§4But it happens fortunately, that though we cannot assume metaphysics to be an actual science, we can say with confidence that certain pure a priori synthetical cognitions, pure Mathematics and pure Physics are actual and given; for both contain propositions, which are thoroughly recognised as apodeictically certain, partly by mere reason, partly by general consent arising from experience, and yet as independent of experience. We have therefore some at least uncontested synthetical knowledge a priori, and need not ask whether it be possible, for it is actual, but how it is possible, in order that we may deduce from the principle which makes the given cognitions possible the possibility of all the rest.
The General Problem: How is Cognition from Pure Reason Possible?
§5We have above learned the significant distinction between analytical and synthetical judgments. The possibility of analytical propositions was easily comprehended, being entirely founded on the law of Contradiction. The possibility of synthetical a posteriori judgments, of those which are gathered from experience, also requires no particular explanation; for experience is nothing but a continual synthesis of perceptions. There remain therefore only synthetical propositions a priori, of which the possibility must be sought or investigated, because they must depend upon other principles than the law of contradiction.
But here we need not first establish the possibility of such propositions so as to ask whether they are possible. For there are enough of them which indeed are of undoubted certainty, and as our present method is analytical, we shall start from the fact, that such synthetical but purely rational cognition actually exists; but we must now inquire into the reason of this possibility, and ask, how such cognition is possible, in order that we may from the principles of its possibility be enabled to determine the conditions of its use, its sphere and its limits. The proper problem upon which all depends, when expressed with scholastic precision, is therefore:
How are Synthetic Propositions a priori possible?
For the sake of popularity I have above expressed this problem somewhat differently, as an inquiry into purely rational cognition, which I could do for once without detriment to the desired comprehension, because, as we have only to do here with metaphysics and its sources, the reader will, I hope, after the fore going remarks, keep in mind that when we speak of purely rational cognition, we do not mean analytical, but synthetical cognition.{9}
=================================== {9} It is unavoidable that as knowledge advances, certain expressions which have become classical, after having been used since the infancy of science, will be found inadequate and unsuitable, and a newer and more appropriate application of the terms will give rise to confusion. [This is the case with the term "analytical."] The analytical method, so far as it is opposed to the synthetical, is very different from that which constitutes the essence of analytical propositions: it signifies only that we start from what is sought, as if it were given, and ascend to the only conditions under which it is possible. In this method we often use nothing but synthetical propositions, as in mathematical analysis, and it were better to term it the regressive method, in contradistinction to the synthetic or progressive. A principal part of Logic too is distinguished by the name of Analytics, which here signifies the logic of truth in contrast to Dialectics, without considering whether the cognitions belonging to it are analytical or synthetical. ===================================
Metaphysics stands or falls with the solution of this problem: its very existence depends upon it. Let any one make metaphysical assertions with ever so much plausibility, let him overwhelm us with conclusions, if he has not previously proved able to answer this question satisfactorily, I have a right to say: this is all vain baseless philosophy and false wisdom. You speak through pure reason, and claim, as it were to create cognitions a priori by not only dissecting given concepts, but also by asserting connexions which do not rest upon the law of contradiction, and which you believe you conceive quite independently of all experience; how do you arrive at this, and how will you justify your pretensions? An appeal to the consent of the common sense of mankind cannot be allowed; for that is a witness whose authority depends merely upon rumor. Says Horace:
"Quodcunque ostendis mihi sic, incredulus odi."
"To all that which thou provest me thus, I refuse to give credence."
The answer to this question, though indispensable, is difficult; and though the principal reason that it was not made long ago is, that the possibility of the question never occurred to anybody, there is yet another reason, which is this that a satisfactory answer to this one question requires a much more persistent, profound, and painstaking reflexion, than the most diffuse work on Metaphysics, which on its first appearance promised immortality to its author. And every intelligent reader, when he carefully reflects what this problem requires, must at first be struck with its difficulty, and would regard it as insoluble and even impossible, did there not actually exist pure synthetical cognitions a priori. This actually happened to David Hume, though he did not conceive the question in its entire universality as is done here, and as must be done, should the answer be decisive for all Metaphysics. For how is it possible, says that acute man, that when a concept is given me, I can go beyond it and connect with it another, which is not contained in it, in such a manner as if the latter necessarily belonged to the former? Nothing but experience can furnish us with such connexions (thus he concluded from the difficulty which he took to be an impossibility), and all that vaunted necessity, or, what is the same thing, all cognition assumed to be a priori, is nothing but a long habit of accepting something as true, and hence of mistaking subjective necessity for objective.
