Chapter 8

By a quality I mean that in virtue of which things are said to be qualified somehow. But quality is one of the things spoken of in a number of ways.

One kind of quality, then, let us call states and conditions. A state differs from a condition in being much more lasting and more stable. Of this sort are the branches of knowledge and the virtues. For knowledge seems to be something that stays with us and is hard to change, even if a man has acquired only a moderate grasp of it, provided that no great change is brought about by disease or anything else of the kind; and likewise virtue too — justice, for instance, and temperance, and each of the like — does not seem to be easily changed or easily altered.

Conditions, on the other hand, are what is easily changed and quickly changing, such as heat and chill, sickness and health, and all others of the sort. For a man is indeed disposed somehow in respect of these, yet he changes quickly, becoming cold from hot, and passing from being healthy to being sick; and it is the same in the other cases — unless one of these very conditions should happen, through length of time, to have become part of his nature, and to be incurable or altogether hard to change, which one might then perhaps already call a state.

It is clear that they mean to call states those things that last longer and are harder to change. For men who have no firm grasp of a branch of knowledge but are easily changed are not said to have a state, although they are of course disposed somehow in respect of that knowledge, either worse or better. Hence a state differs from a condition in that the one is easily changed while the other lasts longer and is harder to change. States are also conditions, but conditions are not necessarily states; for those who have states are thereby disposed somehow in respect of them, whereas those who are disposed somehow do not in every case have a state as well.

Another kind of quality is that in virtue of which we call men boxers or runners, healthy or sickly — and, in general, whatever is spoken of in virtue of a natural capacity or incapacity. For it is not by being disposed somehow that each of these is called qualified, but by having a natural capacity or incapacity for doing something easily, or for not being affected at all. Men are called boxers or runners, for instance, not by being disposed somehow but by having a natural capacity for doing something easily; and they are called healthy by having a natural capacity for not being easily affected by whatever comes their way, and sickly by having a natural incapacity for not being easily affected by whatever comes their way. The hard and the soft stand similarly: a thing is called hard because it has a capacity for not being easily divided, and soft because it has an incapacity for this same thing.

A third kind of quality consists of affective qualities and affections. Such are sweetness and bitterness and sourness, and all that is akin to these; and further hotness and coldness, whiteness and blackness. That these are qualities is evident, for the things that have received them are themselves called qualified in virtue of them: honey, for instance, is called sweet because it has received sweetness, and a body is called white because it has received whiteness; and it is the same in the other cases.

They are called affective qualities not because the things that have received the qualities have themselves been affected in some way — for honey is not called sweet because it has been affected in some way, nor is anything else of the kind. And likewise hotness and coldness are called affective qualities not because the things that have received them have themselves been affected in some way; rather they are called affective qualities because each of the qualities mentioned is productive of an affection of the senses. For sweetness produces a certain affection in taste, and hotness one in touch; and so with the others.

Whiteness and blackness and the other colours, however, are called affective qualities not in the same way as the things just mentioned, but because they have themselves come about from an affection. That many changes of colour come about through an affection is plain: a man who is ashamed turns red, one who is frightened turns pale, and so with each such case. Hence if someone has by nature been affected by some such affection, as a result of certain natural concomitants, it is reasonable that he should have the corresponding colour; for the very bodily condition that arose just now in being ashamed might also arise in accordance with a natural constitution, so that the same colour comes about by nature too.

All such concomitants, then, as have taken their origin from affections that are hard to change and lasting are called affective qualities. For whether pallor or darkness has come about in the natural constitution, they are called qualities (since we are called qualified in virtue of them); or whether this same pallor or darkness has come about through a long illness or through sunburn, and does not readily return to its former state, or even lasts for life, these too are called qualities, for in the same way we are called qualified in virtue of them.

But all that comes about from what is easily dissolved and quickly restored is called an affection, and not a quality; for men are not said to be qualified somehow in virtue of these. A man who blushes because he is ashamed is not called ruddy-complexioned, nor is one who turns pale because he is frightened called pale-complexioned; rather he is said to have been affected somehow. Hence such things are called affections, not qualities.

Similarly, affective qualities and affections are spoken of in the case of the soul as well. All those which have arisen straight away at birth from affections that are hard to change are called qualities — the derangement of madness, for instance, and irascibility and the like; for men are called qualified in virtue of these, irascible and mad. And likewise all derangements that are not natural but have arisen from certain other concomitants and are hard to be rid of, or even wholly unchangeable — such things too are qualities, for men are called qualified in virtue of them. But all that comes about from what is quickly restored is called an affection: if, for example, a man in distress is more prone to anger. For the man who is more prone to anger while in such an affection is not called irascible, but rather is said to have been affected somehow. Hence such things are called affections, not qualities.

