Chapter 9

Doing and being-affected also admit of contrariety and of the more and the less. For heating is contrary to cooling, and being heated to being cooled, and being pleased to being pained; so they do admit of contrariety. And they admit of the more and the less as well: for it is possible to heat more and to heat less, and to be heated more and to be heated less. Doing and being-affected, then, admit of the more and the less.

This much, then, is said about these. Being-in-a-position was also spoken of in the discussion of relatives, where it was said that it is spoken of paronymously, from the corresponding postures.

As for the remaining ones — when, where, and having — because they are obvious nothing further is said about them than what was said at the outset: that having signifies such things as being shod or being armed, and where such things as in the Lyceum — together with everything else that was said about them.

Chapter 10

What has been said about the genera set out above is sufficient. But concerning opposites we must state in how many ways things are customarily opposed. One thing is said to be opposed to another in four ways: either as relatives, or as contraries, or as privation and possession, or as affirmation and negation. Each of these sorts of thing is opposed, to speak in outline, in the following way: as relatives, for example the double to the half; as contraries, for example the bad to the good; as things said in terms of privation and possession, for example blindness and sight; as affirmation and negation, for example 'he is sitting' — 'he is not sitting'.

Things opposed as relatives are called just what they are, of their opposites, or are related to them in some other way. For example, the double, just what it is, is called double of something else; for it is double of something. Knowledge, too, is opposed to the knowable as a relative, and knowledge is called just what it is, of the knowable; and the knowable, just what it is, is spoken of in relation to its opposite, knowledge. For the knowable is called knowable by something, namely by knowledge. So things that are opposed as relatives are called just what they are, of the other, or else are spoken of in relation to one another in some other way.

But things opposed as contraries are never called just what they are in relation to one another, though they are called contraries of one another. For the good is not called the good of the bad, but its contrary; nor is the white called the white of the black, but its contrary. Hence these two oppositions differ from one another.

Those contraries such that one or the other of them must necessarily belong to the things in which they naturally occur, or of which they are predicated, have nothing intermediate. But where it is not necessary for one or the other to belong, there is always something intermediate. For example, sickness and health naturally occur in the body of an animal, and it is necessary for one or the other to belong to an animal's body, either sickness or health. Again, odd and even are predicated of number, and it is necessary for one or the other to belong to a number, either odd or even. And there is nothing intermediate in these cases — neither between sickness and health nor between odd and even.

But where it is not necessary for one or the other to belong, there is something intermediate. For example, black and white naturally occur in a body, and it is not necessary for one or the other of them to belong to the body; for not everything is either white or black. Again, bad and good are predicated both of man and of many other things, but it is not necessary for one or the other of them to belong to those things of which they are predicated; for not all things are either bad or good. And in these cases there is something intermediate: between white and black there is grey and yellow and all the other colours, and between the bad and the good there is what is neither bad nor good.

In some cases, then, names have been given to the intermediates, as grey and yellow and the other colours are names for what lies between white and black; but in other cases it is not easy to supply a name for the intermediate, and the intermediate is instead defined by the negation of each of the extremes, as with what is neither good nor bad, and what is neither just nor unjust.

Privation and possession are spoken of in connection with the same thing, as sight and blindness are in connection with the eye. To speak generally, each of them is spoken of in connection with whatever it is that the possession naturally occurs in. We say that something capable of receiving the possession is deprived of it whenever it is in no way present in that in which it naturally occurs, and at the time when it is natural for it to be had. For we do not call toothless whatever has no teeth, nor blind whatever has no sight, but only what lacks them at the time when it is natural to have them. For some things from birth have neither sight nor teeth, yet they are not called toothless or blind.

But being deprived and having the possession are not privation and possession. For sight is a possession and blindness a privation, whereas having sight is not sight, nor is being blind blindness. For blindness is a certain privation, while being blind is being deprived, and not a privation. Again, if blindness were the same as being blind, both would be predicated of the same thing; but a man is called blind, whereas a man is never called blindness. Still, these too — being deprived and having the possession — do seem to be opposed as privation and possession, for the manner of the opposition is the same: as blindness is opposed to sight, so being blind is opposed to having sight.

Nor, again, is what falls under an affirmation and a negation itself an affirmation and a negation. For an affirmation is an affirmative statement and a negation a negative statement, whereas none of the things falling under an affirmation or a negation is a statement. Yet these too are said to be opposed to one another as affirmation and negation, for in their case also the manner of the opposition is the same. For just as the affirmation is opposed to the negation — for example, 'he is sitting' to 'he is not sitting' — so too the actual thing falling under each is opposed to the other: his sitting to his not sitting.

