Socrates Soc. Then tell me, will it be when the Athenians are taking advice how they are to do their writing correctly that you are to stand up and advise them?

Alcibiades Alc. Upon my word, not I.

Socrates Soc. Well, about strokes on the lyre?

Alcibiades Alc. Not at all.

Socrates Soc. Nor in fact are they accustomed to deliberate on throws in wrestling either at the Assembly.

Alcibiades Alc. No, to be sure.

Socrates Soc. Then what will be the subject of the advice? For I presume it will not be about building.

Alcibiades Alc. No, indeed.

Socrates Soc. For a builder will give better advice than you in that matter.

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. Nor yet will it be about divination?

Alcibiades Alc. No.

Socrates Soc. For there again a diviner will serve better than you.

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. Whether he be short or tall, handsome or ugly, nay, noble or ignoble.

Alcibiades Alc. Of course.

Socrates Soc. For on each subject the advice comes from one who knows, not one who has riches.

Alcibiades Alc. Of course.

Socrates Soc. And whether their mentor be poor or rich will make no difference to the Athenians when they deliberate 107cfor the health of the citizens; all that they require of their counsellor is that he be a physician.

Alcibiades Alc. Naturally.

Socrates Soc. Then what will they have under consideration if you are to be right in standing up, when you do so, as their counsellor?

Alcibiades Alc. Their own affairs, Socrates.

Socrates Soc. Do you mean with regard to shipbuilding, and the question as to what sort of ships they ought to get built?

Alcibiades Alc. No, I do not, Socrates.

Socrates Soc. Because, I imagine, you do not understand shipbuilding. Is that, and that alone, the reason?

Alcibiades Alc. That is just the reason.

Socrates Soc. Well, on what sort of affairs of their own do you mean that they will be deliberating?

Alcibiades Alc. On war, Socrates, or on peace, or on any other of the state’s affairs.

Socrates Soc. Do you mean that they will be deliberating with whom they ought to make peace, and on whom they ought to make war, and in what manner?

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. And on whom it is better to do so, ought they not?

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. And at such time as it is better?

Alcibiades Alc. Certainly.

Socrates Soc. And for so long as they had better?

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. Now if the Athenians should deliberate with whom they should wrestle close, and with whom only at arm’s length, and in what manner, would you or the wrestling-master be the better adviser?

Alcibiades Alc. The wrestling-master, I presume.

Socrates Soc. And can you tell me what the wrestling-master would have in view when he advised as to the persons with whom they ought or ought not to wrestle close, and when and in what manner? What I mean is something like this: ought they not to wrestle close with those with whom it is better to do so?

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. And so far as is better, too?

Alcibiades Alc. So far.

Socrates Soc. And at such time also as is better?

Alcibiades Alc. Certainly.

Socrates Soc. But again, when one sings, one has sometimes to accompany the song with harping and stepping?

Alcibiades Alc. Yes, one has.

Socrates Soc. And at such time as is better?

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. And so far as is better?

Alcibiades Alc. I agree.

Socrates Soc. Well now, since you applied the term “better” to the two cases 108bof harping for accompaniment of a song and close wrestling, what do you call the “better” in the case of harping, to correspond with what in the case of wrestling I call gymnastic? What do you call the other?

Alcibiades Alc. I do not understand.

Socrates Soc. Well, try to copy me: for my answer gave you, I think, what is correct in every instance; and that is correct, I presume, which proceeds by rule of the art, is it not?

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. And was not the art here gymnastic?

Alcibiades Alc. To be sure.

Socrates Soc. And I said that the better ¹ in the case of wrestling was gymnastic.

Alcibiades Alc. You did.

Socrates Soc. And I was quite fair?

Alcibiades Alc. I think so.

Socrates Soc. Come then, in your turn—for it would befit you also, I fancy, to argue fairly ²—tell me, first, what is the art which includes harping and singing and treading the measure correctly? What is it called as a whole? You cannot yet tell me?

Alcibiades Alc. No, indeed.

Socrates Soc. Well, try another way: who are the goddesses that foster the art?

Alcibiades Alc. The Muses, you mean, Socrates?

Socrates Soc. I do. Now, just think, and say by what name the art is called after them.

Alcibiades Alc. Music, ³ I suppose you mean.

Socrates Soc. Yes, I do. And what is that which proceeds correctly by its rule? As in the other case I was correct in mentioning to you gymnastic as that which goes by the art, so I ask you, accordingly, what you say in this case. What manner of proceeding is required?

Alcibiades Alc. A musical one, I suppose.

Socrates Soc. You are right. Come then, what is it that you term “better,” in respect of what is better in waging war and being at peace? 108eJust as in our other instances you said that the “better” implied the more musical and again, in the parallel case, the more gymnastical, try now if you can tell me what is the “better” in this case.

Alcibiades Alc. But I am quite unable.

Socrates Soc. But surely that is disgraceful; for if you should speak to somebody as his adviser on food, and say that one sort was better than another, at this time and in this quantity, and he then asked you—What do you mean by the “better,” Alcibiades?—in a matter like that you could tell him you meant the more wholesome, although you do not set up to be a physician; yet in a case where you set up 109ato have knowledge and are ready to stand up and advise as though you knew, are you not ashamed to be unable, as appears, to answer a question upon it? Does it not seem disgraceful?

