Hermogenes Hermogenes. No, by Zeus, I do not. But I think Hesiod is right in saying:If you can only add little to little, it is worth while.¹ So now if you can make even a little progress, do not shirk the trouble, but oblige Socrates—you owe it to him—and me.

Socrates Socrates. For that matter, Cratylus, I would not positively affirm any of the things I have said. I merely expressed the opinions which I reached with the help of Hermogenes. So far as I am concerned, you need not hesitate, 428band if your view is better than mine, I will accept it. And I should not be at all surprised if it were better; for I think you have not only investigated such matters yourself but have been taught about them by others. So if you have any better theory to propound, put me down as one of your pupils in the course on the correctness of names.

Cratylus Cratylus. Yes, Socrates, I have, as you say, paid attention to these matters, and perhaps I might make you my pupil. However, I am afraid the opposite is the case, 428cand I am impelled to say to you what Achilles says in the “Prayers” to Ajax. He says:Ajax, descendant of Zeus, son of Telamon, chief of thy people,All thou hast uttered is good in my sight and pleases my spirit.² And so, Socrates, your oracular utterances seem to me to be much to my mind, whether you are inspired by Euthyphro or some other Muse has dwelt within you all along without our knowing it. 428d

Socrates Socrates. My excellent Cratylus, I myself have been marvelling at my own wisdom all along, and I cannot believe in it. So I think we ought to reexamine my utterances. For the worst of all deceptions is self-deception. How can it help being terrible, when the deceiver is always present and never stirs from the spot? So I think we must turn back repeatedly to what we have said and must try, as the poet says, to look both forwards and backwards.³ 428eThen let us now see what we have said. Correctness of a name, we say, is the quality of showing the nature of the thing named. Shall we call that a satisfactory statement?

Cratylus Cratylus. I am perfectly satisfied with it, Socrates.

Socrates Socrates. Names, then, are given with a view to instruction?

Cratylus Cratylus. Certainly.

Socrates Socrates. Shall we, then; say that this instruction is an art and has its artisans?

Cratylus Cratylus. Certainly.

Socrates Socrates. Who are they?

Cratylus Cratylus. The lawgivers, as you said in the beginning.

Socrates Socrates. Shall we declare that this art arises in men like the other arts, or not? What I mean is this: Some painters are better, and others worse, are they not?

Cratylus Cratylus. Certainly.

Socrates Socrates. And the better produce better works—that is, their paintings—and the others worse works? And likewise some builders build better houses and others worse?

Cratylus Cratylus. Yes. 429b

Socrates Socrates. Then do some lawgivers produce better, and others worse works?

Cratylus Cratylus. No; at that point I cease to agree.

Socrates Socrates. Then you do not think that some laws are better, and some worse?

Cratylus Cratylus. No, I do not.

Socrates Socrates. And you do not, it appears, think that one name is better, and another worse?

Cratylus Cratylus. No, I do not.

Socrates Socrates. Then all names are correct?

Cratylus Cratylus. All that are really names.

Socrates Socrates. How about the name of our friend Hermogenes, 429cwhich was mentioned a while ago? Shall we say that it is not his name at all, unless he belongs to the race of Hermes, or that it is his name, but is incorrect?

Cratylus Cratylus. I think, Socrates, that it is not his name at all; it appears to be his, but is really the name of some one else who possesses the nature that makes the name clear.

Socrates Socrates. And when anyone says that our friend is Hermogenes, is he not even speaking falsely? For perhaps it is not even possible to say that he is Hermogenes, if he is not.

Cratylus Cratylus. What do you mean?

Socrates Socrates. Do you mean to say that it is impossible to speak falsehood at all? 429dFor there are, my dear Cratylus, many who do so, and who have done so in the past.

Cratylus Cratylus. Why, Socrates, how could anyone who says that which he says, say that which is not? Is not falsehood saying that which is not?

Socrates Socrates. Your reasoning is too clever for me at my age, my friend. However, tell me this: Do you think it is possible to speak falsehood, 429ebut not to say it?

Cratylus Cratylus. Neither to speak nor to say it.

Socrates Socrates. Nor utter it or use it as a form of address? For instance, if some one should meet you in hospitable fashion, should grasp your hand and say, “Well met, my friend from Athens, son of Smicrion, Hermogenes,” would he be saying or speaking or uttering or addressing these words not to you, but to Hermogenes—or to nobody?

Cratylus Cratylus. I think, Socrates, the man would be producing sounds without sense.

