Cratylus Cratylus. That is true. But you see, Socrates, when by the science of grammar we assign these letters—alpha, beta, and the rest—to names, 432aif we take away or add or transpose any letter, it is not true that the name is written, but written incorrectly; it is not written at all, but immediately becomes a different word, if any such thing happens to it.

Socrates Socrates. Perhaps we are not considering the matter in the right way.

Cratylus Cratylus. Why not?

Socrates Socrates. It may be that what you say would be true of those things which must necessarily consist of a certain number or cease to exist at all, as ten, for instance, or any number you like, 432bif you add or subtract anything is immediately another number; but this is not the kind of correctness which applies to quality or to images in general; on the contrary, the image must not by any means reproduce all the qualities of that which it imitates, if it is to be an image. See if I am not right. Would there be two things, Cratylus and the image of Cratylus, if some god should not merely imitate your color and form, as painters do, but should also make all the inner parts like yours, should reproduce 432cthe same flexibility and warmth, should put into them motion, life, and intellect, such as exist in you, and in short, should place beside you a duplicate of all your qualities? Would there be in such an event Cratylus and an image of Cratylus, or two Cratyluses?

Cratylus Cratylus. I should say, Socrates, two Cratyluses.

Socrates Socrates. Then don’t you see, my friend, that we must look for some other principle of correctness in images and in names, of which we were speaking, and must not insist that they are no longer images 432dif anything be wanting or be added? Do you not perceive how far images are from possessing the same qualities as the originals which they imitate?

Cratylus Cratylus. Yes, I do.

Socrates Socrates. Surely, Cratylus, the effect produced by the names upon the things of which they are the names would be ridiculous, if they were to be entirely like them in every respect. For everything would be duplicated, and no one could tell in any case which was the real thing and which the name.

Cratylus Cratylus. Quite true.

Socrates Socrates. Then do not be faint-hearted, but have the courage to admit that one name may be correctly and another incorrectly given; 432edo not insist that it must have all the letters and be exactly the same as the thing named, but grant that an inappropriate letter may be employed. But if a letter, then grant that also a noun in a clause, and if a noun, then also a clause in a sentence may be employed which is not appropriate to the things in question, and the thing may none the less be named and described, so long as the intrinsic quality of the thing named is retained, 433aas is the case in the names of the letters of the alphabet, if you remember what Hermogenes and I were saying a while ago.

Cratylus Cratylus. Yes, I remember.

Socrates Socrates. Very well, then. So long as this intrinsic quality is present, even though the name have not all the proper letters, the thing will still be named; well, when it has all the proper letters; badly, when it has only a few of them. Let us, then, grant this, my friend, or we shall get into trouble, like the belated night wanderers in the road at Aegina,¹ and in very truth we shall be found to have arrived too late; 433botherwise you must look for some other principle of correctness in names, and must not admit that a name is the representation of a thing in syllables and letters. For if you maintain both positions, you cannot help contradicting yourself.

Cratylus Cratylus. Well, Socrates, I think what you say is reasonable, and I accept it.

Socrates Socrates. Then since we are agreed about this, let us consider the next point. If a name, we say, is to be a good one, it must have the proper letters?

Cratylus Cratylus. Yes. 433c

Socrates Socrates. And the proper letters are those which are like the things named?

Cratylus Cratylus. Yes, certainly.

Socrates Socrates. That is, then, the method by which wellgiven names are given. But if any name is not well given, the greater part of it may perhaps, if it is to be an image at all, be made up of proper and like letters, but it may contain some inappropriate element, and is on that account not good or well made. Is that our view?

Cratylus Cratylus. I suppose, Socrates, there is no use in keeping up my contention; but I am not satisfied that it can be a name and not be well given.

Socrates Socrates. Are you not satisfied that the name is 433dthe representation of a thing?

Cratylus Cratylus. Yes.

Socrates Socrates. And do you not think it is true that some names are composed of earlier ones and others are primary?

Cratylus Cratylus. Yes.

Socrates Socrates. But if the primary names are to be representations of any things, can you suggest any better way of making them representations than by making them as much as possible like the things which they are to represent? 433eOr do you prefer the theory advanced by Hermogenes and many others, who claim that names are conventional and represent things to those who established the convention and knew the things beforehand, and that convention is the sole principle of correctness in names, and it makes no difference whether we accept the existing convention or adopt an opposite one according to which small would be called great and great small? Which of these two theories do you prefer?