Should my reader complain of the difficulty and the trouble which I occasion him in the solution of this problem, he is at liberty to solve it himself in an easier way. Perhaps he will then feel under obligation to the person who has undertaken for him a labor of so profound research, and will rather be surprised at the facility with which, considering the nature of the subject, the solution has been attained. Yet it has cost years of work to solve the problem in its whole universality (using the term in the mathematical sense, viz., for that which is sufficient for all cases), and finally to exhibit it in the analytical form, as the reader finds it here.
All metaphysicians are therefore solemnly and legally suspended from their occupations till they shall have answered in a satisfactory manner the question, "How are synthetic cognitions a priori possible?" For the answer contains which they must show when they have anything to offer in the name of pure reason. But if they do not possess these credentials, they can expect nothing else of reasonable people, who have been deceived so often, than to be dismissed without further ado.
If they on the other hand desire to carry on their business, not as a science, but as an art of wholesome oratory suited to the common sense of man, they cannot in justice be prevented. They will then speak the modest language of a rational belief, they will grant that they are not allowed even to conjecture, far less to know, anything which lies beyond the bounds of all possible experience, but only to assume (not for speculative use, which they must abandon, but for practical purposes only) the existence of something that is possible and even indispensable for the guidance of the understanding and of the will in life. In this manner alone can they be called useful and wise men, and the more so as they renounce the title of metaphysicians; for the latter profess to be speculative philosophers, and since, when judgments a priori are under discussion, poor probabilities cannot be admitted (for what is declared to be known a priori is thereby announced as necessary), such men cannot be permitted to play with conjectures, but their assertions must be either science, or are worth nothing at all.
It may be said, that the entire transcendental philosophy, which necessarily precedes all metaphysics, is nothing but the complete solution of the problem here propounded, in systematical order and completeness, and hitherto we have never had any transcendental philosophy; for what goes by its name is properly a part of metaphysics, whereas the former science is intended first to constitute the possibility of the latter, and must therefore precede all metaphysics. And it is not surprising that when a whole science, deprived of all help from other sciences, and consequently in itself quite new, is required to answer a single question satisfactorily, we should find the answer troublesome and difficult, nay even shrouded in obscurity.
As we now proceed to this solution according to the analytical method, in which we assume that such cognitions from pure reasons actually exist, we can only appeal to two sciences of theoretical cognition (which alone is under consideration here), pure mathematics and pure natural science (physics). For these alone can exhibit to us objects in a definite and actualisable form (in der Anschauung), and consequently (if there should occur in them a cognition a priori) can show the truth or conformity of the cognition to the object in concreto, that is, its actuality, from which we could proceed to the reason of its possibility by the analytic method. This facilitates our work greatly for here universal considerations are not only applied to facts, but even start from them, while in a synthetic procedure they must strictly be derived in abstracto from concepts.
§5But, in order to rise from these actual and at the same time well-grounded pure cognitions a priori to such a possible cognition of the same as we are seeking, viz., to metaphysics as a science, we must comprehend that which occasions it, I mean the mere natural, though in spite of its truth not unsuspected, cognition a priori which lies at the bottom of that science, the elaboration of which without any critical investigation of its possibility is commonly called metaphysics. In a word, we must comprehend the natural conditions of such a science as a part of our inquiry, and thus the transcendental problem will be gradually answered by a division into four questions:
1. How is pure mathematics possible? 2. How is pure natural science possible? 3. How is metaphysics in general possible? 4. How is metaphysics as a science possible?
It may be seen that the solution of these problems, though chiefly designed to exhibit the essential matter of the Critique, has yet something peculiar, which for itself alone deserves attention. This is the search for the sources of given sciences in reason itself, so that its faculty of knowing something a priori may by its own deeds be investigated and measured. By this procedure these sciences gain, if not with regard to their contents, yet as to their proper use, and while they throw light on the higher question concerning their common origin, they give, at the same time, an occasion better to explain their own nature.