Socrates Socrates. Even that reply is welcome; 430afor I can ask whether the words he produced would be true, or false, or partly true and partly false. Even that would suffice.

Cratylus Cratylus. I should say that the man in such a case was merely making a noise, going through purposeless motions, as if he were beating a bronze pot.

Socrates Socrates. Let us see, Cratylus, if we cannot come to terms somehow. You would agree, would you not, that the name is one thing and the thing of which it is the name is another?

Cratylus Cratylus. Yes, I should.

Socrates Socrates. And you agree that the name is an imitation 430bof the thing named?

Cratylus Cratylus. Most assuredly.

Socrates Socrates. And you agree that paintings also are imitations, though in a different way, of things?

Cratylus Cratylus. Yes.

Socrates Socrates. Well then—for perhaps I do not understand, and you may be right—can both of these imitations, the paintings and the names, be assigned and applied to the things which they imitate, or not? 430c

Cratylus Cratylus. They can.

Socrates Socrates. First, then, consider this question: Can we assign the likeness of the man to the man and that of the woman to the woman, and so forth?

Cratylus Cratylus. Certainly.

Socrates Socrates. And can we conversely attribute that of the man to the woman, and the woman’s to the man?

Cratylus Cratylus. That is also possible.

Socrates Socrates. And are these assignments both correct, or only the former?

Cratylus Cratylus. The former.

Socrates Socrates. The assignment, in short, which attributes to each that which belongs to it and is like it.

Cratylus Cratylus. That is my view.

Socrates Socrates. To put an end to contentious argument between you and me, 430dsince we are friends, let me state my position. I call that kind of assignment in the case of both imitations paintings and names—correct, and in the case of names not only correct, but true; and the other kind, which gives and applies the unlike imitation, I call incorrect and, in the case of names, false.

Cratylus Cratylus. But it may be, Socrates, that this incorrect assignment is possible in the case of paintings, and not in the case of names, 430ewhich must be always correctly assigned.

Socrates Socrates. What do you mean? What difference is there between the two? Can I not step up to a man and say to him, “This is your portrait,” and show him perhaps his own likeness or, perhaps, that of a woman? And by “show” I mean bring before the sense of sight.

Cratylus Cratylus. Certainly.

Socrates Socrates. Well, then, can I not step up to the same man again and say, “This is your name”? A name is an imitation, just as a picture is. 431aVery well; can I not say to him, “This is your name,” and then bring before his sense of hearing perhaps the imitation of himself, saying that it is a man, or perhaps the imitation of the female of the human species, saying that it is a woman? Do you not believe that this is possible and sometimes happens?

Cratylus Cratylus. I am willing to concede it, Socrates, and grant that you are right.

Socrates Socrates. That is a good thing for you to do, my friend, if I am right; for now we need no longer argue about the matter. 431bIf, then, some such assignment of names takes place, we will call one kind speaking truth, and the other speaking falsehood. But if this is accepted, and if it is possible to assign names incorrectly and to give to objects not the names that befit them, but sometimes those that are unfitting, it would be possible to treat verbs in the same way. And if verbs and nouns can be assigned in this way, the same must be true of sentences; for sentences are, I conceive, a combination of verbs and nouns. 431cWhat do you say to that, Cratylus?

Cratylus Cratylus. I agree; I think you are right.

Socrates Socrates. If, then, we compare the earliest words to sketches, it is possible in them, as in pictures, to reproduce all the colors and shapes, or not all; some may be wanting, and some may be added, and they may be too many or too large. Is not that true?

Cratylus Cratylus. Yes, it is.

Socrates Socrates. Then he who reproduces all, produces good sketches and pictures, and he who adds or takes away produces also sketches and pictures, but bad ones? 431d

Cratylus Cratylus. Yes.

Socrates Socrates. And how about him who imitates the nature of things by means of letters and syllables? By the same principle, if he gives all that is appropriate, the image—that is to say, the name—will be good, and if he sometimes omits a little, it will be an image, but not a good one; and therefore some names are well and others badly made. Is that not true?

Cratylus Cratylus. Perhaps. 431e

Socrates Socrates. Perhaps, then, one artisan of names will be good, and another bad?

Cratylus Cratylus. Yes.

Socrates Socrates. The name of such an artisan was lawgiver?

Cratylus Cratylus. Yes.

Socrates Socrates. Perhaps, then, by Zeus, as is the case in the other arts, one lawgiver may be good and another bad, if we accept our previous conclusions.