Cratylus Cratylus. Representing by likeness the thing represented is absolutely and entirely superior to representation by chance signs.

Socrates Socrates. You are right. Then if the name is like the thing, the letters of which the primary names are to be formed must be by their very nature like the things, must they not? Let me explain. Could a painting, to revert to our previous comparison, ever be made like any real thing, if there were no pigments out of which the painting is composed, 434bwhich were by their nature like the objects which the painter’s art imitates? Is not that impossible?

Cratylus Cratylus. Yes, it is impossible.

Socrates Socrates. In the same way, names can never be like anything unless those elements of which the names are composed exist in the first place and possess some kind of likeness to the things which the names imitate; and the elements of which they are composed are the letters, are they not?

Cratylus Cratylus. Yes.

Socrates Socrates. Then I must now ask you to consider with me the subject which Hermogenes and I discussed a while ago. 434cDo you think I am right in saying that rho is expressive of speed, motion, and hardness, or not?

Cratylus Cratylus. You are right.

Socrates Socrates. And lambda is like smoothness, softness, and the other qualities we mentioned?

Cratylus Cratylus. Yes.

Socrates Socrates. You know, of course, that we call the same thing σκληρότης (hardness) which the Eretrians call σκληρότηρ?

Cratylus Cratylus. Certainly.

Socrates Socrates. Have rho and sigma both a likeness to the same thing, and does the final rho mean to them just what the sigma means to us, or is there to one of us no meaning? 434d

Cratylus Cratylus. They mean the same to both.

Socrates Socrates. In so far as rho and sigma are alike, or in so far as they are not?

Cratylus Cratylus. In so far as they are alike.

Socrates Socrates. And are they alike in all respects?

Cratylus Cratylus. Yes; at least for the purpose of expressing motion equally.

Socrates Socrates. But how about the lambda in σκληρότης? Does it not express the opposite of hardness?

Cratylus Cratylus. Well, perhaps it has no right to be there, Socrates; it may be like the cases that came up in your talk with Hermogenes, when you removed or inserted letters where that was necessary. I think you did right; and in this case perhaps we ought to put a rho in place of the lambda. 434e

Socrates Socrates. Excellent. However, do we not understand one another when anyone says σκληρόν, using the present pronunciation, and do you not now know what I mean?

Cratylus Cratylus. Yes, but that is by custom, my friend.

Socrates Socrates. In saying “custom” do you think you are saying anything different from convention? Do you not mean by “convention” that when I speak I have a definite meaning and you recognize that I have that meaning? Is not that what you mean?

Cratylus Cratylus. Yes.

Socrates Socrates. Then if you recognize my meaning when I speak, that is an indication given to you by me.

Cratylus Cratylus. Yes.

Socrates Socrates. The indication comes from something which is unlike my meaning when I speak, if in your example σκληρότης the lambda is unlike hardness; and if this is true, did you not make a convention with yourself, since both like and unlike letters, by the influence of custom and convention, produce indication? And even if custom is entirely distinct from convention, 435bwe should henceforth be obliged to say that custom, not likeness, is the principle of indication, since custom, it appears, indicates both by the like and by the unlike. And since we grant this, Cratylus—for I take it that your silence gives consent—both convention and custom must contribute something towards the indication of our meaning when we speak. For, my friend, if you will just turn your attention to numbers, where do you think you can possibly get names to apply to each individual number on the principle of likeness, 435cunless you allow agreement and convention on your part to control the correctness of names? I myself prefer the theory that names are, so far as is possible, like the things named; but really this attractive force of likeness is, as Hermogenes says, a poor thing, and we are compelled to employ in addition this commonplace expedient, convention, to establish the correctness of names. Probably language would be, within the bounds of possibility, most excellent when all its terms, or as many as possible, were based on likeness, that is to say, were appropriate, and most deficient under opposite conditions. 435dBut now answer the next question. What is the function of names, and what good do they accomplish?

Cratylus Cratylus. I think, Socrates, their function is to instruct, and this is the simple truth, that he who knows the names knows also the things named.

Socrates Socrates. I suppose, Cratylus, you mean that when anyone knows the nature of the name—and its nature is that of the thing—he will know the thing also, 435esince it is like the name, and the science of all things which are like each other is one and the same. It is, I fancy, on this ground that you say whoever knows names will know things also.

Cratylus Cratylus. You are perfectly right.

Socrates Socrates. Now let us see what this manner of giving instruction is, to which you refer, and whether there is another method, but inferior to this, or there is no other at all. What do you think?