Socrates Soc. Or again, could a woman agree with a man about soldiering, when she has not learnt it?

Alcibiades Alc. Oh, no.

Socrates Soc. Because, I expect you will say again, that is a man’s affair.

Alcibiades Alc. I would.

Socrates Soc. Then, by your account, there are some pursuits belonging to women, and some to men?

Alcibiades Alc. Of course.

Socrates Soc. So in these, at any rate, there is no agreement between men and women.

Alcibiades Alc. No.

Socrates Soc. And hence no friendship either, if, as we said, friendship is agreement.

Alcibiades Alc. Apparently not.

Socrates Soc. So women are not loved by men, in so far as they do their own work.

Alcibiades Alc. It seems not.

Socrates Soc. Nor are men by women, in so far as they do theirs.

Alcibiades Alc. No.

Socrates Soc. And states, therefore, are not well ordered in so far as each person does his own business? ¹

Alcibiades Alc. I think they are, Socrates.

Socrates Soc. How can you say that? Without the presence of friendship, which we say must be there if states are well ordered, as otherwise they are not?

Alcibiades Alc. But it seems to me that friendship arises among them just on that account—that each of the two parties does its own business.

Socrates Soc. It was not so a moment since: but now, what do you mean this time? Does friendship arise where there is no agreement? And is it possible that agreement should arise where some know about the business, but others do not?

Alcibiades Alc. Impossible.

Socrates Soc. And are they doing what is just or unjust, when each man does his own business?

Alcibiades Alc. What is just, of course.

Socrates Soc. And when the citizens do what is just in the city, does not friendship arise among them?

Alcibiades Alc. Again I think that must be so, Socrates.

Socrates Soc. Then whatever do you mean by that friendship or agreement 127dabout which we must be wise and well-advised in order that we may be good men? For I am unable to learn either what it is, or in whom; since it appears that the same persons sometimes have it, and sometimes not, by your account.

Alcibiades Alc. Well, by Heaven, Socrates, I do not even know what I mean myself, and I fear that for some time past I have lived unawares in a disgraceful condition.

Socrates Soc. But you must take heart. For had you perceived your plight 127eat fifty, it would be hard for you to take pains with yourself; whereas here you are at the time of life when one ought to perceive it.

Alcibiades Alc. Then what should one do on perceiving it, Socrates?

Socrates Soc. Answer the questions asked, Alcibiades: only do that, and with Heaven’s favor—if we are to put any trust in my divination—you and I shall both be in better case.

Alcibiades Alc. That shall be, so far as my answering can avail.

Socrates Soc. Come then, what is “taking pains over oneself”— 128afor we may perchance be taking, unawares, no pains over ourselves, though we think we are—and when does a man actually do it? Does he take pains over himself at the same time as over his own things?

Alcibiades Alc. I at least believe so.

Socrates Soc. Well now, when does a man take pains over his feet? Is it when he takes pains over what belongs to his feet?

Alcibiades Alc. I do not understand.

Socrates Soc. Is there anything you can name as belonging to the hand? For instance, does a ring belong to any other part of a man but the finger?

Alcibiades Alc. No, indeed.

Socrates Soc. And so the shoe also belongs to the foot, in the same way?

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. And likewise clothes and coverlets belong to the whole body?

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. Now when we take pains over our shoes, we take pains over our feet?

Alcibiades Alc. I do not quite understand, Socrates.

Socrates Soc. Well, but, Alcibiades, you speak of taking proper pains over this or that matter, do you not?

Alcibiades Alc. I do.

Socrates Soc. And do you call it proper pains when someone makes a thing better?

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. Then what art makes shoes better?

Alcibiades Alc. Shoe-making.

Socrates Soc. So by shoe-making we take pains over our shoes?

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. And over our foot too by shoe-making? Or by that art whereby we make feet better?

Alcibiades Alc. By that art.

Socrates Soc. And is it not the same one for making our feet as for making the whole body better?

Alcibiades Alc. I think so.

Socrates Soc. And is not that gymnastic?

Alcibiades Alc. Certainly.

Socrates Soc. So by gymnastic we take pains over our foot, but by shoe-making over what belongs to our foot?

Alcibiades Alc. Quite so.

Socrates Soc. And by gymnastic over our hands, but by ring-engraving over what belongs to the hand?

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. And by gymnastic over the body, but by weaving 128dand the rest over what belongs to the body?

Alcibiades Alc. Absolutely so.

Socrates Soc. Then for taking pains over a thing itself and over what belongs to it we use different arts.

Alcibiades Alc. Apparently.

Socrates Soc. So when you take pains over your belongings you are not taking pains over yourself.

Alcibiades Alc. Not at all.

Socrates Soc. For the arts, it seems, that one used for taking pains over oneself and over one’s belongings would not be the same.

Alcibiades Alc. Apparently not.

Socrates Soc. Come then, whatever kind of art can we use for taking pains over ourselves?

Alcibiades Alc. I cannot say.

Socrates Soc. Well, so much at least has been admitted, that it is not one which would help us to make a single one of our possessions better, but one which would help to make ourselves so?

Alcibiades Alc. That is true.

Socrates Soc. Now, should we ever have known what art makes a shoe better, if we had not known a shoe?

Alcibiades Alc. Impossible.

