1296a since where some own a very great deal of property and others none there comes about either an extreme democracy or an unmixed oligarchy, or a tyranny may result from both of the two extremes, for tyranny springs from both democracy and oligarchy of the most unbridled kind, but much less often from the middle forms of constitution and those near to them. The cause of this we will speak of later in our treatment of political revolutions. That the middle form of constitution is the best is evident; for it alone is free from faction, since where the middle class is numerous, factions and party divisions among the citizens are least likely to occur. And the great states are more free from faction for the same reason, because the middle class is numerous, whereas in the small states it is easy to divide the whole people into two parties leaving nothing in between, and also almost everybody is needy or wealthy. Also democracies are more secure and more long-lived than oligarchies owing to the citizens of the middle class (for they are more numerous and have a larger share of the honors in democracies than in oligarchies), since when the poor are in a majority without the middle class, adversity sets in and they are soon ruined. And it must be deemed a significant fact that the best lawgivers are from among the middle citizens; for Solon was of that class,as appears from his poetry, and so was Lycurgus (for he was not a king) and Charondas and almost the greatest number of the other lawgivers.

And these considerations also show the reason why the constitutions of most states are either democratic or oligarchical; owing to the middle class in these states being often a small one, the classes diverging from the middle status—whichever of the two, the owners of the estates or the people, from time to time has the upper hand—conduct the government on their own lines, so that it becomes either a democracy or an oligarchy. And in addition to this, because factions occur and fights between the people and the wealthy, whichever party happens to gain the upper hand over its opponents does not establish a common or equal government, but takes the superior share in the government as a prize of victory, and makes it a democracy in the one case and an oligarchy in the other. Moreover each of the two states that in the past held the leadership of Greece took as a pattern the form of government that existed among themselves and set up in the one case democracies and in the other oligarchies in the cities, not considering the interest of the cities but their own advantage. Hence owing to these causes the middle form of constitution either never comes into existence or seldom and in few places; for one man¹ only among the states that have formerly held the leadership was induced to grant this form of organization, and by this time it has become a fixed habit with the people of the separate cities also not even to desire equality,

1296b but either to seek to rule or to endure being under a master.

These considerations therefore make it clear which is the best constitution, and why it is the best; and now that the best has been defined, it is not difficult to see, among the other forms of constitution (inasmuch as we pronounce that there are various forms of democracy and various oligarchies), what kind is to be placed first, what second, and what next in this order, by reason of one being better and another worse. For at each stage the form nearest to the best one must necessarily be superior, and the form that is more remote from the middle must be inferior—unless one is judging relatively to given conditions: I make this reservation because it is quite possible that although one form of constitution is preferable it may often be more advantageous for certain people to have another form.

The next thing after what has been said is to discuss which constitution is advantageous for which people, and what sort of constitution for what sort of people. Now we must first grasp a general principle that applies equally to all sorts of constitution: it is essential that the part of the state that wishes the constitution to remain should be stronger than the part that does not wish it. But every state consists of both quality and quantity: by quality I mean freedom, wealth, education, good birth, and by quantity the superior numbers of the multitude. And it is possible that,while the quality of the state belongs to one among the parts of which the state consists and its quantity to another part—for example the low-born may be more numerous than the noble or the poor than the rich, yet the more numerous class may not exceed in quantity as much as they fall behind in quality. Hence these two factors have to be judged in comparison with one another.

Where therefore the multitude of the poor exceeds in the proportion stated,² here it is natural for there to be democracy, and each kind of democracy in accordance with the superior number of the common people of each sort, for example if the number of the farming class exceeds, the first sort of democracy, but if that of the common laborers and wage-earners, the last sort, and similarly also with the other sorts that lie between these two; but where the class of the well-to-do and notable exceeds in quality more than it falls behind in quantity, here it is natural for there to be an oligarchy, and likewise the various kinds of oligarchy according to the degree of superiority³ of the oligarchical multitude.⁴ But the lawgiver in his constitution must always take in the middle class; if he is making the laws of anoligarchical character he must keep the middle class in view, and if democratic, he must legislate so as to bring them in. And where the number of the middle class exceeds both the extreme classes together, or even one of them only, here it is possible for a constitutional government to be lasting;

for there is no fear of the rich ever coming to terms with the poor against this numerous middle class; for neither class will ever wish to be subject to the other, and if they look for another constitution fairer to both than this they will not find one, for they would not endure to take turns to govern because they distrust each other: everywhere it is the arbitrator that is most trusted, and the man in the middle is an arbitrator. And the better the constitution is mixed, the more permanent it is; and many even of those who want to establish aristocratic forms of constitution make a great mistake not only in giving too large a share to the well-to-do but also in cheating the people; for false benefits inevitably result ultimately in true evil, as the encroachments of the rich ruin the constitution more than those of the people.

The artifices employed in constitutions as a pretext in regard to the people are five in number, and are concerned with the assembly, the magistracies, the law-courts, the bearing of heavy arms, and gymnastic exercises; in relation to the assembly, the granting to all of the right to attend but the imposition of a fine for non-attendance on the well-to-do only, or a much larger fine on them than others; in relation to the magistracies, the denial to the owners of rated property of the right to swear off serving, while the poor have this right; in relation to the law-courts, the imposition of a fine on the well-to-do if they do not serve on a jury, but no penalty for the poor, or else a large fine for the one class and a small one for the others, as in the laws of Charondas. In some places all have the right to serve in the assembly and on juries after having their names put on a register, but large fines are imposed on those who after so registering fail to attend in either capacity, in order that the fine may cause them to avoid registration and that owing to their not registering they may not serve on juries or in the assembly. They also legislate in the same manner about owning heavy arms and engaging in gymnastic exercises: the poor are not allowed to possess arms, but the well-to-do are liable to a fine if they have not got them, and there is no fine for the former class if they abstain from gymnastics, but the well-to-do are liable to a fine, in order that the one class because of the fine may take part in them and the other because they have no penalty to fear may not. These artifices of legislation then are of an oligarchic nature; in democracies they introduce contrary devices in regard to these matters: they provide pay for the poor for serving in the assembly and on juries and impose no fine upon the well-to-do for abstaining. Hence it is manifest that if anybody wishes to make a just blend, he must bring together the regulations existing in each of the two forms of constitution, and provide pay for attendance and a fine for non-attendance; for thus all would participate, whereas in the other way the government comes to be in the hands of only one of the two classes.