1294b This then is one mode of combining the two. Another is to take the middle course between the regulations of each: for example, democracies permit membership of the assembly on no property-qualification at all or a quite small one, oligarchies on a large property-qualification, but the combination clearly is to have neither principle, but one which lies in the middle between either of these two qualifications. In the third place is a combination of the two systems, taking some features from the oligarchical law and some from the democratic; I mean, for example, that it is thought to be democratic for the offices to be assigned by lot, for them to be elected oligarchic, and democratic for them not to have a property-qualification, oligarchic to have one; therefore it is aristocratic and constitutional to take one feature from one form and the other from the other, from oligarchy that offices are to be elected, and from democracy that this is not to be on a property-qualification. This then is the mode of the mixture; and the mark of a good mixture of democracy and oligarchy is when it is possible to speak of the same constitution as a democracy and as an oligarchy; for manifestly this is so when it is said because they have been mixed well, and this is the case with the form that lies in the middle, for each of the two extreme forms can be seen in it. This is the case with the constitution of Sparta. For many peopleendeavor to describe it as being a democracy, because its system has many democratic features, for instance first of all its regulation for the rearing of boys, since the sons of the rich are brought up in the same way as those of the poor, and are educated in a manner in which the sons of the poor also could be educated, and they are also treated similarly at the next age, and in the same manner when they are grown up, for there is nothing that distinguishes the rich man from the poor man—thus the arrangements for food are the same for all at the common messes, and the rich wear clothes such as even any poor man could procure, and also because of the two greatest offices the common people elect to one and share in the other (they elect the Elders and share in the Ephorate); but others call it an oligarchy, because it has many oligarchical features, for instance that all the offices are elective and none appointed by lot and few persons have the power to sentence to death and exile, and a number of other such matters. But in a well-constructed mixed constitution both of the two factors, and neither of them,1 should seem to be present, and it should be kept safe by its own means and not by outside aid, and by its own means not because those who desire its security are more numerous outside it2 (for even a bad constitution might possess this quality), but because no section of the state whatever would even wish for another constitution.
The proper way therefore to establish a constitutional government, and similarly also the governments named aristocracies, has now been stated.
1295a It remained for us to speak of tyranny, not because there is much that can be said about it, but in order that it may receive its part in our inquiry, since we rank this also as one among the kinds of constitution. The nature of kingship we have defined in our first discourses,3 in which we examined the question in relation to the constitution most commonly denoted by the term “kingship,” whether it is disadvantageous or an advantage to states, and what person ought to be set up as king, and from what source, and by what procedure; and in the passage in which we were considering kingship we distinguished two kinds of tyranny, because their power in a manner borders upon royalty, because both these forms of rule are in accordance with law (for among some of the barbarians they elect monarchic rulers with autocratic powers, and also in old times among the ancient Greeks some men used to become monarchs of this sort, the rulers called aesymnetae), but these two forms of tyranny have certain differences from one another, although they were on the one hand of the nature of royalty because they were in accordance with law and because they exercised monarchic rule over willing subjects, and on the other hand of the nature of a tyranny because they ruled despotically and according to their own judgement. But there is a third kind of tyranny which is thought to be tyranny in the fullest degree, being the counterpart of universal kingship; to this sort of tyranny must necessarily belong a monarchythat exercises irresponsible rule over subjects all of the same or of a higher class with a view to its own private interest and not in the interest of the persons ruled. Hence it is held against the will of the subjects, since no free man willingly endures such rule.
These then are the kinds of tyranny and such is their number, for the reasons stated.
But what is the best constitution and what is the best mode of life for most cities and most of mankind, if we do not judge by the standard of a virtue that is above the level of private citizens or of an education that needs natural gifts and means supplied by fortune, norby the standard of the ideal constitution, but of a mode of life able to be shared by most men and a constitution possible for most states to attain? For the constitutions called aristocracies, of which we spoke just now,4 in some cases fall somewhat out of the scope of most states, and in others approximate to what is called constitutional government, so that it is proper to speak of these two forms as if they were one. And indeed the decision in regard to all these questions is based on the same elementary principles. For if it has been rightly said in theEthics 5 that the happy life is the life that is lived without impediment in accordance with virtue, and that virtue is a middle course, it necessarily follows that the middle course of life is the best—such a middle course as it is possible for each class of men to attain. And these same criteria must also necessarily apply to the goodness and badness of a state, and of a constitution—for a constitution is a certain mode of life of a state.
