Socrates Socrates. Well, do you not think this is a grand thing to know, that the name of that river is rightly Xanthus, rather than Scamander? Or, if you like, do you think it is a slight thing to learn about the bird which he says gods call chalcis, but men call cymindis,¹ that it is much more correct for the same bird to be called chalcis than cymindis? Or to learn that the hill men call Batieia is called by the gods Myrina’s tomb,² and many other such statements by Homer and other poets? 392bBut perhaps these matters are too high for us to understand; it is, I think, more within human power to investigate the names Scamandrius and Astyanax, and understand what kind of correctness he ascribes to these, which he says are the names of Hector’s son. You recall, of course: the lines which contain the words to which I refer.

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Certainly.

Socrates Socrates. Which of the names of the boy do you imagine Homer thought was more correct, Astyanax or Scamandrius? 392c

Hermogenes Hermogenes. I cannot say.

Socrates Socrates. Look at it in this way: suppose you were asked, “Do the wise or the unwise give names more correctly?”

Hermogenes Hermogenes. “The wise, obviously,” I should say.

Socrates Socrates. And do you think the women or the men of a city, regarded as a class in general, are the wiser?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. The men.

Socrates Socrates. And do you not know that Homer says the child of Hector was called Astyanax by the men of Troy;³ 392dso he must have been called Scamandrius by the women, since the men called him Astyanax?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Yes, probably.

Socrates Socrates. And Homer too thought the Trojan men were wiser than the women?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. I suppose he did.

Socrates Socrates. Then he thought Astyanax was more rightly the boy’s name than Scamandrius?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. So it appears.

Socrates Socrates. Let us, then, consider the reason for this. Does he not himself indicate the reason most admirably? For he says— 392eHe alone defended their city and long walls.⁴⁵ Therefore, as it seems, it is right to call the son of the defender Astyanax (Lord of the city), ruler of that which his father, as Homer says, defended.

Hermogenes Hermogenes. That is clear to me.

Socrates Socrates. Indeed? I do not yet understand about it myself, Hermogenes. Do you?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. No, by Zeus, I do not.

Socrates Socrates. But, my good friend, did not Homer himself also give Hector his name?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Why do you ask that?

Socrates Socrates. Because that name seems to me similar to Astyanax, and both names seem to be Greek. For lord (ἄναξ) and holder (ἕκτωρ) mean nearly the same thing, indicating that they are names of a king; for surely a man is holder of that of which he is lord; for it is clear that he rules it and possesses it and holds it. 393bOr does it seem to you that there is nothing in what I am saying, and am I wrong in imagining that I have found a clue to Homer’s opinion about the correctness of names?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. No, by Zeus, you are not wrong, in my opinion; I think perhaps you have found a clue.

Socrates Socrates. It is right, I think, to call a lion’s offspring a lion and a horse’s offspring a horse. I am not speaking of prodigies, such as the birth of some other kind of creature from a horse, 393cbut of the natural offspring of each species after its kind. If a horse, contrary to nature, should bring forth a calf, the natural offspring of a cow, it should be called a calf, not a colt, nor if any offspring that is not human should be born from a human being, should that other offspring be called a human being; and the same applies to trees and all the rest. Do you not agree?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Yes.

Socrates Socrates. Good; but keep watch of me, and do not let me trick you; for by the same argument any offspring of a king should be called a king; 393dand whether the same meaning is expressed in one set of syllables or another makes no difference; and if a letter is added or subtracted, that does not matter either, so long as the essence of the thing named remains in force and is made plain in the name.

Hermogenes Hermogenes. What do you mean?

Socrates Socrates. Something quite simple. For instance, when we speak of the letters of the alphabet, you know, we speak their names, not merely the letters themselves, except in the case of four, ε, υ, ο, ω.⁶ 393eWe make names for all the other vowels and consonants by adding other letters to them; and so long as we include the letter in question and make its force plain, we may properly call it by that name, and that will designate it for us. Take beta, for instance, The addition of e(η), t(τ), a(α) does no harm and does not prevent the whole name from making clear the nature of that letter which the lawgiver wished to designate; he knew so well how to give names to letters.

Hermogenes Hermogenes. I think you are right.

