1288b 1In all the arts and the sciences that are not merely sectional but that in relation to some one class of subject are complete, it is the function of a single art or science to study what is suited to each class,2 for instance what sort of gymnastic exercise is beneficial for what sort of bodily frame, and what is the best sort (for the best must naturally suit the person of the finest natural endowment and equipment), and also what one exercise taken by all is the best for the largest number (for this is also a question for gymnastic science), and in addition, in case someone desires a habit of body and a knowledge of athletic exercises that are not the ones adapted to him, it is clearly just as much the task of the trainer and gymnastic master to produce this capacity3 also; and we notice this also happening similarly in regard to medicine, and shipbuilding, and the making of clothes, and every other craft. Hence it is clear that in the case of the constitution as well it is the business of the same science to study which is the best constitution and what character it must have to be the most ideal if no external circumstance stands in the way, and what constitution is adapted to what people (since for many it is doubtless impossible to attain the best one, so that the good lawgiver and the true statesman must be acquainted with both the form of constitution that is the highest absolutely and that which is best under assumed conditions), and also thirdly the form of constitution based on a certain supposition (for he must be also capable of considering both how some given constitution could be brought into existence originally and also in what way having been brought into existence it could be preserved for the longest time: I mean for example if it has befallen some state not only not to possess the best constitution and to be unprovided even with the things necessary for it, but also not to have the constitution that is practicable under the circumstances but an inferior one); and beside all these matters he must ascertain the form of constitution most suited to all states, since most of those who make pronouncements about the constitution, even if the rest of what they say is good, entirely miss the points of practical utility. For it is proper to consider4 not only what is the best constitution but also what is the one possible of achievement, and likewise also what is the one that is easier and more generally shared by all states. But as it is, some students inquire which is the highest form of all even though requiring much material equipment,5 while those who rather state some general form sweep aside the constitutions actually existing and praise that of Sparta or some other;
1289a but the proper course is to bring forward an organization of such a sort that men will easily be persuaded and be able in the existing circumstances to take part in it, since to reform a constitution is no less a task than to frame one from the beginning, just as to re-learn a science is just as hard as to learn it originally; in addition therefore to the things mentioned the student of politics must also be able to render aid to the constitutions that exist already, as was also said before.6 But this is impossible if he does not know how many kinds of constitution there are; but at present some people think that there is only one kind of democracy and one kind of oligarchy, but this is not true. Hence he must take in view the different varieties of the constitutions, and know how many there are and how many are their combinations. And after this it needs this same discrimination also to discern the laws that are the best, and those that are suited to each of the forms of constitution. For the laws should be laid down, and all people lay them down, to suit the constitutions—the constitutions must not be made to suit the laws; for a constitution is the regulation of the offices of the state in regard to the mode of their distribution and to the question what is the sovereign power in the state and what is the object of each community, but laws are distinct from the principles of the constitution, and regulate how the magistrates are to govern and to guard against thosewho transgress them. So that clearly it is necessary to be in possession of the different varieties of each form of constitution, and the number of these, even for the purpose of legislation; for it is impossible for the same laws to be expedient for all oligarchies or democracies if there are really several kinds of them, and not one sort of democracy or oligarchy only.
And inasmuch as in our first inquiry7 about the forms of the constitution we classified the right constitutions as three, kingship, aristocracy and constitutional government, and the deviations from these as three, tyranny from kingship, oligarchy from aristocracy and democracy from constitutional government, and about aristocracy and kingship we have spoken (for to study the best constitution is the same thing as to speak about the forms that bear those names, since each of them means a system based on the qualification of virtue equipped with means), and as also the question what constitutes the difference between aristocracy and kingship and when a royal government is to be adopted has been decided before, it remains to discuss the form of constitution designated by the name8 common to them all, and the other forms, oligarchy, democracy and tyranny. Now it is manifest also which of these deviations9 is the worst and which the second worst. For necessarily the deviation from the first and most divine must be the worst,10 and kingship must of necessity either possess the name only, without really being kingship,
1289b or be based on the outstanding superiority of the man who is king; so that tyranny being the worst form must be the one farthest removed from constitutional government, and oligarchy must be the second farthest (for aristocracy is widely separated from that constitution), while democracy must be the most moderate. An account of their relative merits has indeed already been given also by one of the former writers,11 though not on the same principle as ours; for he inclined to judge that there were good varieties of all the forms, for instance a good sort of oligarchy and so on, and that democracy was the worst among these, but the best among the bad varieties, whereas we say that the deviations are wholly wrong, and that it is not right to speak of one form of oligarchy as better than another, but only as less bad. But let us for the present dismiss the question of a classification of this nature. Our business is first to distinguish how many different forms of the constitutions there are, assuming that there do exist several kinds of democracy and of oligarchy; next, which form is most general, and which most desirable after the best constitution, and also if there exists some other form that is aristocratic in nature and well constructed but not fitted to the largest number of cities, which this is; next, which of the other forms too is desirable for what people (since probably for some democracy is necessary more than oligarchy, and for others oligarchy more than democracy);and after this, in what way should one proceed who wishes to set up these constitutions, I mean the various forms of democracy and of oligarchy; and finally, when as far as possible we have concisely touched upon all these questions, we must endeavor to review what are the agencies that destroy and what are those that preserve constitutions generally and each variety of constitution in particular, and what are the causes by which it is most natural for these events to be brought about.