1295b In all states therefore there exist three divisions of the state, the very rich, the very poor, and thirdly those who are between the two. Since then it is admitted that what is moderate or in the middle is best, it is manifest that the middle amount of all of the good things of fortune is the best amount to possess. For this degree of wealth is the readiest to obey reason, whereas for a person who is exceedingly beautiful or strong or nobly born or rich, or the opposite—exceedingly poor or weak or of very mean station, it is difficult to follow the bidding of reason; for the former turn more to insolence and grand wickedness, and the latter overmuch to malice and petty wickedness, and the motive of all wrongdoing is either insolence or malice. And moreover the middle class are the least inclined to shun office and to covet office,6 and both these tendencies are injurious to states. And in addition to these points, those who have an excess of fortune’s goods, strength, wealth, friends and the like, are not willing to be governed and do not know how to be (and they have acquired this quality even in their boyhood from their homelife, which was so luxurious that they have not got used to submitting to authority even in school), while those who are excessively in need of these things are too humble. Hence the latter class do not know how to govern but know how to submit togovernment of a servile kind, while the former class do not know how to submit to any government, and only know how to govern in the manner of a master. The result is a state consisting of slaves and masters, not of free men, and of one class envious and another contemptuous of their fellows. This condition of affairs is very far removed from friendliness, and from political partnership—for friendliness is an element of partnership, since men are not willing to be partners with their enemies even on a journey. But surely the ideal of the state is to consist as much as possible of persons that are equal and alike, and this similarity is most found in the middle classes; therefore the middle-class state will necessarily be best constituted in respect of those elements7 of which we say that the state is by nature composed. And also this class of citizens have the greatest security in the states; for they do not themselves covet other men’s goods as do the poor, nor do the other classes covet their substance as the poor covet that of the rich; and because they are neither plotted against nor plotting they live free from danger. Because of this it was a good prayer of Phocylides8— In many things the middle have the best; Be mine a middle station. It is clear therefore also that the political community administered by the middle class is the best, and that it is possible for those states to be well governed that are of the kind in which the middle class is numerous, and preferably stronger than both the other two classes, or at all events than one of them, for by throwing in its weight it sways the balance and prevents the opposite extremes9 from coming into existence. Hence it is the greatest good fortune if the men that have political power possess a moderate and sufficient substance,
This then is one mode of combining the two. Another is to take the middle course between the regulations of each: for example, democracies permit membership of the assembly on no property-qualification at all or a quite small one, oligarchies on a large property-qualification, but the combination clearly is to have neither principle, but one which lies in the middle between either of these two qualifications. In the third place is a combination of the two systems, taking some features from the oligarchical law and some from the democratic; I mean, for example, that it is thought to be democratic for the offices to be assigned by lot, for them to be elected oligarchic, and democratic for them not to have a property-qualification, oligarchic to have one; therefore it is aristocratic and constitutional to take one feature from one form and the other from the other, from oligarchy that offices are to be elected, and from democracy that this is not to be on a property-qualification. This then is the mode of the mixture; and the mark of a good mixture of democracy and oligarchy is when it is possible to speak of the same constitution as a democracy and as an oligarchy; for manifestly this is so when it is said because they have been mixed well, and this is the case with the form that lies in the middle, for each of the two extreme forms can be seen in it. This is the case with the constitution of Sparta. For many peopleendeavor to describe it as being a democracy, because its system has many democratic features, for instance first of all its regulation for the rearing of boys, since the sons of the rich are brought up in the same way as those of the poor, and are educated in a manner in which the sons of the poor also could be educated, and they are also treated similarly at the next age, and in the same manner when they are grown up, for there is nothing that distinguishes the rich man from the poor man—thus the arrangements for food are the same for all at the common messes, and the rich wear clothes such as even any poor man could procure, and also because of the two greatest offices the common people elect to one and share in the other (they elect the Elders and share in the Ephorate); but others call it an oligarchy, because it has many oligarchical features, for instance that all the offices are elective and none appointed by lot and few persons have the power to sentence to death and exile, and a number of other such matters. But in a well-constructed mixed constitution both of the two factors, and neither of them, should seem to be present, and it should be kept safe by its own means and not by outside aid, and by its own means not because those who desire its security are more numerous outside it (for even a bad constitution might possess this quality), but because no section of the state whatever would even wish for another constitution.
The proper way therefore to establish a constitutional government, and similarly also the governments named aristocracies, has now been stated.