Socrates Socrates. Does not the same reasoning apply to a king? 394aA king’s son will probably be a king, a good man’s good, a handsome man’s handsome, and so forth; the offspring of each class will be of the same class, unless some unnatural birth takes place; so they should be called by the same names. But variety in the syllables is admissible, so that names which are the same appear different to the uninitiated, just as the physicians’ drugs, when prepared with various colors and perfumes, seem different to us, though they are the same, but to the physician, 394bwho considers only their medicinal value, they seem the same, and he is not confused by the additions. So perhaps the man who knows about names considers their value and is not confused if some letter is added, transposed, or subtracted, or even if the force of the name is expressed in entirely different letters. So, for instance, in the names we were just discussing, Astyanax and Hector, none of the letters is the same, except T, 394cbut nevertheless they have the same meaning. And what letters has Archepolis (ruler of the city) in common with them? Yet it means the same thing; and there are many other names which mean simply “king.” Others again mean “general,” such as Agis (leader), Polemarchus (war-lord), and Eupolemus (good warrior); and others indicate physicians, as Iatrocles (famous physician) and Acesimbrotus (healer of mortals); and we might perhaps find many others which differ in syllables and letters, but express the same meaning. Do you think that is true, or not? 394d

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Certainly.

Socrates Socrates. To those, then, who are born in accordance with nature the same names should be given.

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Yes.

Socrates Socrates. And how about those who are born contrary to nature as prodigies? For instance, when an impious son is born to a good and pious man, ought he not, as in our former example when a mare brought forth a calf, to have the designation of the class to which he belongs, instead of that of his parent?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Certainly. 394e

Socrates Socrates. Then the impious son of a pious father ought to receive the name of his class.

Hermogenes Hermogenes. True.

Socrates Socrates. Not Theophilus (beloved of God) or Mnesitheus (mindful of God) or anything of that sort; but something of opposite meaning, if names are correct.

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Most assuredly, Socrates.

Socrates Socrates. As the name of Orestes (mountain man) is undoubtedly correct, Hermogenes, whether it was given him by chance or by some poet who indicated by the name the fierceness, rudeness, and mountain-wildness of his nature.

Hermogenes Hermogenes. So it seems, Socrates.

Socrates Socrates. And his father’s name also appears to be in accordance with nature.

Hermogenes Hermogenes. It seems so.

Socrates Socrates. Yes, for Agamemnon (admirable for remaining) is one who would resolve to toil to the end and to endure, putting the finish upon his resolution by virtue. And a proof of this is his long retention of the host at Troy and his endurance. So the name Agamemnon denotes that this man is admirable for remaining. 395bAnd so, too, the name of Atreus is likely to be correct; for his murder of Chrysippus and the cruelty of his acts to Thyestes are all damaging and ruinous (ἀτηρά) to his virtue. Now the form of his name is slightly deflected and hidden, so that it does not make the man’s nature plain to every one; but to those who understand about names it makes the meaning of Atreus plain enough; for indeed 395cin view of his stubbornness (ἀτειρές) and fearlessness (ἄτρεστον) and ruinous acts (ἀτηρά) the name is correctly given to him on every ground. And I think Pelops also has a fitting name; for this name means that he who sees only what is near deserves this designation.

Hermogenes Hermogenes. How is that?

Socrates Socrates. Why it is said of him that in murdering Myrtilus he was quite unable to forecast or foresee the ultimate effects upon his whole race, and all the misery with which it was overwhelmed, 395dbecause he saw only the near at hand and the immediate— that is to say, πέλας (near)—in his eagerness to win by all means the hand of Hippodameia. And any one would think the name of Tantalus was given rightly and in accordance with nature, if the stories about him are true.

Hermogenes Hermogenes. What are the stories?

Socrates Socrates. The many terrible misfortunes that happened to him both in his life, the last of which was the utter overthrow of his country, and in Hades, after his death, 395ethe balancing (ταλαντεία) of the stone above his head, in wonderful agreement with his name; and it seems exactly as if someone who wished to call him most wretched (ταλάντατον) disguised the name and said Tantalus instead; in some such way as that chance seems to have affected his name in the legend.