Socrates “What you say is entirely true, Socrates.” “Well,” said I, “if we should affirm that we had found the just man and state and what justice really is¹ in them, I think we should not be much mistaken.” “No indeed, we should not,” he said. “Shall we affirm it, then?” “Let us so affirm.”

“So be it, then,” said I; “next after this, I take it, we must consider injustice.” “Obviously.” 444b “Must not this be a kind of civil war² of these three principles, their meddlesomeness³ and interference with one another’s functions, and the revolt of one part against the whole of the soul that it may hold therein a rule which does not belong to it, since its nature is such that it befits it to serve as a slave to the ruling principle? Something of this sort, I fancy, is what we shall say, and that the confusion of these principles and their straying from their proper course is injustice and licentiousness and cowardice and brutish ignorance and, in general,⁴ all turpitude.” “Precisely this,” 444c he replied. “Then,” said I, “to act unjustly and be unjust and in turn to act justly the meaning of all these terms becomes at once plain and clear, since injustice and justice are so.” “How so?” “Because,” said I, “these are in the soul what⁵ the healthful and the diseaseful are in the body; there is no difference.” “In what respect?” he said. “Healthful things surely engender health⁶ and diseaseful disease.” “Yes.” “Then does not doing just acts engender justice 444d and unjust injustice?” “Of necessity.” “But to produce health is to establish the elements in a body in the natural relation of dominating and being dominated⁷ by one another, while to cause disease is to bring it about that one rules or is ruled by the other contrary to nature.” “Yes, that is so.” “And is it not likewise the production of justice in the soul to establish its principles in the natural relation of controlling and being controlled by one another, while injustice is to cause the one to rule or be ruled by the other contrary to nature?” “Exactly so,” he said. “Virtue, then, as it seems, would be a kind of health⁸ 444e and beauty and good condition of the soul, and vice would be disease,⁹ ugliness, and weakness.” “It is so.” “Then is it not also true that beautiful and honorable pursuits tend to the winning of virtue and the ugly to vice?” “Of necessity.”

“And now at last, it seems, it remains for us to consider whether it is profitable to do justice 445a and practice honorable pursuits and be just, whether¹⁰ one is known to be such or not, or whether injustice profits, and to be unjust, if only a man escape punishment and is not bettered by chastisement.¹¹” “Nay, Socrates,” he said, “I think that from this point on our inquiry becomes an absurdity¹²—if, while life is admittedly intolerable with a ruined constitution of body even though accompanied by all the food and drink and wealth and power in the world, we are yet to be asked to suppose that, when the very nature and constitution of that whereby we live¹³ is disordered 445b and corrupted, life is going to be worth living, if a man can only do as he pleases,¹⁴ and pleases to do anything save that which will rid him of evil and injustice and make him possessed of justice and virtue—now that the two have been shown to be as we have described them.” “Yes, it is absurd,” said I; “but nevertheless, now that we have won to this height, we must not grow weary in endeavoring to discover¹⁵ with the utmost possible clearness that these things are so.” “That is the last thing in the world we must do,” he said. 445c “Come up here¹⁶ then,” said I, “that you may see how many are the kinds of evil, I mean those that it is worth while to observe and distinguish.¹⁷” “I am with you,” he said; “only do you say on.” “And truly,” said I, “now that we have come to this height¹⁸ of argument I seem to see as from a point of outlook that there is one form¹⁹ of excellence, and that the forms of evil are infinite, yet that there are some four among them that it is worth while to take note of.” “What do you mean?” he said. “As many as are the varieties of political constitutions that constitute specific types, so many, it seems likely, 445d are the characters of soul.” “How many, pray?” “There are five kinds of constitutions,” said I, “and five kinds of soul.” “Tell me what they are,” he said. “I tell you,” said I, “that one way of government would be the constitution that we have just expounded, but the names that might be applied to it are two.²⁰ If one man of surpassing merit rose among the rulers, it would be denominated royalty; if more than one, aristocracy.” “True,” he said. “Well, then,” I said, “this is one of the forms I have in mind. 445e For neither would a number of such men, nor one if he arose among them, alter to any extent worth mentioning the laws of our city—if he preserved the breeding and the education that we have described.” “It is not likely,” he said.