Socrates “Or even if they do look at them in that way, are you still going to deny that they will change their opinion and answer differently? Or do you think that anyone is ungentle to the gentle or grudging to the ungrudging if he himself is ungrudging¹ and mild? I will anticipate you and reply that I think that only in some few and not in the mass of mankind is so ungentle or harsh a temper to be found.” “And I, you may be assured,” 500b he said, “concur.” “And do you not also concur² in this very point that the blame for this harsh attitude of the many towards philosophy falls on that riotous crew who have burst in³ where they do not belong, wrangling with one another,⁴ filled with spite⁵ and always talking about persons,⁶ a thing least befitting philosophy?” “Least of all, indeed,” he said.

“For surely, Adeimantus, the man whose mind is truly fixed on eternal realities⁷ has no leisure 500c to turn his eyes downward upon the petty affairs of men, and so engaging in strife with them to be filled with envy and hate, but he fixes his gaze upon the things of the eternal and unchanging order, and seeing that they neither wrong nor are wronged by one another, but all abide in harmony as reason bids, he will endeavor to imitate them and, as far as may be, to fashion himself in their likeness and assimilate⁸ himself to them. Or do you think it possible not to imitate the things to which anyone attaches himself with admiration?” “Impossible,” he said. “Then the lover of wisdom 500d associating with the divine order will himself become orderly and divine in the measure permitted to man.⁹ But calumny¹⁰ is plentiful everywhere.” “Yes, truly.” “If, then,” I said, “some compulsion¹¹ is laid upon him to practise stamping on the plastic matter of human nature in public and private the patterns that he visions there,¹² and not merely to mould¹³ and fashion himself, do you think he will prove a poor craftsman¹⁴ of sobriety and justice and all forms of ordinary civic virtue¹⁵?” “By no means,” he said. “But if the multitude become aware 500e that what we are saying of the philosopher is true, will they still be harsh with philosophers, and will they distrust our statement that no city could ever be blessed unless its lineaments were traced¹⁶ by artists who used the heavenly model?” “They will not be harsh,” 501a he said, “if they perceive that.”

“But tell me, what is the manner of that sketch you have in mind?” “They will take the city and the characters of men, as they might a tablet, and first wipe it clean—¹⁷ no easy task. But at any rate you know that this would be their first point of difference from ordinary reformers, that they would refuse to take in hand either individual or state or to legislate before they either received a clean slate or themselves made it clean.” “And they would be right,” he said. “And thereafter, do you not think that they would sketch the figure of the constitution?” “Surely.” “And then, 501b I take it, in the course of the work they would glance¹⁸ frequently in either direction, at justice, beauty, sobriety and the like as they are in the nature of things,¹⁹ and alternately at that which they were trying to reproduce in mankind, mingling and blending from various pursuits that hue of the flesh, so to speak, deriving their judgement from that likeness of humanity²⁰ which Homer too called when it appeared in men the image and likeness of God.²¹” “Right,” he said. “And they would erase one touch or stroke and paint in another 501c until in the measure of the possible²² they had made the characters of men pleasing and dear to God as may be.” “That at any rate²³ would be the fairest painting.” “Are we then making any impression on those who you said²⁴ were advancing to attack us with might and main? Can we convince them that such a political artist of character and such a painter exists as the one we then were praising when our proposal to entrust the state to him angered them, and are they now in a gentler mood when they hear what we are now saying?” “Much gentler,” 501d he said, “if they are reasonable.” “How can they controvert it²⁵? Will they deny that the lovers of wisdom are lovers of reality and truth?” “That would be monstrous,” he said. “Or that their nature as we have portrayed it is akin to the highest and best?” “Not that either.” “Well, then, can they deny that such a nature bred in the pursuits that befit it will be perfectly good and philosophic so far as that can be said of anyone? Or will they rather say it of those whom we have excluded?” 501e “Surely not.” “Will they, then, any longer be fierce with us when we declare that, until the philosophic class wins control, there will be no surcease of trouble for city or citizens nor will the polity which we fable²⁶ in words be brought to pass in deed?” “They will perhaps be less so,” he said.

“Instead of less so, may we not say that they have been altogether tamed and convinced, so that 502a for very shame, if for no other reason, they may assent?” “Certainly,” said he.

