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🧠 Theaetetus · 146a–149c

Socrates SOC. Well, it is just this that I am in doubt about and cannot fully grasp by my own efforts—what knowledge really is. 146a Can we tell that? What do you say? Who of us will speak first? And he who fails, and whoever fails in turn, shall go and sit down and be donkey, as the children say when they play ball; and whoever gets through without failing shall be our king and shall order us to answer any questions he pleases. Why are you silent? I hope, Theodorus, I am not rude, through my love of discussion and my eagerness to make us converse and show ourselves friends and ready to talk to one another.

Theodorus THEO. That sort of thing would not be at all rude, Socrates; but tell one of the youths to answer your questions; for I am unused to such conversation and, moreover, I am not of an age to accustom myself to it. But that would be fitting for these young men, and they would improve much more than I; for the fact is, youth admits of improvement in every way. Come, question Theaetetus as you began to do, and do not let him off.

Socrates SOC. Well, Theaetetus, you hear what Theodorus says, 146c and I think you will not wish to disobey him, nor is it right for a young person to disobey a wise man when he gives instructions about such matters. Come, speak up well and nobly. What do you think knowledge is?

Theaetetus THEAET. Well, Socrates, I must, since you bid me. For, if I make a mistake, you are sure to set me right.

Socrates SOC. Certainly, if we can.

Theaetetus THEAET. Well then, I think the things one might learn from Theodorus are knowledge—geometry and all the things you spoke of just now—and also cobblery and 146d the other craftsmen’s arts; each and all of these are nothing else but knowledge.

Socrates SOC. You are noble and generous, my friend, for when you are asked for one thing you give many, and a variety of things instead of a simple answer.

Theaetetus THEAET. What do you mean by that, Socrates?

Socrates SOC. Nothing, perhaps; but I will tell you what I think I mean. When you say “cobblery” you speak of nothing else than the art of making shoes, do you?

Theaetetus THEAET. Nothing else.

Socrates SOC. And when you say “carpentry”? Do you mean anything else than the art of making wooden furnishings?

Theaetetus THEAET. Nothing else by that, either.

Socrates SOC. Then in both cases you define that to which each form of knowledge belongs?

Theaetetus THEAET. Yes.

Socrates SOC. But the question, Theaetetus, was not to what knowledge belongs, nor how many the forms of knowledge are; for we did not wish to number them, but to find out what knowledge itself really is. Or is there nothing in what I say?

Theaetetus THEAET. Nay, you are quite right.

Socrates SOC. Take this example. If anyone should ask us about some common everyday thing, for instance, what clay is, and we should reply that it is the potters’ clay and the oven makers’ clay and the brickmakers’ clay, should we not be ridiculous?

Theaetetus THEAET. Perhaps.

Socrates SOC. Yes in the first place for assuming that the questioner can understand from our answer what clay is, when we say “clay,” no matter whether we add “the image-makers’” 147b or any other craftsmen’s. Or does anyone, do you think, understand the name of anything when he does not know what the thing is?

Theaetetus THEAET. By no means.

Socrates SOC. Then he does not understand knowledge of shoes if he does not know knowledge.

Theaetetus THEAET. No.

Socrates SOC. Then he who is ignorant of knowledge does not understand cobblery or any other art.

Theaetetus THEAET. That is true.

Socrates SOC. Then it is a ridiculous answer to the question “what is knowledge?” when we give the name of some art; 147c for we give in our answer something that knowledge belongs to, when that was not what we were asked.

Theaetetus THEAET. So it seems.

Socrates SOC. Secondly, when we might have given a short, everyday answer, we go an interminable distance round; for instance, in the question about clay, the everyday, simple thing would be to say “clay is earth mixed with moisture” without regard to whose clay it is.

Theaetetus THEAET. It seems easy just now, Socrates, as you put it; but you are probably asking the kind of thing that came up among us lately when 147d your namesake, Socrates here, and I were talking together.

Socrates SOC. What kind of thing was that, Theaetetus?

Theaetetus THEAET. Theodorus here was drawing some figures for us in illustration of roots, showing that squares containing three square feet and five square feet are not commensurable in length with the unit of the foot, and so, selecting each one in its turn up to the square containing seventeen square feet and at that he stopped. Now it occurred to us, since the number of roots appeared to be infinite, to try to collect them under one name, 147e by which we could henceforth call all the roots. 1

Socrates SOC. And did you find such a name?

Theaetetus THEAET. I think we did. But see if you agree.

Socrates SOC. Speak on.

Theaetetus THEAET. We divided all number into two classes. The one, the numbers which can be formed by multiplying equal factors, we represented by the shape of the square and called square or equilateral numbers.

Socrates SOC. Well done!

