Socrates Socrates. Then this is the goal of all his effort; he tries to produce conviction in the soul. Is not that so?

Phaedrus Phaedrus. Yes.

Socrates Socrates. So it is clear that Thrasymachus, or anyone else who seriously teaches the art of rhetoric, will first describe the soul with perfect accuracy and make us see whether it is one and all alike, or, like the body, of multiform aspect; for this is what we call explaining its nature.

Phaedrus Phaedrus. Certainly.

Socrates Socrates. And secondly he will say what its action is and toward what it is directed, or how it is acted upon and by what.

Phaedrus Phaedrus. To be sure.

Socrates Socrates. Thirdly, he will classify the speeches and the souls and will adapt each to the other, showing the causes of the effects produced and why one kind of soul is necessarily persuaded by certain classes of speeches, and another is not.

Phaedrus Phaedrus. That would, I think, be excellent.

Socrates Socrates. By no other method of exposition or speech will this, or anything else, ever be written 271cor spoken with real art. But those whom you have heard, who write treatises on the art of speech nowadays, are deceivers and conceal the nature of the soul, though they know it very well. Until they write and speak by this method we cannot believe that they write by the rules of art.

Phaedrus Phaedrus. What is this method?

Socrates Socrates. It is not easy to tell the exact expressions to be used; but I will tell how one must write, if one is to do it, so far as possible, in a truly artistic way.

Phaedrus Phaedrus. Speak then.

Socrates Socrates. Since it is the function of speech 271dto lead souls by persuasion, he who is to be a rhetorician must know the various forms of soul. Now they are so and so many and of such and such kinds, wherefore men also are of different kinds: these we must classify. Then there are also various classes of speeches, to one of which every speech belongs. So men of a certain sort are easily persuaded by speeches of a certain sort for a certain reason to actions or beliefs of a certain sort, and men of another sort cannot be so persuaded. The student of rhetoric must, accordingly, acquire a proper knowledge of these classes and then be able to follow them 271eaccurately with his senses when he sees them in the practical affairs of life; otherwise he can never have any profit from the lectures he may have heard.

Socrates. But when he has learned to tell what sort of man is influenced by what sort of speech, and is able, 272aif he comes upon such a man, to recognize him and to convince himself that this is the man and this now actually before him is the nature spoken of in a certain lecture, to which he must now make a practical application of a certain kind of speech in a certain way to persuade his hearer to a certain action or belief—when he has acquired all this, and has added thereto a knowledge of the times for speaking and for keeping silence, and has also distinguished the favorable occasions for brief speech or pitiful speech or intensity and all the classes of speech which he has learned, then, and not till then, will his art be fully and completely 272bfinished; and if anyone who omits any of these points in his speaking or writing claims to speak by the rules of art, the one who disbelieves him is the better man. “Now then,” perhaps the writer of our treatise will say, “Phaedrus and Socrates, do you agree to all this? Or must the art of speech be described in some other way?”

Phaedrus Phaedrus. No other way is possible, Socrates. But it seems a great task to attain to it.

Socrates Socrates. Very true. Therefore you must examine 272call that has been said from every point of view, to see if no shorter and easier road to the art appears, that one may not take a long and rough road, when there is a short and smooth one. If you have heard from Lysias or anyone else anything that can help us, try to remember it and tell it.

Phaedrus Phaedrus. If it depended on trying, I might, but just now I have nothing to say.

Socrates Socrates. Then shall I tell something that I have heard some of those say who make these matters their business?

Phaedrus Phaedrus. Pray do.

Socrates Socrates. Even the wolf, you know, Phaedrus, has a right to an advocate, as they say.

Phaedrus Phaedrus. Do you be his advocate.

Socrates Socrates. Very well. They say that there is no need of treating these matters with such gravity and carrying them back so far to first principles with many words; for, as we said in the beginning of this discussion, he who is to be a competent rhetorician need have nothing at all to do, they say, with truth in considering things which are just or good, or men who are so, whether by nature or by education. For in the courts, they say, 272enobody cares for truth about these matters, but for that which is convincing; and that is probability, so that he who is to be an artist in speech must fix his attention upon probability. For sometimes one must not even tell what was actually done, if it was not likely to be done, but what was probable, whether in accusation or defence; and in brief, a speaker must always aim at probability, 273apaying no attention to truth; for this method, if pursued throughout the whole speech, provides us with the entire art.