But it happens fortunately, that though we cannot assume metaphysics to be an actual science, we can say with confidence that certain pure a priori synthetical cognitions, pure Mathematics and pure Physics are actual and given; for both contain propositions, which are thoroughly recognised as apodeictically certain, partly by mere reason, partly by general consent arising from experience, and yet as independent of experience. We have therefore some at least uncontested synthetical knowledge a priori, and need not ask whether it be possible, for it is actual, but how it is possible, in order that we may deduce from the principle which makes the given cognitions possible the possibility of all the rest.
The General Problem: How is Cognition from Pure Reason Possible?
We have above learned the significant distinction between analytical and synthetical judgments. The possibility of analytical propositions was easily comprehended, being entirely founded on the law of Contradiction. The possibility of synthetical a posteriori judgments, of those which are gathered from experience, also requires no particular explanation; for experience is nothing but a continual synthesis of perceptions. There remain therefore only synthetical propositions a priori, of which the possibility must be sought or investigated, because they must depend upon other principles than the law of contradiction.
But here we need not first establish the possibility of such propositions so as to ask whether they are possible. For there are enough of them which indeed are of undoubted certainty, and as our present method is analytical, we shall start from the fact, that such synthetical but purely rational cognition actually exists; but we must now inquire into the reason of this possibility, and ask, how such cognition is possible, in order that we may from the principles of its possibility be enabled to determine the conditions of its use, its sphere and its limits. The proper problem upon which all depends, when expressed with scholastic precision, is therefore:
How are Synthetic Propositions a priori possible?
For the sake of popularity I have above expressed this problem somewhat differently, as an inquiry into purely rational cognition, which I could do for once without detriment to the desired comprehension, because, as we have only to do here with metaphysics and its sources, the reader will, I hope, after the fore going remarks, keep in mind that when we speak of purely rational cognition, we do not mean analytical, but synthetical cognition.{9}
=================================== {9} It is unavoidable that as knowledge advances, certain expressions which have become classical, after having been used since the infancy of science, will be found inadequate and unsuitable, and a newer and more appropriate application of the terms will give rise to confusion. [This is the case with the term "analytical."] The analytical method, so far as it is opposed to the synthetical, is very different from that which constitutes the essence of analytical propositions: it signifies only that we start from what is sought, as if it were given, and ascend to the only conditions under which it is possible. In this method we often use nothing but synthetical propositions, as in mathematical analysis, and it were better to term it the regressive method, in contradistinction to the synthetic or progressive. A principal part of Logic too is distinguished by the name of Analytics, which here signifies the logic of truth in contrast to Dialectics, without considering whether the cognitions belonging to it are analytical or synthetical. ===================================
Metaphysics stands or falls with the solution of this problem: its very existence depends upon it. Let any one make metaphysical assertions with ever so much plausibility, let him overwhelm us with conclusions, if he has not previously proved able to answer this question satisfactorily, I have a right to say: this is all vain baseless philosophy and false wisdom. You speak through pure reason, and claim, as it were to create cognitions a priori by not only dissecting given concepts, but also by asserting connexions which do not rest upon the law of contradiction, and which you believe you conceive quite independently of all experience; how do you arrive at this, and how will you justify your pretensions? An appeal to the consent of the common sense of mankind cannot be allowed; for that is a witness whose authority depends merely upon rumor. Says Horace:
"Quodcunque ostendis mihi sic, incredulus odi."
"To all that which thou provest me thus, I refuse to give credence."
The answer to this question, though indispensable, is difficult; and though the principal reason that it was not made long ago is, that the possibility of the question never occurred to anybody, there is yet another reason, which is this that a satisfactory answer to this one question requires a much more persistent, profound, and painstaking reflexion, than the most diffuse work on Metaphysics, which on its first appearance promised immortality to its author. And every intelligent reader, when he carefully reflects what this problem requires, must at first be struck with its difficulty, and would regard it as insoluble and even impossible, did there not actually exist pure synthetical cognitions a priori. This actually happened to David Hume, though he did not conceive the question in its entire universality as is done here, and as must be done, should the answer be decisive for all Metaphysics. For how is it possible, says that acute man, that when a concept is given me, I can go beyond it and connect with it another, which is not contained in it, in such a manner as if the latter necessarily belonged to the former? Nothing but experience can furnish us with such connexions (thus he concluded from the difficulty which he took to be an impossibility), and all that vaunted necessity, or, what is the same thing, all cognition assumed to be a priori, is nothing but a long habit of accepting something as true, and hence of mistaking subjective necessity for objective.