Theaetetus THEAET. The numbers between these, such as three 148a and five and all numbers which cannot be formed by multiplying equal factors, but only by multiplying a greater by a less or a less by a greater, and are therefore always contained in unequal sides, we represented by the shape of the oblong rectangle and called oblong numbers.

Socrates SOC. Very good; and what next?

Theaetetus THEAET. All the lines which form the four sides of the equilateral or square numbers we called lengths, and those which form the oblong numbers we called surds, because they are not commensurable with the others 148b in length, but only in the areas of the planes which they have the power to form. And similarly in the case of solids. 2

Socrates SOC. Most excellent, my boys! I think Theodorus will not be found liable to an action for false witness.

Theaetetus THEAET. But really, Socrates, I cannot answer that question of yours about knowledge, as we answered the question about length and square roots. And yet you seem to me to want something of that kind. So Theodorus appears to be a false witness after all.

Socrates SOC. Nonsense! If he were praising your running and said he had never met any young man who was so good a runner, and then you were beaten in a race by a full grown man who held the record, do you think his praise would be any less truthful?

Theaetetus THEAET. Why, no.

Socrates SOC. And do you think that the discovery of knowledge, as I was just now saying, is a small matter and not a task for the very ablest men?

Theaetetus THEAET. By Zeus, I think it is a task for the very ablest.

Socrates SOC. Then you must have confidence in yourself, and believe that Theodorus is right, 148d and try earnestly in every way to gain an understanding of the nature of knowledge as well as of other things.

Theaetetus THEAET. If it is a question of earnestness, Socrates, the truth will come to light.

Socrates SOC. Well then—for you pointed out the way admirably just now—take your answer about the roots as a model, and just as you embraced them all in one class, though they were many, try to designate the many forms of knowledge by one definition.

Theaetetus THEAET. But I assure you, Socrates, I have often tried to work that out, when I heard reports of the questions that you asked, but I can neither persuade myself that I have any satisfactory answer, nor can I find anyone else who gives the kind of answer you insist upon; and yet, on the other hand, I cannot get rid of a feeling of concern about the matter.

Socrates SOC. Yes, you are suffering the pangs of labor, Theaetetus, because you are not empty, but pregnant.

Theaetetus THEAET. I do not know, Socrates; I merely tell you what I feel.

Socrates SOC. Have you then not heard, you absurd boy, that I am the son of a noble and burly midwife, Phaenarete?

Theaetetus THEAET. Yes, I have heard that.

Socrates SOC. And have you also heard that I practise the same art?

Theaetetus THEAET. No, never.

Socrates SOC. But I assure you it is true; only do not tell on me to the others; for it is not known that I possess this art. But other people, since they do not know it, do not say this of me, but say that I am a most eccentric person and drive men to distraction. Have you heard that also?

Theaetetus THEAET. Yes, I have.

Socrates SOC. Shall I tell you the reason then?

Theaetetus THEAET. Oh yes, do.

Socrates SOC. Just take into consideration the whole business of the midwives, and you will understand more easily what I mean. For you know, I suppose, that no one of them attends other women while she is still capable of conceiving and bearing but only those do so who have become too old to bear.

Theaetetus THEAET. Yes, certainly.

Socrates SOC. They say the cause of this is Artemis, because she, a childless goddess, has had childbirth allotted to her as her special province. Now it would seem she did not allow 149c barren women to be midwives, because human nature is too weak to acquire an art which deals with matters of which it has no experience, but she gave the office to those who on account of age were not bearing children, honoring them for their likeness to herself.

Theaetetus THEAET. Very likely.

Socrates SOC. Is it not, then, also likely and even necessary, that midwives should know better than anyone else who are pregnant and who are not?

Theaetetus THEAET. Certainly.

Socrates SOC. And furthermore, the midwives, by means of drugs 149d and incantations, are able to arouse the pangs of labor and, if they wish, to make them milder, and to cause those to bear who have difficulty in bearing; and they cause miscarriages if they think them desirable.

Theaetetus THEAET. That is true.

Socrates SOC. Well, have you noticed this also about them, that they are the most skillful of matchmakers, since they are very wise in knowing what union of man and woman will produce the best possible children?

Theaetetus THEAET. I do not know that at all.

Socrates SOC. But be assured that they are prouder of this 149e than of their skill in cutting the umbilical cord. Just consider. Do you think the knowledge of what soil is best for each plant or seed belongs to the same art as the tending and harvesting of the fruits of the earth, or to another?

Theaetetus THEAET. To the same art.

Socrates SOC. And in the case of a woman, do you think, my friend, that there is one art for the sowing and another for the harvesting?

Theaetetus THEAET. It is not likely.

Page 2 of 20 · Theaetetus, Plato , tr. Harold North Fowler · Perseus Digital Library