Alcibiades Alc. For instance, it was from them that I learnt to speak Greek, and I could not say who was my teacher, but can only ascribe it to the same people who, you say, are not serious teachers.

Socrates Soc. Ah, gallant sir, the many may be good teachers of that, and they can justly be praised for their teaching of such subjects.

Alcibiades Alc. And why?

Socrates Soc. Because in those subjects they have the equipment proper to good teachers.

Alcibiades Alc. What do you mean by that?

Socrates Soc. You know that those who are going to teach anything should first know it themselves, do you not?

Alcibiades Alc. Of course.

Socrates Soc. And that those who know should agree with each other and not differ?

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. But if they differ upon anything, will you say that they know it?

Alcibiades Alc. No, indeed.

Socrates Soc. Then how can they be teachers of it?

Alcibiades Alc. By no means.

Socrates Soc. Well now, do you find that the many differ about the nature of stone or wood? If you ask one of them, 111cdo they not agree on the same answer, and make for the same things when they want to get a piece of stone or wood? It is just the same, too, with everything of the sort: for I am pretty nearly right in understanding you to mean just this by knowing how to speak Greek, am I not?

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. And on these matters, as we stated, they not only agree with each other and with themselves in private, but states also use in public the same terms about them to each other, without any dispute?

Alcibiades Alc. They do.

Socrates Soc. Then naturally they will be good teachers of these matters.

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. And if we should wish to provide anyone with knowledge of them, we should be right in sending him to be taught by “the many” that you speak of?

Alcibiades Alc. Certainly.

Socrates Soc. But what if we wished to know not only what men were like or what horses were like, but which of them were good runners or not? Would the many still suffice to teach us this?

Alcibiades Alc. No, indeed.

Socrates Soc. And you have ample proof that they do not know this, 111eand are not proficient teachers of it, in their not agreeing about it at all with themselves?

Alcibiades Alc. I have.

Socrates Soc. And what if we wished to know not only what men were like, but what healthy or diseased men were like? Would the many suffice to teach us?

Alcibiades Alc. No, indeed.

Socrates Soc. And you would have proof of their being bad teachers of that, if you saw them differing about it?

Alcibiades Alc. I should.

Socrates Soc. Well then, do you now find that the many agree with themselves or each other 112aabout just and unjust men or things?

Alcibiades Alc. Far from it, on my word, Socrates.

Socrates Soc. In fact, they differ most especially on these points?

Alcibiades Alc. Very much so.

Socrates Soc. And I suppose you never yet saw or heard of people differing so sharply on questions of health or the opposite as to fight and kill one another in battle because of them.

Alcibiades Alc. No, indeed.

Socrates Soc. But on questions of justice or injustice I am sure you have; 112b and if you have not seen them, at any rate you have heard of them from many people, especially Homer. For you have heard ¹ the Odyssey and the Iliad?

Alcibiades Alc. I certainly have, I suppose, Socrates.

Socrates Soc. And these poems are about a difference of just and unjust

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. And from this difference arose the fights and deaths of the Achaeans, and of the Trojans as well, and of the suitors of Penelope in their strife with Odysseus.

Alcibiades Alc. That is true.

Socrates Soc. And I imagine that when the Athenians and Spartans and Boeotians lost their men at Tanagra, ² and later at Coronea, ³ among whom your own father perished, the difference that caused their deaths and fights was solely on a question of just and unjust, was it not?

Alcibiades Alc. That is true.

Socrates Soc. Then are we to say that these people understand those questions, on which 112dthey differ so sharply that they are led by their mutual disputes to take these extreme measures against each other?

Alcibiades Alc. Apparently not.

Socrates Soc. And you refer me to teachers of that sort, whom you admit yourself to be without knowledge?

Alcibiades Alc. It seems I do.

Socrates Soc. Then how is it likely that you should know what is just and unjust, when you are so bewildered about these matters and are shown to have neither learnt them from anyone nor discovered them for yourself?.

Alcibiades Alc. By what you say, it is not likely.

Socrates Soc. There again, Alcibiades, do you see how unfairly you speak?

Alcibiades Alc. In what ?

Socrates Soc. In stating that I say so.

Alcibiades Alc. Why, do you not say that l do not know about the just and unjust?

Socrates Soc. Not at all.

Alcibiades Alc. Well, do I say it?

Socrates Soc. Yes.

Alcibiades Alc. How, pray ?

Socrates Soc. I will show you, in the following way. If I ask you which is the greater number, one or two, you will answer “two”?

Alcibiades Alc. Yes, I shall.

Socrates Soc. How much greater?

Alcibiades Alc. By one.

Socrates Soc. Then which of us says that two are one more than one?

Alcibiades Alc. I.

