Socrates and the lines that follow, are these well—and other impertinences in prose or verse of private citizens to their rulers?” “They are not well.” “They certainly are not suitable for youth to hear for the inculcation of self-control. But if from another point of view they yield some pleasure we must not be surprised, or what is your view of it?” “This,” he said.

“Again, to represent the wisest man as saying that this seems to him the fairest thing in the world, When the bounteous tables are standing Laden with bread and with meat and the cupbearer ladles the sweet wine Out of the mixer and bears it and empties it into the beakers. —do you think the hearing of that sort of thing will conduce to a young man’s temperance or self-control? or this:Hunger is the most piteous death that a mortal may suffer. Or to hear how Zeus lightly forgot all the designs which he devised,

watching while the other gods slept, because of the excitement of his passions, and was so overcome by the sight of Hera that he is not even willing to go to their chamber, but wants to lie with her there on the ground and says that he is possessed by a fiercer desire than when they first consorted with one another, Deceiving their dear parents. Nor will it profit them to hear of Hephaestus’s fettering Ares and Aphrodite for a like motive.” “No, by Zeus,” he said,

“I don’t think it will.” “But any words or deeds of endurance in the face of all odds attributed to famous men are suitable for our youth to see represented and to hear, such as:He smote his breast and chided thus his heart, Endure, my heart, for worse hast thou endured. ” “By all means,” he said. “It is certain that we cannot allow our men to be acceptors of bribes or greedy for gain.”

“By no means.” “Then they must not chant: Gifts move the gods and gifts persuade dread kings. Nor should we approve Achilles’ attendant Phoenix as speaking fairly when he counselled him if he received gifts for it to defend the Achaeans, but without gifts not to lay aside his wrath;”

Socrates “nor shall we think it proper nor admit that Achilles himself was so greedy as to accept gifts from Agamemnon and again to give up a dead body after receiving payment

Socrates but otherwise to refuse.” “It is not right,” he said, “to commend such conduct.” “But, for Homer’s sake,” said I, “I hesitate to say that it is positively impious to affirm such things of Achilles and to believe them when told by others; or again to believe that he said to Apollo Me thou hast baulked, Far-darter, the most pernicious of all gods, Mightily would I requite thee if only my hands had the power.

Socrates And how he was disobedient to the river, who was a god and was ready to fight with him, and again that he said of the locks of his hair, consecrated to her river Spercheius: This let me give to take with him my hair to the hero, Patroclus, who was a dead body, and that he did so we must believe. And again the trailings of Hector’s body round the grave of Patroclus and the slaughter of the living captives upon his pyre, all these we will affirm to be lies,

Socrates nor will we suffer our youth to believe that Achilles, the son of a goddess and of Peleus the most chaste of men, grandson of Zeus, and himself bred under the care of the most sage Cheiron, was of so perturbed a spirit as to be affected with two contradictory maladies, the greed that becomes no free man and at the same time overweening arrogance towards gods and men.” “You are right,” he said.

“Neither, then,” said I, “must we believe this or suffer it to be said, that Theseus, the son of Poseidon,

and Peirithous, the son of Zeus, attempted such dreadful rapes, nor that any other child of a god and hero would have brought himself to accomplish the terrible and impious deeds that they now falsely relate of him. But we must constrain the poets either to deny that these are their deeds or that they are the children of gods, but not to make both statements or attempt to persuade our youth that the gods are the begetters of evil, and that heroes are no better than men.

For, as we were saying, such utterances are both impious and false. For we proved, I take it, that for evil to arise from gods is an impossibility.” “Certainly.” “And they are furthermore harmful to those that hear them. For every man will be very lenient with his own misdeeds if he is convinced that such are and were the actions of The near-sown seed of gods, Close kin to Zeus, for whom on Ida’s top Ancestral altars flame to highest heaven, Nor in their life-blood failsPlato was probably thinking of this passage when he wrote the last paragraph of the Critias. the fire divine. ”

Socrates “For which cause we must put down such fables, lest they breed

Socrates in our youth great laxity in turpitude.” “Most assuredly.” “What type of discourse remains for our definition of our prescriptions and proscriptions?” “We have declared the right way of speaking about gods and daemons and heroes and that other world.” “We have.” “Speech, then, about men would be the remainder.” “Obviously.” “It is impossible for us, my friend, to place this here.” “Why?” “Because I presume we are going to say that so it is that both poets

Socrates and writers of prose speak wrongly about men in matters of greatest moment, saying that there are many examples of men who, though unjust, are happy, and of just men who are wretched, and that there is profit in injustice if it be concealed, and that justice is the other man’s good and your own loss; and I presume that we shall forbid them to say this sort of thing and command them to sing and fable the opposite. Don’t you think so?” “Nay, I well know it,” he said. “Then, if you admit that I am right, I will say that you have conceded the original point of our inquiry?”

Socrates “Rightly apprehended,” he said. “Then, as regards men that speech must be of this kind, that is a point that we will agree upon when we have discovered the nature of justice and the proof that it is profitable to its possessor whether he does or does not appear to be just.” “Most true,” he replied.

“So this concludes the topic of tales. That of diction, I take it, is to be considered next. So we shall have completely examined both the matter and the manner of speech.” And Adeimantus said, “I don’t understand what

you mean by this.” “Well,” said I, “we must have you understand. Perhaps you will be more likely to apprehend it thus. Is not everything that is said by fabulists or poets a narration of past, present, or future things?” “What else could it be?” he said. “Do not they proceed either by pure narration or by a narrative that is effected through imitation, or by both?” “This too,” he said, “I still need to have made plainer.” “I seem to be a ridiculous and obscure teacher,” I said; “so like men who are unable to express themselves

I won’t try to speak in wholes and universals but will separate off a particular part and by the example of that try to show you my meaning.”

Socrates “Tell me. Do you know the first lines if the in which the poet says that Chryses implored Agamemnon to release his daughter, and that the king was angry and that Chryses,

Socrates failing of his request, imprecated curses on the Achaeans in his prayers to the god?” “I do.” “You know then that as far as these verses,And prayed unto all the Achaeans, Chiefly to Atreus’ sons, twin leaders who marshalled the people, the poet himself is the speaker and does not even attempt to suggest to us that anyone but himself is speaking.

Socrates But what follows he delivers as if he were himself Chryses and tries as far as may be to make us feel that not Homer is the speaker, but the priest, an old man. And in this manner he has carried in nearly all the rest of his narration about affairs in Ilion, all that happened in Ithaca, and the entire Odyssey.” “Quite so,” he said. “Now, it is narration, is it not, both when he presents the several speeches and the matter between the speeches?” “Of course.” “But when he delivers a speech

Socrates as if he were someone else, shall we not say that he then assimilates thereby his own diction is far as possible to that of the person whom he announces as about to speak?” “We shall obviously.” “And is not likening one’s self to another speech or bodily bearing an imitation of him to whom one likens one’s self?” “Surely.” “In such case then it appears he and the other poets effect their narration through imitation.” “Certainly.” “But if the poet should conceal himself nowhere, then his entire poetizing and narration would have been accomplished without imitation.

Socrates And lest you may say again that you don’t understand, I will explain to you how this would be done. If Homer, after telling us that Chryses came with the ransom of his daughter and as a suppliant of the Achaeans but chiefly of the kings, had gone on speaking not as if made or being Chryses but still as Homer, you are aware that it would not be imitation but narration, pure and simple. It would have been somewhat in this wise. I will state it without meter for I am not a poet:

Socrates the priest came and prayed that to them the gods should grant to take Troy and come safely home, but that they should accept the ransom and release his daughter, out of reverence for the god;”