Socrates Soc. You are quite a prophet! Now tell me, do you consider some just things to be expedient, and others not?

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. And again, some noble, and some not?

Alcibiades Alc. What do you mean by that question?

Socrates Soc. I would ask whether anyone ever seemed to you to be doing what was base and yet just.

Alcibiades Alc. Never.

Socrates Soc. Well, are all just things noble?

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. And what of noble things, in their turn? Are they all good, or some only, while others are not?

Alcibiades Alc. In my opinion, Socrates, some noble things are evil.

Socrates Soc. And some base things are good?

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. Do you mean as in one of the many cases where men have gone to rescue a comrade or kinsman in battle, and have been either wounded or killed, while those who did not go to the rescue, as duty bade, have got off safe and sound?

Alcibiades Alc. Precisely.

Socrates Soc. And such a rescue you call noble, in respect of the endeavor to save those whom it was one’s duty to save; and this is courage, is it not?

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. But you call it evil, in respect of the deaths and wounds?

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. And is not the courage one thing, and the death another?

Alcibiades Alc. Certainly.

Socrates Soc. Then it is not in the same respect that rescuing one’s friends is noble and evil?

Alcibiades Alc. Apparently not.

Socrates Soc. Then see if, inasmuch as it is noble, it is also good; for in the present case you were admitting that the rescue was noble in respect of its courage: now consider this very thing, courage, and say whether it is good or bad. Consider it in this way: which would you choose to have, good things or evil?

Alcibiades Alc. Good.

Socrates Soc. And most of all, the greatest goods, and of such things you would least allow yourself to be deprived?

Alcibiades Alc. To be sure.

Socrates Soc. Then what do you say of courage? At what price would you allow yourself to be deprived of it?

Alcibiades Alc. I would give up life itself if I had to be a coward.

Socrates Soc. Then you regard cowardice as the uttermost evil.

Alcibiades Alc. I do.

Socrates Soc. On a par with death, it seems.

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. And life and courage are the extreme opposites of death and cowardice?

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. And you would most desire to have the former, and least the latter?

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. Is that because you think the former best, and the latter worst?

Alcibiades Alc. To be sure.

Socrates Soc. So you reckon courage among the best things, and death among the worst.

Alcibiades Alc. I do.

Socrates Soc. Then the rescue of one’s friends in battle, inasmuch as it is noble in respect of the working of good by courage, you have termed noble?

Alcibiades Alc. Apparently.

Socrates Soc. But evil, in respect of the working of evil by death?

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. So we may fairly describe each of these workings as follows: as you call either of them evil because of the evil it produces,

Socrates so you must call it good because of the good it produces.

Alcibiades Alc. I believe that is so.

Socrates Soc. And again, are they noble inasmuch as they are good, and base inasmuch as they are evil?

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. Then in saying that the rescue of one’s friends in battle is noble and yet evil, you mean just the same as if you called the rescue good, but evil.

Alcibiades Alc. I believe what you say is true, Socrates.

Socrates Soc. So nothing noble, in so far as it is noble, is evil, and nothing base, in so far as it is base, is good.

Alcibiades Alc. Apparently.

Socrates Soc. Now then, consider it again in this way: whoever does nobly, does well too, does he not?

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. And are not those who do well happy?

Alcibiades Alc. Of course.

Socrates Soc. And they are happy because of the acquisition of good things?

Alcibiades Alc. Certainly.

Socrates Soc. And they acquire these by doing well and nobly?

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. So doing well is good?

Alcibiades Alc. Of course.

Socrates Soc. And welfare is noble?

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. Hence we have seen again that noble and good are the same thing.

Alcibiades Alc. Apparently.

Socrates Soc. Then whatever we find to be noble we shall find also to be good, by this argument at least.

Alcibiades Alc. We must.

Socrates Soc. Well then, are good things expedient or not?

Alcibiades Alc. Expedient.

Socrates Soc. And do you remember what our admissions were about just things?

Alcibiades Alc. I think we said that those who do just things must do noble things.

Socrates Soc. And that those who do noble things must do good things?

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. And that good things are expedient?

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. Hence just things, Alcibiades, are expedient.

Alcibiades Alc. So it seems.

Socrates Soc. Well now, are not you the speaker of all this, and I the questioner?

Alcibiades Alc. I seem to be, apparently.

Socrates Soc. So if anyone stands up to advise either the Athenians or the Peparethians, imagining that he understands what is just and unjust, and says that just things are sometimes evil, could you do other than laugh him to scorn, since you actually say yourself that

Socrates just and expedient are the same?

Alcibiades Alc. But by Heaven, Socrates, I do not even know what I am saying, I feel altogether in such a strange state! For from moment to moment I change my view under your questioning.

Socrates Soc. And are you unaware, my friend, what this feeling is?

Alcibiades Alc. I am, quite.

Socrates Soc. Well, do you suppose that if someone should ask you whether you have two eyes or three, two hands or four, or anything else of that sort, you would answer differently from moment to moment, or always the same thing?