Socrates Soc. And I was asking, and you were answering?

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. Then is it I, the questioner, or you the answerer, that are found to be speaking about these things?

Alcibiades Alc. I.

Socrates Soc. And what if I ask what are the letters in “Socrates,” and you tell me? Which will be the speaker?

Alcibiades Alc. I.

Socrates Soc. Come then, tell me, as a principle, when we have question and answer, which is the speaker—the questioner, or the answerer?

Alcibiades Alc. The answerer, I should say, Socrates.

Socrates Soc. And throughout the argument so far, I was the questioner?

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. And you the answerer?

Alcibiades Alc. Quite so.

Socrates Soc. Well then, which of us has spoken what has been said?

Alcibiades Alc. Apparently, Socrates, from what we have admitted, it was I.

Socrates Soc. And it was said that Alcibiades, the fair son of Cleinias, did not know about just and unjust, but thought he did, and intended to go to the Assembly as adviser to the Athenians on what he knows nothing about; is not that so?

Alcibiades Alc. Apparently.

Socrates Soc. Then, to quote Euripides, ⁴ the result is, Alcibiades, that you may be said to have heard it from yourself, not me,⁵ and it is not I who say it, but you, and you tax me with it in vain. And indeed what you say is quite true. For it is a mad scheme this, that you meditate, my excellent friend—of teaching things that you do not know, since you have taken no care to learn them.

Alcibiades Alc. I think, Socrates, that the Athenians and the rest of the Greeks rarely deliberate as to which is the more just or unjust course: for they regard questions of this sort as obvious; and so they pass them over and consider which course will prove more expedient in the result. For the just and the expedient, I take it, are not the same, but many people have profited by great wrongs that they have committed, whilst others, I imagine, have had no advantage from doing what was right.

Socrates Soc. What then? Granting that the just and the expedient 113eare in fact as different as they can be, you surely do not still suppose you know what is expedient for mankind, and why it is so?

Alcibiades Alc. Well, what is the obstacle, Socrates,—unless you are going to ask me again from whom I learnt it, or how I discovered it for myself?

Socrates Soc. What a way of going on! If your answer is incorrect, and a previous argument can be used to prove it so, you claim to be told something new, and a different line of proof, as though the previous one were like a poor worn-out coat which you refuse to wear any longer; you must be provided instead with something clean and unsoiled in the way of evidence. 114aBut I shall ignore your sallies in debate, and shall none the less ask you once more, where you learnt your knowledge of what is expedient, and who is your teacher, asking in one question all the things I asked before; and now you will clearly find yourself in the same plight, and will be unable to prove that you know the expedient either through discovery or through learning. But as you are dainty, and would dislike a repeated taste of the same argument, I pass over this question of whether you know or do not know 114bwhat is expedient for the Athenians: but why have you not made it clear whether the just and the expedient are the same or different? If you like, question me as I did you, or if you prefer, argue out the matter in your own way.

Alcibiades Alc. But I am not sure I should be able, Socrates, to set it forth to you.

Socrates Soc. Well, my good sir, imagine I am the people in Assembly; even there, you know, you will have to persuade each man singly, will you not?

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. And the same man may well persuade one person singly, 114cand many together, about things that he knows, just as the schoolmaster, I suppose, persuades either one or many about letters?

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. And again, will not the same man persuade either one or many about number?

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. And this will be the man who knows—the arithmetician?

Alcibiades Alc. Quite so.

Socrates Soc. And you too can persuade a single man about things of which you can persuade many?

Alcibiades Alc. Presumably.

Socrates Soc. And these are clearly things that you know.

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. And the only difference between the orator 114dspeaking before the people and one who speaks in a conversation like ours is that the former persuades men in a number together of the same things, and the latter persuades them one at a time?

Alcibiades Alc. It looks like it.

Socrates Soc. Come now, since we see that the same man may persuade either many or one, try your unpracticed hand on me, and endeavor to show that the just is sometimes not expedient.

Alcibiades Alc. You are insolent, Socrates!

Socrates Soc. This time, at any rate, I am going to have the insolence to persuade you of the opposite of that which you decline to prove to me.

Alcibiades Alc. Speak, then.

Socrates Soc. Just answer my questions.

Alcibiades Alc. No, you yourself must be the speaker.

Socrates Soc. What? Do you not wish above all things to be persuaded?

Alcibiades Alc. By all means, to be sure.

Socrates Soc. And you would best be persuaded if you should say “the case is so”?

Alcibiades Alc. I agree.

Socrates Soc. Then answer; and if you do not hear your own self say that the just is expedient, put no trust in the words of anyone again.

Alcibiades Alc. I will not: but I may as well answer; for I do not think I shall come to any harm.