A fourth kind of quality is shape, and the form that belongs to each thing, and in addition to these straightness and curvedness and anything like them. For in virtue of each of these a thing is said to be qualified somehow: a thing is said to be qualified somehow by being triangular or square, and by being straight or curved; and each thing is said to be qualified somehow in virtue of its form as well.

Rare and dense, rough and smooth might be thought to signify a qualification, but such things seem foreign to the classification of quality; for each of them seems rather to reveal a certain position of the parts. A thing is dense because its parts are close to one another, rare because they stand apart from one another; and smooth because its parts lie somehow in a straight line, rough because one part rises above and another falls short.

Perhaps some other manner of quality might yet come to light, but those most commonly spoken of are pretty well these.

These, then, are qualities; and the things called qualified are those which are called paronymously after them, or in some other way from them. In most cases, indeed in practically all, they are called paronymously: white from whiteness, the grammarian from grammar, the just man from justice, and so with the others.

In some cases, however, because no names have been assigned to the qualities, it is not possible for things to be called paronymously after them. The runner or the boxer, for instance, so called in virtue of a natural capacity, is not called paronymously after any quality; for no names have been assigned to the capacities in virtue of which these men are called qualified, as they have been to the branches of knowledge in virtue of which men are called boxers or wrestlers in virtue of a condition. For there is a knowledge called boxing and one called wrestling, and those who are conditioned by them are called qualified paronymously after them.

Sometimes, again, even where a name has been assigned, what is called qualified in virtue of it is not so called paronymously: the excellent man, for instance, from virtue; for he is called excellent because he has virtue, but not paronymously from virtue. Such cases, however, are not many. Things called qualified, then, are those which are called paronymously after the qualities we have mentioned, or in some other way from them.

There is contrariety in respect of quality: justice is contrary to injustice, whiteness to blackness, and so with the rest; and so too are the things called qualified in virtue of them — the unjust to the just, and the white to the black. But this does not hold in all cases: there is nothing contrary to tawny or pale or colours of that sort, though they are qualifications.

Again, if one of a pair of contraries is a quality, the remaining one too will be a quality. This is clear if one runs over the other categories. For example, if justice is contrary to injustice, and justice is a quality, then injustice too is a quality; for none of the other categories will fit injustice — neither quantity, nor a relative, nor where, nor in general anything else of the kind, but only quality. And it is the same with the other contraries in respect of quality.

Qualifications admit of the more and the less. For one thing is called more and less white than another, and one more just than another; and a thing itself admits of increase, since what is white can still become whiter. Not all do so, however, but most.

For one might raise the puzzle whether one justice is called more and less a justice than another, and likewise with the other conditions. Some indeed dispute about such cases: they say that one justice is by no means to be called more and less a justice than another, nor one health than another health, but that one man has health less than another, and one justice less than another, and likewise with grammar and the other conditions. But at any rate the things called after these indisputably admit of the more and the less: one man is called more of a grammarian than another, and healthier, and juster; and so in the other cases.

Triangle and square, however, do not seem to admit of the more, nor does any other shape. For the things that admit the account of triangle or of circle are all alike triangles or circles, while of those that do not admit it none will be called more so than another: the square is no more a circle than the oblong is, for neither admits the account of circle. In general, if both do not admit the account of what is in question, one will not be called more so than the other. Not all qualifications, then, admit of the more and the less.

None of the things mentioned, then, is distinctive of quality; but things are called like and unlike in virtue of qualities alone, for one thing is not like another in virtue of anything but that in virtue of which it is qualified. Hence it would be distinctive of quality that a thing is called like and unlike in virtue of it.

We need not be disturbed lest someone should say that, having set out to speak of quality, we are counting in many relatives as well; for we said that states and conditions were relatives. In practically all such cases the genera are spoken of as relatives, but none of the particulars. For knowledge, being a genus, is said to be just what it is of something else, since it is called knowledge of something; but none of the particular branches is said to be just what it is of something else — grammar is not called grammar of something, nor music music of something. Rather, if at all, these too are called relatives in virtue of their genus: grammar is called knowledge of something, not grammar of something, and music is called knowledge of something, not music of something. Hence the particular branches are not relatives.

But it is by the particular branches that we are called qualified, for it is these that we actually have; we are called knowers because we have some one of the particular branches of knowledge. Hence it would be these — the particular branches, in virtue of which we are on occasion called qualified — that are the qualities; and these are not relatives.

Further, if the same thing should turn out to be both a relative and a qualification, there is nothing absurd in counting it in both genera.