Hermogenes Hermogenes. But what is the meaning of the word κακόν which you used in many of your derivations?

Socrates Socrates. By Zeus, I think it is a strange word and hard to understand; so I apply to it that contrivance of mine.

Hermogenes Hermogenes. What contrivance?

Socrates Socrates. The claim of foreign origin, which I advance in this case as in those others.

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Well, probably you are right. But, if you please, let us drop these words and try to discover the reasons for the words καλόν (beautiful, noble) and αἰσχρόν (base).

Socrates Socrates. I think the meaning of αἰσχρόν is clear, 416band this also agrees with what has been said before. For the giver of names appears to me throughout to denounce that which hinders and restrains things from flowing, and in this instance he gave to that which always restrains the flow (ἀεὶ ἴσχει τὸν ῥοῦν) this name ἀεισχοροῦν, which is now compressed and pronounced αἰσχρόν.

Hermogenes Hermogenes. What about καλόν?

Socrates Socrates. That is harder to understand, and yet it expresses its meaning: it has been altered merely in accent and in the length of the O. 416c

Hermogenes Hermogenes. How is that?

Socrates Socrates. I think this word denotes intellect.

Hermogenes Hermogenes. What do you mean?

Socrates Socrates. Why, what do you think is the cause why anything is called by a name? Is it not the power which gave the name?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Why, certainly.

Socrates Socrates. And is not that power the intellect either of gods or of men or both?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Yes.

Socrates Socrates. Are not that which called things by name and that which calls them by name (τὸ καλοῦν) the same thing, namely intellect?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Yes, clearly.

Socrates Socrates. And are not all works which are done by mind and intelligence worthy of praise, and those that are not done by them worthy of blame?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Certainly. 416d

Socrates Socrates. Does not the medical power perform medical works and the power of carpentry works of carpentry? Do you agree to that?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. I agree.

Socrates Socrates. And the beautiful performs beautiful works?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. It must do so.

Socrates Socrates. And the beautiful is, we say, intellect?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Certainly.

Socrates Socrates. Then this name, the beautiful, is rightly given to mind, since it accomplishes the works which we call beautiful and in which we delight.

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Evidently. 416e

Socrates Socrates. What further words of this sort are left for us?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Those that are related to the good and the beautiful, 417asuch as συμφέροντα (advantageous), λυσιτελοῦντα (profitable), ὠφέλιμα (useful), κερδαλέα (gainful), and their opposites.

Socrates Socrates. You might by this time be able to find the meaning of συμφέροντα by yourself in the light of the previous explanations, for it appears to be own brother to ἐπιστήμη. It means nothing else but the motion (φορά) of the soul in company with the world, and naturally things which are done by such a power are called συμφέροντα and σύμφορα because they are carried round with (συμπεριφέρεσθαι) the world. But κερδαλέον is from κέρδος (gain). 417bIf you restore nu in the word κέρδος in place of the delta, the meaning is plain; it signifies good, but in another way. Because it passes through and is mingled (κεράννυται) with all things, he who named it gave it this name which indicates that function; but he inserted a delta instead of nu and said κέρδος.

Hermogenes Hermogenes. And what is λυσιτελοῦν?

Socrates Socrates. I do not think, Hermogenes, the name-giver gives the meaning to λυσιτελοῦν which it has in the language of tradesfolk, when profit sets free (ἀπολύει) the sum invested, 417cbut he means that because it is the swiftest thing in the world it does not allow things to remain at rest and does not allow the motion to come to any end (τέλος) of movement or to stop or pause, but always, if any end of the motion is attempted, it sets it free, making it unceasing and immortal. It is in this sense, I think, that the good is dubbed λυσιτελοῦν, for it frees (λύει) the end (τέλος) of the motion. But the word ὠφέλιμον is a foreign one, which Homer often uses in the verbal form ὀφέλλειν. This is a synonym of “increase” and “create.” 417d

Hermogenes Hermogenes. What shall be our explanations of the opposites of these?

Socrates Socrates. Those of them that are mere negatives, need, I think, no discussion.

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Which are those?

Socrates Socrates. Disadvantageous, useless, unprofitable, and ungainful.

Hermogenes Hermogenes. True.

Socrates Socrates. But βλαβερόν (harmful) and ζημιῶδες (hurtful) do need it.

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Yes.

Socrates Socrates. And βλαβερόν means that which harms (βλάπτον) the flow (ῥοῦν); 417ebut βλάπτον means wishing to fasten (ἅπτειν), and ἅπτειν is the same thing as δεῖν (bind), which the name-giver constantly finds fault with. Now τὸ βουλόμενον ἅπτειν ῥοῦν (that which wishes to fasten the flow) would most correctly be called βουλαπτεροῦν, but is called βλαβερόν merely, as I think, to make it prettier.

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Elaborate names these are, Socrates, that result from your method. Just now, 418awhen you pronounced βουλαπτεροῦν, you looked as if you had made up your mouth to whistle the flute-prelude of the hymn to Athena.