Now the reason of there being several forms of constitution is that every city has a considerable number of parts. For in the first place we see that all the cities are composed of households, and then again that of this multitude some must necessarily be rich and some poor and some between the two, and also of the rich and the poor the former class is heavy-armed and the latter without armor. And we see that one portion of the common people is agricultural, another engaged in trade and another mechanic. And the upper classes have distinctions also corresponding to their wealth and the amounts of their property (for example in a stud of horses—for it is not easy to rear horses without being rich, and this is why in ancient times there were oligarchies in all the states whose strength lay in their cavalry, and they used to use horses for their wars against their neighbors, as for instance did the Eretrians and Chalcidians and the people of Magnesia on the Maeander and many of the other Asiatic peoples). Moreover in addition to differences in wealth there is the difference of birth, and that in regard to virtue,
In all the arts and the sciences that are not merely sectional but that in relation to some one class of subject are complete, it is the function of a single art or science to study what is suited to each class, for instance what sort of gymnastic exercise is beneficial for what sort of bodily frame, and what is the best sort (for the best must naturally suit the person of the finest natural endowment and equipment), and also what one exercise taken by all is the best for the largest number (for this is also a question for gymnastic science), and in addition, in case someone desires a habit of body and a knowledge of athletic exercises that are not the ones adapted to him, it is clearly just as much the task of the trainer and gymnastic master to produce this capacity also; and we notice this also happening similarly in regard to medicine, and shipbuilding, and the making of clothes, and every other craft. Hence it is clear that in the case of the constitution as well it is the business of the same science to study which is the best constitution and what character it must have to be the most ideal if no external circumstance stands in the way, and what constitution is adapted to what people (since for many it is doubtless impossible to attain the best one, so that the good lawgiver and the true statesman must be acquainted with both the form of constitution that is the highest absolutely and that which is best under assumed conditions), and also thirdly the form of constitution based on a certain supposition (for he must be also capable of considering both how some given constitution could be brought into existence originally and also in what way having been brought into existence it could be preserved for the longest time: I mean for example if it has befallen some state not only not to possess the best constitution and to be unprovided even with the things necessary for it, but also not to have the constitution that is practicable under the circumstances but an inferior one); and beside all these matters he must ascertain the form of constitution most suited to all states, since most of those who make pronouncements about the constitution, even if the rest of what they say is good, entirely miss the points of practical utility. For it is proper to consider not only what is the best constitution but also what is the one possible of achievement, and likewise also what is the one that is easier and more generally shared by all states. But as it is, some students inquire which is the highest form of all even though requiring much material equipment, while those who rather state some general form sweep aside the constitutions actually existing and praise that of Sparta or some other;
καὶ παιδεία καὶ ἔθη ταὐτὰ σχεδὸν τὰ ποιοῦντα σπουδαῖον ἄνδρα καὶ τὰ ποιοῦντα πολιτικὸν καὶ βασιλικόν. διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων περὶ τῆς πολιτείας ἤδη πειρατέον λέγειν τῆς ἀρίστης, τίνα πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι τρόπον καὶ καθίστασθαι πῶς.