Should my reader complain of the difficulty and the trouble which I occasion him in the solution of this problem, he is at liberty to solve it himself in an easier way. Perhaps he will then feel under obligation to the person who has undertaken for him a labor of so profound research, and will rather be surprised at the facility with which, considering the nature of the subject, the solution has been attained. Yet it has cost years of work to solve the problem in its whole universality (using the term in the mathematical sense, viz., for that which is sufficient for all cases), and finally to exhibit it in the analytical form, as the reader finds it here.
All metaphysicians are therefore solemnly and legally suspended from their occupations till they shall have answered in a satisfactory manner the question, "How are synthetic cognitions a priori possible?" For the answer contains which they must show when they have anything to offer in the name of pure reason. But if they do not possess these credentials, they can expect nothing else of reasonable people, who have been deceived so often, than to be dismissed without further ado.
If they on the other hand desire to carry on their business, not as a science, but as an art of wholesome oratory suited to the common sense of man, they cannot in justice be prevented. They will then speak the modest language of a rational belief, they will grant that they are not allowed even to conjecture, far less to know, anything which lies beyond the bounds of all possible experience, but only to assume (not for speculative use, which they must abandon, but for practical purposes only) the existence of something that is possible and even indispensable for the guidance of the understanding and of the will in life. In this manner alone can they be called useful and wise men, and the more so as they renounce the title of metaphysicians; for the latter profess to be speculative philosophers, and since, when judgments a priori are under discussion, poor probabilities cannot be admitted (for what is declared to be known a priori is thereby announced as necessary), such men cannot be permitted to play with conjectures, but their assertions must be either science, or are worth nothing at all.
It may be said, that the entire transcendental philosophy, which necessarily precedes all metaphysics, is nothing but the complete solution of the problem here propounded, in systematical order and completeness, and hitherto we have never had any transcendental philosophy; for what goes by its name is properly a part of metaphysics, whereas the former science is intended first to constitute the possibility of the latter, and must therefore precede all metaphysics. And it is not surprising that when a whole science, deprived of all help from other sciences, and consequently in itself quite new, is required to answer a single question satisfactorily, we should find the answer troublesome and difficult, nay even shrouded in obscurity.
As we now proceed to this solution according to the analytical method, in which we assume that such cognitions from pure reasons actually exist, we can only appeal to two sciences of theoretical cognition (which alone is under consideration here), pure mathematics and pure natural science (physics). For these alone can exhibit to us objects in a definite and actualisable form (in der Anschauung), and consequently (if there should occur in them a cognition a priori) can show the truth or conformity of the cognition to the object in concreto, that is, its actuality, from which we could proceed to the reason of its possibility by the analytic method. This facilitates our work greatly for here universal considerations are not only applied to facts, but even start from them, while in a synthetic procedure they must strictly be derived in abstracto from concepts.
Wir haben oben den mächtigen Unterschied der analytischen und synthetischen Urteile gesehen. Die Möglichkeit analytischer Sätze konnte sehr leicht begriffen werden; denn sie gründet sich lediglich auf dem Satze des Widerspruchs. Die Möglichkeit synthetischer Sätze a posteriori, d.i. solcher, welche aus der Erfahrung geschöpfet werden, bedarf auch keiner besondern Erklärung; denn Erfahrung ist selbst nichts anders, als eine kontinuierliche Zusammenfügung (Synthesis) der Wahrnehmungen. Es bleiben uns also nur synthetische Sätze a priori übrig, deren Möglichkeit gesucht oder untersucht werden muß, weil sie auf anderen Prinzipien, als dem Satze des Widerspruchs, beruhen muß.
