Socrates inform me, that I may be made wiser, what proof you have that all the gods think that the man lost his life wrongfully, who, when he was a servant, committed murder, was bound by the master of the man he killed, and died as a result of his bonds before the master who had bound him found out from the advisers what he ought to do with him, and that it is right on account of such a man for a son to proceed against his father and accuse him of murder. Come, try to show me clearly about this, that

Socrates the gods surely believe that this conduct is right; and if you show it to my satisfaction, I will glorify your wisdom as long as I live.

Euthyphro Euthyphro. But perhaps this is no small task, Socrates; though I could show you quite clearly.

Socrates Socrates. I understand; it is because you think I am slower to understand than the judges; since it is plain that you will show them that such acts are wrong and that all the gods hate them.

Euthyphro Euthyphro. Quite clearly, Socrates; that is, if they listen to me.

Socrates Socrates. They will listen, if they find that you are a good speaker.

Socrates But this occurred to me while you were talking, and I said to myself: “If Euthyphro should prove to me no matter how clearly that all the gods think such a death is wrongful, what have I learned from Euthyphro about the question, what is holiness and what is unholiness? For this act would, as it seems, be hateful to the gods; but we saw just now that holiness and its opposite are not defined in this way; for we saw that what is hateful to the gods is also dear to them;” and so I let you off any discussion of this point, Euthyphro. If you like, all the gods

Socrates may think it wrong and may hate it. But shall we now emend our definition and say that whatever all the gods hate is unholy and whatever they all love is holy, and what some love and others hate is neither or both? Do you wish this now to be our definition of holiness and unholiness?

Euthyphro Euthyphro. What is to hinder, Socrates?

Socrates Socrates. Nothing, so far as I am concerned, Euthyphro, but consider your own position, whether by adopting this definition you will most easily teach me what you promised.

Euthyphro Euthyphro. Well, I should say that what all the gods love is holy and, on the other hand, what they all hate is unholy.

Socrates Socrates. Then shall we examine this again, Euthyphro, to see if it is correct, or shall we let it go and accept our own statement, and those of others, agreeing that it is so, if anyone merely says that it is? Or ought we to inquire into the correctness of the statement?

Euthyphro Euthyphro. We ought to inquire. However, I think this is now correct.

Socrates Socrates. We shall soon know more about this, my friend.

Socrates Just consider this question:—Is that which is holy loved by the gods because it is holy, or is it holy because it is loved by the gods?

Euthyphro Euthyphro. I don’t know what you mean, Socrates.

Socrates Socrates. Then I will try to speak more clearly. We speak of being carried and of carrying, of being led and of leading, of being seen and of seeing; and you understand—do you not?—that in all such expressions the two parts differ one from the other in meaning, and how they differ.

Euthyphro Euthyphro. I think I understand.

Socrates Socrates. Then, too, we conceive of a thing being loved and of a thing loving, and the two are different?

Euthyphro Euthyphro. Of course.

Socrates. Now tell me, is a thing which is carried a carried thing because one carries it, or for some other reason?

Euthyphro Euthyphro. No, for that reason.

Socrates Socrates. And a thing which is led is led because one leads it, and a thing which is seen is so because one sees it?

Euthyphro Euthyphro. Certainly.

Socrates Socrates. Then one does not see it because its a seen thing, but, on the contrary, it is a seen thing because one sees it; and one does not lead it because it is a led thing, but it is a led thing because one leads it; and one does not carry it because it is a carried thing, but it is a carried thing because one carries it. Is it clear, Euthyphro,

Socrates what I am trying to say? I am trying to say this, that if anything becomes or undergoes, it does not become because it is in a state of becoming, but it is in a state of becoming because it becomes, and it does not undergo because it is a thing which undergoes, but because it undergoes it is a thing which undergoes; or do you not agree to this?

Euthyphro Euthyphro. I agree.

Socrates Socrates. Is not that which is beloved a thing which is either becoming or undergoing something?

Euthyphro Euthyphro. Certainly.

Socrates Socrates. And is this case like the former ones: those who love it do not love it because it is a beloved thing, but it is a beloved thing because they love it?

Euthyphro Euthyphro. Obviously.

Socrates Socrates. Now what do you say about that which is holy,

Socrates Euthyphro. It is loved by all the gods, is it not, according to what you said?

Euthyphro Euthyphro. Yes.

Socrates Socrates. For this reason, because it is holy, or for some other reason?

Euthyphro Euthyphro. No, for this reason.

Socrates Socrates. It is loved because it is holy, not holy because it is loved?

Euthyphro Euthyphro. I think so.

Socrates Socrates. But that which is dear to the gods is dear to them and beloved by them because they love it.

Euthyphro Euthyphro. Of course.

Socrates Socrates. Then that which is dear to the gods and that which is holy are not identical, but differ one from the other.

Euthyphro Euthyphro. How so, Socrates?

Socrates Socrates. Because we are agreed that the holy is loved because it is holy and that it is not holy because it is loved; are we not?

Euthyphro Euthyphro. Yes.

Socrates Socrates. But we are agreed that what is dear to the gods is dear to them because they love it, that is, by reason of this love, not that they love it because it is dear.

Euthyphro Euthyphro. Very true.

Socrates Socrates. But if that which is dear to the gods and that which is holy were identical, my dear Euthyphro, then if the holy

Socrates were loved because it is holy, that which is dear to the gods would be loved because it is dear, and if that which is dear to the gods is dear because it is loved, then that which is holy would be holy because it is loved; but now you see that the opposite is the case, showing that the two are different from each other. For the one becomes lovable from the fact that it is loved, whereas the other is loved because it is in itself lovable. And, Euthyphro, it seems that when you were asked what holiness is you were unwilling to make plain its essence, but you mentioned something that has happened to this holiness, namely,

Socrates that it is loved by the gods. But you did not tell as yet what it really is. So, if you please, do not hide it from me, but begin over again and tell me what holiness is, no matter whether it is loved by the gods or anything else happens it; for we shall not quarrel about that. But tell me frankly, What is holiness, and what is unholiness?

Euthyphro Euthyphro. But, Socrates, I do not know how to say what I mean. For whatever statement we advance, somehow or other it moves about and won’t stay where we put it.

Socrates Socrates. Your statements, Euthyphro,

Socrates are like works of my ancestor Daedalus, and if I were the one who made or advanced them, you might laugh at me and say that on account of my relationship to him my works in words run away and won’t stay where they are put. But now—well, the statements are yours; so some other jest is demanded; for they stay fixed, as you yourself see.

Euthyphro Euthyphro. I think the jest does very well as it is;

Euthyphro for I am not the one who makes these statements move about and not stay in the same place, but you are the Daedalus; for they would have stayed, so far as I am concerned.

Socrates Socrates. Apparently then, my friend, I am a more clever artist than Daedalus, inasmuch as he made only his own works move, whereas I, as it seems, give motion to the works of others as well as to my own.

Socrates And the most exquisite thing about my art is that I am clever against my will; for I would rather have my words stay fixed and stable than possess the wisdom of Daedalus and the wealth of Tantalus besides. But enough of this. Since you seem to be indolent, I will aid you myself, so that you may instruct me about holiness. And do not give it up beforehand. Just see whether you do not think that everything that is holy is right.

Euthyphro Euthyphro. I do.