but the proper course is to bring forward an organization of such a sort that men will easily be persuaded and be able in the existing circumstances to take part in it, since to reform a constitution is no less a task than to frame one from the beginning, just as to re-learn a science is just as hard as to learn it originally; in addition therefore to the things mentioned the student of politics must also be able to render aid to the constitutions that exist already, as was also said before. But this is impossible if he does not know how many kinds of constitution there are; but at present some people think that there is only one kind of democracy and one kind of oligarchy, but this is not true. Hence he must take in view the different varieties of the constitutions, and know how many there are and how many are their combinations. And after this it needs this same discrimination also to discern the laws that are the best, and those that are suited to each of the forms of constitution. For the laws should be laid down, and all people lay them down, to suit the constitutions—the constitutions must not be made to suit the laws; for a constitution is the regulation of the offices of the state in regard to the mode of their distribution and to the question what is the sovereign power in the state and what is the object of each community, but laws are distinct from the principles of the constitution, and regulate how the magistrates are to govern and to guard against thosewho transgress them. So that clearly it is necessary to be in possession of the different varieties of each form of constitution, and the number of these, even for the purpose of legislation; for it is impossible for the same laws to be expedient for all oligarchies or democracies if there are really several kinds of them, and not one sort of democracy or oligarchy only.
And inasmuch as in our first inquiry about the forms of the constitution we classified the right constitutions as three, kingship, aristocracy and constitutional government, and the deviations from these as three, tyranny from kingship, oligarchy from aristocracy and democracy from constitutional government, and about aristocracy and kingship we have spoken (for to study the best constitution is the same thing as to speak about the forms that bear those names, since each of them means a system based on the qualification of virtue equipped with means), and as also the question what constitutes the difference between aristocracy and kingship and when a royal government is to be adopted has been decided before, it remains to discuss the form of constitution designated by the name common to them all, and the other forms, oligarchy, democracy and tyranny. Now it is manifest also which of these deviations is the worst and which the second worst. For necessarily the deviation from the first and most divine must be the worst, and kingship must of necessity either possess the name only, without really being kingship,
ἤ τινα ἄλλην ἐπαινοῦσι·
χρὴ δὲ τοιαύτην εἰσηγεῖσθαι τάξιν ἧς ῥᾳδίως ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων καὶ πεισθήσονται καὶ δυνήσονται κοινωνεῖν, ὡς ἔστιν οὐκ ἔλαττον ἔργον τὸ ἐπανορθῶσαι πολιτείαν ἢ κατασκευάζειν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μεταμανθάνειν ἢ μανθάνειν ἐξ ἀρχῆς· διὸ πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις καὶ ταῖς ὑπαρχούσαις πολιτείαις δεῖ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν τὸν πολιτικόν, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη καὶ πρότερον. τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον ἀγνοοῦντα πόσα πολιτείας ἔστιν εἴδη. νῦν δὲ μίαν δημοκρατίαν οἴονταί τινες εἶναι καὶ μίαν ὀλιγαρχίαν· οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τοῦτʼ ἀληθές. ὥστε δεῖ τὰς διαφορὰς μὴ λανθάνειν τὰς τῶν πολιτειῶν, πόσαι, καὶ συντίθενται ποσαχῶς. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τῆς αὐτῆς φρονήσεως ταύτης καὶ νόμους τοὺς ἀρίστους ἰδεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἑκάστῃ τῶν πολιτειῶν ἁρμόττοντας. πρὸς γὰρ τὰς πολιτείας τοὺς νόμους δεῖ τίθεσθαι καὶ τίθενται πάντες, ἀλλʼ οὐ τὰς πολιτείας πρὸς τοὺς νόμους. πολιτεία μὲν γάρ ἐστι τάξις ταῖς πόλεσιν ἡ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, τίνα τρόπον νενέμηνται, καὶ τί τὸ κύριον τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τί τὸ τέλος ἑκάστης τῆς κοινωνίας ἐστίν· νόμοι δʼ οἱ κεχωρισμένοι τῶν δηλούντων τὴν πολιτείαν, καθʼ οὓς δεῖ τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἄρχειν καὶ φυλάττειν τοὺς παραβαίνοντας αὐτούς. ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι τὰς διαφορὰς ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὸν ὁρισμὸν ἔχειν τῆς πολιτείας ἑκάστης καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν νόμων θέσεις· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε τοὺς αὐτοὺς νόμους συμφέρειν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις οὐδὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις πάσαις, εἴπερ δὴ πλείους καὶ μὴ μία δημοκρατία μηδὲ ὀλιγαρχία μόνον ἔστιν.