Wir dürfen aberdie Möglichkeitsolcher Sätze hier nicht zuerst suchen, d.i. fragen, ob sie möglich sein. Denn es sind deren gnug, und zwar mit unstreitiger Gewißheit wirklich gegeben, und, da die Methode, die wir jetzt befolgen, analytisch sein soll, so werden wir davon anfangen: daß dergleichen synthetische, aber reine Vernunfterkenntnis wirklich sei; aber alsdenn müssen wir den Grund dieser Möglichkeit dennochuntersuchen, und fragen, wie diese Erkenntnis möglich sei, damit wir aus den Prinzipien ihrer Möglichkeit die Bedingungen ihres Gebrauchs, den Umfang und die Grenzen desselben zu bestimmen in Stand gesetzt werden. Die eigentliche mit schulgerechter Präzision ausgedruckte Aufgabe, auf die alles ankömmt, ist also:
Wie sind synthetische Sätze a priori möglich?
Ich habe sie oben, der Popularität zu Gefallen, etwas anders, nämlich als eine Frage nach dem Erkenntnis aus reiner Vernunft, ausgedruckt, welches ich dieses mal ohne Nachteil der gesuchten Einsicht wohl tun konnte, weil, da es hier doch lediglich um die Metaphysik und deren Quellen zu tun ist, man, nach den vorher gemachten Erinnerungen, sich, wie ich hoffe, jederzeit erinnern wird: daß, wenn wir hier von Erkenntnis aus reiner Vernunft reden, niemals von der analytischen, sondern lediglich der synthetischen die Rede sei.3
Auf die Auflösung dieser Aufgabe nun kommt das Stehen oder Fallen der Metaphysik, und also ihre Existenz gänzlich an. Es mag jemand seine Behauptungen in derselben mit noch so großem Schein vortragen, Schlüsse auf Schlüsse bis zum Erdrücken aufhäufen, wenn er nicht vorher jene Frage hat gnugtuend beantworten können, so habe ich Recht zu sagen: es ist alles eitele grundlose Philosophie und falsche Weisheit. Du sprichst durch reine Vernunft, und maßest dir an, a priori Erkenntnisse gleichsam zu erschaffen, indem du nicht bloßgegebene Begriffe zergliederst, sondern neue Verknüpfungen vorgibst, die nicht auf dem Satze des Widerspruchs beruhen, und die du doch so ganz unabhängig von aller Erfahrung einzusehen vermeinest; wie kommst du nun hiezu, und wie willst du dich wegen solcher Anmaßungen rechtfertigen? Dich auf Beistimmung der allgemeinen Menschenvernunft zu berufen, kann dir nicht gestattet werden; denn das ist ein Zeuge, dessen Ansehen nur auf dem öffentlichen Gerüchte beruht.
Quodcunque ostendis mihi sic, incredulus odi. Horat.
So unentbehrlich aber die Beantwortung dieser Frage ist, so schwer ist sie doch zugleich, und, obzwar die vornehmste Ursache, weswegen man sie nicht schon längst zu beantworten gesucht hat, darin liegt, daß man sich nicht einmal hat einfallen lassen, daß so etwas gefragt werden könne, so ist doch eine zweite Ursache diese, daß eine gnugtuende Beantwortung dieser einen Frage ein weit anhaltenderes, tieferes, und mühsameres Nachdenken erfordert, als jemals das weitläuftigste Werk der Metaphysik, das bei der ersten Erscheinung seinem Verfasser Unsterblichkeit versprach. Auch muß ein jeder einsehender Leser, wenn er diese Aufgabe nach ihrer Federung sorgfältig überdenkt, anfangs durch ihre Schwierigkeit erschreckt, sie vor unauflöslich, und, gäbe es nicht wirklich dergleichen reine synthetische Erkenntnisse a priori, sie ganz und gar vor unmöglich halten, welches demDavid Humewirklich begegnete, ob er sich zwar die Frage bei weitem nicht in solcher Allgemeinheit vorstellete, als es hier geschieht und geschehen muß, wenn die Beantwortung vor die ganze Metaphysik entscheidend werden soll. Denn, wie ist es möglich, sagte der scharfsinnige Mann: daß, wenn mir ein Begriff gegeben ist, ich über denselben hinausgehen, und einen andern damit verknüpfen kann, der in jenem gar nicht enthalten ist, und zwar so, als wenn diesernotwendigzu jenem gehöre? Nur Erfahrung kann uns solche Verknüpfungen an die Hand geben (so schloß er aus jener Schwierigkeit, die er vor Unmöglichkeit hielt), und alle jene vermeintliche Notwendigkeit, oder, welches einerlei ist, davor gehaltene Erkenntnis a priori, ist nichts als eine lange Gewohnheit, etwas wahr zu finden, und daher die subjektive Notwendigkeit vor objektiv zu halten.
