1265bbecause this seems to take place in the states at present. But this ought to be regulated much more in the supposed case than it is now, for now nobody is destitute, because estates are divided among any number, but then, as division of estates will not be allowed, the extra children will necessarily have nothing, whether they are fewer in number or more. And one might think that restriction ought to be put on the birth-rate rather than on property, so as not to allow more than a certain number of children to be produced, and that in fixing their number consideration should be paid to the chances of its happening that some of the children born may die, and to the absence of children in the other marriages; but for the matter to be left alone, as it is in most states, is bound to lead to poverty among the citizens, and poverty produces sedition and crime. The Corinthian Phidon¹ in fact, one of the most ancient lawgivers, thought that the house-holds and the citizen population ought to remain at the same numbers, even though at the outset the estates of all were unequal in size; but in Plato’s Laws the opposite is the case.² However, we must say later what we think would be a better system in these matters; but another question omitted in the Laws is how the rulers will be different from the classes ruled; the writer prescribesthat the rulers are to stand in the same relation to the ruled as the warp of cloth stands to the woof by being made of different wool.³ And inasmuch as he allows a man’s total property to be increased up to five times its original value, for what reason should not an increase in his landed estate be allowed up to a certain point? Also it must be considered whether the proposed separation of homesteads is not inexpedient for household economy—for the writer allotted two homesteads separate from one another to each citizen; but it is difficult to manage two households.⁴ And the whole constitution is intended, it is true, to be neither a democracy nor an oligarchy, but of the form intermediate between them which is termed a republic, for the government is constituted from the class that bears arms. If therefore he introduces this constitution as the one most commonly existing of all forms of constitution in the actual states, he has perhaps made a good proposal, but if he introduces it as the next best to the first form of constitution, it is not a good proposal; for very likely one might approve the Spartan constitution more highly, or perhaps some other form nearer to an aristocracy. In fact some people assert that the best constitution must be a combination of all the forms of constitution, and therefore praise the constitution of Sparta (for some people say that it consists of oligarchy, monarchy and democracy, meaning that the kingship is monarchy and the rule of the ephors oligarchy, but that an element of democracy is introduced by the rule of the ephors because the ephors come from the common people; while others pronounce the ephorate a tyranny but find an element of democracy in the public mess-tables and in the other regulations of daily life).

1266a In Plato’s Laws on the other hand it is stated that the best constitution must consist of a combination of democracy and tyranny,⁵ which one might refuse to count as constitutional governments at all, or else rank as the worst of all constitutions. A better theory therefore is put forward by those who intermingle a larger number of forms, for the constitution composed of a combination of a larger number of forms is better. In the next place, the constitution in the Laws proves as a matter of fact not to contain any element of monarchy at all, but its factors are taken from oligarchy and democracy, and for the most part it tends to incline towards oligarchy. This appears from the regulations for the appointment of the magistrates; for their selection by lot from a list previously elected by vote is a feature common to both oligarchy and democracy, but the compulsion put upon the richer citizens to attend the assembly and vote for magistrates or perform any other political function, while the others are allowed to do as they like, is oligarchical, as is the endeavor to secure that a majority of the magistrates shall be drawn from the wealthy and that the highest offices shall be filled from the highest of the classes assessed by wealth. But the writer also makes the election of the council oligarchical for everybody is compelled to elect, but from the first property-class, and then again an equal number from the second class, and then from the members of the third class, except that it was not to be compulsory for all to vote for those to be elected from the members of the third or the fourth class, and to elect from the fourth class was only compulsory for the members of the first and second classes; and afterwards from those thus selected he says that they are to appointan equal number from each class. Thus those who elect the members from the highest property classes will be more numerous and better,⁶ because some of the lower orders will abstain from voting⁷ as it is not compulsory. Accordingly that it is not proper to establish a constitution of this character from a blend of democracy and monarchy appears clearly from these considerations, and from what will be said later when our inquiry comes to deal with this class of constitution; also the provision for the election of the rulers from among candidates chosen at a preliminary election is dangerous, for if even a moderate number of people choose to combine into a party, the elections will always go according to their wish.

Such are the points as to the constitution in the Laws.

There are also certain other constitutional schemes, some drawn up by amateurs and others by philosophers and statesmen, but all of them are nearer to those which have been actually established and by which states are governed at present than are both of those which have been considered; for nobody else has introduced the innovation of community of children and women, nor that of public meals for the women, but they start rather with the necessary reforms. For some persons think that the right regulation of property is the most important; for the question of property, they say, is universally the cause of party strife. Therefore the Chalcedonian Phaleas⁸ was the first who introduced this expedient;

for he says that the citizens’ estates ought to be equal 1266band he thought that this would not be difficult to secure at the outset for cities in process of foundation, while in those already settled, although it would be a more irksome task, nevertheless a levelling would most easily be effected by the rich giving dowries but not receiving them and the poor receiving but not giving them. Plato when writing the Laws thought that up to a certain point inequality ought to be allowed, but that no citizen should be permitted to acquire more land than would make his estate five times the size of the smallest, as has also been said before.

But those who bring in legislation of this sort must also not overlook this point, which is overlooked at present, that when regulating the amount of property legislators ought also to regulate the size of the family; for if the number of children becomes too large for the property, the law is quite sure to be broken, and apart from the breach of the law it is a bad thing that many citizens who were rich should become poor, for it is difficult for such men not to be advocates of a new order. That a level standard of property affects the community of the citizens in an important manner some men even in old times clearly have recognized; for example there is the legislation of Solon, and other states have a law prohibiting the acquisition of land to any amount that the individual may desire; and similarly there is legislation to prevent the sale of estates, as at Locri there is a lawthat a man shall not sell unless he can prove that manifest misfortune has befallen him and also there is legislation to preserve the old allotments, and the repeal of this restriction at Leucas made the Leucadian constitution excessively democratic, for it came about that the offices were no longer filled from the established property-qualifications. But it is possible that equality of estates may be maintained, but their size may be either too large and promote luxury, or too small, causing a penurious standard of living; it is clear therefore that it is not enough for the lawgiver to make the estates equal, but he must aim at securing a medium size. And again, even if one prescribed a moderate property for all, it would be of no avail, since it is more needful to level men’s desires than their properties, and this can only be done by an adequate system of education enforced by law. But perhaps Phaleas would say that he himself actually prescribes this, as he considers it fundamentally necessary for states to have equality in these two things, property and education. But the nature of the education needs to be defined: it is no use merely for it to be one and the same for all, for it is possible for all to have one and the same education but for this to be of such a nature as to make them desirous of getting more than their share of money or honor or both; moreover⁹ civil strife is caused not only by inequality of property but also by inequality of honors, though the two motives operate in opposite ways—the masses are discontented if possessions are unequally distributed,