Hermogenes Hermogenes. True.

Socrates Socrates. And what is that with which we have to bore?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. A borer.

Socrates Socrates. And that with which we weave?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. A shuttle.

Socrates Socrates. And that with which we must name?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. A name.

Socrates Socrates. Right. A name also, then, is a kind of instrument.

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Certainly.

Socrates Socrates. Then if I were to ask “What instrument is the shuttle?” Is it not that with which we weave?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Yes. 388b

Socrates Socrates. And what do we do when we weave? Do we not separate the mingled threads of warp and woof?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Yes.

Socrates Socrates. And you could give a similar answer about the borer and the rest, could you not?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Certainly.

Socrates Socrates. And can you say something of the same kind about a name? The name being an instrument, what do we do with it when we name?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. I cannot tell.

Socrates Socrates. Do we not teach one another something, and separate things according to their natures?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Certainly.

Socrates Socrates. A name is, then, an instrument of teaching and of separating reality, 388cas a shuttle is an instrument of separating the web?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Yes.

Socrates Socrates. But the shuttle is an instrument of weaving?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Of course.

Socrates Socrates. The weaver, then, will use the shuttle well, and well means like a weaver; and a teacher will use a name well, and well means like a teacher.

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Yes.

Socrates Socrates. Whose work will the weaver use well when he uses the shuttle?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. The carpenter’s.

Socrates Socrates. Is every one a carpenter, or he who has the skill?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. He who has the skill. 388d

Socrates Socrates. And whose work will the hole-maker use when he uses the borer?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. The smith’s.

Socrates Socrates. And is every one a smith, or he who has the skill?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. He who has the skill.

Socrates Socrates. And whose work will the teacher use when he uses the name?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. I cannot tell that, either.

Socrates Socrates. And can you not tell this, either, who gives us the names we use?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. No.

Socrates Socrates. Do you not think it is the law that gives them to us?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Very likely. 388e

Socrates Socrates. Then the teacher, when he uses a name, will be using the work of a lawgiver?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. I think so.

Socrates Socrates. Do you think every man is a lawgiver, or only he who has the skill?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. He who has the skill.

Socrates Socrates. Then it is not for every man, Hermogenes, 389ato give names, but for him who may be called the name-maker; and he, it appears, is the lawgiver, who is of all the artisans among men the rarest.

Hermogenes Hermogenes. So it appears.

Socrates Socrates. See now what the lawgiver has in view in giving names. Look at it in the light of what has gone before. What has the carpenter in view when he makes a shuttle? Is it not something the nature of which is to weave?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Certainly.

Socrates Socrates. Well, then, if the shuttle breaks while he making it, 389bwill he make another with his mind fixed on that which is broken, or on that form with reference to which he was making the one which he broke?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. On that form, in my opinion.

Socrates Socrates. Then we should very properly call that the absolute or real shuttle?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Yes, I think so.

Socrates Socrates. Then whenever he has to make a shuttle for a light or a thick garment, or for one of linen or of wool or of any kind whatsoever, all of them must contain the form or ideal of shuttle, 389cand in each of his products he must embody the nature which is naturally best for each?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Yes.

Socrates Socrates. And the same applies to all other instruments. The artisan must discover the instrument naturally fitted for each purpose and must embody that in the material of which he makes the instrument, not in accordance with his own will, but in accordance with its nature. He must, it appears, know how to embody in the iron the borer fitted by nature for each special use.

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Certainly.

Socrates Socrates. And he must embody in the wood the shuttle fitted by nature for each kind of weaving.

Hermogenes Hermogenes. True. 389d

Socrates Socrates. For each kind of shuttle is, it appears, fitted by nature for its particular kind of weaving, and the like is true of other instruments.

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Yes.

