Alcibiades Alc. So it seems.

Socrates Soc. And anyone who gets to know something belonging to the body knows the things that are his, but not himself.

Alcibiades Alc. That is so.

Socrates Soc. Then no physician, in so far as he is a physician, knows himself, nor does any trainer, in so far as he is a trainer.

Alcibiades Alc. It seems not.

Socrates Soc. And farmers, and craftsmen generally, are far from knowing themselves. For these people, it would seem, do not even know their own things, but only things still more remote than their own things, in respect of the arts which they follow; since they know 131bbut the things of the body, with which it is tended.

Alcibiades Alc. That is true.

Socrates Soc. So if knowing oneself is temperance, none of these people is temperate in respect of his art.

Alcibiades Alc. None, I agree.

Socrates Soc. And that is why these arts are held to be sordid, and no acquirements for a good man.

Alcibiades Alc. Quite so.

Socrates Soc. Then once again, whoever tends his body tends his own things, but not himself?

Alcibiades Alc. It looks rather like it.

Socrates Soc. But whoever tends his money tends neither himself nor 131chis own things, but only things yet more remote than his own things?

Alcibiades Alc. I agree.

Socrates Soc. So that the money-maker has ceased to do his own business.

Alcibiades Alc. Correct.

Socrates Soc. And if anyone is found to be a lover of Alcibiades’ body, he has fallen in love, not with Alcibiades, but with something belonging to Alcibiades?

Alcibiades Alc. That is true.

Socrates Soc. Your lover is rather he who loves your soul?

Alcibiades Alc. He must be, apparently, by our argument.

Socrates Soc. And he who loves your body quits you, and is gone, as soon as its bloom is over?

Alcibiades Alc. Apparently.

Socrates Soc. Whereas he who loves your soul will not quit you so long as it makes for what is better?

Alcibiades Alc. So it seems.

Socrates Soc. And I am he who does not quit you, but remains with you when your body’s prime is over, and the rest have departed.

Alcibiades Alc. Yes, and I am glad of it, Socrates, and hope you will not go.

Socrates Soc. Then you must endeavor to be as handsome as you can.

Alcibiades Alc. Well, I shall endeavor.

Socrates Soc. You see how you stand: Alcibiades, 131ethe son of Cleinias, it seems, neither had nor has any lover except one only, and that a cherished one, Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus and Phaenarete.

Alcibiades Alc. True.

Socrates Soc. And you said that I only just anticipated you in coming to you, for otherwise you would have come to me first for the purpose of inquiring why I am the only one who does not leave you?

Alcibiades Alc. Yes, that was so.

Socrates Soc. Then the reason was that I was the only lover of you, whereas the rest were lovers of what is yours; and that is losing its charm, 132awhile you are beginning to bloom. So now, if you are not blighted and deformed by the Athenian people, I shall never forsake you. For my chiefest fear is of your being blighted by becoming a lover of the people, since many a good Athenian has come to that ere now. For fair of face is the people of great-hearted Erechtheus;¹ but you should get a view of it stripped: so take the precaution that I recommend.

Alcibiades Alc. What is it?

Socrates Soc. Exercise yourself first, my wonderful friend, in learning what you ought to know before entering on politics; you must wait till you have learnt, in order that you may be armed with an antidote and so come to no harm.

Alcibiades Alc. Your advice seems to me good, Socrates; but try to explain in what way we can take pains over ourselves.

Socrates Soc. Well, we have made one step in advance; for there is a pretty fair agreement now as to what we are, whereas we were afraid we might fail of this and take pains, without knowing it, over something other than ourselves.

Alcibiades Alc. That is so.

Socrates Soc. And the next step, we see, is to take care of the soul, and look to that.

Alcibiades Alc. Clearly.

Socrates Soc. While handing over to others the care of our bodies and our coffers.

Alcibiades Alc. Quite so.

Socrates Soc. Then how shall we obtain the most certain knowledge of it? For if we know that, it seems we shall know ourselves also. In Heaven’s name, do we fail to comprehend the wise words of the Delphic inscription, which we mentioned just now?

Alcibiades Alc. With what intent do you say that, Socrates?

Socrates Soc. I will tell you what I suspect to be the real advice which the inscription gives us. I rather think there are not many illustrations of it to be found, but only in the case of sight.

Alcibiades Alc. What do you mean by that?

Socrates Soc. Consider in your turn: suppose that, instead of speaking to a man, it said to the eye of one of us, as a piece of advice “See thyself,” how should we apprehend the meaning of the admonition? Would it not be, that the eye should look at that by looking at which it would see itself?

Alcibiades Alc. Clearly.

Socrates Soc. Then let us think what object there is anywhere, by looking at which 132ewe can see both it and ourselves.

Alcibiades Alc. Why, clearly, Socrates, mirrors and things of that sort.

Socrates Soc. Quite right. And there is also something of that sort in the eye that we see with?

Alcibiades Alc. To be sure.

Socrates Soc. And have you observed that the face of the person who looks into another’s eye is shown in the optic confronting him, 133aas in a mirror, and we call this the pupil, ² for in a sort it is an image of the person looking?