That privation and possession are not opposed as relatives is clear; for neither is called just what it is, of its opposite. For sight is not sight of blindness, nor is it spoken of in relation to it in any other way at all. In the same way, neither would blindness be called blindness of sight: blindness is called a privation of sight, but it is not called blindness of sight. Again, all relatives are spoken of in relation to correlatives that reciprocate, so that if blindness were a relative, it and that in relation to which it is spoken of would reciprocate. But they do not reciprocate; for sight is not called sight of blindness.

That things spoken of in terms of privation and possession are not opposed as contraries either is clear from the following. With those contraries which have nothing intermediate, it is necessary that one or the other of them should always belong to that in which they naturally occur or of which they are predicated; for it was precisely those which had nothing intermediate where one of the two had necessarily to belong to the recipient, as with sickness and health, and odd and even. But where there is something intermediate, it is never necessary for one or the other to belong to everything. For it is not necessary that everything capable of receiving them be white or black, or hot or cold; for nothing prevents something intermediate between these from belonging. Further, there was something intermediate in just those cases where it was not necessary for one of the two to belong to the recipient — except where the one belongs by nature, as being hot belongs to fire and being white to snow. In these cases it is necessary for one determinately to belong, and not whichever happens; for it is not possible for fire to be cold or for snow to be black. So it is not necessary for one of them to belong to every recipient, but only to those things to which the one belongs by nature — and to these it belongs determinately, the one and not whichever happens.

But in the case of privation and possession neither of the things just said is true. For it is not always necessary for one of them to belong to the recipient: what is not yet naturally such as to have sight is called neither blind nor sighted, so that these would not be among the sort of contraries that have nothing intermediate. Yet neither are they among those which do have something intermediate; for at a certain time it is necessary for one of them to belong to every recipient. For when a thing is already naturally such as to have sight, then it will be said to be either blind or sighted — and not determinately one of these, but whichever happens; for it is not necessary that it be blind, nor that it have sight, but whichever happens. But with contraries that have something intermediate it was never necessary for one to belong to everything, but only to certain things, and to those the one belongs determinately. So it is clear that things opposed in terms of privation and possession are not opposed as contraries in either of these two ways.

Again, in the case of contraries, so long as the recipient exists, change into one another is possible, unless the one belongs to something by nature, as being hot belongs to fire. For what is healthy can fall sick, and what is white can become black, and what is cold hot; and it is possible for a good man to become bad and for a bad man to become good. For the bad man, if he is led into better pursuits and better discourses, would make at least some small progress towards being better; and if he once makes even a small advance, it is clear that he might either change completely or make a very great advance. For he becomes ever more readily moved towards virtue, if he has received any advance at all from the start, so that it is likely he will make still further advances. And this, happening again and again, restores him completely to the contrary state, provided he is not shut out by lack of time.

But in the case of possession and privation it is impossible for change into one another to take place. For change does occur from possession to privation, but from privation to possession is impossible. For no one who has gone blind ever recovers his sight, nor does a bald man become hairy again, nor does a toothless man grow teeth.

As for things opposed as affirmation and negation, it is clear that they are not opposed in any of the ways mentioned; for only with these is it necessary always that the one be true and the other false. For it is not necessary with contraries that one should always be true and the other false, nor with relatives, nor with possession and privation. For example, health and sickness are contraries, and neither of them is either true or false. Similarly the double and the half are opposed as relatives, and neither of them is either true or false. Nor are things said in terms of privation and possession, such as sight and blindness. In general, nothing said without any combination is either true or false; and all the things just mentioned are said without combination.

All the same, it might seem that this most of all happens with contraries said in combination: for 'Socrates is well' is contrary to 'Socrates is sick'. But not even with these is it necessary that always the one be true and the other false. For if Socrates exists, the one will be true and the other false; but if he does not exist, both will be false. For neither 'Socrates is sick' nor 'Socrates is well' is true if Socrates does not exist at all. With privation and possession, if he does not exist at all neither is true, and if he does exist it is not always the case that the one is true and the other false. For 'Socrates has sight' is opposed to 'Socrates is blind' as possession and privation; and if he exists it is not necessary for the one to be true and the other false — for when he is not yet naturally such as to have sight, both are false — while if Socrates does not exist at all, in that case too both are false, both that he has sight and that he is blind.

But with affirmation and negation, always — whether he exists or does not exist — the one will be false and the other true. For as regards 'Socrates is sick' and 'Socrates is not sick', it is clear that if he exists one of them is true and the other false, and likewise if he does not exist; for if he does not exist, 'he is sick' is false and 'he is not sick' is true. So it would be distinctive of these alone — of things opposed as affirmation and negation — that always one of them is true and the other false.