Phaedrus Phaedrus. You have stated just what those say who pretend to possess the art of speech, Socrates. I remember that we touched upon this matter briefly before,¹ but the professional rhetoricians think it is of great importance.

Socrates Socrates. Well, there is Tisias whom you have studied carefully; now let Tisias himself 273btell us if he does not say that probability is that which most people think.

Phaedrus Phaedrus. That is just what he says.

Socrates Socrates. Apparently after he had invented this clever scientific definition, he wrote that if a feeble and brave man assaulted a strong coward, robbed him of his cloak or something, and was brought to trial for it, neither party ought to speak the truth; the coward should say that he had not been assaulted by the brave man alone, whereas the other should prove that only they two were present 273cand should use the well-known argument, “How could a little man like me assault such a man as he is?” The coward will not acknowledge his cowardice, but will perhaps try to invent some other lie, and thus give his opponent a chance to confute him. And in other cases there are other similar rules of art. Is that not so, Phaedrus?

Phaedrus Phaedrus. Certainly.

Socrates Socrates. Oh, a wonderfully hidden art it seems to be which Tisias has brought to light, or some other, whoever he may be and whatever country he is proud to call his own! 273dBut, my friend, shall we say in reply to this, or shall we not—

Phaedrus Phaedrus. What?

Socrates Socrates. “Tisias, some time ago, before you came along, we were saying that this probability of yours was accepted by the people because of its likeness to truth; and we just stated that he who knows the truth is always best able to discover likenesses. And so, if you have anything else to say about the art of speech, we will listen to you; but if not, we will put our trust in what we said just now, that unless a man take account of the characters of his hearers 273eand is able to divide things by classes and to comprehend particulars under a general idea, he will never attain the highest human perfection in the art of speech. But this ability he will not gain without much diligent toil, which a wise man ought not to undergo for the sake of speaking and acting before men, but that he may be able to speak and to do everything, so far as possible, 274ain a manner pleasing to the gods.”

Socrates. “For those who are wiser than we, Tisias, say that a man of sense should surely practice to please not his fellow slaves, except as a secondary consideration, but his good and noble masters. Therefore, if the path is long, be not astonished; for it must be trodden for great ends, not for those you have in mind. Yet your ends also, as our argument says, will be best gained in this way, if one so desires.”

Phaedrus Phaedrus. I think what you have said is admirable, if one could only do it.

Socrates Socrates. But it is noble to strive after 274bnoble objects, no matter what happens to us.

Phaedrus Phaedrus. Certainly.

Socrates Socrates. We have, then, said enough about the art of speaking and that which is no art.

Phaedrus Phaedrus. Assuredly.

Socrates Socrates. But we have still to speak of propriety and impropriety in writing, how it should be done and how it is improper, have we not?

Phaedrus Phaedrus. Yes.

Socrates Socrates. Do you know how you can act or speak about rhetoric so as to please God best?

Phaedrus Phaedrus. Not at all; do you?

Socrates Socrates. I can tell something I have heard of the ancients; but whether it is true, they only know. But if we ourselves should find it out, should we care any longer for human opinions?

Phaedrus Phaedrus. A ridiculous question! But tell me what you say you have heard.

Socrates Socrates. I heard, then, that at Naucratis, in Egypt, was one of the ancient gods of that country, the one whose sacred bird is called the ibis, and the name of the god himself was Theuth. He it was who 274dinvented numbers and arithmetic and geometry and astronomy, also draughts and dice, and, most important of all, letters. Now the king of all Egypt at that time was the god Thamus, who lived in the great city of the upper region, which the Greeks call the Egyptian Thebes, and they call the god himself Ammon. To him came Theuth to show his inventions, saying that they ought to be imparted to the other Egyptians. But Thamus asked what use there was in each, and as Theuth enumerated their uses, expressed praise or blame, according as he approved 274eor disapproved. The story goes that Thamus said many things to Theuth in praise or blame of the various arts, which it would take too long to repeat; but when they came to the letters, “This invention, O king,” said Theuth, “will make the Egyptians wiser and will improve their memories; for it is an elixir of memory and wisdom that I have discovered.”