Socrates “But if something different manifests itself in the individual, we will return again 435a to the state and test it there and it may be that, by examining them side by side¹ and rubbing them against one another, as it were from the fire-sticks² we may cause the spark of justice to flash forth,³ and when it is thus revealed confirm it in our own minds.” “Well,” he said, “that seems a sound method⁴ and that is what we must do.” “Then,” said I, “if you call a thing by the same⁵ name whether it is big or little, is it unlike in the way in which it is called the same or like?” “Like,” he said. “Then a just man too 435b will not differ⁶ at all from a just city in respect of the very form of justice, but will be like it.” “Yes, like.” “But now the city was thought to be just because three natural kinds existing in it performed each its own function, and again it was sober, brave, and wise because of certain other affections and habits⁷ of these three kinds.” “True,” he said. “Then, my friend, we shall thus expect the individual also to have these same forms 435c in his soul, and by reason of identical affections of these with those in the city to receive properly the same appellations.” “Inevitable,” he said. “Goodness gracious,” said I, “here is another trifling⁸ inquiry into which we have plunged, the question whether the soul really contains these three forms in itself or not.” “It does not seem to me at all trifling,” he said, “for perhaps, Socrates, the saying is true that ’fine things are difficult.’⁹” “Apparently,” said I; 435d “and let me tell you, Glaucon, that in my opinion we shall never in the world apprehend this matter¹⁰ from such methods as we are now employing in discussion. For there is another longer and harder way that conducts to this. Yet we may perhaps discuss it on the level of previous statements and inquiries.” “May we acquiesce in that?” he said. “I for my part should be quite satisfied with that for the present.” “And I surely should be more than satisfied,” I replied. “Don’t you weary then,” he said, “but go on with the inquiry.” “Is it not, then,” 435e said I, “impossible for us to avoid admitting¹¹ this much, that the same forms and qualities are to be found in each one of us that are in the state? They could not get there from any other source.”

“It would be absurd to suppose that the element of high spirit was not derived in states from the private citizens who are reputed to have this quality as the populations of the Thracian and Scythian lands and generally of northern regions; or the quality of love of knowledge, which would chiefly be attributed to¹² the region where we dwell, 436a or the love of money¹³ which we might say is not least likely to be found in Phoenicians¹⁴ and the population of Egypt.” “One certainly might,” he replied. “This is the fact then,” said I, “and there is no difficulty in recognizing it.” “Certainly not.”

“But the matter begins to be difficult when you ask whether we do all these things with the same thing or whether there are three things and we do one thing with one and one with another—learn with one part of ourselves, feel anger with another, and with yet a third desire the pleasures of nutrition 436b and generation and their kind, or whether it is with the entire soul¹⁵ that we function in each case when we once begin. That is what is really hard to determine properly.” “I think so too,” he said. “Let us then attempt to define the boundary and decide whether they are identical with one another in this way.” “How?” “It is obvious that the same thing will never do or suffer opposites¹⁶ in the same respect¹⁷ in relation to the same thing and at the same time. So that if ever we find¹⁸ these contradictions in the functions of the mind 436c we shall know that it was¹⁹ not the same thing functioning but a plurality.” “Very well.” “Consider, then, what I am saying.” “Say on,” he replied. “Is it possible for the same thing at the same time in the same respect to be at rest²⁰ and in motion?” “By no means.” “Let us have our understanding still more precise, lest as we proceed we become involved in dispute. If anyone should say of a man standing still but moving his hands and head that the same man is at the same time at rest and in motion we should not, I take it, regard that as the right way of expressing it, but rather that a part²¹ of him is at rest 436d and a part in motion. Is not that so?” “It is.” “Then if the disputant should carry the jest still further with the subtlety that tops at any rate²² stand still as a whole at the same time that they are in motion when with the peg fixed in one point they revolve, and that the same is true of any other case of circular motion about the same spot—we should reject the statement on the ground that the repose and the movement in such cases²³ were not in relation to the same parts of the objects, but we would say 436e that there was a straight line and a circumference in them and that in respect of the straight line they are standing still²⁴ since they do not incline to either side, but in respect of the circumference they move in a circle; but that when as they revolve they incline the perpendicular to right or left or forward or back, then they are in no wise at rest.” “And that would be right,” he said.

“No such remarks then will disconcert us or any whit the more make us believe that it is ever possible for the same thing at the same time in the same respect and the same relation 437a to suffer, be,²⁵ or do opposites.” “They will not me, I am sure,” said he. “All the same,” said I, “that we may not be forced to examine at tedious length the entire list of such contentions²⁶ and convince ourselves that they are false, let us proceed on the hypothesis²⁷ that this is so, with the understanding that, if it ever appear otherwise, everything that results from the assumption shall be invalidated.” “That is what we must do,” he said. 437b

“Will you not then,” said I, “set down as opposed to one another assent and dissent, and the endeavor after a thing to the rejection of it, and embracing to repelling—do not these and all things like these belong to the class of opposite actions or passions; it will make no difference which?²⁸” “None,” said he, “but they are opposites.” “What then,” said I, “of thirst and hunger and the appetites generally, and again consenting²⁹ and willing, would you not put them all somewhere in the classes 437c just described? Will you not say, for example, that the soul of one who desires either strives for that which he desires or draws towards its embrace what it wishes to accrue to it; or again, in so far as it wills that anything be presented to it, nods assent to itself thereon as if someone put the question,³⁰ striving towards its attainment?” “I would say so,” he said. “But what of not-willing³¹ and not consenting nor yet desiring, shall we not put these under the soul’s rejection³² and repulsion from itself and 437d generally into the opposite class from all the former?” “Of course.” “This being so, shall we say that the desires constitute a class³³ and that the most conspicuous members of that class³⁴ are what we call thirst and hunger?” “We shall,” said he. “Is not the one desire of drink, the other of food?” “Yes.” “Then in so far as it is thirst, would it be of anything more than that of which we say it is a desire in the soul?³⁵ I mean is thirst thirst for hot drink or cold or much or little or in a word for a draught of any particular quality, or is it the fact that if heat³⁶ 437e is attached³⁷ to the thirst it would further render the desire—a desire of cold, and if cold of hot? But if owing to the presence of muchness the thirst is much it would render it a thirst for much and if little for little. But mere thirst will never be desire of anything else than that of which it is its nature to be, mere drink,³⁸ and so hunger of food.” “That is so,” he said; “each desire in itself is of that thing only of which it is its nature to be. The epithets belong to the quality—such or such.³⁹”