And although it is proper that the government should be drawn only from those who possess heavy armor, yet it is not possible to define the amount of the property-qualification absolutely and to say that they must possess so much, but only to consider what sort of amount is the highest that is compatible with making those who have a share in the constitution more numerous than those who have not, and to fix thatlimit. For those who are poor and have no share in the honors are willing to keep quiet if no one insults them or takes away any part of their substance; but this is not easy to secure, for it does not always happen that those who are in the governing class are gentlemen. Also people have a way of being reluctant to serve when there is a war if they do not get rations and are poor men but; if somebody provides food they want to fight. In some states the citizen-body consists not only of those who are serving as heavy-armed soldiers, but also of those who have so served; and at Malea the citizen-body consistedof these, while the magistrates were elected from those who were actually on service. And indeed the earliest form of constitution among the Greeks after the kingships consisted of those who were actually soldiers, the original form consisting of the cavalry （for war had its strength and its pre-eminence in cavalry, since without orderly formation heavy-armed infantry is useless, and the sciences and systems dealing with tactics did not exist among the men of old times, so that their strength lay in their cavalry）; but as the states grew and the wearers of heavy armor had become stronger, more persons came to have a part in the government. Hence what we now call constitutional governments the men of former times called democracies; but the constitutional governments of early days were naturally oligarchical and royal, for owing to the smallness of the populations their middle class was not numerous, so that because of their small numbers as well as in conformity with the structure of the state the middle class more readily endured being in a subject position.

It has then been said what is the reason of there being several forms of constitution, and why there are others besides those designated by name （for there is not one single democracy only, and similarly there are more than one of the other forms）, and also what are the differences between them and what is the reason why these differences occur, and in addition to these points, which is the best of the constitutions speaking generally, and of the other constitutions which sort is suited to which sort of people.

And again, let us speak about the points that come next, both generally and with reference to each constitution separately, taking their appropriate starting-point. All forms of constitution then have three factors in reference to which the good lawgiver has to consider what is expedient for each constitution; and if these factors are well-ordered the constitution must of necessity be well-ordered, and the superiority of one constitution over another necessarily consists in the superiority of each of these factors. Of these three factors one is, what is to be the body that deliberates about the common interests,

1298asecond the one connected with the magistracies, that is, what there are to be and what matters they are to control, and what is to be the method of their election, and a third is, what is to be the judiciary.

The deliberative factor is sovereign about war and peace and the formation and dissolution of alliances, and about laws, and about sentences of death and exile and confiscation of property, and about the audits of magistrates. And necessarily either all these decisions must be assigned to all the citizens, or all to some of them (for instance to some one magistracy or to several), or different ones to different magistracies, or some of them to all the citizens and some to certain persons.

For all the citizens to be members of the deliberative body and to decide all these matters is a mark of a popular government, for the common people seek for equality of this nature. But there are several modes of such universal membership. One is for the citizens to serve in rotation and not all in a body (as is enacted in the constitution of the Milesian Telecles,¹ and in other constitutions also the boards of magistrates deliberate in joint assemblies but all the citizens enter into the magistracies from the tribes or from the very smallest sections of the citizen-body in rotation until office has gone through the whole body), and for there to be joint assemblies only to consider legislation and reforms of the constitution and to hear the reports submitted by the magistrates. Another mode isfor all to assemble in a body, but only for the purpose of electing magistrates, enacting laws, considering the declaration of war and the conclusion of peace and holding the audit of magistrates, but for all other matters to be considered by the magistrates appointed to deal with each respectively and elected by suffrage or by lot from all the citizens. Another mode is for the citizens to meet about the magistracies and the audits and in order to deliberate about declaring war and concluding an alliance, but for all other matters to be dealt with by the magistrates, elected by suffrage in as many cases as circumstances allow,² and such magistracies are all those which must of necessity be filled by experts. A fourth mode is for all to meet in council about all matters, and for the magistracies to decide about nothing but only to make preliminary decisions; this is the mode in which democracy in its last form is administered at the present day—the form of democracy which we pronounce to correspond to dynastic oligarchy and to tyrannical monarchy. These modes then are all of them democratic. On the other hand for some persons to deliberate upon all matters is oligarchic. But this also has several variations. For when the members of the deliberative body are elected on comparatively moderate property-qualifications, and the eligible persons are comparatively numerous because of the moderateness of the qualification, and when they do not make changes in things in which the law forbids it but follow the law, and when anybody acquiring the property-qualification is allowed to become a member, a constitution of this sort is indeed an oligarchy, but one of the nature of constitutional government, because of its moderation. When on the other hand not everybody thus qualified participates in deliberation but only certain persons previously chosen by election,

1298band these govern in accordance with law as in the former case, this is oligarchical; and also when the deliberative officials are elected by co-optation, and when the office is hereditary and has supreme control over the laws, this system is bound to be oligarchical. But when certain persons control certain matters, for instance when all the citizens control decisions as to war and peace and the audit of officials while everything else is controlled by magistrates and these are elected by vote, not by lot,³ the constitution is an aristocracy; while if some matters are controlled by magistrates elected by vote and others by magistrates chosen by lot, and this either directly or from a list previously selected by vote, or if magistrates elected by vote and by lot sit in a joint body, some of these regulations are features of an aristocratic constitution and others of constitutional government itself.

We have then in this way distinguished the different kinds of deliberative body in relation to the forms of constitution, and each form of constitution carries on the administration in accordance with the distinction stated. But for a democracy of the form that at the present day is considered to be democracy in the fullest degree (and I mean one of the sort in which the people is sovereign even over the laws) it is advantageous for the improvement of its deliberative function for it to do the same as is done in oligarchies in the matter of the law-courts (for they enact a fine to compel the attendance on juries of those whom they want to attend, whereas democratic states institute payment for attendance for the benefit of the poor), and also to do this in respect of the assemblies(for they will deliberate better when all are deliberating jointly, the common people when with the notables and these when with the masses), and it is also advantageous for those who deliberate to be elected by vote or by lot equally from the different sections, and, if the men of the people far exceed the political class in number, it is advantageous either not to give pay to all but only to as many as are commensurate with the number of the notables, or to discard by lot those who exceed this number. In oligarchies on the other hand it is advantageous either to co-opt some persons from the multitude, or to institute an office like the one that exists in certain constitutional governments under the flame of Preliminary Councillors or Guardians of the Law,⁴ and deal with the matters about which these officials have held a preliminary deliberation (for thus the common people will have a share in deliberation and will not have the power to abolish any part of the constitution), and then for the people by their vote either to confirm or at all events not to pass anything contrary to the resolutions brought before them, or to allow all to take part in debate but only the magistrates to frame resolutions; and in fact it is proper to do just the opposite of what takes place in constitutionally governed states; for the common people ought to be given power to vote the rejection of a measure, but not to vote its ratification, but it should be referred back to the magistrates. In constitutional governments the procedure is the reverse; the few are competent to vote the rejection of a resolution but are not competent to vote its ratification, this being always referred back to the most numerous body.