Socrates Socrates. Not I, Hermogenes, am responsible, but those who gave the name.

Hermogenes Hermogenes. True. Well, what is the origin of ζημιῶδες?

Socrates Socrates. What can the origin of ζημιῶδες be? See, Hermogenes, how true my words are when I say that by adding and taking away letters people alter the sense of words so that even by very slight changes they sometimes make them mean the opposite of what they meant before; as, for instance, 418bin the case of the word δέον (obligation, right), for that just occurred to me and I was reminded of it by what I was going to say to you, that this fine modern language of ours has turned δέον and also ζημιῶδες round, so that each has the opposite of its original meaning, whereas the ancient language shows clearly the real sense of both words.

Hermogenes Hermogenes. What do you mean?

Socrates Socrates. I will tell you. You know that our ancestors made good use of the sounds of iota and delta, 418cand that is especially true of the women, who are most addicted to preserving old forms of speech. But nowadays people change iota to eta or epsilon, and delta to zeta, thinking they have a grander sound.

Hermogenes Hermogenes. How is that?

Socrates Socrates. For instance, in the earliest times they called day ἱμέρα, others said ἑμέρα, and now they say ἡμέρα.

Hermogenes Hermogenes. That is true.

Socrates Socrates. Only the ancient word discloses the intention of the name-giver, don’t you know? For day comes out of darkness to men; they welcome it and long (ἱμείρουσι) for it, 418dand so they called it ἱμέρα.

Hermogenes Hermogenes. That is clear.

Socrates Socrates. But now ἡμέρα is masquerading so that you could not guess its meaning. Why, some people think day is called ἡμέρα because it makes things gentle (ἥμερα).

Hermogenes Hermogenes. I believe they do.

Socrates Socrates. And you know the ancients called ζυγόν (yoke) δυογόν.

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Certainly.

Socrates Socrates. And ζυγόν conveys no clear meaning, 418ebut the name δυογόν is quite properly given to that which binds two together for the purpose of draught; now, however, we say ζυγόν. There are a great many other such instances.

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Yes, that is plain.

Socrates Socrates. Similarly the word δέον (obligation) at first, when spoken in this way, denotes the opposite of all words connected with the good; for although it is a form of good, δέον seems to be a bond (δεσμός) and hindrance of motion, own brother, as it were, toβλαβερόν.

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Yes, Socrates, it certainly does seem so.

Socrates Socrates. But it does not, if you employ the ancient word, 419awhich is more likely to be right than the present one. You will find that it agrees with the previous words for “good,” if instead of the epsilon you restore the iota, as it was in old times for διόν (going through), not δέον, signifies good, which the name-giver praises. And so the giver of names does not contradict himself, but δέον (obligation, right), ὠφέλιμον (useful), λυσιτελοῦν (profitable), κερδαλέον (gainful), ἀγαθόν (good), ξυμφέρον (advantageous), and εὔπορον (prosperous), are plainly identical, signifying under different names the principle of arrangement and motion which has constantly been praised, 419bwhereas the principle of constraint and bondage is found fault with. And likewise in the case of ζημιῶδες, if you restore the ancient delta in place of the zeta, you will see that the name, pronounced δημιῶδες, was given to that which binds motion (δοῦντι τὸ ἰόν).

Hermogenes Hermogenes. What of ἡδονή (pleasure) and λύπη (pain) and ἐπιθυμία (desire), and the like, Socrates?

Socrates Socrates. I do not think they are at all difficult, Hermogenes, for ἡδονή appears to have this name because it is the action that tends towards advantage (ἡ πρὸς τὴν ὄνησιν τείνουσα); the delta is inserted, so that we say ἡδονή instead of ἡονή. 419cΛύπη appears to have received its name from the dissolution (διάλυσις) of the body which takes place through pain. Ἀνία (sorrow) is that which hinders motion (ἰέναι). Ἀλγηδών (distress) is, I think, a foreign word, derived from ἀλγεινός (distressing). Ὀδύνη (grief) appears to be so called from the putting on of pain (τῆς ἐνδύσεως τῆς λύπης). Ἀχθηδών (vexation) has a name, as anyone can see, made in the likeness of the weight (ἄχθος, burden) which vexation imposes upon motion. Χαρά (joy) seems to have its name from the plenteous diffusion (διάχυσις) of the flow of the soul. 419dΤέρψις (delight) is from τερπνόν (delightful); and τερπνόν is called from the creeping (ἕρψις) of the soul, which is likened to a breath (πνοή), and would properly be called ἕρπνουν, but the name has been changed in course of time to τερπνόν. Εὐφροσύνη(mirth) needs no explanation, for it is clear to anyone that from the motion of the soul in harmony (εὖ) with the universe, it received the name εὐφεροσύνη, as it rightfully is; but we call it ευφροσύνη. 419eNor is there any difficulty about ἐπιθυμία (desire), for this name was evidently given to the power that goes (ἰοῦσα) into the soul (θυμός). And θυμός has its name from the raging (θύσις) and boiling of the soul.