Alcibiades Alc. Very.

Socrates Soc. Then consider and do your best to tell me the connection of “better” in being at peace or at war with those to whom we ought to be so disposed.

Alcibiades Alc. Well, I am considering, but I fail to perceive it.

Socrates Soc. But you must know what treatment it is that we allege against each other when we enter upon a war, 109band what name we give it when we do so?

Alcibiades Alc. I do: we say we are victims of deceit or violence or spoliation.

Socrates Soc. Enough: how do we suffer each of these things? Try and tell me what difference there is between one way and another.

Alcibiades Alc. Do you mean by that, Socrates, whether it is in a just way or an unjust way?

Socrates Soc. Precisely.

Alcibiades Alc. Why, there you have all the difference in the world.

Socrates Soc. Well then, on which sort are you going to advise the Athenians to make war—those who are acting unjustly, or those who are doing what is just?

Alcibiades Alc. That is a hard question: for even if someone decides that he must go to war with those who are doing what is just, he would not admit that they were doing so.

Socrates Soc. For that would not be lawful, I suppose?

Alcibiades Alc. No, indeed; nor is it considered honorable either.

Socrates Soc. So you too will appeal to these things in making your speeches?

Alcibiades Alc. Necessarily.

Socrates Soc. Then must not that “better” about which I was asking in reference to making or not making war, on those on whom we ought to or not, and when we ought to or not, be simply and solely the juster?

Alcibiades Alc. Apparently it is.

Socrates Soc. How now, friend Alcibiades? Have you overlooked your own ignorance of this matter, or have I overlooked ⁴ your learning it and taking lessons of a master who taught you to distinguish the more just and the more unjust? And who is he? Inform me in my turn, in order that you may introduce me to him as another pupil.

Alcibiades Alc. You are joking, Socrates.

Socrates Soc. No, I swear by our common God of Friendship, whose name 109eI would by no means take in vain. Come, if you can, tell me who the man is.

Alcibiades Alc. But what if I cannot? Do you think I could not know about what is just and unjust in any other way?

Socrates Soc. Yes, you might, supposing you discovered it.

Alcibiades Alc. But do you not think I might discover it?

Socrates Soc. Yes, quite so, if you inquired.

Alcibiades Alc. And do you not think I might inquire?

Socrates Soc. I do, if you thought you did not know.

Alcibiades Alc. And was there not a time when I held that view?

Socrates Soc. Well spoken. Then can you tell me at what time it was 110athat you thought you did not know what is just and unjust? Pray, was it a year ago that you were inquiring, and thought you did not know? Or did you think you knew? Please answer truly, that our debates may not be futile.

Alcibiades Alc. Well, I thought I knew.

Socrates Soc. And two years, and three years, and four years back, were you not of the same mind?

Alcibiades Alc. I was.

Socrates Soc. But, you see, before that time you were a child, were you not?

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. So I know well enough that then you thought you knew.

Alcibiades Alc. How do you know it so well?

Socrates Soc. Many a time I heard you, when as a child you were dicing or playing some other game at your teacher’s or elsewhere, instead of showing hesitation about what was just and unjust, speak in very loud and confident tones about one or other of your playmates, saying he was a rascal and a cheat who played unfairly. Is not this a true account?

Alcibiades Alc. But what was I to do, Socrates, when somebody cheated me?

Socrates Soc. Yet if you were ignorant then whether you were being unfairly treated or not, how can you ask—“What are you to do?”

Alcibiades Alc. Well, but on my word, I was not ignorant: no, I clearly understood that I was being wronged.

Socrates Soc. So you thought you knew, even as a child, it seems, what was just and unjust.

Alcibiades Alc. I did; and I knew too.

Socrates Soc. At what sort of time did you discover it? For surely it was not while you thought you knew.

Alcibiades Alc. No, indeed.

Socrates Soc. Then when did you think you were ignorant? Consider; I believe you will fail to find such a time.

Alcibiades Alc. Upon my word, Socrates, I really cannot say.

Socrates Soc. So you do not know it by discovery.

Alcibiades Alc. Not at all, apparently.

Socrates Soc. But you said just now that you did not know it by learning either; and if you neither discovered nor learnt it, how do you come to know it, and whence?

Alcibiades Alc. Well, perhaps that answer I gave you was not correct, that I knew it by my own discovery.

Socrates Soc. Then how was it done?

Alcibiades Alc. I learnt it, I suppose, in the same way as everyone else.

Socrates Soc. Back we come to the same argument. From whom? Please tell me.

Alcibiades Alc. From the many.

Socrates Soc. They are no very serious teachers with whom you take refuge, if you ascribe it to the many!

Alcibiades Alc. Why, are they not competent to teach?

Socrates Soc. Not how to play, or not to play, draughts; and yet that, I imagine, is a slight matter compared with justice. What? Do you not think so?

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. Then if they are unable to teach the slighter, can they teach the more serious matter?

Alcibiades Alc. I think so: at any rate, there are many other things that they are able to teach, more serious than draughts.

Socrates Soc. What sort of things?