Socrates Socrates. Then, my dear friend, must not the law-giver also know how to embody in the sounds and syllables that name which is fitted by nature for each object? Must he not make and give all his names with his eye fixed upon the absolute or ideal name, if he is to be an authoritative giver of names? And if different lawgivers do not embody it in the same syllables, we must not forget this ideal name on that account; for different smiths do not embody the form in the same iron, 389ethough making the same instrument for the same purpose, but so long as they reproduce the same ideal, 390athough it be in different iron, still the instrument is as it should be, whether it be made here or in foreign lands, is it not?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Certainly.

Socrates Socrates. On this basis, then, you will judge the law-giver, whether he be here or in a foreign land, so long as he gives to each thing the proper form of the name, in whatsoever syllables, to be no worse lawgiver, whether here or anywhere else, will you not?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Certainly. 390b

Socrates Socrates. Now who is likely to know whether the proper form of shuttle is embodied in any piece of wood? The carpenter who made it, or the weaver who is to use it ?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Probably the one who is to use it, Socrates.

Socrates Socrates. Then who is to use the work of the lyre-maker? Is not he the man who would know best how to superintend the making of the lyre and would also know whether it is well made or not when it is finished?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Certainly.

Socrates Socrates. Who is he?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. The lyre-player.

Socrates Socrates. And who would know best about the work of the ship-builder? 390c

Hermogenes Hermogenes. The navigator.

Socrates Socrates. And who can best superintend the work of the lawgiver and judge of it when it is finished, both here and in foreign countries? The user, is it not?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Yes.

Socrates Socrates. And is not this he who knows how to ask questions?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Certainly.

Socrates Socrates. And the same one knows also how to make replies?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Yes.

Socrates Socrates. And the man who knows how to ask and answer questions you call a dialectician?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Yes, that is what I call him. 390d

Socrates Socrates. The work of the carpenter, then, is to make a rudder under the supervision of the steersman, if he rudder is to be a good one.

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Evidently.

Socrates Socrates. And the work of the lawgiver, as it seems, is to make a name, with the dialectician as his supervisor, if names are to be well given.

Hermogenes Hermogenes. True.

Socrates Socrates. Then, Hermogenes, the giving of names can hardly be, as you imagine, a trifling matter, or a task for trifling or casual persons: and Cratylus is right in saying that names belong to things by nature 390eand that not every one is an artisan of names, but only he who keeps in view the name which belongs by nature to each particular thing and is able to embody its form in the letters and syllables.

Hermogenes Hermogenes. I do not know how to answer you, Socrates; nevertheless it is not easy to change my conviction suddenly. 391aI think you would be more likely to convince me, if you were to show me just what it is that you say is the natural correctness of names.

Socrates Socrates. I, my dear Hermogenes, do not say that there is any. You forget what I said a while ago, that I did not know, but would join you in looking for the truth. And now, as we are looking, you and I, we already see one thing we did not know before, that names do possess a certain natural correctness, and that not every man knows 391bhow to give a name well to anything whatsoever. Is not that true?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Certainly.

Socrates Socrates. Then our next task is to try to find out, if you care to know about it, what kind of correctness that is which belongs to names.

Hermogenes Hermogenes. To be sure I care to know.

Socrates Socrates. Then investigate.

Hermogenes Hermogenes. How shall I investigate?

Socrates Socrates. The best way to investigate, my friend, is with the help of those who know; and you make sure of their favour by paying them money. They are the sophists, 391c¹ of Protagoras altogether, should desire what is said in such a Truth, as if it were of any value.

Socrates. Then if you do not like that, 391dyou ought to learn from Homer and the other poets.

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Why, Socrates, what does Homer say about names, and where?

Socrates Socrates. In many passages; but chiefly and most admirably in those in which he distinguishes between the names by which gods and men call the same things. Do you not think he gives in those passages great and wonderful information about the correctness of names? For clearly the gods call things 391eby the names that are naturally right. Do you not think so?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Of course I know that if they call things, they call them rightly. But what are these instances to which you refer?

Socrates Socrates. Do you not know that he says about the river in Troy which had the single combat with Hephaestus,²whom the gods call Xanthus, but men call Scamander³?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Oh yes.