Alcibiades Alc. I begin to have misgivings about myself, but still I think I should make the same answer.

Socrates Soc. And the reason would be, because you know?

Alcibiades Alc. I think so.

Socrates Soc. Then if you involuntarily give contradictory answers, clearly it must be about things of which you are ignorant.

Alcibiades Alc. Very likely.

Socrates Soc. And you say you are bewildered in answering about just and unjust, noble and base, evil and good, expedient and inexpedient? Now, is it not obvious that your bewilderment is caused by your ignorance of these things?

Alcibiades Alc. I agree.

Socrates Soc. Then is it the case that when a man does not know a thing he must needs be bewildered in spirit regarding that thing?

Alcibiades Alc. Yes, of course.

Socrates Soc. Well now, do you know in what way you can ascend to heaven?

Alcibiades Alc. On my word, not I.

Socrates Soc. Is that too a kind of question about which your judgement is bewildered?

Alcibiades Alc. No, indeed.

Socrates Soc. Do you know the reason, or shall I state it?

Alcibiades Alc. State it.

Socrates Soc. It is, my friend, that while not knowing the matter you do not suppose that you know it.

Alcibiades Alc. Here again, how do you mean?

Socrates Soc. Do your share, in seeing for yourself. Are you bewildered about the kind of thing that you do not know and are aware of not knowing? For instance, you know, I suppose, that you do not know about the preparation of a tasty dish?

Alcibiades Alc. Quite so.

Socrates Soc. Then do you think for yourself how you are to prepare it, and get bewildered, or do you entrust it to the person who knows?

Alcibiades Alc. I do the latter.

Socrates Soc. And what if you should be on a ship at sea? Would you think

Socrates whether the tiller should be moved inwards or outwards, and in your ignorance bewilder yourself, or would you entrust it to the helmsman, and be quiet?

Alcibiades Alc. I would leave it to him.

Socrates Soc. So you are not bewildered about what you do not know, so long as you know that you do not know?

Alcibiades Alc. It seems I am not,

Socrates Soc. Then do you note that mistakes in action also are due to this ignorance of thinking one knows when one does not?

Alcibiades Alc. Here again, how do you mean?

Socrates Soc. We set about acting, I suppose, when we think we know what we are doing?

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. But when people think they do not know, I suppose they hand it over to others?

Alcibiades Alc. To be sure.

Socrates Soc. And so that kind of ignorant person makes no mistakes in life, because they entrust such matters to others?

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. Who then are those who make mistakes? For, I take it, they cannot be those who know.

Alcibiades Alc. No, indeed.

Socrates Soc. But since it is neither those who know, nor those of the ignorant

Socrates who know that they do not know, the only people left, I think, are those who do not know, but think that they do?

Alcibiades Alc. Yes, only those.

Socrates Soc. Then this ignorance is a cause of evils, and is the discreditable sort of stupidity?

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. And when it is about the greatest matters, it is most injurious and base?

Alcibiades Alc. By far.

Socrates Soc. Well then, can you mention any greater things than the just, the noble, the good, and the expedient?

Alcibiades Alc. No, indeed.

Socrates Soc. And it is about these, you say, that you are bewildered?

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. But if you are bewildered, is it not clear from what has gone before

Socrates that you are not only ignorant of the greatest things, but while not knowing them you think that you do?

Alcibiades Alc. I am afraid so.

Socrates Soc. Alack then, Alcibiades, for the plight you are in! I shrink indeed from giving it a name, but still, as we are alone, let me speak out. You are wedded to stupidity, my fine friend, of the vilest kind; you are impeached of this by your own words, out of your own mouth; and this, it seems, is why you dash into politics before you have been educated. And you are not alone in this plight, but you share it with most of those who manage our city’s affairs,

Socrates except just a few, and perhaps your guardian, Pericles.

Alcibiades Alc. Yes, you know, Socrates, they say he did not get his wisdom independently, but consorted with many wise men, such as Pythocleides and Anaxagoras ; and now, old as he is, he still confers with Damon for that very purpose.

Socrates Soc. Well, but did you ever find a man who was wise in anything and yet unable to make another man wise in the same things as himself? For instance, the man who taught you letters was wise himself, and also made you wise, and anyone else he wished to, did he not?

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. And you too, who learnt from him, will be able to make another man wise?

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. And the same holds of the harper and the trainer?

Alcibiades Alc. Certainly.

Socrates Soc. For, I presume, it is a fine proof of one’s knowing anything that one knows, when one is able to point to another man whom one has made to know it.

Alcibiades Alc. I agree.

Socrates Soc. Well then, can you tell me whom Pericles made wise? One of his sons, to begin with?

Alcibiades Alc. But what if the two sons of Pericles were simpletons, Socrates?

Socrates Soc. Well, Cleinias, your brother.

Alcibiades Alc. But why should you mention Cleinias, a madman?

Socrates Soc. Well, if Cleinias is mad and the two sons of Pericles were simpletons, what reason are we to assign, in your case, for his allowing you to be in your present condition?

Alcibiades Alc. I believe I am myself to blame for not attending to him.