Socrates for because it flows with a rush (ἱέμενος) and with a desire for things and thus draws the soul on through the impulse of its flowing, all this power gives it the name of ἵμερος. And the word πόθος (yearning) signifies that it pertains not to that which is present, but to that which is elsewhere (ἄλλοθί που) or absent, and therefore the same feeling which is called ἵμερος when its object is present, is called πόθος when it is absent. And ἔρως (love) is so called because it flows in (ἐσρεῖ) from without, and this flowing is not inherent in him who has it,

Socrates but is introduced through the eyes; for this reason it was in ancient times called ἔσρος, from ἐσρεῖν—for we used to employ omicron instead of omega—but now it is called ἔρως through the change of omicron to omega. Well, what more is there that you want to examine?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. What is your view about δόξα (opinion) and the like?

Socrates Socrates. Δόξα is derived either from the pursuit (δίωξις) which the soul carries on as it pursues the knowledge of the nature of things, or from the shooting of the bow (τόξον); the latter is more likely; at any rate οἴησις (belief) supports this view,

Socrates for it appears to mean the motion (οἶσις) of the soul towards the essential nature of every individual thing, just as βουλή (intention) denotes shooting (βολή) and βούλεσθαι (wish), as well as βουλεύεσθαι (plan), denotes aiming at something. All these words seem to follow δόξα and to express the idea of shooting, just as ἀβουλία (ill-advisedness), on the other hand, appears to be a failure to hit, as if a person did not shoot or hit that which he shot at or wished or planned or desired.

Hermogenes Hermogenes. I think you are hurrying things a bit, Socrates.

Socrates Socrates. Yes, for I am running the last lap now. But I think I must still explain ἀνάγκη (compulsion) and ἑκούσιον (voluntary) because they naturally come next. Now by the word ἑκούσιον is expressed the yielding (εἶκον) and not opposing, but, as I say, yielding to the motion which is in accordance with the will; but the compulsory (τὸ ἀναγκαῖον) and resistant, being contrary to the will, is associated with error and ignorance; so it is likened to walking through ravines (ἄγκη),

Socrates because they are hard to traverse, rough, and rugged, and retard motion; the word ἀναγκαῖον may, then, originate in a comparison with progress through a ravine. But let us not cease to use my strength, so long as it lasts and do not you cease from asking questions.

Hermogenes Hermogenes. I ask, then, about the greatest and noblest words,

Hermogenes truth (ἀλήθεια), falsehood (ψεῦδος), being (τὸ ὄν), and why name, the subject of our whole discourse, has the name ὄνομα.

Socrates Socrates. Does the word μαίσθαι (search) mean anything to you?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Yes, it means seek.

Socrates Socrates. The word ὄνομα seems to be a word composed from a sentence signifying “this is a being about which our search is.” You can recognize that more readily in the adjective ὀνομαστόν, for that says clearly that this is

Socrates ὄν οὗ μάσμα ἐστίν (being of which the search is). And ἀλήθεια (truth) is like the others; for the divine motion of the universe is, I think, called by this name, ἀλήθεια, because it is a divine wandering θεία ἄλη. But ψεῦδος (falsehood) is the opposite of motion; for once more that which is held back and forced to be quiet is found fault with, and it is compared to slumberers (εὕουσι); but the addition of the psi conceals the meaning of the word. The words τὸ ὄν (being) and οὐσία (existence) agree with ἀληθής with the loss of iota, for they mean going (ἰόν). And οὐκ ὄν (not being) means οὐκ ἰόν (not going),

Socrates and indeed some people pronounce it so.

Hermogenes Hermogenes. I think you have knocked these words to pieces manfully, Socrates; but if anyone should ask you what propriety or correctness there was in these words that you have employed—ἰόν and ρἕον and δοῦν—

Socrates Socrates. What answer should I make? Is that your meaning?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Yes, exactly.

Socrates Socrates. We acquired just now one way of making an answer with a semblance of sense in it.

Hermogenes Hermogenes. What way was that?

Socrates Socrates. Saying, if there is a word we do not know about, that it is of foreign origin.

Socrates Now this may be true of some of them, and also on account of the lapse of time it may be impossible to find out about the earliest words; for since words get twisted in all sorts of ways, it would not be in the least wonderful if the ancient Greek word should be identical with the modern foreign one.

Hermogenes Hermogenes. That is not unlikely.

