Euthyphro Euthyphro. Well then, I say that holiness is doing what I am doing now, prosecuting the wrongdoer who commits murder or steals from the temples or does any such thing, whether he be your father, 5eor your mother or anyone else, and not prosecuting him is unholy. And, Socrates, see what a sure proof I offer you,—a proof I have already given to others,—that this is established and right and that we ought not to let him who acts impiously go unpunished, no matter who he may be. Men believe 6athat Zeus is the best and most just of the gods, and they acknowledge that he put his father in bonds because he wickedly devoured his children, and he in turn had mutilated his father for similar reasons; but they are incensed against me because I proceed against my father when he has done wrong, and so they are inconsistent in what they say about the gods and about me.

Socrates Socrates. Is not this, Euthyphro, the reason why I am being prosecuted, because when people tell such stories about the gods I find it hard to accept them? And therefore, probably, people will say I am wrong. Now if you, who know so much about such things, 6baccept these tales, I suppose I too must give way. For what am I to say, who confess frankly that I know nothing about them? But tell me, in the name of Zeus, the god of friendship, do you really believe these things happened?

Euthyphro Euthyphro. Yes, and still more wonderful things than these, Socrates, which most people do not know.

Socrates Socrates. And so you believe that there was really war between the gods, and fearful enmities and battles and other things of the sort, such as are told of by the poets and represented in varied designs 6cby the great artists in our sacred places and especially on the robe which is carried up to the Acropolis at the great Panathenaea? for this is covered with such representations. Shall we agree that these things are true, Euthyphro?

Euthyphro Euthyphro. Not only these things, Socrates; but, as I said just now, I will, if you like, tell you many other things about the gods, which I am sure will amaze you when you hear them.

Socrates Socrates. I dare say. But you can tell me those things at your leisure some other time. At present try to tell more clearly what I asked you just now. 6dFor, my friend, you did not give me sufficient information before, when I asked what holiness was, but you told me that this was holy which you are now doing, prosecuting your father for murder.

Euthyphro Euthyphro. Well, what I said was true, Socrates.

Socrates Socrates. Perhaps. But, Euthyphro, you say that many other things are holy, do you not?

Euthyphro Euthyphro. Why, so they are.

Socrates Socrates. Now call to mind that this is not what I asked you, to tell me one or two of the many holy acts, but to tell the essential aspect, by which all holy acts are holy; for you said 6ethat all unholy acts were unholy and all holy ones holy by one aspect. Or don’t you remember?

Euthyphro Euthyphro. I remember.

Socrates Socrates. Tell me then what this aspect is, that I may keep my eye fixed upon it and employ it as a model and, if anything you or anyone else does agrees with it, may say that the act is holy, and if not, that it is unholy.

Euthyphro Euthyphro. If you wish me to explain in that way, I will do so.

Socrates Socrates. I do wish it.

Euthyphro Euthyphro. Well then, what is dear to the gods is holy, 7aand what is not dear to them is unholy.

Socrates Socrates. Excellent, Euthyphro, now you have answered as I asked you to answer. However, whether it is true, I am not yet sure; but you will, of course, show that what you say is true.

Euthyphro Euthyphro. Certainly.

Socrates Socrates. Come then, let us examine our words. The thing and the person that are dear to the gods are holy, and the thing and the person that are hateful to the gods are unholy; and the two are not the same, but the holy and the unholy are the exact opposites of each other. Is not this what we have said?

Euthyphro Euthyphro. Yes, just this.

Socrates Socrates. And it seems to be correct? 7b

Euthyphro Euthyphro. I think so, Socrates.

Socrates Socrates. Well then, have we said this also, that the gods, Euthyphro, quarrel and disagree with each other, and that there is enmity between them?

Euthyphro Euthyphro. Yes, we have said that.

Socrates Socrates. But what things is the disagreement about, which causes enmity and anger? Let us look at it in this way. If you and I were to disagree about number, for instance, which of two numbers were the greater, would the disagreement about these matters make us enemies and make us angry with each other, or should we not quickly settle it by resorting 7cto arithmetic?

Euthyphro Euthyphro. Of course we should.

