1306a (as Hipparinus put forward Dionysius¹ at Syracuse, and at Amphipolis ² a man named Cleotimus led the additional settlers that came from Chalcis and on their arrival stirred them up to sedition against the wealthy, and in Aegina the man who carried out the transactions with Chares attempted to cause a revolution in the constitution for a reason of this sort³); so sometimes they attempt at once to introduce some reform, at other times they rob the public funds and in consequence either they or those who fight against them in their peculations stir up faction against the government, as happened at Apollonia on the Black Sea. On the other hand, harmonious oligarchy does not easily cause its own destruction; and an indication of this is the constitutional government at Pharsalus, for there the ruling class though few are masters of many men⁴ because on good terms with one another. Also oligarchical governments break up when they create a second oligarchy within the oligarchy. This is when, although the whole citizen class is small, its few members are not all admitted to the greatest offices; this is what once occurred in Elis, for the government being in the hands of a few, very few men used to become members of the Elders,⁵ because these numbering ninety held office for life, and the mode of election was of a dynastic type⁶ and resembled that of the Elders at Sparta.

Revolutionsof oligarchies occur both during war and in time of peace— during war since the oligarchs are forced by their distrust of the people to employ mercenary troops (for the man in whose hands they place them often becomes tyrant, as Timophanes did at Corinth,⁷ and if they put several men in command, these win for themselves dynastic power), and when through fear of this they give a share in the constitution to the multitude, the oligarchy falls because they are compelled to make use of the common people; during peace, on the other hand, because of their distrust of one another they place their protection in the hands of mercenary troops and a magistrate between the two parties, who sometimes becomes master of both, which happened at Larisa in the time of the government of the Aleuadae led by Simus,⁸ and at Abydos in the time of the political clubs of which that of Iphiades was one. And factions arise also in consequence of one set of the members of the oligarchy themselves being pushed aside by another set and being driven into party strife in regard to marriages or law-suits; examples of such disorders arising out of a cause related to marriage are the instances spoken of before, and also the oligarchy of the knights at Eretria was put down⁹ by Diagoras when he had been wronged in respect of a marriage, while the faction at Heraclea and that at Thebes arose out of a judgement of a law-court, when the people at Heraclea justly but factiously enforced the punishment against Eurytion on a charge of adultery 1306b and those at Thebes did so against Archias;

for their personal enemies stirred up party feeling against them so as to get them bound in the pillory in the market-place. Also many governments have been put down by some of their members who had become resentful because the oligarchies were too despotic; this is how the oligarchies fell at Cnidus ¹⁰ and at Chios. And revolutions also occur from an accident, both in what is called a constitutional government and in those oligarchies in which membership of the council and the law-courts and tenure of the other offices are based on a property-qualification. For often the qualification first having been fixed to suit the circumstances of the time, so that in an oligarchy a few may be members and in a constitutional government the middle classes, when peace or some other good fortune leads to a good harvest it comes about that the same properties become worth many times as large an assessment, so that all the citizens share in all the rights, the change sometimes taking place gradually and little by little and not being noticed, but at other times more quickly.

Such then are the causes that lead to revolutions and factions in oligarchies (and generally, both democracies and oligarchies are sometimes altered not into the opposite forms of constitution but into ones of the same class, for instancefrom legitimate democracies and oligarchies into autocratic ones and from the latter into the former).

In aristocracies factions arise in some cases because few men share in the honors (which has also been said¹¹ to be the cause of disturbances in oligarchies, because an aristocracy too is a sort of oligarchy, for in both those who govern are few—although the reason for this is not the same in both—since this does cause it to be thought that aristocracy is a form of oligarchy). And this is most bound to come about when there is a considerable number of people who are proud-spirited on the ground of being equals in virtue (for example the clan called the Maidens’ Sons¹² at Sparta—for they were descended from the Equals—whom the Spartans detected in a conspiracy and sent away to colonize Tarentum); or when individuals although great men and inferior to nobody in virtue are treated dishonorably by certain men in higher honor (for example Lysander by the kings¹³); or when a person of manly nature has no share in the honors (for example Cinadon,¹⁴ who got together the attack upon the Spartans in the reign of Agesilaus). Faction in aristocracies also arises when some of the well-born are too poor and others too rich (which happens especially during wars, and this also occurred at Sparta at the time of the Messenian War—as appears from the poem of Tyrtaeus entitledLaw and Order;

1307afor some men being in distress because of the war put forward a claim to carry out a re-division of the land of the country). Also if a man is great and capable of being yet greater, he stirs up faction in order that he may be sole ruler (as Pausanias who commanded the army through the Persian war seems to have done at Sparta, and Hanno¹⁵ at Carthage).

But the actual overthrow of both constitutional governments and aristocracies is mostly due to a departure from justice in the actual framework of the constitution. For what starts it in the case of a constitutional government is that it does not contain a good blend of democracy and oligarchy; and in the case of an aristocracy it is the lack of a good blend of those two elements and of virtue, but chiefly of the two elements (I mean popular government and oligarchy), for both constitutional governments and most of the constitutions that are called aristocracies aim at blending these. For this¹⁶ is the point of distinction between aristocracies and what are called constitutional governments, and it is owing to this that some of them¹⁷ are less and others more stable; for the constitutions inclining more towards oligarchy men call aristocracies and those inclining more to the side of the multitude constitutional governments, owing to which those of the latter sort are more secure than the others, for the greater number is the stronger, and also men are more content when they have an equal amount, whereas the owners of wealthy properties, if the constitution gives them the superior position,seek to behave insolently and to gain money. And speaking broadly, to whichever side the constitution leans, that is the side to which it shifts as either of the two parties increases its own side—a constitutional government shifts to democracy and an aristocracy to oligarchy, or to the opposite extremes, that is, aristocracy to democracy (for the poorer people feeling they are unjustly treated pull it round to the opposite) and constitutional governments to oligarchy (for the only lasting thing is equality in accordance with desert and the possession of what is their own). And the change mentioned¹⁸ came about at Thurii, for because the property-qualification for honors was too high, the constitution was altered to a lower property-qualification and to a larger number of official posts, but because the notables illegally bought up the whole of the land (for the constitution was too oligarchical, so that they were able to grasp at wealth) . . .¹⁹ And the people having been trained in the war overpowered the guards, until those who were in the position of having too much land relinquished it.

Besides, as all aristocratic constitutions are inclined towards oligarchy, the notables grasp at wealth (for example at Sparta the estates are coming into a few hands); and the notables have more power to do what they like, and to form marriage connections with whom they like (which was the cause of the fall of the state of Locri, as a result of the marriage with Dionysius,²⁰ which would not have taken place in a democracy; nor in a well-blended aristocracy).