Socrates Socrates. It is indeed quite probable. However, we must play the game and investigate these questions vigorously. But let us bear in mind that if a person asks

Socrates about the words by means of which names are formed, and again about those by means of which those words were formed, and keeps on doing this indefinitely, he who answers his questions will at last give up; will he not?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Yes, I think so.

Socrates Socrates. Now at what point will he be right in giving up and stopping? Will it not be when he reaches the names which are the elements of the other names and words? For these, if they are the elements, can no longer rightly appear to be composed of other names. For instance, we said just now that ἀγαθόν was composed of ἀγαστόν and θοόν; and perhaps we might say that θοόν was composed of other words, and those of still others;

Socrates but if we ever get hold of a word which is no longer composed of other words, we should be right ill saying that we had at last reached an element, and that we must no longer refer to other words for its derivation.

Hermogenes Hermogenes. I think you are right.

Socrates Socrates. Are, then, these words about which you are now asking elements, and must we henceforth investigate their correctness by some other method?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Probably.

Socrates Socrates. Yes, probably, Hermogenes; at any rate, all the previous words were traced back to these.

Socrates But if this be true, as I think it is, come to my aid again and help me in the investigation, that I may not say anything foolish in declaring what principle must underlie the correctness of the earliest names.

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Go on, and I will help you to the best of my ability.

Socrates Socrates. I think you agree with me that there is but one principle of correctness in all names, the earliest as well as the latest, and that none of them is any more a name than the rest.

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Certainly.

Socrates Socrates. Now the correctness of all the names we have discussed was based upon the intention of showing the nature of the things named.

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Yes, of course.

Socrates Socrates. And this principle of correctness must be present in all names, the earliest as well as the later ones, if they are really to be names.

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Certainly.

Socrates Socrates. But the later ones, apparently, were able to accomplish this by means of the earlier ones.

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Evidently.

Socrates Socrates. Well, then, how can the earliest names, which are not as yet based upon any others, make clear to us the nature of things, so far as that is possible,

Socrates which they must do if they are to be names at all? Answer me this question: If we had no voice or tongue, and wished to make things clear to one another, should we not try, as dumb people actually do, to make signs with our hands and head and person generally?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Yes. What other method is there, Socrates?

Socrates Socrates. If we wished to designate that which is above and is light, we should, I fancy, raise our hand towards heaven in imitation of the nature of the thing in question; but if the things to be designated were below or heavy, we should extend our hands towards the ground; and if we wished to mention a galloping horse or any other animal, we should, of course, make our bodily attitudes as much like theirs as possible.

Hermogenes Hermogenes. I think you are quite right; there is no other way.

Socrates Socrates. For the expression of anything, I fancy,

Socrates would be accomplished by bodily imitation of that which was to be expressed.

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Yes.

Socrates Socrates. And when we wish to express anything by voice or tongue or mouth, will not our expression by these means be accomplished in any given instance when an imitation of something is accomplished by them?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. I think that is inevitable.

Socrates Socrates. A name, then, it appears, is a vocal imitation of that which is imitated, and he who imitates with his voice names that which he imitates.

Hermogenes Hermogenes. I think that is correct.

Socrates Socrates. By Zeus, I do not think it is quite correct, yet, my friend.

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Why not?

Socrates Socrates. We should be obliged to agree that people who imitate sheep and cocks and other animals were naming those which they imitate.

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Yes, so we should.

Socrates Socrates. And do you think that is correct?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. No, I do not; but, Socrates, what sort of an imitation is a name?

Socrates Socrates. In the first place we shall not, in my opinion, be making names, if we imitate things as we do in music,

Socrates although musical imitation also is vocal; and secondly we shall make no names by imitating that which music imitates. What I mean is this: all objects have sound and shape, and many have color, have they not?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Certainly.

Socrates Socrates. Well then, the art of naming is not employed in the imitation of those qualities, and has nothing to do with them. The arts which are concerned with them are music and design, are they not?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. Yes.

Socrates Socrates. Here is another point. Has not each thing an essential nature, just as it has a color and the other qualities we just mentioned? Indeed, in the first place, have not color and sound and all other things which may properly be said to exist, each and all an essential nature?

Hermogenes Hermogenes. I think so.

Socrates Socrates. Well, then, if anyone could imitate this essential nature of each thing by means of letters and syllables, he would show what each thing really is, would he not?