ἐπεὶ δʼ ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ μεθόδῳ περὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν διειλόμεθα τρεῖς μὲν τὰς ὀρθὰς πολιτείας, βασιλείαν ἀριστοκρατίαν πολιτείαν, τρεῖς δὲ τὰς τούτων παρεκβάσεις, τυραννίδα μὲν βασιλείας ὀλιγαρχίαν δὲ ἀριστοκρατίας δημοκρατίαν δὲ πολιτείας, καὶ περὶ μὲν ἀριστοκρατίας καὶ βασιλείας εἴρηται (τὸ γὰρ περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας θεωρῆσαι ταὐτὸ καὶ περὶ τούτων ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν τῶν ὀνομάτων· βούλεται γὰρ ἑκατέρα κατʼ ἀρετὴν συνεστάναι κεχορηγημένην), ἔτι δὲ τί διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων ἀριστοκρατία καὶ βασιλεία, καὶ πότε δεῖ βασιλείαν νομίζειν, διώρισται πρότερον, λοιπὸν περὶ πολιτείας διελθεῖν τῆς τῷ κοινῷ προσαγορευομένης ὀνόματι, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτειῶν, ὀλιγαρχίας τε καὶ δημοκρατίας καὶ τυραννίδος. φανερὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ τούτων τῶν παρεκβάσεων τίς χειρίστη καὶ δευτέρα τίς. ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὴν μὲν τῆς πρώτης καὶ θειοτάτης παρέκβασιν εἶναι χειρίστην, τὴν δὲ βασιλείαν ἀναγκαῖον ἢ τοὔνομα μόνον ἔχειν οὐκ
or be based on the outstanding superiority of the man who is king; so that tyranny being the worst form must be the one farthest removed from constitutional government, and oligarchy must be the second farthest (for aristocracy is widely separated from that constitution), while democracy must be the most moderate. An account of their relative merits has indeed already been given also by one of the former writers, though not on the same principle as ours; for he inclined to judge that there were good varieties of all the forms, for instance a good sort of oligarchy and so on, and that democracy was the worst among these, but the best among the bad varieties, whereas we say that the deviations are wholly wrong, and that it is not right to speak of one form of oligarchy as better than another, but only as less bad. But let us for the present dismiss the question of a classification of this nature. Our business is first to distinguish how many different forms of the constitutions there are, assuming that there do exist several kinds of democracy and of oligarchy; next, which form is most general, and which most desirable after the best constitution, and also if there exists some other form that is aristocratic in nature and well constructed but not fitted to the largest number of cities, which this is; next, which of the other forms too is desirable for what people (since probably for some democracy is necessary more than oligarchy, and for others oligarchy more than democracy);and after this, in what way should one proceed who wishes to set up these constitutions, I mean the various forms of democracy and of oligarchy; and finally, when as far as possible we have concisely touched upon all these questions, we must endeavor to review what are the agencies that destroy and what are those that preserve constitutions generally and each variety of constitution in particular, and what are the causes by which it is most natural for these events to be brought about.
