1299aLet us then decide in this manner about the deliberative body, which in fact is the sovereign power in the constitution.

Connected with this subject is the determination in regard to the magistracies (for this part of the constitution also has many varieties), how many magistracies there are to be, and what are to be their powers, and what their various periods of tenure (for some people make their magistracies tenable for six months, others for less, others for a year and others for a longer period)—shall the magistracies be for life or for a long period, or if for a shorter term shall the same people be allowed to hold them several times or not the same man twice but once only? and also as to the appointment of magistrates, who shall be eligible, who the electors, and what the mode of election? For on all these points it is needful to be able to determine how many modes of procedure are possible, and then to settle what modes are expedient for what sorts of constitution. Nor is it easy to decide to what kinds of office the name of magistracy ought to be applied; for the political community requires a great many officials, owing to which it is not proper to reckon all of them magistrates, whether elected by vote or by lot,—for instance first the priests (for this office must be considered as something different from the political magistracies), and again there are leaders of choruses, and heralds, and persons are also elected as ambassadors. And of the offices exercising superintendence some are political, and are exercised either over the whole of the citizens in regard to some operation—for instance ageneral superintends them when serving as soldiers, or over a section—for instance the superintendent of women or of children; while others are economic (for states often elect officers to dole out corn¹); and others are subordinate, and are the sort of services to which people when well off appoint slaves. But the title of magistracy, to put it simply, is chiefly to be applied to all those offices to which have been assigned the duties of deliberating about certain matters and of acting as judges and of issuing orders, and especially the last, for to give orders is most characteristic of authority. But this question is of virtually no practical importance (for no decision has yet been given, our discussion being merely about the name), although it does admit of some further inquiry of a speculative kind. On the other hand the questions what kinds and what number of magistracies are necessary to constitute a state at all, and what kinds although not necessary are advantageous for a good constitution, are questions that might preferablybe discussed, both indeed as regards every form of constitution and particularly in regard to the small states. For it is true that in the large states it is possible and proper for one magistracy to be assigned to one function (for the large number of the citizens makes it possible for many people to enter on an official career, so as to intermit their tenure of some offices for a long time and to hold others only once, and also every task is better attended to if the attention is directed to one thing only than if it is busy with many);

1299b but in the small states it is inevitable that many offices must be gathered into few hands (for owing to shortage of manpower it is not easy for many people to be in office, since who will take over the posts as their successors?). But sometimes small states require the same magistracies and laws as large ones except that the latter require the same persons to serve often, but in the former this only occurs after a long interval. Hence it is possible to assign several duties to one man at the same time (since they will not interfere with one another), and to meet the shortage of man-power it is necessary to make the magistracies like spit-lampholders.² If therefore we are able to say how many magistracies every state must necessarily possess and how many, though not absolutely necessary, it ought to possess, knowing these points one might more easily make a combination of those magistracies which are of a suitable nature to be combined into a single office. And it is suitable for the further question not to be overlooked, what kinds of matters ought to be attended to by a number of officials locally distributed and what ought to be under the authority of one magistrate for all localities, for example should good order be seen to in the market-place by a Controller of the Market and elsewhere by another official, or everywhere by the same one? and ought the offices to be divided according to the function or according to the persons concerned—I mean, for instance, should there be a single official in control of good order, or a different onefor children and for women? and also under the various constitutions does the nature of the magistracies vary in accordance with each or does it not vary at all—for example in democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy and monarchy are the magistracies the same in their powers, although they are not filled from equal ranks nor from similar classes but are different in different constitutions (for example in aristocracies drawn from the educated, in oligarchies from the wealthy, and in democracies from the free), or although some constitutions happen to be correspondent with the actual differences of their magistracies, yet in other cases are the same magistracies advantageous even where the constitutions differ (for in some places it is suitable for the same magistracies to have large functions and in other places small ones)? Not but what there are also some offices peculiar to special forms of constitution, for instance the office of Preliminary Councillors.³ This is undemocratic, although a Council is a popular body, for there is bound to be some body of this nature to have the duty of preparing measures for the popular assembly, in order that it may be able to attend to its business; but a preparatory committee, if small, is oligarchical, and Preliminary Councillors must necessarily be few in number, so that they are an oligarchical element. But where both of these magistracies exist, the Preliminary Councillors are in authority over the Councillors, since a councillor is a democratic official, but a preliminary councillor is an oligarchic one. Also the power of the Council is weakened in democracies of the sort in which the people in assembly deals with everything itself;

1300a and this usually happens when there is a plentiful supply of pay for those who attend the assembly, for being at leisure they meet frequently and decide all things themselves. But a Superintendent of Children and a Superintendent of Women, and any other magistrates that exercise a similar sort of supervision, are an aristocratic feature, and not democratic (for how is it possible to prevent the wives of the poor from going out of doors⁴?) nor yet oligarchic (for the wives of oligarchic rulers are luxurious). But let the discussion of these matters go no further at present, and let us attempt to go through from the beginning the question of the ways of appointing the magistrates. The varieties here depend on three determinants, the combinations of which must give all the possible modes. One of these three determining points is, who are the persons who appoint the magistrates? the second is, from whom? and last, in what manner? And of each of these three determinants there are three variations: either all the citizens appoint or some, and either from all or from a certain class (defined for instance by property-assessment or birth or virtue or some other such qualification, as at Megara only those were eligible who returned in a body from exile and fought together against the common people),⁵ and the mode of appointment may be either by vote or by lot; again, these systems may be coupled together—I mean that some citizens may appoint to some offices but all to others, and to some offices all citizens may be eligible but to others only a certain class, and to some appointment may be by vote but to others by lot. And of each variation of these determinants there will be four modes: either all citizens may appoint from all by vote, or all from all by lot—and from all either section by section, for instance by tribes or demes or brotherhoods until the procedure has gone through all the citizens, or from the whole number every time,—or else partly in one way and partly in the other. Again, if the electors are some of the citizens, they must either appoint from all by vote, or from all by lot, or from some by vote, or from some by lot, or partly in one way and partly in the other—I mean partly by vote and partly by lot. Hence the modes prove to be twelve, apart from the two combinations. And among these, two ways of appointment are democratic—for all to appoint from all by vote, or by lot, or by both—some offices by lot and others by vote; but for not all to be the electors and for them to appoint simultaneously, and either from all or from some either by lot or by vote or by both, or some offices from all and others from some by both (by which I mean some by lot and others by vote) is constitutional. And for some to appoint from all, to some offices by vote and to others by lot or by both⁶ (to some by lot and to others by vote) is oligarchical; and it is even more oligarchical to appoint from both classes. But to appoint some offices from all and the others from a certain class is constitutional with an aristocratic bias;