Socrates Soc. Nor could we know what art makes rings better, if we had no cognizance of a ring.

Alcibiades Alc. True.

Socrates Soc. Well then, could we ever know what art makes the man himself better, if we were ignorant of what we are ourselves?

Alcibiades Alc. Impossible.

Socrates Soc. Well, and is it an easy thing to know oneself, and was it a mere scamp who inscribed these words on the temple at Delphi; or is it a hard thing, and not a task for anybody?

Alcibiades Alc. I have often thought, Socrates, that it was for anybody; but often, too, that it was very hard.

Socrates Soc. But, Alcibiades, whether it is easy or not, here is the fact for us all the same: if we have that knowledge, we are like to know what pains to take over ourselves; but if we have it not, we never can.

Alcibiades Alc. That is so.

Socrates Soc. Come then, in what way can the same-in-itself ² be discovered? For thus we may discover what we are ourselves; whereas if we remain in ignorance of it we must surely fail.

Alcibiades Alc. Rightly spoken.

Socrates Soc. Steady, then, in Heaven’s name! To whom are you talking now? To me, are you not?

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. And I in turn to you ?

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. Then the talker is Socrates?

Alcibiades Alc. To be sure.

Socrates Soc. And the hearer, Alcibiades?

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. And Socrates uses speech in talking?

Alcibiades Alc. Of course.

Socrates Soc. And you call talking and using speech the same thing, I suppose.

Alcibiades Alc. To be sure.

Socrates Soc. But the user and the thing he uses are different, are they not?

Alcibiades Alc. How do you mean?

Socrates Soc. For instance, I suppose a shoemaker uses a round tool, and a square one, and others, when he cuts.

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. And the cutter and user is quite different from what he uses in cutting?

Alcibiades Alc. Of course.

Socrates Soc. And in the same way what the harper uses in harping will be different from the harper himself?

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. Well then, that is what I was asking just now—whether the user 129dand what he uses are always, in your opinion, two different things.

Alcibiades Alc. They are.

Socrates Soc. Then what are we to say of the shoemaker? Does he cut with his tools only, or with his hands as well?

Alcibiades Alc. With his hands as well.

Socrates Soc. So he uses these also?

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. Does he use his eyes, too, in his shoe-making?

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. And we admit that the user and what he uses are different things?

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. Then the shoemaker and the harper are different from 129ethe hands and eyes that they use for their work?

Alcibiades Alc. Apparently.

Socrates Soc. And man uses his whole body too?

Alcibiades Alc. To be sure.

Socrates Soc. And we said that the user and what he uses are different?

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. So man is different from his own body?

Alcibiades Alc. It seems so.

Socrates Soc. Then whatever is man?

Alcibiades Alc. I cannot say.

Socrates Soc. Oh, but you can—that he is the user of the body.

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. And the user of it must be the soul?

Alcibiades Alc. It must.

Socrates Soc. And ruler?

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. Now, here is a remark from which no one, I think, can dissent.

Alcibiades Alc. What is it?

Socrates Soc. That man must be one of three things.

Alcibiades Alc. What things?

Socrates Soc. Soul, body, or both together as one whole.

Alcibiades Alc. Very well.

Socrates Soc. But yet we have admitted that what actually rules the body is man?

Alcibiades Alc. We have.

Socrates Soc. And does the body rule itself?

Alcibiades Alc. By no means.

Socrates Soc. Because we have said that it is ruled.

Alcibiades Alc. Yes.

Socrates Soc. Then that cannot be what we are seeking.

Alcibiades Alc. It seems not.

Socrates Soc. Well then, does the combination of the two rule the body, so that we are to regard this as man?

Alcibiades Alc. Perhaps it is.

Socrates Soc. The unlikeliest thing in the world: for if one of the two does not share in the rule, it is quite inconceivable that the combination of the two can be ruling.

Alcibiades Alc. You are right.

Socrates Soc. But since neither the body nor the combination of the two is man, we are reduced, I suppose, to this: either man is nothing at all, or if something, he turns out to be nothing else than soul.

Alcibiades Alc. Precisely so.

Socrates Soc. Well, do you require some yet clearer proof that the soul is man?

Alcibiades Alc. No, I assure you: I think it is amply proved.

Socrates Soc. And if it is tolerably, though not exactly, we are content; exact knowledge will be ours later, 130dwhen we have discovered the thing that we passed over just now because it would involve much consideration.

Alcibiades Alc. What is that?

Socrates Soc. The point suggested in that remark a moment ago, ³ that we should first consider the same-in-itself; but so far, instead of the same, we have been considering what each single thing is in itself. And perhaps we shall be satisfied with that: for surely we cannot say that anything has more absolute possession of ourselves than the soul.

Alcibiades Alc. No, indeed.

Socrates Soc. And it is proper to take the view that you and I are conversing with each other, while we make use of words, by intercourse of soul with soul?

Alcibiades Alc. Quite so.

Socrates Soc. Well, that is just what we suggested a little while ago—that Socrates, in using words to talk with Alcibiades, is holding speech, not with your face, it would seem, but with Alcibiades—that is, with his soul.

Alcibiades Alc. I believe so.

Socrates Soc. Then he who enjoins a knowledge of oneself bids us become acquainted with the soul.