact with one another and separated, and in all kinds of motion and in every sort of rest, and coming into being and perishing, and neither of the two, and all that sort of thing, which we can easily mention in detail,

Cephalos if the many exist and the one does not. Very true.

Let us, then, go back once more to the beginning and tell the consequences, if the others exist and the one does not. Let us do so. Well, the others will not be one? Of course not. Nor will they be many for if they were many, one would be contained in them. And if none of them is one, they are all nothing, so that they cannot be many. True. If one is not contained in the others, the others are neither many nor one.

No.

Cephalos Ceph. And they do not even appear to be one or many. Why is that? Because the others have no communion in any way whatsoever with anything which is non-existent, and nothing that is non-existent pertains to any of the others, for things that are non-existent have no parts. True. Nor is there any opinion or appearance of the non-existent in connection with the others, nor is the non-existent conceived of in any way whatsoever as related to the others. No. Then if one does not exist,

Cephalos none of the others will be conceived of as being one or as being many, either; for it is impossible to conceive of many without one. True, it is impossible. Then if one does not exist, the others neither are nor are conceived to be either one or many. No so it seems. Nor like nor unlike. No. Nor the same nor different, nor in contact nor separate, nor any of the other things which we were saying they appeared to be. The others neither are nor appear to be any of these, if the one does not exist.

Cephalos True. Then if we were to say in a word, “if the one is not, nothing is,” should we be right? Most assuredly. Then let us say that, and we may add, as it appears, that whether the one is or is not, the one and the others in relation to themselves and to each other all in every way are and are not and appear and do not appear. Very true.