πολιτικόν, μέμεικται γὰρ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν)·
It remained for us to speak of tyranny, not because there is much that can be said about it, but in order that it may receive its part in our inquiry, since we rank this also as one among the kinds of constitution. The nature of kingship we have defined in our first discourses, in which we examined the question in relation to the constitution most commonly denoted by the term “kingship,” whether it is disadvantageous or an advantage to states, and what person ought to be set up as king, and from what source, and by what procedure; and in the passage in which we were considering kingship we distinguished two kinds of tyranny, because their power in a manner borders upon royalty, because both these forms of rule are in accordance with law (for among some of the barbarians they elect monarchic rulers with autocratic powers, and also in old times among the ancient Greeks some men used to become monarchs of this sort, the rulers called aesymnetae), but these two forms of tyranny have certain differences from one another, although they were on the one hand of the nature of royalty because they were in accordance with law and because they exercised monarchic rule over willing subjects, and on the other hand of the nature of a tyranny because they ruled despotically and according to their own judgement. But there is a third kind of tyranny which is thought to be tyranny in the fullest degree, being the counterpart of universal kingship; to this sort of tyranny must necessarily belong a monarchythat exercises irresponsible rule over subjects all of the same or of a higher class with a view to its own private interest and not in the interest of the persons ruled. Hence it is held against the will of the subjects, since no free man willingly endures such rule.
These then are the kinds of tyranny and such is their number, for the reasons stated.
But what is the best constitution and what is the best mode of life for most cities and most of mankind, if we do not judge by the standard of a virtue that is above the level of private citizens or of an education that needs natural gifts and means supplied by fortune, norby the standard of the ideal constitution, but of a mode of life able to be shared by most men and a constitution possible for most states to attain? For the constitutions called aristocracies, of which we spoke just now, in some cases fall somewhat out of the scope of most states, and in others approximate to what is called constitutional government, so that it is proper to speak of these two forms as if they were one. And indeed the decision in regard to all these questions is based on the same elementary principles. For if it has been rightly said in theEthics that the happy life is the life that is lived without impediment in accordance with virtue, and that virtue is a middle course, it necessarily follows that the middle course of life is the best—such a middle course as it is possible for each class of men to attain. And these same criteria must also necessarily apply to the goodness and badness of a state, and of a constitution—for a constitution is a certain mode of life of a state.
περὶ δὲ τυραννίδος ἦν ἡμῖν λοιπὸν εἰπεῖν, οὐχ ὡς ἐνούσης πολυλογίας περὶ αὐτήν, ἀλλʼ ὅπως λάβῃ τῆς μεθόδου τὸ μέρος, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ταύτην τίθεμεν τῶν πολιτειῶν τι μέρος. περὶ μὲν οὖν βασιλείας διωρίσαμεν ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις, ἐν οἷς περὶ τῆς μάλιστα λεγομένης βασιλείας ἐποιούμεθα τὴν σκέψιν, πότερον ἀσύμφορος ἢ συμφέρει ταῖς πόλεσιν, καὶ τίνα καὶ πόθεν δεῖ καθιστάναι, καὶ πῶς· τυραννίδος δʼ εἴδη δύο μὲν διείλομεν ἐν οἷς περὶ βασιλείας ἐπεσκοποῦμεν, διὰ τὸ τὴν δύναμιν ἐπαλλάττειν πως αὐτῶν καὶ πρὸς τὴν βασιλείαν, διὰ τὸ κατὰ νόμον εἶναι ἀμφοτέρας ταύτας τὰς ἀρχάς (ἔν τε γὰρ τῶν βαρβάρων τισὶν αἱροῦνται αὐτοκράτορας μονάρχους, καὶ τὸ παλαιὸν ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις Ἕλλησιν ἐγίγνοντό τινες μόναρχοι τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, οὓς ἐκάλουν αἰσυμνήτας), ἔχουσι δέ τινας πρὸς ἀλλήλας αὗται διαφοράς, ἦσαν δὲ διὰ μὲν τὸ κατὰ νόμον βασιλικαὶ καὶ διὰ τὸ μοναρχεῖν ἑκόντων, τυραννικαὶ δὲ διὰ τὸ δεσποτικῶς ἄρχειν καὶ κατὰ τὴν αὑτῶν γνώμην· τρίτον δὲ εἶδος τυραννίδος, ἥπερ μάλιστʼ εἶναι δοκεῖ τυραννίς, ἀντίστροφος οὖσα τῇ παμβασιλείᾳ. τοιαύτην δʼ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τυραννίδα τὴν μοναρχίαν ἥτις ἀνυπεύθυνος ἄρχει τῶν ὁμοίων καὶ βελτιόνων πάντων πρὸς τὸ σφέτερον αὐτῆς συμφέρον, ἀλλὰ μὴ πρὸς τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων. διόπερ ἀκούσιος· οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἑκὼν ὑπομένει τῶν ἐλευθέρων τὴν τοιαύτην ἀρχήν. τυραννίδος μὲν οὖν εἴδη ταῦτα καὶ τοσαῦτα διὰ τὰς εἰρημένας αἰτίας.