Socrates Socrates. Then, too, if we were to disagree about the relative size of things, we should quickly put an end to the disagreement by measuring?

Euthyphro Euthyphro. Yes.

Socrates Socrates. And we should, I suppose, come to terms about relative weights by weighing?

Euthyphro Euthyphro. Of course.

Socrates Socrates. But about what would a disagreement be, which we could not settle and which would cause us to be enemies and be angry with each other? Perhaps you cannot give an answer offhand; 7dbut let me suggest it. Is it not about right and wrong, and noble and disgraceful, and good and bad? Are not these the questions about which you and I and other people become enemies, when we do become enemies, because we differ about them and cannot reach any satisfactory agreement?

Euthyphro Euthyphro. Yes, Socrates, these are the questions about which we should become enemies.

Socrates Socrates. And how about the gods, Euthyphro. If they disagree, would they not disagree about these questions?

Euthyphro Euthyphro. Necessarily. 7e

Socrates Socrates. Then, my noble Euthyphro, according to what you say, some of the gods too think some things are right or wrong and noble or disgraceful, and good or bad, and others disagree; for they would not quarrel with each other if they did not disagree about these matters. Is that the case?

Euthyphro Euthyphro. You are right.

Socrates Socrates. Then the gods in each group love the things which they consider good and right and hate the opposites of these things?

Euthyphro Euthyphro. Certainly.

Socrates Socrates. But you say that the same things are considered right by some of them and wrong by others; and it is because they disagree about these things 8athat they quarrel and wage war with each other. Is not this what you said?

Euthyphro Euthyphro. It is.

Socrates Socrates. Then, as it seems, the same things are hated and loved by the gods, and the same things would be dear and hateful to the gods.

Euthyphro Euthyphro. So it seems.

Socrates Socrates. And then the same things would be both holy and unholy, Euthyphro, according to this statement.

Euthyphro Euthyphro. I suppose so.

Socrates Socrates. Then you did not answer my question, my friend. For I did not ask you what is at once holy and unholy; but, judging from your reply, what is dear to the gods is also hateful to the gods. And so, Euthyphro, 8bit would not be surprising if, in punishing your father as you are doing, you were performing an act that is pleasing to Zeus, but hateful to Cronus and Uranus, and pleasing to Hephaestus, but hateful to Hera, and so forth in respect to the other gods, if any disagree with any other about it.

Euthyphro Euthyphro. But I think, Socrates, that none of the gods disagrees with any other about this, or holds that he who kills anyone wrongfully ought not to pay the penalty.

Socrates Socrates. Well, Euthyphro, to return to men, did you ever hear anybody arguing that he who had killed anyone wrongfully, 8cor had done anything else whatever wrongfully, ought not to pay the penalty?

Euthyphro Euthyphro. Why, they are always arguing these points, especially in the law courts. For they do very many wrong things; and then there is nothing they will not do or say, in defending themselves, to avoid the penalty.

Socrates Socrates. Yes, but do they acknowledge, Euthyphro, that they have done wrong and, although they acknowledge it, nevertheless say that they ought not to pay the penalty?

Euthyphro Euthyphro. Oh, no, they don’t do that.

Socrates Socrates. Then there is something they do not do and say. For they do not, I fancy, dare to say and argue that, 8dif they have really done wrong, they ought not to pay the penalty; but, I think, they say they have not done wrong; do they not?

Euthyphro Euthyphro. You are right.

Socrates Socrates. Then they do not argue this point, that the wrongdoer must not pay the penalty; but perhaps they argue about this, who is a wrongdoer, and what he did, and when.

Euthyphro Euthyphro. That is true.

Socrates Socrates. Then is not the same thing true of the gods, if they quarrel about right and wrong, as you say, and some say others have done wrong, and some say they have not? For surely, my friend, no one, either of gods or men, 8ehas the face to say that he who does wrong ought not to pay the penalty.

Euthyphro Euthyphro. Yes, you are right about this, Socrates, in the main.

Socrates Socrates. But I think, Euthyphro, those who dispute, both men and gods, if the gods do dispute, dispute about each separate act. When they differ with one another about any act, some say it was right and others that it was wrong. Is it not so?

Euthyphro Euthyphro. Certainly.