“Let us assume, then,” said I, “that they are won over to this view. Will anyone contend that there is no chance that the offspring of kings and rulers should be born with the philosophic nature?” “Not one,” he said. “And can anyone prove that if so born they must necessarily be corrupted? The difficulty²⁷ of their salvation we too concede; but that in all the course of time 502b not one of all could be saved,²⁸ will anyone maintain that?” “How could he?” “But surely,” said I, “the occurrence of one such is enough,²⁹ if he has a state which obeys him,³⁰ to realize³¹ all that now seems so incredible.” “Yes, one is enough,” he said. “For if such a ruler,” I said, “ordains the laws and institutions that we have described it is surely not impossible that the citizens should be content to carry them out.” “By no means.” “Would it, then, be at all strange or impossible for others to come to the opinion to which we have come³²?” 502c “I think not,” said he. “And further that these things are best, if possible, has already, I take it, been sufficiently shown.” “Yes, sufficiently.” “Our present opinion, then, about this legislation is that our plan would be best if it could be realized and that this realization is difficult³³ yet not impossible.” “That is the conclusion,” he said.

“This difficulty disposed of, we have next 502d to speak of what remains, in what way, namely, and as a result of what studies and pursuits, these preservers³⁴ of the constitution will form a part of our state, and at what ages they will severally take up each study.” “Yes, we have to speak of that,” he said. “I gained nothing,” I said, “by my cunning³⁵ in omitting heretofore³⁶ the distasteful topic of the possession of women and procreation of children and the appointment of rulers, because I knew that the absolutely true and right way would provoke censure and is difficult of realization; 502e for now I am none the less compelled to discuss them. The matter of the women and children has been disposed of,³⁷ but the education of the rulers has to be examined again, I may say, from the starting-point.”

“We were saying, if you recollect, 503a that they must approve themselves lovers of the state when tested³⁸ in pleasures and pains, and make it apparent that they do not abandon³⁹ this fixed faith⁴⁰ under stress of labors or fears or any other vicissitude, and that anyone who could not keep that faith must he rejected, while he who always issued from the test pure and intact, like gold tried in the fire,⁴¹ is to be established as ruler and to receive honors in life and after death and prizes as well.⁴² Something of this sort we said while the argument slipped by with veiled face⁴³ 503b in fear⁴⁴ of starting⁴⁵ our present debate.” “Most true,” he said; “I remember.” “We shrank, my friend,” I said, “from uttering the audacities which have now been hazarded. But now let us find courage for the definitive pronouncement that as the most perfect⁴⁶ guardians we must establish philosophers.” “Yes, assume it to have been said,” said he. “Note, then, that they will naturally be few,⁴⁷ for the different components of the nature which we said their education presupposed rarely consent to grow in one; but for the most part these qualities are found apart.” 503c “What do you mean?” he said. “Facility in learning, memory, sagacity, quickness of apprehension and their accompaniments, and youthful spirit and magnificence in soul are qualities, you know, that are rarely combined in human nature with a disposition to live orderly, quiet, and stable lives;⁴⁸ but such men, by reason of their quickness,⁴⁹ are driven about just as chance directs, and all steadfastness is gone out of them.” “You speak truly,” he said. “And on the other hand, the steadfast and stable temperaments, whom one could rather trust in use, 503d and who in war are not easily moved and aroused to fear, are apt to act in the same way⁵⁰ when confronted with studies. They are not easily aroused, learn with difficulty, as if benumbed,⁵¹ and are filled with sleep and yawning when an intellectual task is set them.” “It is so,” he said. “But we affirmed that a man must partake of both temperaments in due and fair combination or else participate in neither the highest⁵² education nor in honors nor in rule.” “And rightly,” he said. “Do you not think, then, that such a blend will be a rare thing?” 503e “Of course.” “They must, then, be tested in the toils and fears and pleasures of which we then spoke,⁵³ and we have also now to speak of a point we then passed by, that we must exercise them in many studies, watching them to see whether their nature is capable of enduring the greatest and most difficult studies 504a or whether it will faint and flinch⁵⁴ as men flinch in the trials and contests of the body.”