Wenn der Leser sich über Beschwerde und Mühe beklagt, die ich ihm durch die Auflösung dieser Aufgabe machen werde, so darf er nur den Versuch anstellen, sie auf leichtere Art selbst aufzulösen. Vielleicht wird er sich alsdenn demjenigen verbunden halten, der eine Arbeit von so tiefer Nachforschung für ihn übernommen hat, und wohl eher über die Leichtigkeit, die nach Beschaffenheit der Sache der Auflösung noch hat gegeben werden können, einige Verwunderung merken lassen, auch hat es Jahre lang Bemühung gekostet, um diese Aufgabe in ihrer ganzen Allgemeinheit (in dem Verstande, wie die Mathematiker dieses Wort nehmen, nämlich hinreichend vor alle Fälle) aufzulösen, und sie auch endlich in analytischer Gestalt, wie der Leser sie hier antreffen wird, darstellen zu können.
Alle Metaphysiker sind demnach von ihren Geschäften feierlich und gesetzmäßig so lange suspendiert, bis sie die Frage:Wie sind synthetische Erkenntnisse a priori möglich? gnugtuend werden beantwortet haben. Denn in dieser Beantwortung allein besteht das Kreditiv, welches sie vorzeigen mußten, wenn sie im Namen der reinen Vernunft etwas bei uns anzubringen haben; in Ermangelung desselben aber können sie nichts anders erwarten, als von Vernünftigen, die so oft schon hintergangen worden, ohne alle weitere Untersuchung ihres Anbringens, abgewiesen zu werden.
Wollten sie dagegen ihr Geschäfte nicht alsWissenschaft, sondern als eineKunstheilsamer und dem allgemeinen Menschenverstande anpassender Überredungen, treiben, so kann ihnen dieses Gewerbe nach Billigkeit nicht verwehrt werden. Sie werden alsdenn die bescheidene Sprache eines vernünftigen Glaubens führen, sie werden gestehen, daß es ihnen nicht erlaubt sei, über das, was jenseit der Grenzen aller möglichen Erfahrung hinausliegt, auch nur einmal zumutmaßen, geschweige etwas zuwissen, sondern nur etwas (nicht zum spekulativen Gebrauche, denn auf den müssen sie Verzicht tun, sondern lediglich zum praktischen)anzunehmen, was zur Leitung des Verstandes und Willens im Leben möglich und sogar unentbehrlich ist. So allein werden sie den Namen nützlicher und weiser Männer führen können, um desto mehr, je mehr sie auf den der Metaphysiker Verzicht tun; denn diese wollen spekulative Philosophen sein, und da, wenn es um Urteile a priori zu tun ist, man es auf schale Wahrscheinlichkeiten nicht aussetzen kann (denn was dem Vorgeben nach a priori erkannt wird, wird eben dadurch als notwendig angekündigt), so kann es ihnen nicht erlaubt sein, mit Mutmaßungen zu spielen, sondern ihre Behauptung muß Wissenschaft sein, oder sie ist überall gar nichts.
Man kann sagen, daß die ganze Transzendentalphilosophie, die vor aller Metaphysik notwendig vorhergeht, selbst nichts anders, als bloß die vollständige Auflösung der hier vorgelegten Frage sei, nur in systematischer Ordnung und Ausführlichkeit, und man habe also bis jetzt keine Transzendentalphilosophie: Denn, was den Namen davon führt, ist eigentlich ein Teil der Metaphysik; jene Wissenschaft soll aber die Möglichkeit der letzteren zuerst ausmachen, und muß also vor aller Metaphysik vorhergehen. Man darf sich also auch nicht wundern, da eine ganze und zwar aller Beihülfe aus andern beraubte, mithin an sich ganz neue Wissenschaft nötig ist, um nur eine einzige Frage hinreichend zu beantworten, wenn die Auflösung derselben mit Mühe und Schwierigkeit, ja sogar mit einiger Dunkelheit verbunden ist.