τίς δʼ ἀρίστη πολιτεία καὶ τίς ἄριστος βίος ταῖς πλείσταις πόλεσι καὶ τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν ἀνθρώπων, μήτε πρὸς ἀρετὴν συγκρίνουσι τὴν ὑπὲρ τοὺς ἰδιώτας, μήτε πρὸς παιδείαν ἣ φύσεως δεῖται καὶ χορηγίας τυχηρᾶς, μήτε πρὸς πολιτείαν τὴν κατʼ εὐχὴν γινομένην, ἀλλὰ βίον τε τὸν τοῖς πλείστοις κοινωνῆσαι δυνατὸν καὶ πολιτείαν ἧς τὰς πλείστας πόλεις ἐνδέχεται μετασχεῖν; καὶ γὰρ ἃς καλοῦσιν ἀριστοκρατίας, περὶ ὧν νῦν εἴπομεν, τὰ μὲν ἐξωτέρω πίπτουσι ταῖς πλείσταις τῶν πόλεων, τὰ δὲ γειτνιῶσι τῇ καλουμένῃ πολιτείᾳ (διὸ περὶ ἀμφοῖν ὡς μιᾶς λεκτέον). ἡ δὲ δὴ κρίσις περὶ ἁπάντων τούτων ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν στοιχείων ἐστίν. εἰ γὰρ καλῶς ἐν τοῖς Ἠθικοῖς εἴρηται τὸ τὸν εὐδαίμονα βίον εἶναι τὸν κατʼ ἀρετὴν ἀνεμπόδιστον, μεσότητα δὲ τὴν ἀρετήν, τὸν μέσον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι βίον βέλτιστον, τὸ τῆς ἑκάστοις ἐνδεχομένης τυχεῖν μεσότητος· τοὺς δὲ αὐτοὺς τούτους ὅρους ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καὶ πόλεως ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας καὶ πολιτείας· ἡ γὰρ πολιτεία
In all states therefore there exist three divisions of the state, the very rich, the very poor, and thirdly those who are between the two. Since then it is admitted that what is moderate or in the middle is best, it is manifest that the middle amount of all of the good things of fortune is the best amount to possess. For this degree of wealth is the readiest to obey reason, whereas for a person who is exceedingly beautiful or strong or nobly born or rich, or the opposite—exceedingly poor or weak or of very mean station, it is difficult to follow the bidding of reason; for the former turn more to insolence and grand wickedness, and the latter overmuch to malice and petty wickedness, and the motive of all wrongdoing is either insolence or malice. And moreover the middle class are the least inclined to shun office and to covet office, and both these tendencies are injurious to states. And in addition to these points, those who have an excess of fortune’s goods, strength, wealth, friends and the like, are not willing to be governed and do not know how to be (and they have acquired this quality even in their boyhood from their homelife, which was so luxurious that they have not got used to submitting to authority even in school), while those who are excessively in need of these things are too humble. Hence the latter class do not know how to govern but know how to submit togovernment of a servile kind, while the former class do not know how to submit to any government, and only know how to govern in the manner of a master. The result is a state consisting of slaves and masters, not of free men, and of one class envious and another contemptuous of their fellows. This condition of affairs is very far removed from friendliness, and from political partnership—for friendliness is an element of partnership, since men are not willing to be partners with their enemies even on a journey. But surely the ideal of the state is to consist as much as possible of persons that are equal and alike, and this similarity is most found in the middle classes; therefore the middle-class state will necessarily be best constituted in respect of those elements of which we say that the state is by nature composed. And also this class of citizens have the greatest security in the states; for they do not themselves covet other men’s goods as do the poor, nor do the other classes covet their substance as the poor covet that of the rich; and because they are neither plotted against nor plotting they live free from danger. Because of this it was a good prayer of Phocylides— In many things the middle have the best; Be mine a middle station. It is clear therefore also that the political community administered by the middle class is the best, and that it is possible for those states to be well governed that are of the kind in which the middle class is numerous, and preferably stronger than both the other two classes, or at all events than one of them, for by throwing in its weight it sways the balance and prevents the opposite extremes from coming into existence. Hence it is the greatest good fortune if the men that have political power possess a moderate and sufficient substance,
βίος τίς ἐστι πόλεως.
Page 29 of 60 · Politics, Aristotle , tr. H. Rackham · Perseus Digital Library