Socrates “Is it then distinct from this too, or is it a form of the rational, so that there are not three but two kinds in the soul, the rational and the appetitive, or just as in the city there were 441a three existing kinds that composed its structure, the moneymakers, the helpers, the counsellors, so also in the soul there exists a third kind, this principle of high spirit, which is the helper of reason by nature unless it is corrupted by evil nurture?” “We have to assume it as a third,” he said. “Yes,” said I, “provided¹ it shall have been shown to be something different from the rational, as it has been shown to be other than the appetitive.” “That is not hard to be shown,” he said; “for that much one can see in children, that they are from their very birth chock-full of rage and high spirit, but as for reason, 441b some of them, to my thinking, never participate in it, and the majority quite late.” “Yes, by heaven, excellently said,” I replied; “and further, one could see in animals that what you say is true. And to these instances we may add the testimony of Homer quoted above:He smote his breast and chided thus his heart. ² For there Homer has clearly represented that in us 441c which has reflected about the better and the worse as rebuking that which feels unreasoning anger as if it were a distinct and different thing.” “You are entirely right,” he said.

“Through these waters, then,” said I, “we have with difficulty made our way³ and we are fairly agreed that the same kinds equal in number are to be found in the state and in the soul of each one of us.” “That is so.” “Then does not the necessity of our former postulate immediately follow, that as and whereby⁴ the state was wise so and thereby is the individual wise?” “Surely.” “And so whereby and as 441d the individual is brave, thereby and so is the state brave, and that both should have all the other constituents of virtue in the same way⁵?” “Necessarily.” “Just too, then, Glaucon, I presume we shall say a man is in the same way in which a city was just.” “That too is quite inevitable.” “But we surely cannot have forgotten this, that the state was just by reason of each of the three classes found in it fulfilling its own function.” “I don’t think we have forgotten,” he said. “We must remember, then, that each of us also in whom⁶ the several parts within him 441e perform each their own task—he will be a just man and one who minds his own affair.” “We must indeed remember,” he said. “Does it not belong to the rational part to rule, being wise and exercising forethought in behalf of the entire soul, and to the principle of high spirit to be subject to this and its ally?” “Assuredly.”

“Then is it not, as we said,⁷ the blending of music and gymnastics that will render them concordant, intensifying 442a and fostering the one with fair words and teachings and relaxing and soothing and making gentle the other by harmony and rhythm?” “Quite so,” said he. “And these two thus reared and having learned and been educated to do their own work in the true sense of the phrase,⁸ will preside over the appetitive part which is the mass⁹ of the soul in each of us and the most insatiate by nature of wealth. They will keep watch upon it, lest, by being filled and infected with the so-called pleasures associated with the body¹⁰ and so waxing big and strong, it may not keep to¹¹ its own work 442b but may undertake to enslave and rule over the classes which it is not fitting¹² that it should, and so overturn¹³ the entire life of all.” “By all means,” he said. “Would not these two, then, best keep guard against enemies from without¹⁴ also in behalf of the entire soul and body, the one taking counsel,¹⁵ the other giving battle, attending upon the ruler, and by its courage executing the ruler’s designs?” “That is so.” “Brave, too, then, I take it, we call 442c each individual by virtue of this part in him, when, namely, his high spirit preserves in the midst of pains and pleasures¹⁶ the rule handed down by the reason as to what is or is not to be feared.” “Right,” he said. “But wise by that small part that¹⁷ ruled in him and handed down these commands, by its possession¹⁸ in turn within it of the knowledge of what is beneficial for each and for the whole, the community composed of the three.” “By all means.” “And again, was he not sober 442d by reason of the friendship and concord of these same parts, when, namely, the ruling principle and its two subjects are at one in the belief that the reason ought to rule, and do not raise faction against it?” “The virtue of soberness certainly,” said he, “is nothing else than this, whether in a city or an individual.” “But surely, now, a man is just by that which and in the way we have so often¹⁹ described.” “That is altogether necessary.” “Well then,” said I, “has our idea of justice in any way lost the edge²⁰ of its contour so as to look like anything else than precisely what it showed itself to be in the state?” “I think not,” he said. 442e “We might,” I said, “completely confirm your reply and our own conviction thus, if anything in our minds still disputes our definition—by applying commonplace and vulgar²¹ tests to it.” “What are these?”

“For example, if an answer were demanded to the question concerning that city and the man whose birth and breeding was in harmony with it, whether we believe that such a man, entrusted with a deposit²² of gold or silver, would withhold it and embezzle it, who do you suppose would think that he would be more likely so to act 443a than men of a different kind?” “No one would,” he said. “And would not he be far removed from sacrilege and theft and betrayal of comrades in private life or of the state in public?” “He would.” “And, moreover, he would not be in any way faithless either in the keeping of his oaths or in other agreements.” “How could he?” “Adultery, surely, and neglect of parents and of the due service of the gods would pertain to anyone rather than to such a man.” “To anyone indeed,” 443b he said. “And is not the cause of this to be found in the fact that each of the principles within him does its own work in the matter of ruling and being ruled?” “Yes, that and nothing else.” “Do you still, then, look for justice to be anything else than this potency which provides men and cities of this sort?” “No, by heaven,” he said, “I do not.”

“Finished, then, is our dream and perfected —the surmise we spoke of,²³ that, by some Providence, at the very beginning of our foundation of the state, 443c we chanced to hit upon the original principle and a sort of type of justice.” “Most assuredly.” “It really was, it seems, Glaucon, which is why it helps,²⁴ a sort of adumbration of justice, this principle that it is right for the cobbler by nature to cobble and occupy himself with nothing else, and the carpenter to practice carpentry, and similarly all others. But the truth of the matter²⁵ was, as it seems, 443d that justice is indeed something of this kind, yet not in regard to the doing of one’s own business externally, but with regard to that which is within and in the true sense concerns one’s self, and the things of one’s self—it means that²⁶ a man must not suffer the principles in his soul to do each the work of some other and interfere and meddle with one another, but that he should dispose well of what in the true sense of the word is properly his own,²⁷ and having first attained to self-mastery²⁸ and beautiful order²⁹ within himself,³⁰ and having harmonized³¹ these three principles, the notes or intervals of three terms quite literally the lowest, the highest, and the mean, 443e and all others there may be between them, and having linked and bound all three together and made of himself a unit,³² one man instead of many, self-controlled and in unison, he should then and then only turn to practice if he find aught to do either in the getting of wealth or the tendance of the body or it may be in political action or private business, in all such doings believing and naming³³ the just and honorable action to be that which preserves and helps to produce this condition of soul, and wisdom the science 444a that presides over such conduct; and believing and naming the unjust action to be that which ever tends to overthrow this spiritual constitution, and brutish ignorance, to be the opinion³⁴ that in turn presides³⁵ over this.”