Indem wir jetzt zu dieser Auflösung schreiten, und zwar nach analytischer Methode, in welcher wir voraussetzen, daß solche Erkenntnisse aus reiner Vernunft wirklich sein: so können wir uns nur auf zweiWissenschaftender theoretischen Erkenntnis (als von der allein hier die Rede ist) berufen, nämlichreine Mathematikundreine Naturwissenschaft, denn nur diese können uns die Gegenstände in der Anschauung darstellen, mithin, wenn etwa in ihnen ein Erkenntnis a priori vorkäme, die Wahrheit, oder Übereinstimmung derselben mit dem Objekte, in concreto, d.i.ihre Wirklichkeitzeigen, von der alsdenn zu dem Grunde ihrer Möglichkeit auf dem analytischen Wege fortgegangen werden könnte. Dies erleichtert das Geschäfte sehr, in welchem die allgemeine Betrachtungen nicht allein auf Facta angewandt werden, sondern sogar von ihnen ausgehen, anstatt daß sie in synthetischem Verfahren gänzlich in abstracto aus Begriffen abgeleitet werden müssen.
Um aber von diesen wirklichen und zugleich gegründeten reinen Erkenntnissen a priori zu einer möglichen, die wir suchen, nämlich einer Metaphysik, als Wissenschaft, aufzusteigen, haben wir nötig, das, was sie veranlaßt, und als bloß natürlich gegebene, obgleich wegen ihrer Wahrheit nicht unverdächtige, Erkenntnis a priori jener zum Grunde liegt, deren Bearbeitung ohne alle kritische Untersuchung ihrer Möglichkeit gewöhnlicher maßen schon Metaphysik genannt wird, mit einem Worte die Naturanlage zu einer solchen Wissenschaft unter unserer Hauptfrage mit zu begreifen, und so wird die transzendentale Hauptfrage in vier andere Fragen zerteilt nach und nach beantwortet werden.
1)Wie ist reine Mathematik möglich?
2)Wie ist reine Naturwissenschaft möglich?
3)Wie ist Metaphysik überhaupt möglich?
4)Wie ist Metaphysik als Wissenschaft möglich?
Man siehet, daß, wenn gleich die Auflösung dieser Aufgaben hauptsächlich den wesentlichen Inhalt der Kritik darstellen soll, sie dennoch auch etwas Eigentümliches habe, welches auch vor sich allein der Aufmerksamkeit würdig ist, nämlich zu gegebenen Wissenschaften die Quellen in der Vernunft selbst zu suchen, um dadurch dieser ihr Vermögen, etwas a priori zu erkennen, vermittelst der Tat selbst zu erforschen und auszumessen; wodurch denn diese Wissenschaften selbst, wenn gleich nicht in Ansehung ihres Inhalts, doch, was ihren richtigen Gebrauch betrifft, gewinnen, und, indem sie einer höheren Frage, wegen ihres gemeinschaftlichen Ursprungs, Licht verschaffen, zugleich Anlaß geben, ihre eigene Natur besser aufzuklären.
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Der transzendentalen Hauptfrage erster Teil.
Wie ist reine Mathematik möglich?
But, in order to rise from these actual and at the same time well-grounded pure cognitions a priori to such a possible cognition of the same as we are seeking, viz., to metaphysics as a science, we must comprehend that which occasions it, I mean the mere natural, though in spite of its truth not unsuspected, cognition a priori which lies at the bottom of that science, the elaboration of which without any critical investigation of its possibility is commonly called metaphysics. In a word, we must comprehend the natural conditions of such a science as a part of our inquiry, and thus the transcendental problem will be gradually answered by a division into four questions:
1. How is pure mathematics possible? 2. How is pure natural science possible? 3. How is metaphysics in general possible? 4. How is metaphysics as a science possible?
It may be seen that the solution of these problems, though chiefly designed to exhibit the essential matter of the Critique, has yet something peculiar, which for itself alone deserves attention. This is the search for the sources of given sciences in reason itself, so that its faculty of knowing something a priori may by its own deeds be investigated and measured. By this procedure these sciences gain, if not with regard to their contents, yet as to their proper use, and while they throw light on the higher question concerning their common origin, they give, at the same time, an occasion better to explain their own nature.
Page 5 of 27 · Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, Immanuel Kant , tr. Paul Carus · Project Gutenberg