Socrates “Now he to whom the ledger of his life shows an account of many evil deeds starts up¹ even from his dreams like children again and again in affright and his days are haunted by anticipations of worse to come. But on him who is conscious of no wrong 331a that he has done a sweet hope² ever attends and a goodly to be nurse of his old age, as Pindar³ too says. For a beautiful saying it is, Socrates, of the poet that when a man lives out his days in justice and pietysweet companion with him, to cheer his heart and nurse his old age, accompanies Hope, who chiefly rules the changeful mind of mortals. ⁴ That is a fine saying and an admirable. It is for this, then, that I affirm that the possession of wealth is of most value 331b not it may be to every man but to the good man. Not to cheat any man even unintentionally or play him false, not remaining in debt to a god⁵ for some sacrifice or to a man for money, so to depart in fear to that other world—to this result the possession of property contributes not a little. It has also many other uses. But, setting one thing against another, I would lay it down, Socrates, that for a man of sense this is the chief service of wealth.” “An admirable sentiment, Cephalus,” 331c said I. “But speaking of this very thing, justice, are we to affirm thus without qualification⁶ that it is truth-telling and paying back what one has received from anyone, or may these very actions sometimes be just and sometimes unjust? I mean, for example, as everyone I presume would admit, if one took over weapons from a friend who was in his right mind and then the lender should go mad and demand them back, that we ought not to return them in that case and that he who did so return them would not be acting justly—nor yet would he who chose to speak nothing but the truth 331d to one who was in that state.” “You are right,” he replied. “Then this is not the definition of justice: to tell the truth and return what one has received.” “Nay, but it is, Socrates,” said Polemarchus breaking in, “if indeed we are to put any faith in Simonides.” “Very well,” said Cephalus, “indeed I make over the whole argument⁷ to you. For it is time for me to attend the sacrifices.” “Well,” said I, “is not Polemarchus the heir of everything that is yours?” “Certainly,” said he with a laugh, and at the same time went out to the sacred rites.⁸ 331e

“Tell me, then, you the inheritor of the argument, what it is that you affirm that Simonides says and rightly says about justice.” “That it is just,” he replied, “to render to each his due.⁹ In saying this I think he speaks well.”

“I must admit,” said I, “that it is not easy to disbelieve Simonides. For he is a wise and inspired man.¹⁰ But just what he may mean by this you, Polemarchus, doubtless know, but I do not. Obviously he does not mean what we were just speaking of, this return of a deposit¹¹ to anyone whatsoever even if he asks it back when not in his right mind. And yet what the man deposited 332a is due to him in a sense, is it not?” “Yes.” “But rendered to him it ought not to be by any manner of means when he demands it not being his right mind.” “True,” said he. “It is then something other than this that Simonides must, as it seems, mean by the saying that it is just to render back what is due.” “Something else in very deed,” he replied, “for he believes that friends owe it to friends to do them some good and no evil.” “I see,” said I; “you mean that¹² he does not render what is due or owing who returns a deposit of gold 332b if this return and the acceptance prove harmful and the returner and the recipient are friends. Isn’t that what you say Simonides means?” “Quite so.” “But how about this—should one not render to enemies what is their due?” “By all means,” he said, “what is due¹³ and owing to them, and there is due and owing from an enemy to an enemy what also is proper for him, some evil.”

“It was a riddling¹⁴ definition of justice, then, that Simonides gave after the manner of poets; for while his meaning, 332c it seems, was that justice is rendering to each what befits him, the name that he gave to this was “the due.”” “What else do you suppose?” said he. “In heaven’s name!” said I, “suppose¹⁵ someone had questioned him thus: “Tell me, Simonides, the art that renders what that is due and befitting to what is called the art of medicine.”¹⁶ What do you take it would have been his answer?” “Obviously,” he said, “the art that renders to bodies drugs, foods, and drinks.” “And the art that renders to what things what that is due and befitting is called the culinary art?” 332d “Seasoning to meats.” “Good. In the same way tell me the art that renders what to whom would be denominated justice.” “If we are to follow the previous examples,¹⁷ Socrates, it is that which renders benefits and harms to friends and enemies.” “To do good to friends and evil to enemies,¹⁸ then, is justice in his meaning?” “I think so.” “Who then is the most able when they are ill to benefit friends and harm enemies in respect to disease and health?” “The physician.” 332e “And who navigators in respect of the perils of the sea?” “The pilot.” “Well then, the just man, in what action and for what work is he the most competent to benefit friends and harm enemies?” “In making war and as an ally, I should say.” “Very well. But now if they are not sick, friend Polemarchus, the physician is useless to them.” “True.” “And so to those who are not at sea the pilot.” “Yes.” “Shall we also say this that for those who are not at war the just man is useless?”

“By no means.” “There is a use then even in peace for justice?” 333a “Yes, it is useful.” “But so is agriculture, isn’t it?” “Yes.” “Namely, for the getting of a harvest?” “Yes.” “But likewise the cobbler’s art?” “Yes.” “Namely, I presume you would say, for the getting of shoes.” “Certainly.” “Then tell me, for the service and getting of what would you say that justice is useful in time of peace?” “In engagements and dealings, Socrates.” “And by dealings do you mean associations, partnerships, or something else?” “Associations, of course.” “Is it the just man, 333b then, who is a good and useful associate and partner in the placing of draughts or the draught-player?” “The player.” “And in the placing of bricks and stones is the just man a more useful and better associate than the builder?” “By no means.” “Then what is the association¹⁹ in which the just man is a better partner than the harpist as an harpist is better than the just man for striking the chords?” “For money-dealings,²⁰ I think.” “Except, I presume, Polemarchus, for the use of money when there is occasion to buy in common 333c or sell a horse. Then, I take it, the man who knows horses, isn’t it so?” “Apparently.” “And again, if it is a vessel, the shipwright or the pilot.” “It would seem so.” “What then is the use of money in common for which a just man is the better partner?” “When it is to be deposited and kept safe, Socrates.” “You mean when it is to be put to no use but is to lie idle²¹?” “Quite so.” “Then it is when money is useless that justice is useful in relation to it?” 333d “It looks that way.” “And similarly when a scythe is to be kept safe, then justice is useful both in public and private. But when it is to be used, the vinedresser’s art is useful?” “Apparently.” “And so you will have to say that when a shield and a lyre are to be kept and put to no use, justice is useful, but when they are to be made use of, the military art and music.” “Necessarily.” “And so in all other cases, in the use of each thing, justice is useless but in its uselessness useful?” “It looks that way.” 333e

“Then, my friend, justice cannot be a thing of much worth²² if it is useful only for things out of use and useless. But let us consider this point. Is not the man who is most skilful to strike or inflict a blow in a fight, whether as a boxer or elsewhere, also the most wary to guard against²³ a blow?” “Assuredly.” “Is it not also true that he who best knows how to guard against disease is also most cunning to communicate it and escape detection?” “I think so.”