Alcibiades Alc. That is true.

Socrates Soc. Then an eye viewing another eye, and looking at the most perfect part of it, the thing wherewith it sees, will thus see itself.

Alcibiades Alc. Apparently.

Socrates Soc. But if it looks at any other thing in man or at anything in nature but what resembles this, ³ it will not see itself.

Alcibiades Alc. That is true.

Socrates Soc. Then if an eye is to see itself, it must look at an eye, and at that region of the eye in which the virtue of an eye is found to occur; and this, I presume, is sight.

Alcibiades Alc. That is so.

Socrates Soc. And if the soul too, my dear Alcibiades, is to know herself, she must surely look at a soul, and especially at that region of it in which occurs the virtue of a soul—wisdom, and at any other part of a soul which resembles this?

Alcibiades Alc. I agree, Socrates.

Socrates Soc. And can we find any part of the soul that we can call more divine than this, which is the seat of knowledge and thought?

Alcibiades Alc. We cannot.

Socrates Soc. Then this part of her resembles God, and whoever looks at this, and comes to know all that is divine, will gain thereby the best knowledge of himself.

Alcibiades Alc. Apparently.

Socrates Soc. And self-knowledge we admitted to be temperance. ⁴

Alcibiades Alc. To be sure.

Socrates Soc. So if we have no knowledge of ourselves and no temperance, shall we be able to know our own belongings, good or evil?

Alcibiades Alc. How can that be, Socrates?

Socrates Soc. For I expect it seems impossible to you that without knowing Alcibiades you should know that the belongings of Alcibiades are in fact his.

Alcibiades Alc. Impossible indeed, upon my word.

Socrates Soc. Nor could we know that our belongings are ours if we did not even know ourselves?

Alcibiades Alc. How could we?

Socrates Soc. And so, if we did not so much as know our belongings, we could not know the belongings of our belongings either?

Alcibiades Alc. Apparently not.

Socrates Soc. Then we were not quite correct in admitting just now that there are people who, without knowing themselves, know their belongings, while others know their belongings’ belongings. For it seems to be the function of one man and one art to discern all three— 133ehimself, his belongings, and the belongings of his belongings.

Alcibiades Alc. It looks like it.

Socrates Soc. And anyone who is ignorant of his belongings will be similarly ignorant, I suppose, of the belongings of others.

Alcibiades Alc. Quite so.

Socrates Soc. And if ignorant of others’ affairs, he will be ignorant also of the affairs of states.

Alcibiades Alc. He must be.

Socrates Soc. Then such a man can never be a statesman.

Alcibiades Alc. No, indeed.

Socrates Soc. No, nor an economist either.

Alcibiades Alc. No, indeed.

Socrates Soc. Nor will he know what he is doing.

Alcibiades Alc. No, I agree.

Socrates Soc. And will not he who does not know make mistakes?

Alcibiades Alc. To be sure.

Socrates Soc. And when he makes mistakes, will he not do ill both in private and in public?

Alcibiades Alc. Of course.

Socrates Soc. And doing ill he will be wretched?

Alcibiades Alc. Yes, very.

Socrates Soc. And what of those for whom he is doing so?

Alcibiades Alc. They will be wretched also.

Socrates Soc. Then it is impossible to be happy if one is not temperate and good.

Alcibiades Alc. Impossible.

Socrates Soc. So it is the bad men who are wretched.

Alcibiades Alc. Yes, very.

Socrates Soc. And hence it is not he who has made himself rich that is relieved of wretchedness, but he who has made himself temperate.

Alcibiades Alc. Apparently.

Socrates Soc. So it is not walls or warships or arsenals that cities need, Alcibiades, if they are to be happy, nor numbers, nor size, without virtue.

Alcibiades Alc. No, indeed.

Socrates Soc. And if you are to manage the city’s affairs properly and honorably, you must impart virtue to the citizens.

Alcibiades Alc. Of course.

Socrates Soc. But could one possibly impart a thing that one had not?

Alcibiades Alc. How, indeed?

Socrates Soc. Then you or anyone else who is to be governor and curator, not merely of himself and his belongings in private, but of the state and its affairs, must first acquire virtue himself.

Alcibiades Alc. That is true.

Socrates Soc. Hence it is not licence or authority for doing what one pleases that you have to secure to yourself or the state, but justice and temperance.

Alcibiades Alc. Apparently.

Socrates Soc. For you and the state, if you act justly and temperately, will act so as to please God.

Alcibiades Alc. Naturally.

Socrates Soc. And, as we were saying in what went before, you will act with your eyes turned on what is divine and bright.

Alcibiades Alc. Apparently.

Socrates Soc. Well, and looking thereon you will behold and know both yourselves and your good.

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. And so you will act aright and well?

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. Well now, if you act in this way, I am ready to warrant that you must be happy.

Alcibiades Alc. And I can rely on your warranty.

Socrates Soc. But if you act unjustly, with your eyes on the godless and dark, the probability is that your acts will resemble these through your ignorance of yourselves.

Alcibiades Alc. That is probable.