Now the reason of there being several forms of constitution is that every city has a considerable number of parts. For in the first place we see that all the cities are composed of households, and then again that of this multitude some must necessarily be rich and some poor and some between the two, and also of the rich and the poor the former class is heavy-armed and the latter without armor. And we see that one portion of the common people is agricultural, another engaged in trade and another mechanic. And the upper classes have distinctions also corresponding to their wealth and the amounts of their property (for example in a stud of horses—for it is not easy to rear horses without being rich, and this is why in ancient times there were oligarchies in all the states whose strength lay in their cavalry, and they used to use horses for their wars against their neighbors, as for instance did the Eretrians and Chalcidians and the people of Magnesia on the Maeander and many of the other Asiatic peoples). Moreover in addition to differences in wealth there is the difference of birth, and that in regard to virtue,
οὖσαν,
ἢ διὰ πολλὴν ὑπεροχὴν εἶναι τὴν τοῦ βασιλεύοντος· ὥστε τὴν τυραννίδα χειρίστην οὖσαν πλεῖστον ἀπέχειν πολιτείας, δεύτερον δὲ τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν (ἡ γὰρ ἀριστοκρατία διέστηκεν ἀπὸ ταύτης πολὺ τῆς πολιτείας), μετριωτάτην δὲ τὴν δημοκρατίαν. ἤδη μὲν οὖν τις ἀπεφήνατο καὶ τῶν πρότερον οὕτως, οὐ μὴν εἰς ταὐτὸ βλέψας ἡμῖν. ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ ἔκρινε πασῶν μὲν οὐσῶν ἐπιεικῶν, οἷον ὀλιγαρχίας τε χρηστῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, χειρίστην δημοκρατίαν, φαύλων δὲ ἀρίστην· ἡμεῖς δὲ ὅλως ταύτας ἐξημαρτημένας εἶναί φαμεν, καὶ βελτίω μὲν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἄλλην ἄλλης οὐ καλῶς ἔχειν λέγειν, ἧττον δὲ φαύλην. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τῆς τοιαύτης κρίσεως ἀφείσθω τὰ νῦν· ἡμῖν δὲ πρῶτον μὲν διαιρετέον πόσαι διαφοραὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν, εἴπερ ἔστιν εἴδη πλείονα τῆς τε δημοκρατίας καὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας, ἔπειτα τίς κοινοτάτη καὶ τίς αἱρετωτάτη μετὰ τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν, κἂν εἴ τις ἄλλη τετύχηκεν ἀριστοκρατικὴ καὶ συνεστῶσα καλῶς, ἀλλʼ οὐ ταῖς πλείσταις ἁρμόττουσα πόλεσι, τίς ἐστιν, ἔπειτα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τίς τίσιν αἱρετή (τάχα γὰρ τοῖς μὲν ἀναγκαία δημοκρατία μᾶλλον ὀλιγαρχίας, τοῖς δʼ αὕτη μᾶλλον ἐκείνης), μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τίνα τρόπον δεῖ καθιστάναι τὸν βουλόμενον ταύτας τὰς πολιτείας, λέγω δὲ δημοκρατίας τε καθʼ ἕκαστον εἶδος καὶ πάλιν ὀλιγαρχίας· τέλος δέ, πάντων τούτων ὅταν ποιησώμεθα συντόμως τὴν ἐνδεχομένην μνείαν, πειρατέον ἐπελθεῖν τίνες φθοραὶ καὶ τίνες σωτηρίαι τῶν πολιτειῶν καὶ κοινῇ καὶ χωρὶς ἑκάστης, καὶ διὰ τίνας αἰτίας ταῦτα μάλιστα γίνεσθαι πέφυκεν.
τοῦ μὲν οὖν εἶναι πλείους πολιτείας αἴτιον ὅτι πάσης ἔστι μέρη πλείω πόλεως τὸν ἀριθμόν. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἐξ οἰκιῶν συγκειμένας πάσας ὁρῶμεν τὰς πόλεις, ἔπειτα πάλιν τούτου τοῦ πλήθους τοὺς μὲν εὐπόρους ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοὺς δʼ ἀπόρους τοὺς δὲ μέσους, καὶ τῶν εὐπόρων δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀπόρων τὸ μὲν ὁπλιτικὸν τὸ δὲ ἄνοπλον. καὶ τὸν μὲν γεωργικὸν δῆμον ὁρῶμεν ὄντα, τὸν δʼ ἀγοραῖον, τὸν δὲ βάναυσον. καὶ τῶν γνωρίμων εἰσὶ διαφοραὶ καὶ κατὰ τὸν πλοῦτον καὶ τὰ μεγέθη τῆς οὐσίας, οἷον ἱπποτροφίας (τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ ῥᾴδιον μὴ πλουτοῦντας ποιεῖν· διόπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων χρόνων ὅσαις πόλεσιν ἐν τοῖς ἵπποις ἡ δύναμις ἦν, ὀλιγαρχίαι παρὰ τούτοις ἦσαν· ἐχρῶντο δὲ πρὸς τοὺς πολέμους ἵπποις πρὸς τοὺς ἀστυγείτονας, οἷον Ἐρετριεῖς καὶ Χαλκιδεῖς καὶ Μάγνητες οἱ ἐπὶ Μαιάνδρῳ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολλοὶ περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν)· ἔτι πρὸς ταῖς κατὰ πλοῦτον διαφοραῖς ἐστιν ἡ μὲν κατὰ γένος ἡ δὲ
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