1304b for instance the rich and the people, and there is no middle class or only an extremely small one; for if either of the two sections becomes much the superior, the remainder is not willing to risk an encounter with its manifestly stronger opponent. Owing to this men who are exceptional in virtue generally speaking do not cause faction, because they find themselves few against many. Universally then in connection with all the forms of constitution the origins and causes of factions and revolutions are of this nature.

The means used to cause revolutions of constitutions are sometimes force and sometimes fraud. Force is employed either when the revolutionary leaders exert compulsion immediately from the start or later on—as indeed the mode of using fraud is also twofold: sometimes the revolutionaries after completely deceiving the people at the first stage alter the constitution with their consent, but then at a later stage retain their hold on it by force against the people’s will: for instance, at the time of the Four Hundred,¹ they deceived the people by saying that the Persian King would supply money for the war against the Spartans, and after telling them this falsehood endeavored to keep a hold upon the government; but in other cases they both persuade the people at the start and afterwards repeat the persuasion and govern them with their consent.

Speaking generally therefore in regard to all the forms of constitution, the causes that have been stated are those from which revolutions have occurred.

But in the light of these general rules we must consider the usual course of eventsas classified according to each different kind of constitution. In democracies the principal cause of revolutions is the insolence of the demagogues; for they cause the owners of property to band together, partly by malicious prosecutions of individuals among them (for common fear brings together even the greatest enemies), and partly by setting on the common people against them as a class. And one may see this taking place in this manner in many instances. In Cos the democracy was overthrown² when evil demagogues had arisen there, for the notables banded themselves together; and also in Rhodes,³ for the demagogues used to provide pay for public services, and also to hinder the payment of money owed⁴ to the naval captains, and these because of the lawsuits that were brought against them were forced to make common cause and overthrow the people. And also at Heraclea ⁵ the people were put down immediately after the foundation of the colony because of the people’s leaders; for the notables being unjustly treated by them used to be driven out, but later on those who were driven out collecting together effected their return and put down the people. And also the democracy at Megara was put down in a similar manner⁶; the people’s leaders in order to have money to distribute to the people went on expelling many of the notables, until they made the exiles a large body, and these came back and defeated the people in a battle and set up the oligarchy.

And the same thing happened also at Cyme 1305a in the time of the democracy which Thrasymachus put down⁷, and in the case of other states also examination would show that revolutions take place very much in this manner. Sometimes they make the notables combine by wronging them in order to curry favor, causing either their estates to be divided up or their revenues by imposing public services, and sometimes by so slandering them that they may have the property of the wealthy to confiscate. And in old times whenever the same man became both leader of the people and general, they used to change the constitution to a tyranny; for almost the largest number of the tyrants of early days have risen from being leaders of the people. And the reason why this used to happen then but does not do so now is because then the leaders of the people were drawn from those who held the office of general (for they were not yet skilled in oratory), but now when rhetoric has developed the able speakers are leaders of the people, but owing to their inexperience in military matters they are not put in control of these, except in so far as something of the kind has taken place to a small extent in some places. And tyrannies also used to occur in former times more than they do now because important offices were entrusted to certain men, as at Miletus a tyranny⁸ arose out of the presidency (for the president had control of many important matters). And moreover, because the cities in those times were not large but the common people lived on their farmsbusily engaged in agriculture, the people’s champions when they became warlike used to aim at tyranny. And they all used to do this when they had acquired the confidence of the people, and their pledge of confidence was their enmity towards the rich, as at Athens Pisistratus made himself tyrant by raising up a party against the men of the plain, and Theagenes at Megara by slaughtering the cattle of the well-to-do which he captured grazing by the river, and Dionysius⁹ established a claim to become tyrant when he accused Daphnaeus and the rich, since his hostility to them caused him to be trusted as a true man of the people. And revolutions also take place from the ancestral form of democracy to one of the most modern kind; for where the magistracies are elective, but not on property-assessments, and the people elect, men ambitious of office by acting as popular leaders bring things to the point of the people’s being sovereign even over the laws. A remedy to prevent this or to reduce its extent is for the tribes to elect the magistrates, and not the people collectively.

These then are the causes through which almost all the revolutions in democracies take place.

Oligarchies undergo revolution principally through two ways that are the most obvious. One is if they treat the multitude unjustly; for anybody makes an adequate people’s champion, and especially so when their leader happens to come from the oligarchy itself, like Lygdamis at Naxos, who afterwards actually became tyrant of the Naxians.

1305b Faction originating with other people also has various ways of arising. Sometimes when the honors of office are shared by very few, dissolution originates from the wealthy themselves,¹⁰ but not those that are in office, as for example has occurred at Marseilles,¹¹ at Istrus,¹² at Heraclea,¹³ and in other states; for those who did not share in the magistracies raised disturbances until as a first stage the older brothers were admitted, and later the younger ones again (for in some places a father and a son may not hold office together, and in others an elder and a younger brother may not). At Marseilles the oligarchy became more constitutional, while at Istrus it ended in becoming democracy, and in Heraclea the government passed from a smaller number to six hundred. At Cnidus also there was a revolution¹⁴ of the oligarchy caused by a faction formed by the notables against one another, because few shared in the government, and the rule stated held, that if a father was a member a son could not be, nor if there were several brothers could any except the eldest; for the common people seized the opportunity of their quarrel and, taking a champion from among the notables, fell upon them and conquered them, for a party divided against itself is weak. Another case was at Erythrae,¹⁵ where at the time of the oligarchy of the Basilidae in ancient days, althoughthe persons in the government directed affairs well, nevertheless the common people were resentful because they were governed by a few, and brought about a revolution of the constitution.

On the other hand, oligarchies are overthrown from within themselves both¹⁶ when from motives of rivalry they play the demagogue (and this demagogy is of two sorts, one among the oligarchs themselves, for a demagogue can arise among them even when they are a very small body,—as for instance in the time of the Thirty at Athens, the party of Charicles rose to power by currying popularity with the Thirty, and in the time of the Four Hundred¹⁷ the party of Phrynichus rose in the same way,— the other when the members of the oligarchy curry popularity with the mob, as the Civic Guards at Larisa ¹⁸ courted popularity with the mob because it elected them, and in all the oligarchies in which the magistracies are not elected by the class from which the magistrates come but are filled from high property-grades or from political clubs while the electors are the heavy-armed soldiers or the common people, as used to be the case at Abydos, and in places where the jury-courts are not made up from the government¹⁹—for there members of the oligarchy by courting popular favor with a view to their trials cause a revolution of the constitution, as took place at Heraclea on the Euxine²⁰; and a further instance is when some men try to narrow down the oligarchy to a smaller number, for those who seek equality are forced to bring in the people as a helper.) And revolutions in oligarchy also take place when they squander their private means by riotous living; for also men of this sort seek to bring about a new state of affairs, and either aim at tyranny themselves or suborn somebody else